3 Conn. Cir. Ct. 249 | Conn. App. Ct. | 1965
The plaintiff, a certified public accountant, brought this action to recover money owed for professional services rendered by him in accordance with an agreement with the defendant. The defendant admitted the employment but denied the method and rate of compensation as claimed by the plaintiff. The trial court rendered a judgment for the plaintiff in the amount of $700 which, as shown by the supplemental finding, was computed at the hourly rate of $10, the court having
The plaintiff in his appeal claims that the court erred in refusing to find certain facts which were admitted or undisputed and arrived at conclusions which were unsupported by the subordinate facts, and, further, that the court applied the wrong rule of damages. Most of the changes sought in the finding would not directly affect the ultimate facts upon which the judgment depends; Beach v. First National Bank, 107 Conn. 1, 4; nor would they, even if made, affect the result which we reach. State v.
The finding, with such changes as are warranted, may be summarized as follows: The plaintiff, a certified public accountant of many years’ experience in the general field of accounting, was engaged by the defendant to render accounting services at hourly rates of $10 for his services and $4.50 for his assistants. Such rates were not unreasonable. The plaintiff engaged in such services intermittently from February 25, 1963, to May 31, 1963. He submitted two bills to the defendant, one dated May 1, 1963, for $890 and the other dated May 31, 1963, for $470. The major portion of the bill for $470 represented time expended in the preparation of tax returns, and the remainder represented two months’ accounting services for March and April, 1963. A reasonable monthly fee for the monthly accounting was $40 per month. The tax returns were prepared from the company’s records and would require approximately three hours to prepare. The defendant employed a full-time bookkeeper who assisted the plaintiff. As a result of differences which arose between the plaintiff and the defendant over the scope of the work, the plaintiff’s services were
The basic issue raised by the plaintiff relates to the manner in which the court arrived at the judgment. The plaintiff claims that the court in its finding assessed damages on a basis of “fair and reasonable compensation” and in its supplemental finding merely substituted for this measure the number of hours it “reasonably should have taken” to perform such services. The phrase “reasonably should have taken,” he argues, indicates the court adhered to the reasonable value rule, whereas it should have determined the precise time actually spent by him in performing such services.
The burden of proof was upon the plaintiff to establish by a fair preponderance of the evidence the substantial allegations of his complaint, among which were the rendition of services alleged, the rate of compensation, and the time required to perform such services. The trial court found that the services were performed and that the rate of compensation was $10 an hour, thus the remaining question relates to the element of time, that is, the reasonable amount of time required to perform such
There is no error.
In this opinion Pkuyn and Levine, Js., concurred.
After the original argument of this ease, and in the course of our consideration of it, the following order was entered:
“ORDER OF APPELLATE DIVISION
“This action was brought to recover for services rendered by the plaintiff, a certified public accountant. The plaintiff in his complaint alleged that an express contractual obligation of payment based on an hourly rate had been agreed to by the parties and such agreement was found by the trial court. The plaintiff has assigned error in the refusal of the court to include in its finding the actual time found to have been spent by him in performing such services. The finding contains no measure of time spent by the plaintiff. The court concluded that the time sheets kept by the plaintiff were inaccurate and did not reflect the actual time spent and that therefore the total sum claimed by the plaintiff was unreasonable. In awarding an amount less than that claimed by the plaintiff the court concluded that 'the sum of $700.00 represents fair and reasonable compensation for services rendered.’
“We are considerably handicapped in our analysis of the basic issue on appeal, that is, whether or not the judgment was based on the rate of compensation which the court found had been agreed on by the parties or on the reasonable value rule and without regard for the contractual obligation. While it is true that the defendant in its special defense alleged that a different method of payment had been agreed on by the parties, the court found the hourly rate controlled. Ordinarily the basis of a defendant’s liability in an action to recover wages under a contract is derived from the contract itself providing the contract includes a measure or standard for compensation. Under such circumstances the plaintiff would*251 be precluded from recovery for the reasonable value of his services as in the case of an implied contract. See Collins v. Lewis, 11 Conn. 299, 304; O’Keefe v. Bassett, 132 Conn. 659, 663; Shelton Yacht & Cabana Club, Inc. v. Suto, 150 Conn. 251, 260. If the agreement contains no standard as to the price to be paid, the law invokes the standard of reasonableness and the fair value of the services rendered. See 12 Am. Jur., Contracts, § 324. In the instant ease, however, the court found the rate of compensation had been agreed on by the parties. We recognize the complexities that confronted the court because of the issues involved in a trial extended over seven days and resulting in a lengthy transcript. However, under the circumstances of this case we have decided to act of our own motion, under the supervisory power inhering in us, to order the filing of a supplemental finding. See Practice Book § 985. Such supplemental finding should be limited to such facts as indicate the measure of damages based on the amount of time spent and which the court finds that the plaintiff has proven.
“It is ordered that the trial court shall file a supplemental finding on or before January 1, 1965, indicating the basis by which it arrived at the amount of its judgment, and that in the meantime this appeal shall be continued on our docket without decision, subject to the right of the parties to assign error in the supplemental finding and, if error is so assigned, to claim the case for argument on the additional error assigned and to file further briefs. Sueh assignment of error, if any, shall be filed not later than fourteen days from the time the supplemental finding is filed, a copy of which shall be forwarded immediately to each of the attorneys of record.”