Case Information
*1 FILED United States Court of Appeals Tenth Circuit June 8, 2016 U N I T E D S T A T E S C O U R T O F A P P E A L S Elisabeth A. Shumaker Clerk of Court F O R T H E T E N T H C I R C U I T _________________________________ JAMES R. DAWSON, JR.,
Plaintiff - Appellant,
v. No. 15-1365
(D.C. No. 1:14-CV-01919-MSK-NYW) CYNTHIA COFFMAN, (D. Colo.) Defendant - Appellee.
_________________________________ O R D E R A N D J U D G M E N T [*] _________________________________ Before L U C E R O , M A T H E S O N , and B A C H A R A C H , Circuit Judges.
_________________________________
Mr. James Dawson, Jr. filed a complaint under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, alleging denial of due process and equal protection. The district court dismissed the complaint for failure to state a valid claim, and we affirm. *2 I . T h e T a k i n g o f B l o o d a n d U r i n e S a m p l e s , t h e C o n v i c t i o n , a n d
A m e n d m e n t o f S t a t e L a w
Facing state charges involving violent crimes, Mr. Dawson alleged diminished capacity based on intoxication and a drug-related mental impairment. In light of these allegations, the state trial court ordered law enforcement officers to take blood and urine samples from Mr. Dawson. The samples were collected but not tested.
The jury found Mr. Dawson guilty of second-degree murder, attempted second-degree murder, second-degree assault, and commission of a crime of violence. Mr. Dawson’s blood and urine samples were subsequently lost or destroyed.
Many years later, Colorado amended its laws to authorize judicial remedies when law enforcement officials negligently lose or destroy biological evidence. See Colo. Rev. Stat. § 18-1-414(b). Mr. Dawson learned that his blood and urine samples were no longer available and invoked the new law, but the state courts denied relief on grounds that the new law (1) did not apply when a criminal suspect presents a diminished-capacity defense because the law applies only to a defense of actual innocence and (2) applies only to DNA evidence, not to blood and urine samples collected to test the presence of intoxicants.
I I . M r . D a w s o n ’ s C l a i m s a n d O u r D i s p o s i t i o n
Dissatisfied with the state-court outcome, Mr. Dawson brought the present action, claiming that the limitations on the new law constituted denials of due process and equal protection. [1] With these claims, Mr.
Dawson requested leave to avoid prepayment of the filing fee.
The district court denied relief from the prepayment obligation and dismissed the claims. Mr. Dawson renews his request for leave to proceed without prepayment of the filing fee and appeals the dismissal.
We grant Mr. Dawson relief from the prepayment obligation but affirm the dismissal.
I I I . L e a v e t o A v o i d P r e p a y m e n t o f t h e F i l i n g F e e
Ordinarily, appellants must prepay the filing fee before we will entertain an appeal. Fed. R. App. P. 3(e). An exception exists for *4 indigent litigants. 28 U.S.C. § 1915(a)(1) (2012). This exception applies because Mr. Dawson is indigent, preventing him from prepaying the filing fee. As a result, we grant relief from the prepayment obligation. [2] I V . D i s m i s s a l o f t h e D u e P r o c e s s a n d E q u a l P r o t e c t i o n C l a i m s
The district court concluded that the statutory limitations on relief did not violate Mr. Dawson’s right to due process or equal protection. *5 Accordingly, the district court dismissed the complaint for failure to state a valid claim.
We review this dismissal de novo.
Janke v. Price
,
The district court’s explanation for the dismissal is thorough and persuasive. As the district court explained, Colorado may set rational limits on its newly authorized judicial remedy for the loss or destruction of biological evidence. These statutory limits precluded Mr. Dawson from obtaining a judicial remedy because he did not claim actual innocence in his state-court criminal proceedings, and his blood and urine samples did not involve DNA evidence. As the district court explained, Mr. Dawson’s inability to obtain a judicial remedy did not result in a denial of due process or equal protection. Accordingly, we affirm the dismissal.
Entered for the Court Robert E. Bacharach Circuit Judge
Notes
[*] The parties have not requested oral argument, and it would not materially aid our consideration of the appeal. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2)(C); 10th Cir. R. 34.1(G). Thus, we have decided the appeal based on the briefs. Our order and judgment does not constitute binding precedent except under the doctrines of law of the case, res judicata, and collateral estoppel. Fed. R. App. P. 32.1(a); 10th Cir. R. 32.1(A).
[1] Mr. Dawson also argues that the district court erred by (1) recharacterizing his claims as challenges to the state court judgment, (2) recharacterizing his § 1983 suit as an application for relief under 28 U.S.C. § 2254, and (3) holding that his claims were time barred. The district court did none of these things. The district court ! expressly declined to construe Mr. Dawson’s claims as challenges to the state-court judgment, ! held that § 1983, rather than § 2254, was the proper vehicle for Mr. Dawson’s claims, and ! declined to decide whether the claims were time barred.
[2] As a prisoner, Mr. Dawson is subject to the Prison Litigation
Reform Act. This statute restricts relief from the prepayment obligation
when a prisoner has brought at least three “prior” suits that had been
dismissed based on frivolousness, maliciousness, or failure to state a
valid claim. 28 U.S.C. § 1915(g) (2012).
Before filing this appeal, Mr. Dawson brought two suits that had
been dismissed for frivolousness or failure to state a valid claim. This
appeal involves Mr. Dawson’s third dismissal for frivolousness,
maliciousness, or failure to state a valid claim.
The Supreme Court recently noted the existence of an open question
on whether the appeal of a prisoner’s third dismissal triggers the
statutory restriction on relief from the prepayment obligation.
Coleman
v. Tollefson
, __ U.S. __,