*1 Mich in automobile and other determining negligence civil cases.
T. E. C. J., Brennan, J., concurred Dethmers, J. with Kelly,
T. did J., G-. not sit in this case. Kavanagh, v.
DAVIS THORNTON Opinion op the Court Negligence—Keys Dept Ignition Judgment 1. Automobiles — in — —Summary Judgment. Summary judgment for a defendant, action negligently an keys in the neglecting or to shut off the motor of a lock vehicle, vehicle and properly secure the can only upon be made a determination all that reasonable men agree: (1) would that defendant did act as a prudent man would have acted same or under the similar cir- cumstances, (2) plaintiff or that injury, no suffered or (3) that the defendant’s plain- did not cause the injury, (4) tiff’s injury plaintiff caused was too insignificantly remotely connected or too effected negligence. defendant’s Negligence—Keys Ignition Duty. 2. Left Automobiles — — A plaintiff duty conclusion that defendant owed a no could properly only by jury negligently in an aetion for leaving keys neglecting to shut off the motor of a vehicle and lock and secure the vehicle. por
References Points in Headnotes 2d, seq. Highway 7 Am Jur et Automobiles and Traffic 234 [1-10] § , 2d, 8 Am Highway Jur Automobiles and 833. Traffic § Thornton Negligence Jury —Standard Conduct —Reasonable Men — Question. law of aetor is held to the standard *2 upon of a man and the determination of the facts judgment jury,
which of the reasonableness based is a ruling by for negligence implicitly is a of law the finder of fact. Negligence—Violation
4. Automobiles — of Ordinance —Evidence. ordinance, prohibiting of city leaving Violation a a noncom- place mercial motor a curb other vehicle unattended at public operator which the has the shall first access unless prevent shut the off motor and lock the vehicle so as to starting operation negligence and thereof is itself evidence of (City 38-8-5). of Code Detroit § Negligence Causation—Summary Judgment Jury 5. — — Question.
The determination susceptible of causation the most to sum- mary in aetion; any however, determination a tort doubts about the connections between should causes effects be jury.
resolved a Negligence—Keys Ignition 6. Automobiles — Left in —Reason- able Men —Remote Effect. Reasonable men leaving keys could differ as to in whether of an automobile caused an accident and whether too accident was an of remote effect such act. Negligence Foreseeability—Remote Summary Judg- 7. — Effect — Jury ment — Question.
Foreseeability any jury may of harm is one of the factors in determining reasonably consider if a defendant acted under all the circumstances and determination of remoteness seldom, ever, summarily effect should if as determined both determination remoteness and of should al- always most be left to the Negligence Foreseeability—Intervening 8. — Cause. general intervening, independent rule and efficient cause severs whatever connection there be between the
plaintiff’s injuries and a defendant’s is not con- trolling intervening if the aet was foreseeable. Keys Negligence—Reasonable in Men — Deft 9. Automobiles — Intervening Ignition Cause —Causal Connec- Cause — —Remote Summary Judgment. tion — might men have concluded that Reasonable parked intersection of ignition of near the an automobile southwest side Streets Detroit’s lower Miami Beatrice injuries that a was not too remote connection; joyrider’s not sever causal intervention did grant judge sum- therefore, improper it for the trial negligently defendant, mary judgment an action for neglecting off the motor leaving keys in to shut and secure the vehicle. of the vehicle and lock Dissenting Kelly,
Dethmers JJ. Appeal Appeal — — Dismissal —Court and Error Grant
Rules. Supreme
Appeal should dismissed to the Court i/mprovi- denying granted dently Appeals err in not as the Court did *3 application delayed appeal plaintiffs’ to meet for failure for 80S.S). requirements (GCB 196S, 806.4[S], rules court of Appeal Appeals, Le- 1, Division from Court of deny- Levin, Gillis, JJ., and H. sinski, J.,C. J. Wayne, delayed appeal application ing for 2, Nathan December J. J. Submitted Kaufman, (Calendar 51,908.) Docket De- 23, 1969. No. No. cided October
Complaint himself and Jr., James for Davis, Anthony Reginald as next friend Davis Davis, of admin- Levoria his minor and as Davis, children, of deceased, istrator the estate of Jimmie Davis, against Eva Thornton, Davis A. and Mr. Williams, J. resulting damages whose first name for known, is not from an motion collision. Defendants’ automobile granted. application for to de- dismiss Plaintiffs’ layed appeal Appeals Plain- to the of denied. Court petition Appeals rehearing tiffs’ for to Court Thornton appeal. Reversed and Plaintiffs remanded denied. for trial. $ Benjamin (by Tushman), H.
Levine Allan plaintiffs. Selby,
Bouse, Webber, Shaw, Dickenson & defendant. favorably T. G. J. Viewed most Kavanagh, plaintiffs,
tbe tbe facts are follows: On tbe eve- ning April driving 4,1965 defendant Williams was employer, the car of his defendant while Thornton, employer’s parked on his business. He the car near the intersection of Miami and Beatrice on Streets keys Detroit’s lower southwest left the side, in the ignition, failed to lock the doors and have left running. group the motor While so left of minors “joyride”, joyriding, took the car for a while and, they highway crossed the centerline of and col- plaintiff’s killing severely lided with car, one and injuring occupants five of the other car. plaintiffs They then sued the defendants. negligence (“leaving
claimed that the defendant’s neglecting shut and/or off the motor of the vehicle and lock secure the * * * ”) proximate vehicle was the injuries. August their various 3,1966 On defendant plaintiffs’ grounds: moved to dismiss the suit two *4 brought first, that the matter was settled an action plaintiffs by provision under the uninsured motorist policy; of their own insurance second, that the pleading upon failed which to state a cause of action granted. ruling relief could be The withheld court ground granted summary judgment on the first Application delayed appeal on the second. 384 Opinion op the Court granted Appeals by by but this denied the Oonrt of Court. judgment judge granting summary trial
In
Wittkopp (1959),
For judge all reason- must rule that a trial defendant, a), b), e), agree able on the conclusion men would d) above. judge in the defend- this case determined trial duty. plaintiff con- believe this
ant no We owed only properly be made clusion could is held to an actor The law of is that The determina of a man. the standard *5 143 v. Thornton Opinion op the Court upon judgment tion the facts which the of reason jury.1 admittedly ableness is based is The springs only labelling negligence confusion —for by implicitly ruling of law is a the finder of fact. ruling prescinded
This not be from the fact except finder on a all determination that (Normand agree. men v. would Thomas Theatre Corporation p seq.) Mich 349 [1957], 50, 54 et
The ultimate determination of reasonableness a determination of law—the law the case.
Injuries properly are not the issue here, and speaking, question neither should the of defendant’s negligence regarded be as the issue here. City adopted following of Detroit has or-
dinance : operator, except
“No those of commercial vehicles, shall leave a motor vehicle unattended at the curb place public or other which the shut off has access unless operator shall first motor and lock part pre- the motor vehicle or some thereof as to starting operation vent the of the motor vehicle.” (City § 38-8-5.) of Detroit Code negligence.2 and violation itof itself evidence of support position. Reason common law this police Such an ordinance exists virtue power government city promote of the the health, safety, and welfare of its citizens. The ordinance contemplates key that a left in the is dan- gerous, not harmful, because it is then but because likely it creates a condition to cause harm. The it keys Company (1965), accident and should mination [2] was held that [1] See Nor Khoyan a reaffirmanee violation Turner go was evidence of to the see this Court’s attitude toward of ordinance Kevreson especially the footnote on and statute v. Md Michigan (257 as to the prohibiting Consolidated Gas A2d summary 219) resulting p where deter 384 the Couet actuating harm would cause of the instrument engine.3 person necessarily start the would who inexperienced person child, a could be Such *6 youth harm could joyriding a thief. The will neces- presupposes meddler who caused sarily vehicle but far more owner of harm the society.4 importantly, the theft threatens Attorney General of the 1968, the 1, March “On organiza responsible and nineteen States United mayors, including associations national tions, police attorneys, municipal law offi district chiefs, Theft Auto Prevention the National cers, launched Campaign effort reduce automo nation-wide in a * * # by the data The distributed theft. bile Campaign more in 1966 included the estimates nationally and that a million cars were stolen than were involved of the stolen vehicles about 24% * * * stolen cars accident rate for accidents. is estimated to be approximately the nor 200 times * ** study A has disclosed mal that in rate. accident key had been left stolen, the of the total cars ignition the the either in the car 42.3% of the cases cases. In an additional 16.7% by leaving un invited motorist theft * * * point out Moreover, locked. that the authorities large oppor auto is to a a crime of theft extent people, tunity, unusually inviting young and is major episode in a criminal career the first often Dept. Survey [U.S. Division, 7, Criminal Justice, Myers (1968), App p 8].” 131 Cited in Gaither v. (404 223). 216, 223 F2d 222, 216, 222, DC (en- Tile circumstances reflected in suck statistics tirely apart ordinance) any make it obvious jury might that a man conclude that a reasonable foreseen meddler. SW2d 4 See 3Ney ALK2d 793) v. Justus Wood Yellow Cab 624) Ney where it was said that v. Yellow Cab Company (1961), 209 Tenn 55 (1954), Co., [2] the statute supra, Ill 2d 74 (348 at 79. SW2d contemplates (117 NE2d 332, 74, Thornton Davis v. his key have left of his
would not car under the circumstances confronted defend- ant Williams.
In Detroit & v. Van Steinberg M. R. Co. Cooley Mich 99, expressed Justice best this Court’s attitude towards determination of summary negligence:
“The case, however, must be a one clear very which would the court in justify itself taking upon when responsibility. For, this judge he decides that a want of due care is not fixes in his own shown, necessarily
mind standard of ordinary pru- dence, and, measuring by that, conduct turns him out of court upon his of what a opinion prudent man ought to have done under the circumstances. He thus makes his own opinion of what would be regarded prudence a generally *7 definite rule of law. It is quite that, if possible the question same prudence of were submitted to a jury collected from the different occupations of society, and better perhaps competent the judge to of com- mon opinion, he might them him find with differing as to the ordinary standard of proper care.”
But determination of negligence alone does not end the Once a inquiry. found jury judge has that the defendant was negligent that the plain- tiff suffered it injuries, must be whether determined, the plaintiff’s injuries were caused the defend- by ant’s wrongful conduct and, then, if the defendant did cause the injuries, judge whether the plaintiff’s injuries were too insignificantly related to or too remotely by effected the defendant’s negligence.
Of all the elements to necessary support recovery in a action, tort causation is the most susceptible to summary determination for it usually amounts logical to a connection of However, cause effect. to any doubts about the connections between the causes effects, and the by should the resolved leaving question the first, whether here inBut a of ignition the keys remote was too in the leaving keys if the resulting second, collision, of remote a cause the not too in the independent cause theft was the collision, whether relationship. causal severed which kept he decided however to mind, must It is not whether us the accident was whether accident—nor caused the must be act. Bather it an effect of such remote too point. on this men could differ if decided they could. holdWe helpful proper perspective it is establish
To foreseeability. proper It has a role of recall question bearing negligence and it also question independence bearing has on the intervening causes. Negligence Foreseeability I. any
Foreseeability one harm is factors determining jury if the defendant consider reasonably under all the Such acted circumstances. by considering only can determination best be existing up injury— to the time of those facts reasonably foreseen that should the defendant have up doing might then or had done what he was negligent. jury must so, cause harm —if he was plaintiff’s injuries bridge gap then between the negligence. defendant’s This the deter- *8 of of effect. mination cause and remoteness foreseeability negligence of determined, Once is longer harm should no be considered. process logical determination,
Causation is a of significance while the of the connections—remote- policy ness—is a determination. Thornton v. judicial appears of “It that modern trend eliminating opinion of con- is favor foreseeable sequences proximate except cause, where as a test of independent, responsible, intervening
an involved. cause is view is that once it is determined negligent, that a defendant is be held responsible injurious consequences negli- for his gent naturally act omission which occur directly, without reference to whether he antici- pated, might reasonably have foreseen such con- sequences. Apparent inconsistencies between this language view and the of former decisions has been explained ground many on the that while in instances spoken have the decisions of foreseen or foreseeable consequences proximate as a test of cause, what the really liability negligence court had in mind was differentiating original question without between the duty of whether there was a breach of to use due question proximate Logi- and the care cally, cause. question always liability is anterior to question consequences measure go liability, with and where is there no tort there question proximate no of remote or cause. On the question negligence, of what it is material consequences prudent might consider the man anticipated; negligence have but when wholly is once established, that consideration is im- question imposes material on the far of how it lia- bility. discussing proximate There is no need cause is not a case where of the defendant but when established, his has been proximate established, result and amount of recovery depend upon the evidence of direct se- quences, upon foresight.” and not defendant’s Negligence, (Emphasis §§ Am Jur, 58, 709, 710. added.)
The determination of remoteness, however, should
summarily
if ever,
seldom,
determined. Selleck
v. Lake
&
Shore M. S.
Co.
R.
In
intervening joy-
problem of the
consider
have to
injuries
of the
remoteness
and the
riders
in the car.
left
Intervening
Foreseeability
Causes
II.
independ
intervening,
general
an
rule—that
connection
severs whatever
and efficient cause
ent
injuries
and the
between the
there
(Fowles
Briggs
[1898],
v.
defendant’s
p
Negligence, §
724
425;
68,
116 Mich
38 Am Jur,
intervening
seq.)
controlling if the
act
not
et —is
Negli
Am Jur,
38
foreseeable.5
seq.,
p
(1903),
gence, § 70,
726 et
Skinn v. Reutter
135 Mich
also
General Motors
57 and
Comstock v.
Corporation
quoted
(1959),
“The fact that act third intervening person in itself or is done in negligent negligent manner does not it a make cause of harm superseding another which the actor’s conduct is a negligent *10 in about, substantial factor if bringing (a) the actor at the of his time negligent conduct have realized person should act, that third might so (b) man the situation knowing exist- when ing the act of the third person was done would not regard highly it as the third extraordinary person had so acted.”
"We have the already discussed, above, conditions the prompting passage the city ordinance, was—it intended to prevent, first, the meddlers and, second, the of their consequences meddling6 of which —one consequences is threat and to life property posed aby thief or fleeing joyriding We therefore youth.7 hold that reasonable men have might concluded that in under keys these circum- stances too was not remote a the plaintiff’s injuries and that the joyrider’s intervention did not sever that causal connection. 6 Ermatinger our in (1920), See comments Hawkins v. case of 578, dangerous 211 Mich sense as “An 584: automobile in is not the same agency a ferocious beast loose on the streets. Until human
intervenes, usually it hazard harmless. The results conduct of driver rather than the nature of the It vehicle. possesses, however, recklessly power when driven, injury such to do justify stringent as of regulations, only not the vehicle itself but operator, safety persons for property of v. Detroit and on the public ways.” also Colborne United (1913), See R. Co. 139, 149, light knowledge 150: “In the of common courts judicial automobile, can well only take notice of the not as a most pleasing persons useful swiftly transporting prop and means of and erty driven, the hands of pleasure business, properly cautiously when controlled and possibilities but as a so vehicle its destructive when spread careless reckless drivers over the land the maimed and dead until it has belittled the cruelties of the Juggernaut.” car of 7 leading foreseeability See the ease in App in Ross (139 v. Hartman 2 14) 217 D2d DC footnote above. Dissenting Opinion by Kerry, J. totality of these Under the circumstances8 we hold improper judge granted it was for the trial to have judgment. summary
Reversed and remanded trial.
T. E. C. T. J., M. Kavanagh, Brennan, Black, and Adams, JJ., concurred with T. Gr. Kavanagh, J. {dissenting). Appeals J. The Court of did
Kelly, plaintiffs’ application not err when it denied for de- appeal layed ground application on the their requirements failed to meet the of OCR 806.4 (2) and 803.3. appeal having to this Court is dismissed as improvidently granted.
been Costs to defendants. J., concurred with Kelly, J. Dethmers, 39 Cal employed prohibiting case is an affirmation of the common law- See Rptr 4) *11 Hergenrether in a ordinance “key where the East effeet. ignition” totality In case and where there was not a our of the circumstances view, Cal 2d the ordinance in this (393 P2d test was