43 S.E.2d 165 | Ga. Ct. App. | 1947
Where the driver of an automobile fails to reduce speed and to stop on approaching a passenger-carrying bus from the rear at the intersection of a paved State-aid highway and a county road intersecting the paved highway at right angles, into which the driver of the bus proposes to turn on the left, and the automobile collides with the rear end of the bus while it is standing still, the negligence of the driver of the automobile is the sole proximate cause of the collision, under the facts of this case, irrespective of whether the bus driver had stopped at the intersection within eight feet of the center line of the pavement for the sole purpose of discharging a passenger or for the dual purpose of discharging the passenger and awaiting the approach of another automobile coming from the opposite direction before making a customary left turn into the county road at the left, and a guest in the automobile which is driven into the rear of the bus is not entitled to recover damages from the carrier and its insurer. The court properly directed a verdict for the defendants.
The plaintiff's petition charged the defendant motor carrier with four aspects of negligence: (1) negligence per se in that the driver of the bus violated Code, § 68-314, in that he stopped or parked the bus so that it was not at least eight feet removed from the center line of the highway, which is a State-aid road; (2) negligence per se in that the driver of the bus violated Code, § 68-305, by failing to give the driver of the automobile in which the plaintiff was riding a fair opportunity to pass the bus on the highway; (3) negligence per se in that the driver of the bus violated Code, § 68-309, by unreasonably obstructing or impeding the right of travel of the driver of the automobile in which the plaintiff was riding and failing to stop or park the bus at least eight feet from the center line of the highway; (4) that there was a space 25 feet east, adjacent to the highway from where the bus was stopped or parked where the motor bus could have parked safely and entirely off the highway, and such place was apparent to the driver of the bus or could have been discovered by him in the exercise of ordinary care and his failure to use this space was a failure to exercise ordinary care.
Whether or not the defendant motor carrier could be said to have been negligent in any of these respects, the evidence shows conclusively that the automobile in which the plaintiff was riding did not reduce its speed as required by Code, § 68-303 (i) upon approaching the intersection of the highway and the Bellview-Fish Creek Road. Marvin Graces, one of the occupants of the automobile, testified for the plaintiff: "My best judgment of the speed of the car just before the collision is about 45 miles an hour. I have ridden in automobiles a lot and I think I am a pretty good judge of the speed of a car. The speed of the car just before the collision was just about the same as it had been during the balance of the evening." W. C. Williams testified for the defendant that the car passed him at a distance of approximately 500 yards from the point of the collision going "not under 80 miles per hour." The Code, § 68-303 (h), requires that, "An operator of a vehicle shall bring the same to a full stop not less than five feet from the rear of any street car or passenger-carrying bus headed in the same direction, which has stopped for the purpose of taking on or discharging passengers, and shall remain standing until such car or bus has taken on or discharged said passengers: Provided, *303 however, that said operator may pass such street car where a safety zone is established by proper authorities, or where said operator may pass such car at a distance of at least eight feet therefrom: and Provided further, that he shall have slowed down and proceeded cautiously."
Other evidence offered by the defendants showed that it was a moonlight night; there was nothing to obstruct the view of the driver of the automobile in which the plaintiff was riding such as would have prevented his seeing the motor bus, which, under the undisputed testimony for the defendants, was well lighted with two taillights, two marker lights, and three additional lights, all on the rear end of the bus; and that the bus could have been seen by the driver of the automobile in which the plaintiff was riding for a distance of about one half mile. While we recognize that negligence and proximate cause are exclusively questions for the determination of the jury, where only one conclusion could be reached by all reasonable and fair-minded men from the evidence, they become questions of law, and under the evidence in this case no other conclusion could be reached but that even if the defendant motor carrier was negligent as charged, and we do not find it necessary to decide this point, the negligence of the driver of the automobile in which the plaintiff was riding was the sole proximate cause of the plaintiff's injuries and the defendants were not liable under any view of the case. Sumner v. Thomas,
Judgment affirmed. Sutton, C. J., and Parker, J., concur.