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Day-Brite Lighting, Inc. v. Missouri
342 U.S. 421
SCOTUS
1952
Check Treatment

*1 DAY-BRITE LIGHTING, INC. v. MISSOURI. Argued No. 317. January 10, 1952. Decided March 1952. Henry C. M. Lamkin argued the for cause appellant. With him' on the brief were William- H. Armstrong and Louis J. Fortner. H. Thomas Cobbs was also of counsel.

John R. Baty, Assistant Attorney General of Missouri, for appellee. With him on the brief was J. E. Taylor, Attorney General. M. Arthur O’Keefe, Assistant Attor- ney General, was also of counsel.

J. Woll, Albert Herbert S. Thatcher and James A. Glenn filed a brief for the- American Federation of Labor, as curiae, amicus supporting app dlee-. Douglas

Mr. delivered the opinion of the Justice Court.

Missouri has a statute, Mo. Stat., Rev. 1949, 129.060, § first enacted in 1897, which was designed to end the co- ercion of employees by employers in the exercise of the franchise. It provides that an employee may him- absent between the four hours employment

self from penalty, without closing opening *2 things wages deducts other among who any employer of a misdemeanor.1 guilty that absence for business doing corporation ais Missouri Appellant general for elec- day was 5, 1946, Louis. November St. A. M. to from 6 being open Missouri, polls the tions was appellant, of employee Grotemeyer, M. 7 P. One M. M. 4:30 P. each A. worked from 8 on a shift that was His rate of for lunch. thirty minutes day, with hours from the sched- He four requested $1.60 an hour. That re- 5, 1946. to vote on November day uled work all other em- Grotemeyer and refused; was but quest 3 P. M. that to leave at his shift were allowed ployees on be- hours vote gave them four consecutive day, which fore the closed. M. in order to vote at 3 P.

Grotemeyer left his work day. paid He was not not return to work that did P. M. 3 P. M. and 4:30 for the hour and a half between penalizing fined for Grote- Appellant guilty was found judgment was of the statute. The meyer violation 299, Supreme Court, Missouri 362 Mo. affirmed shall, “Any any in this state person entitled to vote at election any day election, himself from on the of such be entitled to absent engaged employed, employment he is then or services or in which opening closing period for of the times of four hours between polls; not, absenting himself, and such voter shall because of so any however, employer may penalty; provided, be liable may specify during employee the hours absent himself such Any person any corporation as aforesaid. or who shall refuse to employee privilege hereby conferred, discharge or or shall threaten discharge any employee absenting for for himself from his work purpose any election, employee of or said shall cause to suffer any penalty wages or deduction of of of because the exercise such privilege, shall, directly indirectly, or provisions who or violate the section, guilty misdemeanor, be shall deemed of a and on any exceeding conviction thereof be fined in sum not five hundred dollars.” 886, objection W. 2d over the that the statute violated Due Process and the Equal Protection Clauses

Fourteenth Amendment and the Contract Clause of Art. I, § 10.

The liberty argument pressed on us contract is rem York, iniscent of the philosophy of Lochner v. New S. 45, which invalidated a New York law prescribing maximum hours for work in bakeries; Kansas, Coppage U. S. which struck down a Kansas statute outlaw ing “yellow dog” contracts; Adkins Children’s Hos pital, 261 U. S. 525, which held unconstitutional a federal statuté fixing minimum wage standards women District of Columbia, and others of that vintage. Our recent plain decisions make that we do not a super- sit as legislature to weigh the wisdom legislation nor to de *3 cide whether the it policy expresses offends the public welfare. legislative The power limits, has as Tot States, v. United 319 S. 463, U. holds. But leg the state islatures have constitutional authority to experiment with new techniques; they are entitled to their own stand ard public of the welfare; they may within extremely practices broad limits control in the field, business-labor long specific so as prohibitions constitutional are not vio lated and so long as conflicts with valid and controlling federal laws are That is avoided. essence of the West Coast Hotel Parrish, Co. v. 379; U. S. Nebbia v. New York, 291 S. 502; Nebraska, U. Olsen 236; v. S.U. Lincoln Union Co., v. Northwestern 335 U. S. and 525; Auto. Maloney, Assn. v. 341 U. S. 105. California West Coast Parrish, Hotel Co. v. supra, overruling Adkins v. Children’s Hospital, supra, held constitutional a state law fixing minimum wages for present women. The in contains form a wage minimum requirement. There is a difference in purpose of the legislation.. Here it is not protection of the health and morals of the citizen. Missouri this legislation has sought employ right suffrage by taking of safeguard to leverage use their over power ers the incentive But the police to influence the vote. extends, to a narrow as stated category; is not confined Haskell, 104, 111, to in Noble Bank 219 U. S. State protection right all The great public needs. is basic and suffrage things under our scheme of fundamental.2 only

The semblance of substance the constitutional objection employer law is that the must Missouri’s wages period employee performs for a which the no many regulation services. Of forms of reduce the course enterprise; yet gives net return of the rise to no con- Queenside Saxl, infirmity. stitutional See Hills Co. Maloney, supra. 80; Auto. Assn. v. California regulations necessarily impose Most of business financial no enterprise compensation burdens for which on of our paid. part Those are the costs civilization. conjured Extreme cases are where an is re- up employer for a no quired pay wages period that has relation to legitimate end. Those cases can await decision as they present law no when arise. The has such infirmity. Jt designed any penalty to eliminate exercising suffrage prac- and to remove a tical obstacle to out the getting public vote. The welfare concept. moral, is broad inclusive social, eco- contrary Supreme Decisions of the Missouri Court Appeals Kentucky case have been rendered the Court of *4 Commonwealth, Ky. 632, Illinois R. Co. v. 305 204 W. 2d S. Central 973, Supreme People Chicago, Court of Illinois v. in M. & 486, Co., Zelney Murphy, P. St. R. 306 Ill. 138 N. E. 155. But cf. v. 492, Appellate Supreme 387 Ill. 56 N. E. 2d 754. The Division of the People Co., 141, Court of York App. New in v. Ford Motor 271 Div. 697, Appellate Department Superior 63 N. Y. 2dS. and the of the Schlage Co., Court of App. California in Ballarini Lock v. 100 Cal. 2d 859, 771, 226 P. 2d held in accord with Missouri. For a review legislation field, in this see 47 Col. L. Rev. 135.

425 community is well-being of the nomic, physical - another. The well-being, it; political part one fix burden the financial adequate which is police of the judgment other. The for the adequate one the em- cost voting time out for should legislature It is indeed one. nothing may be debatable ployee But if our recent to be such. opposition conceded re- issues as anything, they mean leave debatable cases to legislative and social affairs spects business, economic, if re- only down this law we decision. could strike We Lochner, Coppage, turned to the philosophy Adkins cases. so as to free

The classification voters deal with employers attempt the domination of group exposed. an evil to which the one has been legislative judg- for that is a matter for need classification (American ment Federation Labor v. American Sash Co., 538), 335 S. and does not amount to a denial of equal protection under the laws.

Affirmed. concurs the result. Frankfurter Mr. Justice Jackson, dissenting. Mr. Justice very not vital case, The constitutional issue if one. Two present application, surely its is debatable resort, only state courts of last ones to consider simi Only lar held it unre legislation, have unconstitutional.1 viewed decisions of intermediate courts2 can be cited support holding. of the Court’s

1 Ky. 632, v. Commonwealth, 204 S. W. Illinois Central R. Co. 973; People Chicago, 486, 2d v. Ill. Co., 138 N. E. M. & St. P. R. 492, 155. Cf. Ill. 56 N. E. 2d 754. Zelney Murphy, 2People 141, 697; App. v. Ford Motor Div. N. Y. 2d Co., App. Ballarini 2d 226 P. Schlage Co., 100 Cal. 2d Lock 771. *5 a union Grotemeyer', under employed one

Appellant for each per $1.60 at hour hourly on an basis contract, absence, demanded a four-hour leave hour worked. He and to campaigning to do pay, day with full on election that his residence was get stipulated out the It is vote. took actually and that it polling place 200 feet from the closed the Appellant him about minutes to vote. five earlier day’s for all one and one-half hours work hours usual, gave statutory than them the four something polls before the For failure to less closed.. than did Grotemeyer for this hour and a half which $3 provide not work and for which his contract did not he paid, employer should be is convicted of crime under the statute set forth in opinion. the Court’s

To mini- analogy sustain statute resort to the wage mum seems unconvincing laws so farfetched and as strength. demonstrate its weakness rather than its Be- may require payment cause a State of a wage minimum for hoürs that are may worked it does not follow that it compel payment for time that is not worked. To over- look a point distinction so fundamental is to confuse the in issue. Court, by speaking though ap- the statute as

plies only to industry, big, sinister and further obscures .principle real involved. The plainly requires farmers, small service enterprises, professional offices, with help, housewives domestic and all other employers, not only to allow their employees vote, time to but to pay them for time to do so. It does not, however, require the employee to any part use of such time for purpose. Such legislation stands a class itself and should not be uncritically commended regulation “prac- as mere business-labor, tices field.” Obtaining a full and free expression qualified from all voters at is so fundamental rep- successful government resentative that a State concerns rightly it- of every self with the removal obstruction to the opportunity freely. go to vote Courts should far to *6 from ob- legislation designed sustain to relieve would stand in the ligations private employers to which way duty of their as citizens.

But there must limit to shift the be some to whole to who voting burden someone else voter to him. happens relationship stand some economic to Getting out the of employers; vote is not the business I indeed, have when em- regarded political as a abuse ployers concerned employees’ themselves with their vot- It ing. is either the own or the State’s voter’s business I question business. do not that incentive this statute will help offers swell to the'vote; require .employees paid be time-and-a-half would swell it still more, double-time would do even better. But does the success of an justify enticement to vote putting its cost on some other citizen?

The discriminatory flagrant. character of this It is obvious that not everybody paid will be for voting and the “rational basis” on which the State has ordered paid some be while others are not eludes If me. there is a need for a subsidy get out the vote, no reason ápparent to me itwhy go should to one who lives feet from his polling place but not to a self-employed farmer who may to lay have down his work and let his equipment idle for several hours while he travels several miles over bad fall roads to do duty his as a If citizen. he has hired man, he must also lose his hand’s time and pay. Perhaps plan some will be forthcoming farmer requiring his iñortgagee to pro- rebate some portion of the interest on the farm if mortgage he will vote; It would principle. not differ in way But no occurs to byme which the doctor can charge patient some of. the lawyer some client for call he could not receive while he was voting.

I suppose a State itself has considerable latitude to offer inducements to voters who do not value their franchise enough to vote on their own time, if even they seem to me corrupting or discriminating ones. Perhaps my difficulty with today’s decision is that I rise above old- cannot fashioned valuation of American citizenship which makes a state-imposed pay-for-voting system appear to be a con- fession of failure of popular representative government.

It undoubtedly is right of every union negotiating with an employer bargain for voting time without loss of pay. It is of any individual equally employee to make that part of his hire. I have no reason doubt that a large number of voters already have voluntary arrangements which make their absence for voting with- *7 out cost. But a constitutional philosophy which sanc- tions intervention by State to fix terms of pay without work may be available tomorrow give constitutional sanction to state-imposed terms of employment less benevolent.

Case Details

Case Name: Day-Brite Lighting, Inc. v. Missouri
Court Name: Supreme Court of the United States
Date Published: Mar 3, 1952
Citation: 342 U.S. 421
Docket Number: 317
Court Abbreviation: SCOTUS
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