178 Ga. 203 | Ga. | 1934
Sweat Davis was indicted for the murder of Joe Moody by shooting with a shotgun. 'The jury returned a verdict of guilty, without any recommendation. The defendant’s motion for a new trial, based on the usual general grounds and several amended grounds, was overruled. Error was assigned on that judgment.
The first special ground of the motion for a new trial complains of the failure to charge the jury on the law of voluntary manslaughter, as expressed in the Penal Code, § 65. The basis alleged upon which to predicate such charge was in part a statement of the defendant before the jury, to the effect that at the time of the difficulty the deceased with epithets called the defendant vile names and placed his hand in his pocket as if to draw a weapon, and also testimony to the effect that the deceased had previously made threats to kill the defendant with a pistol, which threats were communicated by witness to defendant. It was specially urged that the statement of the accused and the evidence were sufficient at least to raise a reasonable doubt as to whether voluntary manslaughter was involved in the case. The testimony of the witness was insufficient to raise the question of voluntary manslaughter. If the statement of the defendant before the jury was sufficient to authorize a charge on the law of voluntary manslaughter, there should have been an appropriate written request for a charge on that subject. This ground of the motion for a new trial is without merit.
The second special ground of the motion complains of the charge: “The burden is on the State to prove his guilt before a verdict of guilty could be considered. The State contends that it has carried that burden and proved his guilt. The defendant contends that he is not guilty, and that the State has failed to prove his guilt; and he contends for a verdict of not guilty. The State contends for a verdict of guilty.” The criticisms of this charge are: (a) that “the charge . . is not a correct statement of the law, . . in that the burden is upon the State to prove his guilt beyond a reasonable doubt, and the court should have charged the jury that the burden is upon the State to prove his guilt beyond a reasonable doubt before a verdict of guilty could be considered;” (b) that the law places upon the State a greater burden than that of merely proving the defendant’s guilt, but goes
These several grounds of the motion for a new trial relate to the subject of reasonable doubt, and will be considered together. They must be viewed in the light of the general charge, in the first paragraph of which it is stated: “Before you would be authorized to find the defendant guilty, you must believe beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant is guilty of the offense, of murder as charged in the bill of indictment.” In the third paragraph it is stated: "The defendant enters upon the trial presumed to be innocent, and this presumption continues and still exists unless in your opinion the State has overcome and removed that presumption of innocence by satisfactory proof of the defendant's guilt to the extent which I have already stated, beyond a reasonable doubt.” In the seventh paragraph it is stated: “Whether dependent upon direct or circumstantial evidence, the true ques
The fourth ground of the motion for a new trial complains that the court erred in charging the jury as follows: “Taking the law as I will give it to you in charge Avith reference to these contentions in the case, gentlemen, and applying it to the facts as you find them from the witnesses, you are the judges of both the law and the facts and what kind of verdict you should Avrite under the law and the evidence. It is your duty to take the law from the judge as the correct law; and applying it to the facts as you find them from the witnesses, you make a verdict which in your judgment speaks the truth under the law and the evidence.” Tlie criticisms are (a) “that said charge . . was erroneous, because it withdrew from the jury the consideration of the defendant’s statement, and directed the jury to apply the la-Av to the facts as found from the witnesses and deprived the movant of having the jury consider the defendant’s statement;” (b) “that said charge was erroneous, because it specifically confines the jury to the testimony
The ruling announced in the fourth headnote does not require elaboration.
Judgment affirmed.