26 Cal. 615 | Cal. | 1864
The plaintiffs being in possession of certain real property described in the complaint, brought an action as authorized by the two hundred and fifty-fourth section of the Practice Act, against the defendants as persons claiming some estate or interest therein adverse to the plaintiffs, for the purpose of determining such adverse claim, estate or interest.
The premises in controversy are situated in San Mateo
The answer of the defendants admits that at the time the action was commenced, and when the answer was filed, the plaintiffs were in possession of the premises, and interposes as an equitable defense and as ground for affirmative relief the following facts:
First—That the plaintiffs’ title is founded on a Mexican grant, confirmed by a decree of the Supreme Court, and that the same has been surveyed and patented.
Second—That the decree of confirmation does not embrace the land in controversy, but that by a mistake of the Surveyor-General and the Commissioner of the General Land Office an erroneous survey was made, which improperly includes the disputed premises, in violation of the decree of confirmation, and that the patent follows the erroneous survey, including the premises therein.
Third—That the defendants are the true owners of the same lands, under a grant from the Mexican Government to Juan Coppinger, which grant has been finally confirmed by metes and bounds embracing such lands. In conclusion the defendants pray that their titles may be adjudged to be superior to that of plaintiffs, and that the plaintiffs be decreed to release the legal title which they acquired under their erroneous survey and patent.
The plaintiffs by replication controvert the material allegations of the affirmative matter contained in the answer, besides pleading affirmatively matters in bar and estoppel to the facts on which the defendants rely for a judgment and decree in their favor.
When the cause came on for trial the parties stipulated as to certain facts, upon which and the pleadings the plaintiffs moved for judgment. The Court granted this motion, and rendered judgment for plaintiffs against the defendants in
The defendants maintain that they are in equity the owners of the lands in controversy, and that at most the plaintiffs are but the trustees of the defendants, holding for their use the legal title of the premises, and they insist that the pleadings, stipulation and proofs in the case authorized and required a judgment and decree in their favor as prayed for in their answer, which was in the nature of a cross bill in equity.
In order to avoid prolixity we shall in the course of this opinion refer only to such facts appearing in the record as may be necessary to a clear understanding of the case as connected with the legal questions to be determined.
In 1835 there was granted by the Mexican Government to José Ramon Arguello, Luis Arguello, Maria Concepcion Arguello and Maria Josefa Arguello, children of Luis Arguello, then deceased, a tract of land called “ Las Pulgas,” situate within the present County of San Mateo, the boundaries of which were specified in the grant in the following words: “ On the south the Creek of San Francisquito, on the north that of San Mateo, on the east the estuaries, and on the west the Cañada de Raimundo.” In a subsequent part of the grant are the words: “ The tract of which mention is made is of four leagues of latitude and one of longitude.” The grant contains no reservation of any excess of four square leagues that might be within the locative calls of the description, to the nation for its uses, as was generally the case when it was "intended to grant a particular quantity of land lying within limits of larger extent. In due time after the organization of the Board of Commissioners appointed under the Act of the Congress of the United States, passed in March, 1851, entitled “An Act to ascertain and settle the private land claims in the State of California,” the claimants of the Las Pulgas presented their petition to the Board for the confirmation of their alleged title thereto. The Board confirmed the claim, describing the land substantially as in the grant, and adding the words, “ said land being of the extent of four
It should be observed here that the confirmees, in their petition, presented to the Board of Land Commissioners asking for the confirmation of Las Pulgas, claimed that the tract of land granted contained twelve square leagues, including the valley called the Cañada de Raimundo; and hence that part of the decree declaring that “ as to the portion of the premises described in said petition which is not included within the boundaries above mentioned, the claim of the petitioners is adjudged not to be valid,” is to be understood as applying to the portion of the tract of land described in the petition lying without the boundaries specified by the decree.
After the final confirmation the land was surveyed by the
The defendants' claim the western portion of the lands embraced in the Las Pulgas patent, under a grant made in August, 1840, by the Mexican Government to Juan Coppinger, of the place known as the “Canada de Raimundo,” adjoining to and west of the Las Pulgas. The record shows that in July, 1839, Coppinger by petition addressed to the Prefect of the First District, sought to obtain a grant of a certain tract of land which he represented as “a small valley which lies in the Sierra in the same place where there now is a small timber cutting establishment, which ¡olace is about two and one half leagues in length and about three quarters of a league in breadth at the utmost; said valley borders on the Rancho of Donna Soledad Ortega and that of Maximo Martinez, and also on the Sierra, at the extremity,- as it appears from the accompanying sketch.” The grant which was afterwards made to Coppinger described the Cañada de Raimundo as “ bordering on the west by the Sierra Morena; on the east by the Rancho de las Pulgas; on the south by that of Señor Maximo Martinez, and on the north with the lagoon.” This grant had annexed to it certain conditions or specifications, one of which was, that “ when the property shall have been confirmed to him he shall solicit the proper magistrate to give him judicial possession thereof.” Another was, that “ the land of which donation is made is that between the boundaries shown by the .sketch he has presented. The Judge who shall give possession of it shall have it measured according to ordinance, specifying the amount of sitios it contains.” There is no provision in this grant reserving any surplus to the nation for its uses.
. The land in controversy is bounded on the south by the San Francisquito Creek; on the west by the line forming the western boundary of the Las Pulgas as described in the patent ; on the north by the San Mateo Creek, and on the east by a line running from the San Mateo Creek to the San Francisquito Creek, at a distance of one league westward from the estuaries of the Bay of San Francisco. The defendants maintain that the Las Pulgas patent, to the extent that it embraces the land here described, was not authorized by the. original grant nor by the final confirmation of it by the Supreme Court, and also that the same land is embraced in the tract granted to Juan Coppinger and in the decree of confirmation to his heirs; and that the survey and patent including this land was the result of a mistake on the part of the Government Sur-'
The defendants claim that they come within the category of persons denominated third persons in the fifteenth section of the Act of Congress of 1851, and that the interest which they have under the original grant to Coppinger is of a quality that stands unaffected by the survey and patent of the Las Pulgas, and that they may impeach this patent by their answer and the proofs existing in' the case, in so far as it embraces the land in dispute.
The section of the Act here referred to reads as follows: “ And be it further enacted, That the final decrees rendered by the said Commissioners or by the District or Supreme Court of the United States, or any patent to be issued under this Act, shall be conclusive between the United States and the said claimants only, and shall not affect the interests of third persons.”
The first case passed upon by the Supreme Court of this State involving a construction of the section of the Act of Congress quoted and determining the character of persons and the interests that remained unaffected by a confirmation or patent, was the case of Waterman v. Smith, 13 Cal. 373.
In that case, which was an action of ejectment, Waterman claimed to recover upon a Mexican grant made to Francisco Solano, which had ripened into a .perfect title by final confirmation and an approved survey and patent. Smith, the defendant, interposed as a defense the. grant made by. the Mexican Government to José Francisco Armijo, under which he derived his supposed right to the .premises demanded, and which he relied on as the paramount title. The grants made to Solano and Armijo respectively embraced within their general boundaries more land than the quantity designated as granted, and overlapped each other, including in each the land in dispute ; and both grants were regarded by the Court as inchoate and imperfect. The Court, in speaking of the effect of the patent
In Minturn v. Brower, 24 Cal. 644, this Court, after citing the fifteenth section of the Act of 1851, say: “ If such only can be the effect of decrees and patents, and the interests of third persons are not to be affected thereby, then who are these third persons and what is the character of the interests that stand unaffected ? Third persons must be regarded to be all persons who were not parties to the proceeding before the Land Commission, or standing in such relation with those who were parties thereto as to become affected and bound as privies; and the interests of third persons that remained unaffected by the final confirmation and patent are those subsisting in perfect titles derived from a source of paramount proprietorship, which could be used in resisting successfully any action of the Government respecting them.”
These cases must be regarded as having settled the construction, so far as the Courts of this State are concerned, to be
It does not appear that the land granted to Coppinger was ever measured by the proper officer, as required by one of the conditions of the grant, nor that judicial possession of it was given to the grantee; hence it did not become definitively complete and valid under the former Government. (Greer v. Mezes, 24 How. 274; United States v. Reading, 18 How. 7, 8; Leese v. Clark, 18 Cal. 574; Rodriguez v. Comstock, 24 Cal. 87, 88.)
The only interest which Coppinger had in the land mentioned in the grant at the time California was ceded to the United States was what is denominated an inchoate or imperfect title, as contradistinguished from a perfect title. Before then the legal title to the land was in the Mexican nation, and upon the cession of the country the same passed to the United States, charged with the equitable interest of Coppinger therein, which the Government of the United States was in good faith bound to protect on such just terms as the Congress of the nation might devise and prescribe. The protection promised by the treaty of Guadalupe Hidalgo, and which without an express stipulation, it would have been the duty of the Government to afford, it was the design of the Act of Congress to effectuate, by providing the mode and means' for the confirmation of such inchoate titles to lands as were equitable and just, and for investing those entitled to the same with indefeasible titles thereto. But to secure the speedy settlement of such land claims, the Act required their presentation within a specified period to the tribunal established for the purpose, providing that if they were not so presented such
The Coppinger claim was one requiring confirmation and segregation to render it a perfect title. The right to determine its validity and give it a precise location belonged to the former Government until the country wras transferred to the United States. With that event the right passed to the new Government, and has been exercised in discharge of its obligation to the heirs of, and successors in interest to, the original grantee. If we may, after having ascertained the nature and quality of the interest of Coppinger, look into the espedientes of the Las Pulgas and the Cañada de Raimundo, and the evidence properly connected therewith, in order to discover the intention of the granting authority as to the quantity of land to be granted in each case, then what land was granted or intended to be granted to the respective grantees ?
In his petition to the Prefect, Coppinger represented the land which he desired to obtain, as a small valley lying in the sierra, where there was a timber cutting establishment, and that such valley was at the utmost in extent about two and a half leagues long and three quarters of a league broad, and that . it bordered on the rancho of Donna Soledad Ortega and that of Maximo Martinez, and also on the sierra at the extremity, as appeared from a map or sketch which was submitted with his petition. The grant made to him described the property as “the place known as ‘Cañada de Raimundo,’ bordering on the west by the Sierra Morena; on the east by the Rancho de las Pulgas; on the south by that of Señor Maximo Marti
As to the absence in the grant of a reservation of any surplus, as was used in grants of a designated quantity to be selected and set apart by the Government authority to the grantee wre are of opinion that this circumstance in no just view aids the defendants’ construction of the effect of the grant. The petition had represented the valley of less area than two square leagues, and acting upon it and the report of the Prefect the Governor issued the grant to Coppinger for the place known as the “ Canada de Raimundo,” providing that the Judge who should give him the possession of it should have it measured according to ordinance, and should specify the quantity of sitios or square leagues contained in it. It is to be presumed that no reservation of any surplus was made, because the Governor was aware, from “ having previously taken the necessary steps and investigations on the subject,”
It is maintained that the survey and patent on which the plaintiffs rely are not authorized by the confirmation in the Las Pulgas case; that the survey was made and approved under a misapprehension as to the effect of the decree of confirmation, and that the patent following the same is involved in the consequences of the mistake which was the result of such misapprehension.
In the original grant made to the Arguellos the western limit of the Las Pulgas (which is the disputed boundary in this case) was the Cañada de Raimundo. The four sides of the tract were defined with particularity by natural objects, and no surplus lands remained to be reserved. The manifest intent, as appears upon the face of the titulo, was to grant to the children of Luis Arguello, deceased, the land described. The confirmation of the grant by the Government of the United States described the land by the same natural objects as those contained in the original concession, but defined with more precision its western boundary as at the eastern borders of the valley known as the Cañada de Raimundo. The words in the final decree following the description by boundaries—“ said land being of the extent of four leagues in length and one in breadth, be the same more or less,”—is not a limitation of the quantity confirmed. If it had been intended to limit the quantity to four square leagues of land—in length four leagues and in breadth one—lying adjoining the estuaries, it is to be presumed the Court would have so declared in express terms; but, as if doubtful as to its extent, and to guard against a constructive limitation as to quantity, the words “be the same more or less” seem to have been employed.
The rule is well settled that where land is described in a
Admitting this construction of the language of the description contained in the original grant of the Las Pulgas and in the decree of confirmation to be correct, the defendants claim that the valley of the Canada de Raimundo, by fair construction, comprehends the slope of the hills forming its eastern boundary, and that as the western limit of the Las Pulgas was declared to be the Cañada de Raimundo, the line between the two ranchos was at the top of these hills. Whatever force there might be in this position of the defendants, if the eastern line of the Cañada de Raimundo were not already established by Government authority, is overcome in the present state of things, by the fact that the Government, in a proceeding to which the defendants or those under whom - they claim, were parties, has determined the eastern boundary of the Cañada de Raimundo to be at the base of the hills on the eastern border of the valley. It does not appear that any objection was made to the Government survey fixing this boundary so as to make it coincide with the western boundary line of the Las Pulgas, as surveyed and patented. If they did so object at the proper time and before the proper authority, their objections did not prevail. The survey of the Cañada de Raimundo was approved and confirmed on the part of the Government, as appears by the patent issued, and this must be regarded as conclusive upon the defendants who were parties or privies to the proceeding, and became bound by this action of the Government.
The views which we entertain and have herein expressed,
Judgment affirmed.