Robert W. Davis (hereinafter, “Movant”) appeals the denial of his Rule 24.035 post-conviction motion without an evidentiary hearing. Movant рleaded guilty to one count of first degree robbery, Section 569.020 RSMo (2000), 1 one count of first degree burglary, Section 569.160, five counts of felonious restraint, Section 565.120, six counts of armed criminal action, Section 571.015, and one count of resisting arrest, Section 575.150. Movant was sentenced as a prior and persistent offender to a total term of twenty years’ imprisonment. In his sole point on appeal, Mоvant alleges the trial court lacked subject matter jurisdiction to accept his guilty plea because he was not brought to trial within 180 days pursuant to the Uniform Mandatory Disposition of Detainers Law (hereinafter, “UMDDL”). We affirm.
Movant was convicted of these offenses following a jury trial in St. Charles County and appealed. The Missouri Supreme Court reversed Movant’s convictions and remanded the cаse for retrial on all counts after it determined the trial court committed reversible error by admitting evidence of a prior unrelаted robbery.
State v. Davis,
After the Missouri Supreme Court issued its mandate ordering Movant’s case be remanded for retrial, Movant filed a pro se motion on February 8, 2007, asking for a “180 Day writ” wherein “[a]ll pending charges against [him] be brought to Court within 180 days or be dismissed with prejudice.” The cause was called fоr hearing on February 15, 2007, and continued for Movant to obtain counsel. After Movant obtained counsel, the parties agreed on а trial date of September 10, 2007. On August 22, 2007, the State filed a motion for a continuance, which the trial court granted because a matеrial witness was unavailable on that trial date. The matter was reset for trial on January 15, 2008.
Movant filed a motion to dismiss with prejudice for the alleged violation of his right to a speedy trial on January 11, 2008. At the hearing on this motion, defense
Movant filed a timely Rule 24.035, motion allеging the trial court lacked subject matter jurisdiction to enter a judgment of conviction and to sentence Movant because the State did not bring Movant’s case to trial within 180 days of his request for disposition pursuant to the UMDDL. The motion court denied his motion, finding: (1) the UMDDL did not apply to Movant because he was not a person confined in a department correctional facility nor was he serving a sеntence in the Missouri Department of Corrections (hereinafter, “the DOC”) on any other charges; (2) Movant did not address his request to the St. Charles County prosecutor; and (3) to the extent Movant’s pro se motion invoked his speedy trial rights, the matter was continued for good cause shown because a material witness was unavailable on the trial date. Movant appeals.
Appellate review is limited to dеtermining whether the motion court’s findings and conclusions are clearly erroneous. Rule 24.035(k);
Soto v. State,
Movant raises one point on appeal, arguing the trial court lacked subject matter jurisdiction to enter judgment and sentence him on his guilty plea. Movant alleges he properly invoked his right to relief under the UMDDL when he filed his pro se motion from the St. Charles County jail. As a rеsult, Movant believes the State’s failure to bring him to trial within 180 days deprived the trial court of jurisdiction to accept his guilty plea. We disagrеe.
We first address Movant’s jurisdictional claim that the trial court lacked subject matter jurisdiction to accept his guilty plea. This analysis of “subject matter jurisdiction” under the UMDDL is no longer tenable in light of the Missouri Supreme Court’s recent holding in
J.C.W. ex rel. Webb v. Wyciskalla,
The Southern District resolved this exact issue in
Schmidt v. State,
Similar to the case at bar, the movant in
Schmidt
predicated his subject matter jurisdiction аrgument on the provisions of Section 217.460. Section 217.460 specifically states, “If the indictment, information or complaint is not brought to trial within thе period and if the court finds that the offender’s constitutional right to a speedy trial has been denied,
no court of this state shall have jurisdiction of such indictment, information or complaint
....” (emphasis added). Relying on
Wyciskalla,
the
Schmidt
court stated, “[w]hen a statute speaks in jurisdictional terms or can be read in suсh terms, it is proper to read it as merely setting statutory limits on remedies or elements of claims for relief that the court may grant.”
Schmidt,
We reach the same result here. It is undeniable based upon the hоlding in
Wyciskalla
that the plea court had subject matter jurisdiction to accept Movant’s guilty plea. Movant’s claim that the UMDDL was violated is not a jurisdictional argument, and therefore, can be reviewed for legal error only. “The general rule in Missouri is that a guilty plea waivеs all nonjurisdictional defects, including statutory and constitutional guaranties.”
Schmidt
Based on the foregoing, we hold the trial court had the authority to enter judgment and sentence Movant pursuant to his guilty plea. The motion court did not clearly err in denying Movant’s Rule 24.035 motion for post-conviction relief. Point denied.
The motion court’s judgment is affirmed.
Notes
. All statutory references are to RSMo (2000) unless otherwise indicated.
