*1 NOLAN C. et DAVIS, al., Respondents Plaintiffs and v.
UNION PACIFIC RAILROAD COMPANY, Appellant.
Defendant and ROBERT W. HULL, Appellant, Plaintiff and v.
BURLINGTON NORTHERN RAILROAD corporation,
COMPANY, Respondent. Defendant MICHAEL P. MIESEN, KYLE J. POINTER, and
JOHN T. SAMTER, Respondents, Plaintiffs BURLINGTON NORTHERN RAILROAD corporation,
COMPANY,
Appellant.
Defendant
96-163,
Nos.
96-031 & 96-115.
January
Submitted
1997.
April
Decided
1997.
St.Rep.
See J.S. Constitutional Law 798. *3 C.
See J.S. 798. Constitutional Law
See C.J.S. Constitutional Law (argued); Browning, Kaleczyc, Daniel Hoven Appellants: For J. Helena; R. Berry Hoven; Jayne; Thompson and Thomas & & (for Louis, Mitchell; appellant Missouri Union Pacific Railroad St. (for Hedger; Yerger; Billings appellant Jeff Kroschel and Company); Company); Alexander Blewett ni Burlington Northern Railroad Hoyt Dearden; C. Blewett; & Great Falls and Chas. (argued); Hull). (for Law; Robert W. Attorney appellant Whitefish Morrison, (argued) Larry Jr. and Frank B. M. Respondents: For Whitefish; Morrisons, McCarthy Moore; & and James J. Elison; (for Portland, Shea; Bricker, Querin; Oregon respondents & Zakovics (ar- Samter); al., Pointer, Erik B. Thueson Davis, Miesen, and et Kützman; Lamb; Lamb, John A. Thueson & Micheál F. gued), Carter). (for Nelson and respondents Helena William A. Ross- Elizabeth A. Brennan and For Amici Curiae: (for Whiston; Lawyers Trial bach; & Missoula Montana Rossbach Hattersley Walter; Gough, A. Association); E. and Teri Thomas (for Corpo- Waterman; Pegasus Helena Gold Shanahan, Johnson & Mines, Inc., ration, Hill, Inc., Sunlight Golden Luzenac TVXMineral Mining Company, Phelps Dodge Corpora- America, Inc., Stillwater Corporation). tion, Canyon Resources Opinion delivered the Court. JUSTICE REGNIER Davis, Company v. Railroad et al. Union The cases of Pacific Pacific) Hull, Miesen, Pointer, Samter, Nelson, (hereinafter Union (hereinafter Company Burlington Northern Railroad and Carter Northern) our have been consolidated for consideration are raised in each case. These consolidated similar issues since employers sued their railroad workers who have involve appeals Liability (FELA), Act Employers the Federal injuries under personal (1994). U.S.C. 51-60 §§ Montana’s venue stat- Legislature amended The 1995 Montana *4 (2) 25-2-122, MCA, provides by adding § subsection utes brought against corpora- nonresident for tort suits venues specific 25-2-122, amended case, defendant, relying § on the the In each tions. granted have Some district courts MCA, change ofvenue. moved for others have denied of venue and change motions for defendants’ them, depending upon interpretations their respective amended statute. following appeal: issue is on 25-2-122(2), MCA, providing specific
Does for § venues tort suits brought against corporate defendants, nonresident violate constitu- guarantees equal protection? tional
FACTUAL BACKGROUND Legislature the Montana amended Montana’s venue (2) by adding 25-2-122, statutes subsection MCA, restricting the § plaintiffs bringing against choice of venue for tort suits nonresident corporate defendants. The statute at issue in appeal provides: this corporation
If the defendant incorporated is in a state other than Montana, proper place of trial for a tort action is:
(a) county committed; where the tort was (b) county plaintiff resides; in which the (c) county corporation’s which the agent resident located, required by law, as judicial or in the first district. 25-2-122(2), Section MCA.
Before the enactment of the amendment, 25-2-118, statute, general place controlled the of venue for a tort against defendant, action an out-of-state including corporate defen- 25-2-118, MCA, dant. Section reads: specified
Unless otherwise part: in this (1) except provided place subsection proper trial county for all civil actions is the in which the any defendants or them action; reside the commencement of the
(2) if none of state; reside in the defendants the proper place county plaintiff trial is designates complaint .... Pacific, In the action plaintiffs Union allege that due negligence Pacific, they of Union have exposed been to loud resulting noise in their workplace hearing plaintiffs loss. All reside outside of the state of Montana, and none of the acts or occurrences complaints which form the bases of the occurred in Montana. Defen- Pacific, incorporated Utah, dant Union in the state of operating its railroad business in several Montana counties and has its registered Montana agent County. located Lewis and Clark Each of the FELA claims plaintiffs’ County, were filed in Silver Bow change The defendant filed for a Montana. a motion of venue based Legislature’s on the amendment MCA. This amend- *5 1, plaintiffs effective October 1995. The all filed their ment became County in Silver Bow after that date. The Second Judicial complaints County appropriate Court ruled that Silver Bow was an District of action to be The then filed for their causes filed. defendant venue request hearing. Following and a motion for reconsideration plaintiffs’ right bring Corut reaffirmed the to argument, the District to County, finding in Bow that 1995 amendment the action Silver MCA, 25-2-122, supplemented general provisions more venue § to MCA, to in which file tort 25-2-118, provide additional counties § defendants. against nonresident actions Burlington proce- involve Northern share similar The cases that case, plaintiff to the Union Pacific cases. In the first history dural County, alleged of Flathead where Robert Hull was a resident incorporated in Delaware injury Burlington occurred. Northern for Montana located in Lewis and Clark registered agent and has its County. County 14,1995. August on filed his FELA action in Cascade
Hull change venue under the terms filed motion to Burlington Northern complaint argued MCA. Hull that since his was filed of § 1995, proceed his entitled to case should be prior to October Comity. granted Judicial Court Eighth District Cascade County of venue to Flathead under the terms of change motion for a 25-2-122(2), MCA, holding change in the venue statute was § 25-2-122(2), MCA, Thus, could not substantive. § and procedural to filed the effective date of retroactively complaint before applied amendment. Meisen, Pointer, case, and Samter filed plaintiffs In the second on 1995. County September in Silver Bow their FELA actions County, alleged injury his a resident of Flathead where Meisen was and were not residents Montana Pointer Samter occurred. respectively. they injured in Nebraska and Idaho allege that were venue in each case. The change filed a motion to Burlington Northern change the motion for a District Court denied Judicial Second 25-2-122, provided an alternative grounds § venue on the 25-2-118, On recon- MCA. provisions § general to the more to the venue sideration, held that the amendment District Court retroac- applied and could not be substantive statute affected effective. became filed before the amendment tively to actions Carter filed Larry case, Donnie Nelson plaintiffs In the next County. Nel- in Cascade against Burlington Northern actions FELA County, was also January 26,1991, in Hill injured on was son where he resided at the time. Carter on February 9,1993, was County in Flathead he May where resided. Nelson filed his lawsuit on Carter his filed lawsuit on October 1995. change Northern filed motions venue based on the 1995 amend- 25-2-122, MCA, case, ment to both cases. Nelson’s the railroad argued that the 1995 amendment was retroactive applied case, though Nelson’s even that case had prior been filed 1, 1995, Eighth October effective date. The Judicial District Court granted the railroad’s motions in pursuant both cases 25-2- 122(2), MCA. discussion, Davis, purposes following Hull, Miesen,
For Pointer, *6 Samter, Nelson, Carter, and others will be referred to as “railroad workers.” Union Pacific Company Railroad Northern Company Railroad will be referred as companies.” the “railroad
STANDARD OF REVIEW legislative presumed A enactment is be to constitutional and upheld will on except proven be review when to be unconstitutional beyond a (1994), reasonable doubt. State v. Lilburn 265 Mont. 262, 875 1036, 1039 P.2d (citing City (1991), v. Billings Laedeke 247 of 1349). 151, 154, Mont. P.2d
There governing are limitations a court’s ability to declare a statute unconstitutional. We take of cognizance cau following tions: is duty
[I]t our sacred to measure the Act of the terms our limitations, constitutional interpret as we them. “It must evi- be anyone dent to the power legislative to declare a enactment is judge, void one which the of fallibility conscious of the human judgment, any will shrink from exercising in case where he can conscientiously and with regard duty due and official oath responsibility. decline the legislative judicial The are co-ordi- departments nate the government of equal dignity; each alike is supreme functions, in the exercise of proper its and cannot directly indirectly or acting authority while within the limits its subjected to the supervision control or of the other without an assumption by which, by unwarrantable power that other of Constitution, is upon apportions not conferred it. The Constitution powers of governments but it one of does not make exercising three subordinate departments to another when may it. The enact- legislative trust committed to courts declare and void not cases, ments unconstitutional in some but because judicial power superior degree dignity legislative. Being to declare what the law is in the cases which come required them, they paramount must enforce the Constitution before law, legislative a enactment comes in conflict with it.” whenever State, 76, 84-85, 213 227, 229. Mills v.Dixon 66 Mont. P. ex rel.
Additionally: legislative expressed a course action statutes or
When constitutionality laws is tested for under the State budgetary Constitution, our review is circumscribed certain We principles. provision a broad and liberal give must the state constitutional people adopting with the intent of the it to construction consistent provision a state. The constitutional growing the needs of serve practical interpretation reasonable and in accord should receive a constitutionality legislative The of a enact- with common sense. presumed, every intendment in its favor prima ment is facie unconstitutionality appears beyond its presumed, unless will be constitutionality question whether reasonable doubt. condemn, possible uphold but whether it is possible it is which will not be declared invalid unless it legislative action court, constitution, beyond ofthe judgment conflicts with the doubt. reasonable 443, 445-46, v. 231 Mont. 753 P.2d County State Fallon omitted). (citations Furthermore, every possible presumption 339-40 constitutionality the Act. in favor of the See State indulged must be Stores, 182, 199, Safeway Inc. P.2d Notwithstanding given the deference that must be law, express duty it is the function and Legislature when it enacts *7 equal protec that all Montanans are afforded of this Court to ensure II, 4, of Article the 1972 Montana Consti tion under the law. Section that: tution states being person No be dignity of the human is inviolable. shall
The any of the State nor the laws. Neither equal denied against firm, or institution shall discriminate person, corporation, rights civil or on any political in the exercise of his account person condition, culture, color, sex, origin political social or or or race, of religious ideas. Clause, II, Equal Protection Article principal purpose
The Constitution, persons is to ensure that who 4, the Montana Section arbitrary subject discriminatory to state not are citizens are 304, & Mont. Fish Game Comm’n Godfrey v. State action. 306, 1265, 1267. P.2d
DISCUSSION 25-2-122(2), MCA, providing specific Does § venues for tort suits brought against defendants, nonresident corporate violate constitu- guarantees equal protection? tional The railroad workers contend that the 1995 amendment statute, MCA, 25-2-122(2), II, with venue conflicts Article Section 16, Constitution, stating of the Montana justice “[c]ourts to open every person.” part II, shall be This of Article 16, Section is commonly “open known as the access to the courts” provision. They challenge that, and assert without showing a compelling interest, state the statute a person’s denies funda- right open mental to access to the courts. that,
The
companies
although
railroad
counter
the State Consti-
guarantees
right
tution
courts,
Legislature
access
power
scope
retains the
right.
define
and extent of that
companies contend that the
statute
does
leave the railroad
Montana,
merely
workers without access
the courts of
specifies
but
available venues within the state
system
court
where they may bring
against
corporate
tort lawsuits
nonresident
defendants.
scrutinizing
constitutionality
When
of legislation under
attack,
equal protection
an
this Court
the legislation
reviews
under
recognized
of three
scrutiny.
stringent
one
levels of
The most
stand
ard,
scrutiny,
complained
strict
is used when the action
of infringes
upon
right
the exercise of a fundamental
or
discriminates
class,
suspect
such
or
origin.
as race
national
v. Carey
Gulbrandson
494, 502, 901
573, 579.
scrutiny
272 Mont.
P.2d
Strict
has been
limited to those instances when either a
right
fundamental
has been
infringed
suspect
classification has been established. Strict
scrutiny requires
government
compelling
to show a
state interest
Community
for its action. Butte
Union Lewis
712 P.2d
scrutiny
situations,
Middle-tier
has
used in
been
limited
includ
ing
origin
those
have
where
issue
some
in the Montana
Constitution,
welfare,
such
but are not found
the Declaration of
Rights.
scrutiny
requires
Middle-tier
the state
demonstrate that its
classification reasonable and that its interest
the classification is
right infringed.
that of
greater than
the individual’sinterest in the
Butte
Union,
Community
When the under examination is not determined to scrutiny, fundamental does not warrant middle-tier reviewed *8 242 requires government rational basis test. This test the
under a to show objective legitimate the of the statute was a that bears rational Legislature. to the used the relationship classification Cottrill v. (1987), Sodding 40, Service 229 Mont. 744 P.2d Cottrill 895. analyze strongly urge workers this Court railroad scrutiny, very at to the venue statute under a strict amendment least, They choices, venue argue restricting a middle-tier test. that claimants, FELA limits their access to the courts and especially to 16, II, Section of the Montana Constitution. Alterna violates Article rights tively, proper if this Court concludes that venue are not scrutiny, urge strict the workers that their consti subject matter for rights very “implicated” by are at the least amendment tutional proceed under a middle-tier test. State ex rel. analysis and our should 269, (1986), 1 223 726 P.2d School Dist. No. Mont. 801. Bartmess v. argue that the classification at issue in companies The railroad 25-2-122(2), MCA, neither a fundamental nor a involves so the standard for review the rational suspect appropriate class test. basis R.R. 250 Mont. 819 Northern Ford 2184, 119 648, 112 432 S. Ct. L.Ed.2d aff’d,
P.2d 504 U.S. 25-2- determining test when whether § the rational basis applied we statute, 118, MCA, Equal venue violated Protection another Fourteenth Amendment of United States Constitu Clause of the differently purposes from residents for by treating tion nonresidents present adopt see no reason to different test of venue. We courts, access to the but rather Limiting venue does not affect case. impli does appropriate venues available. Neither specifies application middle-tier test. require which cate discretion, Therefore, may, place in its fix the venue or Legislature not violate long as the statute it enacts does of civil actions so of trial arbitrarily and unreason of the laws and does equal protection person. Fraser v. Smith against particular ably discriminate 273 P.2d test, if this Court must determine Using the rational basis objective bears some iden governmental legitimate there is discriminatory classification. relationship tifiable rational Mont, P.2d at 1267. Godfrey, no rational arbitrary and bears patently classification A equal interest offends governmental relationship legitimate to a held, equal protection previously As have of the laws. we requires all persons the laws treated alike under like circumstances. *9 (1982), 339, v. Tipco Corp., City Billings 346, Inc. 197 Mont. 642 (citations omitted). 1074, instance, this 1078 we must
P.2d the amendment a determine whether venue statute has sufficiently legislative purpose reasonable relation to a proper so as A arbitrary. having not to be deemed classification some reasonable deny equal merely does not it is not basis because made nicety in precise inequality. mathematical or results some with State 456, (1975), Jack 167 Mont. 539 P.2d v. 726. analyzing equal protection
When
claims under the rational basis
test,
creating arbitrary
this Court has struck down laws
classifica-
legitimate
See,
tions without
state
interest as unconstitutional.
e.g.,
McKamey
(1994),
137,
268
(holding
v. State
Mont.
885
515
P.2d
requirement
firefighters
military
that
be members of the
violative of
(1993),
equal protection);
Arneson v. State
262 Mont.
864 P.2d
1245
that statute
(holding
regarding post-retirement
increases in
equal protection);
violated
v.
pension
Ski-Lift,
Brewer
Inc.
(holding
Mont.
light following The example illustrates how classification leads to arbitrary If west traveling results. two Montana residents toward accidents, were car each separate Missoula on 1-90 involved negligence, result of an out-of-state defendant’s both victims would filing suing damages a tort claim and option have the in state individual, may court. If one defendant was an out-of-state the victim any county However, if person sue that in Montana. the other corporation, was an out-of-state the victim’s choice of defendant (1) (2) county residence, his venue would limited to (3) occurred, county county the tort where the where out-of-state (4) agent, County. has its resident Lewis and Clark corporation above, similarly example given vastly plaintiffs In the situated are statute, 25-2-122(2), MCA, options different venue state. on two different One has operates unequally people. classes of victim fifty-six to file a tort opportunity action Montana’s However, the victim’s choice of to a counties. other limited solely counties, corporate of four due to the maximum status defendant. companies argue Legislature acted reason-
The railroad ably distinguishing corporations nonresident as a class from other defendants. The railroads assert that as nonresident nonresident *10 a they registered agent are to have in Mon- corporations, required state, tana, many fees and other taxes to the and pay license many In provide a livelihood to Montanans. contrast corporations nonresident, noncorporate typically have they argue that entities state, thus, they a connection to the can be only transitory the reasonably distinguished from class nonresident defendants a whole. argument persuasive. the Corporations
We do not find this
are not
substantially to
econ-
only nonresidents
that contribute
the Montana
omy.
individuals,
partnerships,
part-
limited
Both nonresident
taxes,
employ Montanans.
It
not
nerships
property,
own
does
pay
to benefit
that the statute was intended
nonresidents because
appear
economy. By
operation,
to
the
contributions
the state
its
of their
of nonresident
corporations.
discriminates
victims
statute
legitimate
objective
to
state
companies have failed
show some
railroad
changes
the
venue statutes in such
Legislature
the statute. When
for
forum,
to
there
among plaintiffs as
their choice of
way as to discriminate
Here,
discriminatory impact.
there is
basis for that
must be a rational
plaintiff injured
that permits
classification
no reasonable basis
any county,
file
while
to be able to
a claim
by a nonresident
individual
injured
been
a nonresident
by
corporation
who have
restricting plaintiffs
in a limited number of counties.
bring
suit
that
does
companies assert
The railroad
choice
by limiting their
of venue.
equal protection
deprive plaintiffs
rely
companies
upon
The railroad
Ford v.
Northern R.R.
In contrast to the classification in this is case based upon form in which the chose do defendants The complaining business. group plaintiffs class is a who were corpo- nonresident rations. How can there be a rational distinguish basis to one class of tort from on legal victims another the basis of the status in Furthermore, tort-feasor chose to do business? cases cited companies railroad focused on the defendants’ to venue which is more limited than the plaintiffs. Under Montana’s venue statutes, plaintiffs the right, limits, have within certain choose venue when an filing action. recognizes
This Court also
there
a commonly
accepted
justification
historical
allowing
railroad
greater
workers
flexibil
ity than other litigants
choosing
when
a forums.
Ford,
See
actions,
In this claims, Court’s of FELA we have followed *11 giving federal law in injured case liberal construction in favor of may railroad workers so that FELA accomplish its humanitarian and Northern, Burlington remedial See purposes. Haug v. Inc. 236 517; Northern, Bevacqua Burlington Mont. 770 P.2d v. Inc. 237, 598 Northern, 1124; P.2d LaBella v. 202, 595 182 of Inc. Mont. P.2d 1184. One area FELA that this liberally objectives Court has construed order to further the of plaintiff’s brought FELA is a selection of forum actions under the “highly persuasive” policy favoring found as the the Act. We have Haug; choice of forum. See LaBella. injured worker’s 25-2-122(2), MCA, we summary, In find unconstitutional § Equal of Montana violates the Protection Clause the because treating There no rational basis for tort victims Constitution. differently injured by corporate nonresident tort-feasors than tort injured by all other nonresident tort-feasors. victims retroactivity light In our there is no need address the ruling, of legislation issues. special or the District Courts proceed-
The above cases are remanded to for ings consistent with our decision.
CHIEF JUSTICE TURNAGE and JUSTICE NELSON concur. specially concurring. TRIEWEILER JUSTICE 25-2-122, MCA, majority’s I the conclusion that concur with § corporate defen- venue in actions nonresident restricts which II, at dants, the Protection Clause found Article Equal violates of the Montana Constitution. Section level disagree majority’s appropriate I with conclusion that scrutiny applied parties in this as it is § case, test. is the rational basis Em- brought pursuant cases railroad workers Federal
In Act, 51-60, injured choice for Liability 45 U.S.C. of venue ployers’ §§ significance, past equated has which in the has been with unique worker II, guaranteed by Section of the Montana courts Article access necessarily right, therefore, Any implicates Constitution. erosion right and, discriminatory done in fashion as was fundamental when 25-2-122(2), MCA, requires scrutiny. our strict done an The nature of railroad worker’s fundamental Act, from the FELA itself. 5 of that choose venue is evident Section 56, provides U.S.C. that: codified in a court chapter may brought this an action be district Under defen- States, in the district of residence of the of the United arose, dant, cause action or in which the commencing such doing be business at time shall defendant under action. of the courts of the United States jurisdiction the courts of shall concurrent with that of chapter this several States. added.)
(Emphasis (6th 1948), 168 New York Central Railroad Co. Akerly Cir. explained Circuit Appeals Sixth the U.S. Court F.2d
247 provision Employers’ that the venue Liability Federal Act was than procedural. more That court concluded that it was a substantive part guaranteed injured of those to pursuant railroad workers to the FELA. Akerly, sought
In
the railroad
to limit the
worker’s choice
advancing “living
of venue as a condition to
expenses”
was
while he
injury.
out of work as a result of a
holding
work-related
that such
void,
provision
contract
was
the Court Appeals pointed
out that
provision
venue
found at 56 was
first enacted in 1910 because
general
provisions
“the
venue
injustices
worked
to employees.” Ak-
erly,
Section 6
important rights
creates new and
in
it
employee and
created corresponding
liabilities
employer.
... In fact
this
creates,
new venue statute
ordinary
within the
meaning of the
word, liability against
employer
districts,
in states and
where
he could not
been
prior
have
sued
to the amendment. The para
graph is
and sweeping,
pointed
broad
and as
out in Duncan v.
Thompson,
1, 62
422, 424, 86
315 U.S.
S.Ct.
575,
L.Ed.
the adoption
present
section in its
“argues persuasively
form
that Con
gress wanted Section 5 to have the full effect that its comprehen
phraseology implies.”
sive
As specifically
case,
held
the cited
5§
applicable
existing
to
causes of action.
We think that
inclusion
this section in
Employers’
Act,
Liability
with its creation of new obligations against
employer, makes the
provision
part
venue
an inherent
employer’s liability.
by
An
to
attempt
limit
contract
an attempt
exempt
liability,
the railroad from
and is void.
Akerly,
The substantial nature of the provided by for the FELA’s provision by venue was acknowledged Supreme the U.S. Court Boyd 263, Grand Trunk Western Railroad Co. 338 U.S. 70 26, S.Ct. L.Ed. 55. has, 1979,
This
acknowledged
any
Court
since
limit
that
effort to
beyond
railroad worker’s choice of
a FELA action
those
pursuant
limitations found at 56 has
implications
constitutional
II,
Burlington Northern,
See
Article
Section 16.
LaBella v.
Inc.
182 Mont.
In State ex rel. Northern Railroad Co. v. District Court holding P.2d we summarized our LaBella as follows: that pointed public policy,
We first
out
this state’s
dictated
II,
Constitution, requires
Article
Section
of our
courts
our
every person,
remedy
open
speedy
“shall be
afforded
every
or
injury
person, property
character.” We noted
citizenship
constitutional
was unrestricted
reference to
qualification
pass
residence and that
such
could not
muster
*13
Privileges
IV,
under the
and
Clause of Article
Section
Immunities
LaBella,
2 of the Unites States Constitution.
State
BN,
injured
case
unique
In State ex rel.
we reaffirmed that
of
workers,
strong
policy
of
favoring
because
the
national
choice
railroad
actions,
bring
which to
FELA
in combination with our
of venue in
every
open
to assure that our courts are
to
obligation
constitutional
of
not be
injured
an
railroad worker’s choice
venue could
person,
doctrine of
non conveniens. We held that:
by
limited
the
forum
II,
requirements
Article
Section 16 Montana’s
The clear
of
of
49-1-204, MCA,
important
and
policy
Constitution and of
the
§
of Act in
supporting a liberal construction
the
favor
reasons
injured
plaintiff’s
simply
and the FELA
choice of forum
worker
im-
denigrated
secondary position
to a
because of the
cannot be
filing
types
the
of
of
pact
theoretical or real —of
these
—whether
the
of local Montana courts. When balanced
cases on
dockets
Constitution,
the
our
our statute and
the mandates of
adopted
and
underpinning
expressed
Act which are
in
policies
decades, applying
three and one-half
spanning
our
cases
own
to FELA actions because of docket over-
non conveniens
forum
opened
That we
door in
sequitur.
non
such a
crowding
simply
long,
open
then allowed it to remain
for so
place
and
first
argument,
of
as it
to our
much to merits
does
speaks not so
infirmity.
its obvious
to concede
simple failure
LaBella,
clearly did in
that a district court
hold, as we
again We
itself
may
a FELA action because
deems
not dismiss
in this state
hold,
in
again
clearly
forum. We
as we
did
to be an inconvenient
Haug Burlington
368, 770
517],
[v.
Northern
P.2d
in
that a district court
this State is not
empowered
change
of
place of trial
a FELA action based on the
of
doctrine
non
forum
conveniens,
variety or,
whether
the common law
arguendo, as
Moreover,
25-2-201,
in
light
codified
MCA.
§
mandates
of
of
II,
Constitution,
49-1-204, MCA,
Article
Section 16 our
and the
policies underpinning
adopted
are
expressed
Act which
thirty
our own cases spanning
years,
not,
more than
we will
henceforth,
reexamine this issue
on
basis of the numbers of
out-of-state FELA cases filed in Montana’s district courts.
Mont,
BN,
ex
State
rel.
Based significance injured on the historical of an railroad worker’s venue, right except by choose limited 45 U.S.C. based on right law, the substantive nature of that pursuant federal case long history on our repeated based own any conclusions that right erosion of that also right diminishes the access Montana’s guaranteed II, courts Article Section of Rights Bill Constitution, Montana’s I injured conclude that an railroad worker’s choice of venue is a right; fundamental right limitation statutory on scrutiny based classifications requires proof strict compelling interest; of a interest, state and that no compelling state any kind, nor interest of this proof has been established eroding case an railroad worker’s to choose the *14 brings in he she which or a FELA claim.
Therefore, majority’s while I concur in conclusion that 25-2- § 122, MCA, Equal violates the of Protection Clause Montana’s Consti- tution, disagree I the process by majority with which the arrived that conclusion. goes
It saying that, without for the reasons set forth this opinion, in I disagree with the in expressed conclusions the dissent. While the interesting exercise, dissent sets forth an academic it is unfounded reality lawyer in unsupported by experience and of who has litigated throughout cases the state of I that Montana. am certain lawyers would, those exception, without believe that choice of venue significant is the litigation most involved in the a of case. significance injured More an important, of railroad worker’s choice of litigation employer venue in his or her is against recognized by eighty-seven years law, of legislation federal and case and more thirty than years precedent. argue, of this Court’s To as the dissent does, anyone that “the law assumes that or all four of the will venues equally a forum where the laws will be administered” provide ignores history reality, legislative but the of 45 U.S.C. only § not of and the federal and state case law which has substance § ignores economically that are 56. It the fact some venues applied § justifiably perceived and impacted the railroad industries injured for the enforcement of unfavorable locations railroad workers’ throughout ignores It the fact that some venues Montana have rights. historically employees hostile to been considered fact, general. Finally, ignores anyone which should be known that come to this Court appeals who has reviewed the hundreds are year, judges equal. all district are Some more every complex unique about the knowledgeable than others features than others to the strict enforce- Some are more committed FELAlaw. by that law. All of these factors were rights guaranteed ment of by Congress injured when railroad workers into consideration taken flexibility statute, greater litigants than other were, by given of their prosecution favorable for the claims. choose the most conclusion, not, never has assumed that some the law does afford options of limited venue will even-handed arbitrary number justice to railroad workers. The dissent’s administration contrary are unfounded in either fact or law. conclusions opinion. joins foregoing concurring JUSTICE HUNT dissenting. LEAPHART, JUSTICE party injured by that since a who
I dissent. The Court holds fifty-six choice of different venues in the has a person nonresident Montana, 25-2-118(2), MCA, an out-of- person injured § state of limited fewer than and whose venue choices are corporation state Thus, being denied of the law. fifty-six equal counties is all 25-2-122(2), MCA, limits venue suits nonresident which to four counties unconstitutional. corporations pro- of the four venues there is evidence that none Unless some just 25-2-122(2), MCA, the law in a will administer vided for handed admini- manner, that there is even we must assume equal state of justice the district courts throughout stration litigant the fact that some other assumption, Montana. Given five, ten fifty-six venues ability to choose between may have the just fair and manner makes the law in a administer will also no difference. 24 S.Ct. 193 U.S. Ry. Co. Snell Street
Cincinnati *15 party which allowed a 604, 607, involved a statute 319, 321, 48 L.Ed.
251 right litigating corporation with a the to the out of change the county corporation kept in which the its principal place of business. railway company challenged the statute for the reason that it did corporate party the the same to change afford venue. The Court characterized the issue follows: although protection equal equally
That of laws administered enjoyed, there has equal has been nevertheless been denial of the purview protection Amendment, the law within the 14th only the state has one person because allowed to seek one forum and has not allowed another asserted to be person, same class, forum, to seek the although persons same as to both the law has afforded a forum in and equal same laws are applicable administered. rejecting
In if A proposition only has access to one forum administered, equally where the law is B fact that access has more one administered, than forum where the law is equally means that A been equal protection laws, has denied of the the court held:
But
rights
fundamental
which the 14th Amendment
safe-
guards, and not
mere
may
forum which a state
proper
see
designate for the
protection
enforcement and
of such rights. Given,
therefore, a condition where
fundamental
are equally pro-
and preserved,
tected
it is
impossible
say
the rights which
protected
preserved
are thus
have been denied because the
state has
to provide
deemed best
for a trial in one forum or another.
not,
view,
It is
under any
the mere tribunal
person
into which a
proceed by
authorized to
a state which determines whether the
equal
the law
been
protection
afforded,
has
but
whether
tribunals which the state
provided equal
prevail.
has
laws
It follows that
the mere direction of the
a cause,
state law that
given circumstances,
under
shall be tried in one forum instead of
another, or may be
when brought
transferred
from one forum to
another, can
tendency
have no
to violate
guaranty
equal
protection of the laws where
both the
equality
law
forums
governs
equality
prevails.
administration
Co.,
36-37,
Ry.
Cincinnati Street
L.Ed. filed an to a venue equal challenge plaintiffs sue private corporation statute which allowed limited county statute, however, an action arose. The suit where *16 the unincorporated county they individuals in which were against statute, the the Court upholding domiciled. In stated: deciding corporation equal In whether is denied the protection the its creator a more extensive of laws when establishes venue private [sic] it than are fixed for have against actions citizens we geometrical equation corporation not a between a to consider injustice whether the does gener- a man but class difference case, in ally, even though particular hard some which is not bear alleged proved here. added) Co., 501, 282 at
Bain Peanut (emphasis U.S. at 51 S.Ct. 229 omitted). (citations Ry. looked to its decision in Cincinnati Street Co. for the Court
The answer. Ry. Cincinnati Street Co. v. question seems to be answered Snell, protection lays [citation omitted] which down that if of rights by enjoyed, laws administered is equal equally
fundamental one allowing person does not seek a Constitution forbid forum another in the same class is excluded. from added). Co., 501, (emphasis 282 at Bain Peanut U.S. at 51 S.Ct. 229 case, equal Likewise, present we cannot address geometrical (plaintiffs by merely looking equation at the hurt question plaintiffs four hurt corporations get venue choices while by out-of-state choices) fifty-six get concluding, by out-of-state individuals venue equal protection. Rather, must be a denial of we must priori, there difference, fact, injustice.” in “does an determine whether person challenging Court has held that a Supreme The United States grounds must show “discrimination equal protection a statute on Party American Texas v. White (1974), 415 them of some substance.” of “ 1296, 1306, 39 744, 760. create 781, 94 S.Ct. L.Ed.2d ‘Statutes U.S. only not it is “invidi many deny equal protection; which do classifications Party discrimination” which offends the Constitution.’ ’’American ous v. Texas, (citing Ferguson Skrupa 781, 94 at 415 S.Ct. 1306 U.S. 93, 98). L.Ed.2d “The 726, 732, 83 1028, 1032, 10 prohibition U.S. S.Ct. goes further than the invidious discrimi Equal Protection Clause no Optical v.Lee Oklahoma 483, 489,
nation.” Williamson U.S. 563, 573. 461, 465, 99 L.Ed. 75 S.Ct. Supreme recognized Court
Additionally, as the United States Ins. Co. Starnes 425 U.S. 96 S.Ct. American Motorists 1800, 48 L.Ed.2d challenge under language statute are confined to
We
not
any discriminatory
has
effect.
whether
that statute
determining
nondiscriminatory
Just as a statute
its
may
grossly
on
face
be
discriminatory in its operation,
may
[citations omitted] so
a statute
discriminatory
nondiscriminatory
on its
in its operation.
face
being
discriminatory
aspects
There
no
effect achieved
provisions
venue
calling
Texas
for establishment
of a
cause
action,
difficulty
concluding
have no
appellant’s
we
equal
protection challenge
Exception
rejected.
27 must be
Co.,
American Motorists Ins.
Although may appear discriminatory on its fifty-six face when one contrasts venue choices with four venue choices, question the real one Rather, of numerical discrepancy. inquiry discrepancy substantive, is whether creates a invidi- ous discrimination. view, my discriminatory operation only statute its *17 it injustice
if can be shown that an by does to plaintiffs injured (1) corporations by denying out-of-state any them choice selecting (2) venue, denying plaintiffs such they a venue in enjoy can equal equally laws administered. Section MCA, does nei- injured ther. It a plaintiff by allows an out-of-state corporation to file any county suit one four venues: the committed; where the tort was county plaintiff in which the resides, county which the corporation’s agent resident located, is or the first judicial district. reaching conclusion, presents its the Court hypothetical a situation where two Montana resident drivers separate were hurt in car accidents both involving out-of-state defendants. Both residents would be able to file tort claims state court. If one resident were an individual, out-of-state that any resident could sue in county However, in Montana. if the other injured by resident were an employee corporation, of an out-of-state that resident would be re- stricted four venue upon analogy, choices. Based this the Court 25-2-122(2), MCA, concludes that operates unequally on two differ- people equal ent classes of and thus denies of the laws. The conclusion, however, Court’s entirely upon is based the numerical discrepancy. analyze The opinion fails discrepancy whether that actually discrimination, i.e., creates a substantive whether it works injustice. an plaintiff injured by
The Court assumes that a an out-of-state corporation, will, despite choices, four venue be a somehow denied equal equally forum where laws will be There is no administered. making an If assumption. party basis for such a can demonstrate that impartial that an trial cannot be had in a there is reason to believe justice ends venue, or the convenience of witnesses and the that venue, then the Court “must” promoted change be a would 25-2-201, of trial. Section MCA. Absent such a change place showing, law assumes that one or all four of the venues will equally a administered. provide forum where the laws will limitation assumes, a of four venue choices works If, as the Court does that 25-2- injustice plaintiff, say an on a then what about § 122(1), MCA, residents sue which limits Montana who Montana to mere venue choices: the defendant’s residence a two corporations place or the where tort occurred? argument if A has prey fallen to a facile that more
The Court has B, necessarily equal protection. than B has been denied We choices showing a a that B does not should not reach such conclusion absent If B enjoy equal laws administered. has four venue equally still change venue if there is reason to believe and can force choices had, working cannot be then the law not an impartial an trial no injustice equal protection. B and there is denial on FELA special much store in status of majority puts The that Indeed, recognized plaintiffs this Court has FELA plaintiffs. selecting Haug of choice in a venue. right have However, 368, 374, 770 P.2d R. Mont. Northern plaintiffs FELA have a certain have never stated that we legislature choices or that cannot limit the of venue number fifty-six. It cannot be 25-2- than said choices a number less a choice in Rather it 122(2), plaintiff denies the FELA venue. only question is whether fact gives the four choices. plaintiff nonresident defendants have more suing noncorporate, plaintiffs choices, being equal denied plaintiff means that FELA four each plaintiff think not. If the FELA has choices and protection. I *18 presumed to afford even handed admini- of the four venue choices is substantive, no invidious discrimination. justice, there is stration deny equal does not that § I would hold laws. foregoing dissent. joins GRAY JUSTICE