DAVIS, Respondent, v. WASCO INTERMEDIATE EDUCATION DISTRICT, Petitioner.
(CA 9985, SC 25842)
Supreme Court of Oregon
Argued March 7, reversed May 1, 1979
593 P.2d 1152 | 286 Or. 261
Robert D. Durham, of Kulongoski, Heid, Durham & Drummonds, Eugene, argued the cause and filed the brief for respondent.
Before Holman, Presiding Justice, Tongue, Howell, Bryson, Lent and Linde, Justices.**
TONGUE, J.
Linde, J., specially concurring opinion.
**Holman, J., and Bryson, J., did not participate in this decision. (Bryson, J., retired April 1, 1979)
This case involves the review of a determination by the Fair Dismissal Appeals Board that the petitioner school teacher did not retain her permanent teacher status when she changed jobs in connection with the transfer of the special education program in which she worked from her former employer, The Dalles School District No. 12, to her new employer, Wasco Intermediate Education District.1 The Court of Appeals reversed. 36 Or App 3, 583 P2d 1151 (1978). We granted review.
The central issue on review is whether petitioner as a public school teacher was a “public employe” for purposes of
The facts of this case are not in dispute. Bettyjane Davis (hereafter Ms. Davis) was employed by The Dalles School District No. 12 as a “permanent teacher.” As such, she had certain rights under the Fair Dismissal Law,
Ms. Davis taught classes in a “special education” program for children with mental, physical, emotional or learning problems. In 1975 this program was transferred to the Wasco Intermediate Education District (hereafter Wasco IED). Ms. Davis was informed by District No. 12 that its program was being terminated, and she was offered the option of applying for another job with District No. 12 or seeking transfer to Wasco IED. She chose the latter, and Wasco IED thereafter employed Ms. Davis as a probationary
Ms. Davis appealed her nonrenewal to the Fair Dismissal Appeals Board, contending that the provisions of
The FDAB disagreed, holding that a public school teacher was not a “public employe” for purposes of
The Court of Appeals reversed, holding that because it found “no persuasive reason for not following the plain words of
We granted review to determine the question whether a teacher is a “public employe” within the intended meaning of
“(1) No public employe shall be deprived of his employment solely because the duties of his employment have been assumed or acquired by another public employer, whether or not an agreement, annexation or consolidation with his present employer is involved. Notwithstanding any statute, charter, ordinance or resolution, but subject to
ORS 236.610 to236.650 , the public employe shall be transferred to the employment of the public employer who assumed or acquired his duties, without further civil service examination.“(2) As used in subsection (1) of this section, ‘public employe’ means an employe whose salary or wages is paid from public funds * * *.
“*****”
“A public employer who receives a transferred employe under subsection (1) of
ORS 236.610 , including an employe whose transfer is provided for by an agreement underORS 190.010 , shall place that employe on its employe roster, subject to the following:“(1) If the employe was serving a probationary period with his employer at the time of transfer, his past service on probation shall apply on the regular probation requirements of the transferee employer.
******
“(3) The employe shall retain the seniority he accrued under his prior employment, but no regular employe of the transferee employer shall be demoted or laid off by reason of that seniority.
“(4) The employe otherwise shall enjoy the same privileges and be subject to the same regulations as other employes of the transferee employer.”
“A public employer who receives a transferred employe under subsection (1) of
ORS 236.610 shall place that employe in a position comparable to the position he enjoyed under his prior employment, subject to the following:*****”
“(2) If the transferee employer finds that no comparable position exists under subsection (1) of this section, the employe shall be offered a lesser position, if such position is available, according to his qualifications, by the transferee employer. The finding and action of such employer under this subsection, and subsection (3) of this section shall be subject to a hearing upon the employe‘s request and subject to review under
ORS 34.010 to34.100 .“(3) If the transferee employer finds that no position exists, the employe shall be listed as a regular laid-off employe and shall have priority to appointment over other persons eligible for any position for which he is qualified.”
Ms. Davis contends that because both Wasco IED and District No. 12 are public employers, and because at all times her salary was “paid from public funds,” she is clearly a “public employe” for purposes of
It is commonly stated, as a rule of statutory construction, that the words used in a statute are to be given their “plain” or “ordinary” meaning.3 2A Sands, Sutherland Statutory Construction 24, 48, §§ 45.08, 46.01 (4th ed. 1973). This court has also recognized the general rule that a court may not ignore the plain meaning of unambiguous words of a statute. Fox v. Galloway, 174 Or 339, 347, 148 P2d 992 (1944); Lane County v. Heintz Const. Co. et al, 228 Or 152, 157, 364 P2d 627 (1961).
The “plain or ordinary meaning” of the words of
“* * * A statute is passed as a whole and not in parts or sections and is animated by one general purpose and intent. Consequently, each part or section should be construed in connection with every other part or section so as to produce a harmonious whole. Thus it is not proper to confine interpretation to the one section to be construed.”
Accord, City of Portland v. Duntley, 185 Or 365, 380, 203 P2d 640 (1949); Cal-Roof Wholesale v. Tax Com., 242 Or 435, 443, 410 P2d 233 (1966).
In other words, the remainder of the language of
Upon examination of the language of
“That the courts may and frequently do resort to the history of a bill during its passage as an aid to interpretation where language of doubtful import is found in the statute is not open to doubt. * * * As stated in 2 Horack‘s Sutherland Statutory Construction (3d ed) 484, § 5003, this history has generally been the first extrinsic aid to which courts have turned in attempting to construe an ambiguous act.’ * * *” (Citation omitted)
In particular, we find ambiguity in the apparent references in
Second,
In addition, although
The legislative history of the statute sheds light on the intention of the legislature in utilizing such language.
After examining the legislative history, we agree with Wasco IED‘s characterization of its focus as follows:
“In the discussions, particularly those at the hearings of April 2, 1963, in the House Committee on Local Government, it is apparent that the legislators were addressing problems caused by the various civil service laws. They were concerned with (1) Civil Service Law restrictions which would preclude the acquiring government from installing acquired employees anywhere but the ‘bottom of the pile’ and, conversely, (2) civil service restrictions which would inhibit demoting or laying off acquired employees where no comparable position is available after the acquisition.”
Counsel for Ms. Davis has pointed to no discussion whatsoever in the reported legislative history (and we have found none) which indicates that teachers were intended or contemplated to be within the coverage of HB 1474. Wasco IED also notes that no representative from any teacher or education organization appeared at any of the hearings to comment on the bill, and contends that “[i]f this bill were intended to have the impact which this teacher claims for it, it is inconceivable that it could have gone through several hearings in the Oregon House and Senate without some appearance by educational groups.” Although we attach no great weight to the absence of educational groups at the legislative hearings, we do find this fact to be of some interest because we agree with Wasco IED that the bill as construed by Ms. Davis would have had a significant impact on the then-established laws governing teacher employment.
HB 1474 was enacted in 1963. Then, as now, the legislature had provided in
If
“‘Permanent teachers’ includes all teachers who have been regularly appointed and employed by any such school district for not less than three successive school years * * *, and have been re-elected after the completion of the three years for the next succeeding school year.” (Emphasis added)5
This definition reflects the special relationship between the school district and one of its permanent teachers. Consistent with this special relationship, neither the Teachers’ Tenure Law nor the Fair Dismissal Law provides for the retention of permanent teacher status upon transfer from one school district to another.
Second, as noted above,
Finally,
In short, if
There are two more rules of statutory construction that are of particular application in this case. First, as stated by this court in Thompson v. IDS Life Ins. Co., 274 Or 649, 656, 549 P2d 510 (1976):
“* * * [A] specific or special act controls over a general act. This is the rule even if, as here, the general act was enacted later. * * * Absent a plain indication of intent to repeal the special act, the special act will continue to have effect and the general act will be modified by construction so the two can stand together; one as the general law of the state and the other as the law of the particular case or as an exception to the general rule. * * *” (Citations omitted)
See also 2A Sands, Sutherland Statutory Construction, supra, at 315, § 51.05.
Second, whenever possible the court should construe together statutes on the same subject as consistent with and in harmony with each other. Again, as we stated in Thompson, supra, 274 Or at 655:
“Interpreting the Public Accommodations Act as not including insurance would avoid any conflict between the two state agencies otherwise involved
and prevent the possibility of obstruction or interference with the Insurance Commissioner‘s statutory powers and duties under
ORS 746.015 and737.310 by the Labor Commissioner.”
See also 2A Sands, Sutherland Statutory Construction, supra, at 290, § 51.02.
Applying these rules to this case, the specific statutory provisions relating to teachers,
For these reasons we conclude that the phrase “public employe” in
LINDE, J., concurring.
The Court‘s scrutiny of the legislative history of
Propositions such as that a later law generally displaces an earlier inconsistent one, or that when the legislature specifically addresses a narrow problem it probably means the problem to be governed by the specific statute rather than by a different law covering a more general class, or that individual sections of a statute, or related statutes, should be read in the context of the entire statutory scheme, are not themselves law unless enacted as such.1 They are merely the common sense descriptions of the search for the governing legislative rule or policy among the many enactments that, over the years, formulate those rules and policies by express provisions, by implication, or sometimes even by omission. Each of these common sense approaches fits some cases but not others, each has “exceptions” and opposite-and-equal counterparts,2 and each causes more harm than it is worth if it is not cheerfully ignored whenever it is an obstacle to understanding what the legislature enacted.
References to “rules,” “maxims” or “aids” to statutory construction might pass as merely a difference in the style of opinions, which is a personal matter, if it were not for the risk that they will be mistaken by courts and counsel as directives for how to argue and decide statutory questions. Experience shows that
Notes
“‘Permanent teacher’ means any teacher who has been regularly employed by a fair dismissal district for a period of not less than three successive years, * * * and who has been reelected by such district after the completion of such three-year period for the next succeeding school year.” (Emphasis added)
“Rights of teachers in merged districts. Whenever any school district is merged into any other district of the same or a different class, the teachers in the district that loses its identity through such merger shall enjoy the rights of probationary teachers who have completed one year‘s service in the enlarged district.”