Dayton v. JordanDayton v. Jordan
This case arises from the same quiet title action underlying our opinion in Dayton v. Jordan,
Our resolution of this appeal turns solely on an issue of law. However, for context, we begin with an overview of the underlying dispute, which we take from our opinion in Dayton I:
“Plaintiffs and defendants operate competing all-terrain vehicle (ATV) rental businesses on adjoining parcels near the Oregon Dunes National Recreation Area. Plaintiffs’ parcel is immediately north of defendants’ parcel; the southern boundary of plaintiffs’ parcel is the northern boundary of defendants’ parcel. A road — the point of conflict in this appeal — runs east to west through plaintiffs’ parcel along that boundary. That disputed road connects with Highway 101 to the east and the dunes to the west; it provides the only direct access from еither parcel to the dunes.”
“Previously, both parcels — and the disputed road— were part of a larger, undivided parcel owned by Pacific Coast Recreation RV, Inc. (Pacific Coast).” Id. Over time, Pacific Coast made various partitions of its property, including a partition in 1999, which created Tax Lot (TL) 606, which is now defendants’ parcel. Id. at 740. Pacific Coast conveyed that property to defendants’ predecessor, Endicott, in 2004. Id. “At thе time that Pacific Coast sold TL 606 to Endicott in 2004, plaintiffs’ parcel had not yet been created, and Pacific Coast still owned both the disputed road and the property to the north of TL 606.” Id. at 740-41. Subsequently, defendants acquired their parcel from Endicott, and Pacific Coast partitioned what is now plaintiffs’ parcel and conveyed it to plaintiffs. Id.
“This litigation arose out of the parties’ competing interests in using the disputed road for their respective ATV rental businesses. Plaintiffs filed a complaint seeking to quiet title as to any adverse claims by defendants and to enjoin defendants from using the disputed road. Defendants’ answer raised two counterclaims, each seeking a declaration recognizing an easement for their benefit over the road. Defendants’first counterclaim, the subject of [Dayton 7], alleged that the easement over the disputed road was ‘implied from reference to’ the 1999 plat. Their second counterclaim, the subject of the appeal in [this case], alleged that the easement over the disputed road was ‘implied from prior use.’”
Id. at 741.
The trial court granted summary judgment for defendants on their first counterclaim, because it concluded that defendants had established an easement “implied from reference to a plat” in the disputed road. Id. at 742-43. Plaintiffs appealed that judgment and assigned error to the trial court’s summary judgment ruling. See id. at 743.
While the Dayton I аppeal was pending, the parties proceeded to trial on the remaining issues in this litigation, including defendants’ second counterclaim alleging an “easement implied from prior use.” Defendants presented evidence in various forms supporting that counterclaim and argued that the trial court was required to look at a number of factors to determine whether they had established an implied easement.
The trial court accepted plaintiffs’ argument and concluded that the absence of evidence regarding the prior use of defendants’ property foreclosed their second сounterclaim. As the trial judge explained:
“I didn’t find that there is any evidence to show the *** prior use of the easement for the [defendants’ property]. * * * [T]he evidence shows to me * * * that the manner in which * ⅜ * [defendants’ property] was used * * *, at any time [that] it was used other than just sitting there, was for the mining of the sand and not for the use * * * that would require the use of the easement. * * * So, I * * * grant [plaintiffs’] motion for * * * dismissal on the second counterclaim.”
Accordingly, the trial сourt entered a limited judgment dismissing defendants’ second counterclaim with prejudice. Defendants now appeal that limited judgment and assign error to the trial court’s ruling.
We review the trial court’s legal conclusion — that defendants could not establish an implied easement without proving how their property had been used before the 2004 conveyance — for errors of law. Case v. Burton,
The trial court properly acknowledged that an implied easement may arise when a property owner severs a piece of
As we explained in Dayton I, the Supreme Court considers eight factors “important” in determining the existence of an implied easement.
Although prior use is prominent among those “important” considerations, id. at 118-19, evidence of prior use “cannot of itself establish an easement,” id. at 120. Evidence of prior use may, however, strongly support an implied easement claim, because prior use consistent with a claim provides a firm basis from which to infer intent. In that regard, the characterization of some easements as being “implied from prior use” does not connote a unique category of implied easements; rather, that characterization recognizes that, in some cases, prior use is the most compelling evidence that the parties intended to create an easement. See, e.g., Garrett,
Despite that obligation, the trial court in this case mistakenly focused on the parties’ evidence of prior use to the exclusion of other available evidence of intent. As noted above,
On appeal, the parties express somе disagreement as to what standard the trial court applied in evaluating plaintiffs’ ORCP 54 B(2) motion. Under that rule, a court may grant a motion for judgment of dismissal “on either of two grounds: (1) The [claimant] has failed to present a prima facie case (the ‘directed verdict’ standard); or (2) even if the [claimant] has presented a prima facie case, the court, as trier of fact, is unpersuaded by the [claimant’s] evidence.” Venture Properties, Inc. v. Parker,
Despite our review of the record, we are unable to dеtermine which approach the trial court adopted.
First, to the extent that the trial court applied the directed verdict standard, the court evidently believed that defendants were required to produce at least some evidence of the seventh or eighth Cheney factors. The court explained: “I didn’t find that there is any evidence to show the * * * prior use of the easement for the [benefit of defendants’ parcel].” The court further explained that it had not seen any evidence that defendants’ parcel had been used in any way “that would require the use of the easement.” As a result, the court concluded that defendants’ evidence was insufficient to support the second counterclaim as a matter of law.
By resting that decision solely on the absence of evidence regarding one or two of the Cheney factors — specifically, the lack of proof that the use of defendants’ parcel included or necessitated the use of the claimed easement — the trial court erred. As we have explained, in evaluating implied easement claims, no one factor has controlling effect; if a claimant produces other relevant evidеnce in support of an implied easement claim, the court must consider it.
Similarly, the trial court erred even if it evaluated defendants’ claim on its merits and concluded that the evidence was not sufficiently persuasive to satisfy the applicable clear and convincing standard. The record reflects the court’s understanding that that standard applied, generally, but the record is unclear as to whether, in fact, the court applied it. We can infer from the court’s ultimate ruling, however, that if the court did apply that standard, it concluded that defendants’ evidence of an implied easement claim was not clear and convincing specifically because it did not include evidenсe of prior use. In other words, even though the record included other evidence in support of defendants’ claim — including those items listed above — the court evidently disregarded that evidence and gave controlling effect to the prior use factor.
Furthermore, we are not persuaded by plaintiffs’ alternative argument that the trial court appropriately considered only the prior use theory that defendants specifically alleged in their second counterclaim, rather than some broader implied easement theory that they did not allege. As plaintiffs frame that argument, defendants “chose to rely on ‘prior use,’ so they have to prove ‘prior use.’” For support, plaintiffs cite Fischer v. Walker, where we upheld the denial, in summary judgment proceedings, of the plaintiffs implied easement claim, because the plaintiff had “failed to plead facts necessary for relief on such a theory.”
In Fischer, the plaintiff had alleged an express, rather than implied, easement. Id. at 593. As part of that claim, the complaint alleged that a private roadway had historically crossed the defendant’s property and that the plaintiff had used that roadway to access her own property after acquiring it. Id. at 598. In concluding that the complaint failed to allege sufficient facts to support an implied easement claim, we noted that the plaintiff had not alleged facts related to certain Cheney factors, including necessity and the extent to which prior use was apparent to the claimant at the time that she acquired the property. Id. at 599. Further, we reasoned that, even though the plaintiff had introduced evidence of those factors during the summary judgment proceeding, neither the trial court nor the Court of Appeals was required to treat the complaint as having been implicitly amеnded to conform to the evidence presented. See id. (citing Weihl v. Asbestos Corporation, Ltd,
Here, in contrast, when the trial court ruled on plaintiffs’ motion for judgment of dismissal, the court’s assessment was not constrained by defendants’ pleading. Rather, the court was required to consider whether the evidence that it had received supported the claim that the parties had litigated. See ORCP 23 B (“When issues not raised by the pleadings are tried by express or implied consent of the parties, they shall be treated in all respects as if they had been raised in the pleadings.”); Whinston v. Kaiser Foundation Hospital,
In sum, evidence of prior use is highly relevant, but not essential, to an implied easement claim. The trial court erroneously concluded otherwise. As a result, the trial court erred in granting plaintiffs’ motion for judgment of dismissal on that ground.
Vacated and remanded.
Notes
We identify some specific aspects of that evidence later in this opinion. See
ORCP 54 B(2) provides:
“After the plaintiff in an action tried by the court without a jury has completed the presentation of plaintiffs evidence, the defendant, without waiving the right to offer evidence in the event the motion is not granted, may move for a judgment of dismissal on the ground that upon the facts and the law the plaintiff has shown no right to relief. The court as trier of the facts may then determine them and render judgment of dismissal against the plaintiff or may decline to render any judgment until the close of all the evidence. If the court renders judgment of dismissal with prejudice against the plaintiff, the court shall make findings as provided in Rule 62.”
In turn, ORCP 54 C clarifies that that rule also applies to a motion for judgment of dismissal of a counterclaim.
Where “prior use” evidence is relevant, it may include evidence of both prior use of the easement itself and prior use of the properties benefitted and burdened by the easement. See Cheney,
Defendants suggest that, to the extent that we conclude that the trial court weighed the evidence and concluded that they had not proved their claim, we should exercise our discretion to review this case de novo on the record. We decline that suggestion.
As noted above, plaintiffs moved for the involuntary dismissal of defendants’ second counterclaim at the close of all evidence. In response, defendants argued that they were required only to make out a prima facie case to avoid dismissal. Plaintiffs, on the other hand, noted that, having reached the end of the trial, the trial court would have to apply the clear and convincing evidence standard of proof at that time, if ever, as no further evidence or arguments were anticipated. The trial court discussed both defendants’ prima facie showing and the clear and convincing standard of proof in its ruling, and then proсeeded to grant what it characterized as plaintiffs’ motion for a directed verdict and dismissal.
As plaintiffs correctly note, the trial court was not required to explicitly address each of the Cheney factors, in determining whether an implied easement existed. Eagles Five, LLC,