Following a stipulated bench trial, Angela K. Davis was found guilty of possession of methamphetamine (OCGA § 16-13-30). Davis appeals the trial court’s denial of her motion to suppress, arguing that (1) her consent to search the vehicle was the product of an illegal detention, and (2) her consent was not freely and voluntarily given. Discerning no error, we affirm.
While the trial court’s findings as to disputed facts in a ruling on a motion to suppress will be reviewed to determine whether the ruling was clearly erroneous, where the evidence is uncontroverted and no question regarding the credibility of witnesses is presented, the trial court’s application of the law to undisputed facts is subject to de novo appellate review.
(Citation omitted.)
Vansant v. State,
In light of these principles, we review the evidence presented at the suppression hearing. On January 20, 2009, Officer Robert J. Stanfield of the Calhoun Police Department observed a green Cavalier with a tag number matching the description of a vehicle reported *186 as connected with drug activities in Calhoun. After the vehicle ran a red light, the officer stopped it. The officer approached the vehicle driven by Davis, obtained her driver’s license, explained his reason for the stop, and indicated that he would give her a warning ticket. The officer recognized Davis’s passenger as an individual he stopped two weeks before, who was on probation and lived in a neighborhood known for drug activity. In his patrol vehicle, the officer wrote up the warning ticket, ran a computer check on Davis’s driver’s license, and called for a backup officer and a K-9 drug dog handler. 1 After the officer asked Davis to exit her vehicle, he gave her the written warning, returned her driver’s license, and advised her that she was free to go. As he did so, the officer asked Davis if she was aware that the area was known for high drug activity, and Davis indicated that she was and that she worked at a nearby store. Thereafter, Davis consented to the officer’s request to search her vehicle. In the search of the vehicle that followed, methamphetamine was found in Davis’s purse, which Davis had left inside her vehicle. The trial court admitted a DVD of the traffic stop into evidence. 2
The trial court denied the motion to suppress, finding that Davis voluntarily consented to the search of the vehicle.
1. Davis contends that her consent to search was invalid as the product of an illegal detention following a valid traffic stop. We disagree. .
“To pass muster under the Fourth Amendment, the continued questioning of a driver . . . outside the scope of a valid traffic stop is permissible only when the officer has a reasonable articulable suspicion of illegal activity
or when the valid traffic stop has become consensual.”
(Citation and punctuation omitted; emphasis supplied.)
State v. Felton,
Here, the duration of the brief traffic stop was approximately seven minutes. After returning Davis’s driver’s license and issuing
*187
the warning ticket, the officer told Davis that she was free to leave.
3
Although Davis argues that the State failed to show that the officer returned Davis’s license before asking for consent to search, the officer indicated that he “was sure he did.” Upon receiving her license and warning ticket, a reasonable person would have concluded that the traffic stop had ended. In this case, however, Davis remained on the scene and engaged in casual conversation about the high level of drug activity in the area and the fact that she worked nearby. Her conduct showed that she did not feel intimidated by the officer’s presence. Under the circumstances, the initial traffic stop had de-escalated into a consensual encounter. Compare
State v. Connor,
To the extent Davis argues that
Felton,
supra, requires a different result, we disagree. In
Felton,
after the traffic stop had concluded, but before consent was given, the officer issued the ticket to Felton and returned his license. We held that, because Felton’s consent “was not within the scope of the original traffic stop, nor consensual, the consent to search the vehicle was the product of an illegal detention.”
Felton,
supra,
2. Davis argues that her consent to search was not freely and voluntarily given. We are not persuaded.
“[T]he State has the burden of proving that the consent was freely and voluntarily given under the totality of the circumstances.” (Citations and punctuation omitted.)
Sommese v. State,
Here, the officer requested consent to search, which Davis readily provided. There is no evidence that the officer coerced Davis’s consent, tricked her, or conveyed a message that her consent to search was required.
See Florida v. Bostick,
Accordingly, the trial court did not err in denying Davis’s motion to suppress.
Judgment affirmed.
Notes
The record does not indicate at what point during the traffic stop the backup officer or the K-9 drug dog arrived on the scene.
A copy of the DVD recording the traffic stop was included in the record on appeal; however, it does not include the time stamps referred to by counsel in their appellate briefs. Further, the recording is not complete. Since the material facts are undisputed, we need not rely on the DVD in reaching our decision.
In determining whether a reasonable person would have felt free to leave, we examine the totality of the circumstances and focus on three key factors: “(a) whether the driver’s documents have been returned to him; (b) whether the officer informed the driver that he was free to leave; and (c) whether the driver appreciated that the traffic stop had reached an endpoint.” (Citation and punctuation omitted.) Felton, supra,