186 Ga. 663 | Ga. | 1938
E. W. Woolworth Company seeks to enjoin the sale of its property under an execution for the tax imposed by paragraph 50 of the general tax act of 1935, which reads as follows: '“Electrical Contractors. Upon all electrical contractors, $25.00 for each county. The term ‘electrical contractor5 as used in this paragraph shall be held to mean each person, firm, or corporation who shall engage in installing, repairing, and/or selling electrical wiring or equipment.55 Its resistance to the payment of the tax rests upon its contention that although it operates a retail mercantile business and is engaged in selling a small supply of
We recognize the rule that tax acts, including acts imposing taxes on occupations, are to be strictly construed against the government. Mayor &c. of Savannah v. Hartridge, 8 Ga. 23; Mystyle Hosiery Shops v. Harrison, 171 Ga. 430 (155 S. E. 765). But we must not lose sight of another rule which admonishes us that however
We think that what the legislature intended was that paragraph 50 of the general tax act of 1935 is to be read by using the word
It is further contended that if the act, properly construed, undertakes to impose a tax on the defendant in error, then it is unconstitutional because violative of our requirement as to uniformity (art. 7, sec. 2, par. 1; Code, § 2-5001), requiring that “all taxation shall be uniform upon the same class of subjects.” The argument is that a legislative classification that disregards the clear distinction between contractors and materialmen, as commonly understood, as embraced in our lien statutes, and as defined by repeated decisions of this court, is fairly subject to the criticism that it is unreasonable and arbitrary. In Wright v. Hirsch, 155 Ga. 229 (116 S. E. 795), this court dealt at length with the power of the legislature to make classification of subjects for occupation taxes; and it was said that in doing so the lawmakers might make subclassifications. In Guerry v. Harrison, 178 Ga. 669 (173 S. E. 831), it was said that the General Assembly, in the imposition of occupation taxes, may subdivide into different classes persons engaged in the same business but under different conditions and surroundings. In Singer Mfg. Co. v. Wright, 97 Ga. 114 (25 S. E. 249, 35 L. R. A. 497), it was ruled that the uniformity required by the constitution is not violated so long as a given tax is made uniform upon all individuals belonging to the particular class on which it is imposed. In that ease the contention was that the tax was not uniform, because none was required of retailers of machines who were not manufacturers. It was held that such contention was unsound. There is nothing in the paragraph of the act involved in the instant case which violates the rule against uniformity. It was error to enjoin collection of the tax.
Judgment reversed.