Dаvita, Inc. and Renal Treatment Centers Midatlantic, Inc. (RTC), tenants occupying a commercial property used as a dialysis facility, appeal the trial court’s grant of a writ of possession to Aida Othman, the landowner. Appellants contend that the trial court erred in refusing to transfer the dispossessory action to the superior court and in granting the writ of possession. We agree with the trial court’s rulings and therefore affirm.
The record shows that in August 1993, Renal Treatmеnt Centers-Georgia, Inc. and Aida Othman entered into a ten-year lease agreement for premises located in the city of Macon. At some point, the tenant assigned its rights in the lease to a successor entity, RTC, but representеd itself as Davita, Inc. The lease was due to expire by its terms on August 23, 2003.
*94 In January 2003, Othman met with a representative of Davita concerning other property in Fort Valley, Georgia. During this meeting, Othman also told the representative that the lеase on the Macon property would be expiring in August. She heard nothing from Davita, however, and on July 5, 2003, she sent a letter to the regional director of Davita with a copy to Davita’s representative, proposing a five- or three-year lease for the Macon property. The letter further stated, “If three years are not acceptable to you, then you may consider this letter as a notice to vacate the premises at the end of the current lease term, August 23, 2003,” and requested a response within seven days. Again, no response was received.
On August 22, 2003, Othman’s attorney sent a letter to Davita noting that the lease would expire on the following day, and proposing a new 30-day lease with enumerated conditions, “solely in order to facilitate a smooth transition for the patients’ benefit.” Davita did not respond through its in-house counsel until September 5, stating that it was “interested in discussing a possible extension to the current lease.” Othman retained counsel to file the dispossessory action, and that counsel informed Davita on September 19 that Othman had instructed him to delay filing in order to give Davita additional time to make alternativе arrangements. On November 24, Davita responded through retained counsel that it “will not leave the premises and will not peacefully surrender same to your client. I have been informed that there will be no vacating the premises withоut a court order.” Thereafter, Othman filed this dispossessory action in the State Court of Bibb County.
Davita answered, asserting numerous legal and equitable defenses. RTC was added by consent as defendant, and Othman filed an amended complaint which was answered separately but by the same counsel on behalf of Davita and RTC. On the same day, appellants filed a motion seeking to transfer the dispossessory action, contending that the state court lacked jurisdiction to grant the equitable relief appellants sought and asserting that RTC had filed a separate action in the Bibb County Superior Court against Othman and her husband, a physician, seeking damages and injunctive relief as a result of alleged brеach of the lease agreement, fraud, and tortious interference with contractual relations. 1
The trial court denied appellants’ motion to transfer, reasoning that they had “not sought any of the forms of relief reserved by thе Georgia Constitution for superior courts,” because they were “not *95 seeking affirmative equitable relief but rather have raised an equitable defense which may be heard by this court.” On the same date, the trial court granted a writ of possession to Othman.
1. We first address appellants’ contention that the State Court of Bibb County erred in denying the motion to transfer because it lacked jurisdiction to hear the dispossessory action. Ga. Const, of 1983, Art. VI, Sec. IV, Par. I, provides thаt the superior courts “shall have exclusive jurisdiction ... in equity cases.” The state courts have jurisdiction over all “civil actions without regard to the amount in controversy, except those actions in which exclusive jurisdiction is vested in the superior courts.” OCGA § 15-7-4 (a) (2). Based on this authority, appellants argue that because they sought “affirmative equitable relief’ and “lacked an adequate remedy at law,” the action should have been transferred to the superior court.
Appellants acknowledge in their brief, however, that RTC seeks only “the affirmative equitable relief of being allowed to remain in possession of the premises until such time as adequate alternative premises can bе located and seeks an injunction against Othman preventing her from evicting it at the present time.” OCGA § 44-7-51 (b) provides that a tenant’s answer in a dispossessory proceeding “may contain any legal or equitable defense or counterclaim.” (Emphasis supplied.)
It is fundamental, of course, absent spеcial circumstances, such as insolvency of the landlord, or inadequacy of any legal defense which could be interposed thereto, that equity will not interfere with a dispossessory proceeding to enjoin the same, sincе whatever defenses the tenant may have to such a proceeding may be interposed in the dispossessory proceeding as readily as in a court of equity. [Cits.]
Lee v. Peck,
Appellants argue that the relief they seek constitutes “spеcial circumstances” within the meaning of
Lee,
contending that Othman violated a noncompete agreement contained in the lease and that its patients would be jeopardized. Othman denied these contentions. Appellаnts acknowledge that no Georgia cases support their assertion that extraordinary relief is required here, but they cite a New Mexico decision,
Navajo Academy v. Navajo United Methodist Mission School,
Of course, appellate courts of this state are “not bound by decisions of other states or federal courts except the United States Supreme
Court.”Rodgers v. First Union Nat. Bank,
In fact, while appellants contend they seek “reformation” of the expired lease, they seek in essence merely to remain in possеssion of the premises. Here, as in
Speir v. Davis,
2. Appellants also contend the trial court erred in granting a writ of possession because Othman wrongfully competed with their business and because eviction will work a hardship on their customers. When the trial court sits as the finder of faсt in a dispossessory action, its findings “are analogous to a jury verdict and will not be disturbed if there is any evidence to support them. [Cit.]”
Housing Auth. v. Bigsby,
(a) The record contains evidence supporting the trial court’s findings. The record demonstrates that Othman gave adequate and repeated notice to appellants. Any possible risk to patients was caused by appellants’ delays in responding to Othman’s notice; as the trial court noted, appellants’ witness acknowledged that patients could be moved to other nearby facilities owned by appellants.
*97 (b) Appellants also argue that Othman violated a noncompete covenant in the lease by owning a part interest in another dialysis center. That provision forbade “participation or involvement” in “any entity, trade or business providing ‘dialysis services’ within the restricted area as defined in this agreement” during the term of the lease. But appellants failed to shоw that the center in which Othman held an interest was “providing dialysis services” during the term of the lease, which expired approximately four months before the hearing. Othman contends in her brief that the center did not open until after the leаse expired, and Othman’s counsel stated to the trial court that the center did not treat patients until after the expiration of the lease. As Othman acknowledges, there was no testimony on this point. Counsel for appellants, hоwever, stated in response to questioning by the trial court that the covenant expired with the lease and that appellants’ witness testified only to “post expiration” events. The witness knew of no other violations of the lease by Othman. The trial court’s decision that appellants failed to show misconduct on the part of Othman was therefore in accord with the evidence on the record.
3. Appellee has moved for imposition of frivolous appeal penalties pursuant to Court of Appeals Rule 15 (b). “[T]he law is indisputably clear concerning the issues raised on appeal.”
Hightower v. Kendall Co.,
Judgment affirmed.
Notes
A blank copy of this complaint without case number, file stamp, or summons appears in the record, but appellee does not dispute that the action was filed and remains pending.