22 S.E.2d 762 | Ga. Ct. App. | 1942
1. "It is `well settled in this State that a party may contradict his own witness by showing the truth to be different from what the witness testified. Skipper v. State,
2. "`The whole question of the credibility of witnesses is wisely left to the jury under any and all circumstances, and, though Ananias and Sapphira spoke again, the law would not strike them dead, but would leave their testimony to be weighed and accepted or rejected by the jury.' This court is therefore powerless to interfere with the verdict of a jury where there is any evidence, however slight, to support it, and regardless of what may be the character of the witnesses for the State." Aycock v. State,
3. "Wherever a homicide is neither justifiable or malicious, it is manslaughter; and, if intentional, is voluntary manslaughter." Mixon v. State,
4. The evidence and the defendant's statement authorized the jury to infer that the conduct of the deceased and his companion, and the attendant circumstances, were not sufficient to justify the killing, but *297
were sufficient to excite the passion of the defendant and to reduce the killing to manslaughter. Horton v. State,
5. Applying the above rules of law to the evidence, a verdict of voluntary manslaughter was authorized.
Judgment affirmed. Broyles, C. J., and Gardner, J.,concur.
Eddie Lane testified that the deceased was going away from the defendant at the time he was shot. In seeming contradiction of such testimony, Marcellus Thornton, a State's witness and a funeral director and embalmer who handled the body of the deceased, testified: "I found a gunshot wound in his right side right below the right breast, right under the arm. That wound was right there [indicating]. That was a pistol wound." On cross-examination he testified, "The wound was right there, right under the right breast. It was right under the right breast under the arm. If the arm was being held down by the side that wound could not have been inflicted. He must have had his arm up. He could have had it up like that, too." Will Lackey, a witness for the defendant, testified that, on the Saturday night preceding the shooting on Monday, the defendant's coal house (underneath his house) had been broken into, and that he had seen the lock exhibited to him and that the lock was on the coal-house door and in a broken condition. Anderson Edwards, a witness for the defendant, testified that the deceased "run backwards and began to shoot, and he shot three or four times, and this man at the corner of the old pillar [the defendant] he shot one time, and that settled the shooting." The defendant in his statement to the jury stated: "On the night of Saturday night before the 3rd of November, some one broke in my coal house. I got chickens out there and coal, and I had a lot of tools in there where I do carpenter work, paint brushes and things. So that Sunday I laid for somebody to come back. They didn't come. So Monday I bought another lock and put on there. Monday night I heard a noise out in the back yard. When I come around the house and come in the yard I seen these two fellows and I hollered, `Halt,' and when I hollered `Halt' one flashed a light and the other one started to shooting. Well, when *299 he started to shoot I shot back, and when I heard one say, `I am shot,' I walked up the street."
The jury manifestly believed those phases of the State's evidence that authorize a conviction of voluntary manslaughter, rather than the defendant's evidence and his statement which would have authorized an acquittal. This they were permitted to do.
The judge did not err in overruling the motion for a new trial.