125 Mich. 433 | Mich. | 1900
(after stating the facts).
“But, she having shown a chain of title running back for a considerable term of years, if, in that connection, she shows that that title came down through persons in possession of the land claiming as owners, she would in law be presumed to be the owner, and presumed to have a title*442 which came down from the government; and in that connection, in relation to the possession of herself and those from whom she claimed to hold, the possession of part of the land, under a conveyance covering the whole of it,, would be presumed to be a possession of the whole of' it,, in the absence of anything to the contrary.”
“If you find that originally, and while one of the defendants’ remote grantors was in possession of the upland in dispute, such grantor built his fence along the margin of the river, and that afterwards the waters of St. Mary’s river either receded and left bare land or formed an accretion by washing of the soil up, you are instructed that it would not then be necessary for the successive occupants or grantors of Wheeler constantly to keep this river front fence extended to the waters of the river, because this accretion or bare land, whether actually inclosed or not, belongs to the owner of the shore, whether his title to the shore rests on a deed or on adverse possession for the legal time. Title to the shore carries title to the accretion of newly-formed shore.”
We think this request was sufficiently covered by the charge of the court in regard to accretions.
*443 “The undisputed evidence in this case shows, with, reference to the land in question, that an east fence was built by Mr. Easterday in accordance with a line run by Surveyor Carleton in 1866 or 1867 to ascertain the boundary line. If the jury finds that said east fence was acquiesced in by parties on either side having power to bind the land, and that such parties occupied up to said fence as the true boundary for a period of more than 15 years, acquiescence and occupation would have the effect of establishing the fence as the boundary line, and1 said boundary line could not thereafter be changed, except by an agreement in writing.”
We think the oral charge of the court sufficiently covers this ground, in which the court said:
“If the testimony satisfies you that Mr. Easterday had built a fence along the west line of his property, or where he conceived it to be, at a period more than 15 years prior to this conversation [between Mr. Gallagher and Mr. Easterday]; that that fence had been retained and maintained as a boundary line; that both parties had occupied up to it, and held possession up to that boundary line,— any mere oral agreement between Mr. Easterday and Mr. Gallagher after that time, after the expiration of 15 years, would not be binding upon them or their grantees, unless it was acted upon, and the fence then changed. It would come within the statute of frauds, and, even though they had expressly agreed, it would not be binding upon any of the parties.”
It seems to us impossible to hold that a jury, from this and other parts of the charge, would not have understood that the erection of such a fence, and the possession of the land on his side of it for the statutory period,'would convey the title to the defendant by adverse possession. At the time of the conversation between Mr. Easterday and Mr. Gallagher, Easterday was the owner of claim 106, and was in possession, while Gallagher and his wife occupied claim 105 as their homestead; the title thereto being in her.
“If you find that the parties to this contest and their predecessors in ownership have treated and acquiesced in the fence built by Mr. Easterday as the true boundary line for a period of 15 years prior to the commencement of this suit, then it becomes immaterial and unimportant where the actual line of the old original survey may have been. It would be now too late to disturb it, and the plaintiff would not be entitled to recover. The peace of the community requires that all attempts to distui’b lines with which the parties concerned have long been satisfied should not be encouraged, for government surveys are not always accurate, and the evidence of such survey may become indistinct or lost; and if, after a long series of years, old and well-established lines, which have been recognized as true boundaries, were set aside by new surveys, necessarily the mischief arising from such a policy would be incalculable, and titles .to property thrown into vast and endless confusion.”
We think this is sufficiently covered by the oral charge.
Errors are assigned upon the admission of testimony. The most of them refer to the introduction of deeds, leases, and contracts covering claim 106, or portions thereof. We find no error in the admission of testimony which we think of. sufficient importance to j ustify a reversal of the case. If all cases were to be reversed because of an error in admitting or rejecting testimony, the number of reversals would be largely increased. The error in such rulings must relate to some material point, and be such as would naturally tend to mislead or prejudice a jury. We find none such in this case.
Judgment affirmed.