Lead Opinion
The Defendant, David Davis, was found guilty of distribution of cocaine and heroin by a jury in the Circuit Court for Baltimore City. Following his sentencing, Davis appealed his conviction, and the Court of Special Appeals affirmed the circuit court. This Court granted certiorari. Davis contends that the circuit court erred in improperly restricting the scope of voir dire during jury selection and in permitting the State to make a missing witness argument to the jury during closing arguments. We find that the circuit court did not err in either respect and affirm the decision of the Court of Special Appeals.
On September 25, 1990, Officer Andrew Bratcher of the Baltimore City Police responded to a call regarding an individual selling narcotics in the 2100 block of Barclay Street. Shortly after his arrival, Officer Bratcher observed from his cruiser the Defendant, David Davis, carrying a small white bag in his hand. Davis placed the white bag beside a set of stairs and approached a car. Officer Bratcher then observed Davis hand the car’s driver a small white object. Believing that he had just witnessed a drug transaction, Officer Bratcher exited his cruiser and instructed Davis to place his hands on the top of the purchaser’s car. Davis fled, with Officer Bratcher giving pursuit. After apprehending Davis, Officer Bratcher returned to the location of the suspected sale and recovered the white bag that Davis had concealed along the side of the stairs. The white bag contained 48 capsules of cocaine and 18 wax-paper bags of heroin. Davis was subsequently charged with two counts of distribution of a controlled dangerous substance, two counts of possession of a controlled dangerous substance with the intent to distribute, and two counts of possession of a controlled dangerous substance.
Davis pled not guilty to the charges and requested a trial by jury before the Circuit Court for Baltimore City. During voir dire, Judge David Ross asked the entire venire panel six questions and dismissed several prospective jurors on the basis of their replies. The six questions were as follows:
“1) ... whether any of the prospective jurors had any knowledge or information about this particular case[;]
2) ... whether any of the jurors knew a) the [Defendant], b) defense counsel, c) the assistant state’s attorney, d) Officer Andrew Bratcher, the chief police investigator and only State’s witness; or e) Mary Easley, a witness for the defense[;]
3) ... whether any of the jurors ‘has been or ... has a close relative who has either been the victim of or has been charged with or convicted of a drug related crime[;]’
*33 4) ... whether any of the jurors is ‘likely to give more or less weight to the testimony of a police officer merely because that person is a police officer!;]’
5) ... whether any of the jurors ‘knows Of anything that would keep him or her from giving a fair and impartial verdict in this case!;]’
6) ... whether any of the jurors ‘knows of any reason why he or she should not sit on the jury in this case.’ ”
Davis v. State,
Thereafter, Davis requested that the trial judge ask the jury panel “whether anyone on the jury has been a member or is a member of the law enforcement community or whether they have a close relative or friend who is such a member____” Davis argued that the judge’s prior “omnibus” questions, pertaining only to whether any member of the panel knew of any reason why they should not sit on the jury, were insufficient. Davis contended that such questions were “unrealistic” and posited for “[w]hat other reason would I get ten peremptory challenges if I cannot make a halfway intelligent decision to strike or not to strike.” The trial judge denied Davis’s request.
At the conclusion of the trial, the jury found Davis guilty of the two counts of distribution of controlled dangerous substances. Davis appealed and the Court of Special Appeals affirmed his conviction. Davis v. State,
II.
Davis’s principal contention is that the trial court abused its discretion in refusing to ask whether any of the jurors were, or were associated with, law enforcement personnel. Davis argues that he was entitled to such a question since it may have led to the disqualification for cause of one or more of the
The principles governing jury voir dire are well established in Maryland. As we have noted on several occasions, there is no statute in Maryland prescribing the manner in which voir dire is to be conducted or regulating the objects of inquiry during voir dire. See Bedford v. State,
A.
Davis first contends that the trial judge abused his discretion in refusing to ask his proposed question because, in a case where “the sole issue ... is the credibility of the police officer as [o]pposed to [the defendant], a voir dire question concerning law enforcement employment or association may well lead to the disqualification for cause of one or more of the prospective jurors.” We must reject Davis’s argument.
As the Court noted in Langley v. State, a fundamental tenet underlying the practice of trial by jury is that each juror, as far as possible, be “impartial and unbiased.” Langley v. State,
In addition, this Court has identified several areas of inquiry where, if reasonably related to the case at hand, a trial judge must question prospective jurors. See Bowie v. State,
Davis’s proposed voir dire inquiry does not relate to cause for disqualification. Davis merely sought to discover whether any prospective juror was either a law enforcement
“The purpose of the voir dire examination is to ascertain the existence of cause for disqualification and for no other purpose. Neither mere acquaintance with an individual or*38 group, nor mere relationship to witnesses, other than parties, is sufficient basis for challenging a prospective juror for cause. Bias on the part of prospective jurors will never be presumed, and the challenging party bears the burden of presenting facts, in addition to mere relationship or association, which would give rise to a showing of actual prejudice.” (Citations omitted).
Borman v. State,
Davis next argues that, “[w]hile an affirmative answer to the proposed question may not, as a matter of law, result in disqualification of the prospective juror for cause, the answer, by itself or together with the juror’s manner and demeanor, may persuade the trial court, in the exercise of its discretion, to excuse the juror for cause.” He asserts that such “followup questioning may reveal facts, predilections, or unacknowledged prejudices____” Davis’s suggested approach to voir dire, however, finds no support in the law of Maryland. Davis suggests that a party be allowed to incrementally question prospective jurors in a piecemeal fashion until the party can uncover grounds for a challenge for cause. We see no difference between this approach and the practice in some other states that permit parties to use voir dire as a means to more effectively exercise peremptory challenges — a practice that this Court has long since rejected. Where parties do not direct their questions to grounds for disqualification but such questions are “speculative, inquisitorial, catechising or ‘fishing’, asked in aid of deciding on peremptory challenges,” a trial judge has the discretion to refuse to ask them. McGee,
B.
Perhaps sensing the impending demise of his initial contention, Davis next requests that this Court reconsider the frame
Davis correctly recognizes that there exist two schools of thought among the various courts throughout the country with regard to the scope of voir dire. See J. Alexander Tanford, An Introduction to Trial Law, 51 Mo.L.Rev. 627, 638-40 (1986). These two camps differ largely in the mandatory scope of examination of prospective jurors. The Maryland system requires that the trial judge allow inquiries reasonably likely to disclose cause for disqualification with all other inquiries subject to the trial judge’s discretion. In stark contrast is the system that Davis wishes us to adopt. This alternative system requires that a trial judge inquire about any topic or subject matter which may be reasonably related to the intelligent exercise of peremptory challenges.
While the extent of questioning under either system of voir dire may differ, the desire to obtain a fair and impartial jury is at the heart of both. Likewise, the constitutional imperative that the criminal defendant receive a fair trial remains constant. There is no constitutionally protected right to exercise peremptoiy challenges. See Frazier v. United States,
Nearly ninety years ago this Court, in Handy v. State,
“The rule is, then, that questions, not directed to a specific reason for disqualification and exclusion by the court, may be refused in the court’s discretion....
The questions excluded in this case were for no specified purpose, and apparently with no question of disqualification in mind, but were merely beginning a process of examining at large, in order to form impressions and preferences, which, while they might properly be made the ground for peremptory challenges, would not test the eligibility of the jurymen.”
In addition to clarifying the holding of Handy, the Court in Whittemore reexamined the policy underlying the adoption of a rule mandating voir dire in only those areas relating to a specific cause of disqualification. The Court noted the following:
“Judge Pearce writing the [Handy ] opinion for the Court said, ‘we are aware that there are decisions to the contrary in other courts of equal authority and reputation, but such knowledge as we possess of the experience in practice under those decisions does not commend them to our adoption’ — -in this referring, presumably, to reports from other jurisdic*42 tions of seemingly unreasonable encumbering and prolongation of the work of securing a jury to proceed with the trial.”
This Court initially adopted the rules concerning the scope of voir dire because allowing more extensive inquiry would unduly tax the efficiency of Maryland’s judicial system. Although some litigants might benefit from broader mandatory voir dire, a greater number of citizens would be hindered due to the accompanying decline in their ability to gain prompt resolution of their litigation. In Handy and Whittemore, this Court decided that any such detrimental effects outweighed the marginal gains springing from unlimited voir dire. Writing for the Court of Special Appeals in the instant case, Judge Moylan vividly captured the essence of this policy choice. In comparing Davis’s proposed system of expanded voir dire with Maryland’s current system, Judge Moylan wrote the following:
“There is, however, an opposing school of thought that looks upon such indulgence as errant, if not grotesque, foolishness____ In terms of the profligate waste of precious courtroom and human resources, it looks upon any fractional gain from unlimited voir dire as a minimally incremental benefit that soon passes the point of diminishing returns. In a world of finite resources, if the fabled ‘day in court’ is permitted casually to multiply into twenty days in court, the inevitable consequence is that, by the inexorable law of mathematics, nineteen other litigants are denied any time in court at all.... ”
Davis v. State,
Davis cites numerous other states that hold a contrary view to Maryland’s and invites this Court to reverse the policy decision it made nearly a century ago. We must, however, decline any such invitation. Several considerations underpin our decision to remain faithful to the Handy rule and maintain this State’s present course. First, the present-day need for judicial efficiency is even greater than it was at the turn of the
Furthermore, the trend for expansive voir dire appears to be waning. For example, prior to 1981, California followed a rule which limited the scope of voir dire to questions reasonably likely to uncover cause for disqualification and excluded those asked to aid the use of peremptory challenges. See People v. Edwards,
In 1981, however, the California Supreme Court reassessed its prior rule and abandoned the Edwards line of cases, thereby expanding the scope of permissible voir dire questioning. People v. Williams,
When the California Supreme Court discarded the Edwards rule, which had limited voir dire to grounds for cause, the court failed to foresee the effects that broadened voir dire would cause. There was a great deal of dissatisfaction with the newly expanded right of voir dire, because of the additional burdens that the Williams rule placed upon California’s criminal justice system. As one distraught trial judge wrote in the aftermath of the Williams decision:
*44 “Many trial judges have decided that if exclusion of such a question [to aid in the use of peremptory challenges, no matter how ridiculous] is grounds for reversal, it is too risky to rule out almost any line of inquiry.... In the large municipal court where I recently completed 11 years’ service, voir dire in driving-under-the-influence cases now routinely consumes a minimum of two days, frequently three. Young lawyers recite their questions from dog-eared sets of Xeroxed inquiries, sometimes hardly glancing up to the faces of the prospective jurors. When voir dire is finally over, the evidence can normally be presented in a little over a day.”
Roderic Duncan, Putting a Cap on Voir Dire, 7 Cal.Lawyer 14, 58 (March 1987).
In response to the apparent waste of judicial resources in the criminal arena, due to extensive voir dire required under Williams, the voters of California passed Proposition 115. People v. Boulerice,
*45 “In a criminal case, the court shall conduct the examination of prospective jurors. However, the court may permit the parties, upon a showing of good cause, to supplement the examination by such further inquiry as it deems proper, or shall itself submit to the prospective jurors upon such a showing, such additional questions by the parties as it deems proper....
Examination of prospective jurors shall be conducted only in the aid of the exercise of challenges for cause.”
Thus, California experimented with both forms of jury voir dire and ultimately returned to a more limited form of voir dire questioning in the criminal context. The populace clearly decided, as a matter of state law and policy, that any potential benefits to criminal defendants due to expansive questioning of prospective jurors was outweighed by the burdens imposed upon their State’s system of justice. California’s reaction to expanded voir dire reinforces our view that we should not change Maryland’s current voir dire practices.
Finally, we note that a litigant’s unbridled use of peremptory challenges has come under intense scrutiny and is the subject of some criticism. See Batson v. Kentucky,
“ ‘Never take a German; they are bullheaded. Rarely take a Swede; they are stubborn. Always take an Irishman or a Jew; they are the easiest to move to emotional sympathy. Old men are generally more charitable and kindly disposed than young men; they have seen more of the world and understand it.’ ”
Robert F. Hanley, Getting to Know You, 40 Am.U.L.Rev. 865, 865-66 (1991) (quoting The Oxford Book of Legal Anecdotes 101 (M. Gilbert 1986)).
The number of peremptory challenges available to litigants is regulated by the legislature. See Md.Code (1974, 1989 RephVol.), Courts and Judicial Proceedings Art., § 8-301. The future of peremptory challenges is a legislative question. If the General Assembly wishes to expand or contract those statutory rights or the manner in which they are exercised, it may do so. Until such time, we will continue to follow the principles adopted in Handy and Whittemore and applied consistently for the greater part of this century. See Bowie v. State,
III.
Davis’s final contention focuses upon the propriety of a portion of the State’s closing argument. At trial, Davis presented both his own testimony and the testimony of Mary Easley that he was only in the vicinity of the alleged drug sale because he was on his way to get food for his children. Easley testified that a woman identified only by her forename, Lakeesha, whom Easley stated was Davis’s wife and mother of his children, gave Davis $10 in food stamps in order to buy food for their children. No food stamps were found on Davis’s person at the time of his arrest. Although Davis did not call Lakeesha to testify in his defense, she sat in the courtroom throughout the entire trial.
In closing argument, the prosecuting attorney stated:
“Now, I think you would find something interesting in this case.
Defendant’s wife, or girlfriend, came outside and saw him with the police. Allegedly the Defendant had been given food stamps by her via Ms. Easley. She was in the house when Deon allegedly came in and said that [the] Defendant*48 had been arrested. Now this woman sat in the courtroom everyday the entire trial; she was clearly in a better position to know what happened other than Defendant. She was never called to testify.
[DEFENSE COUNSEL]: Objection.
COURT: Overruled.
[The Prosecutor continued:] She could have told you that she gave the food stamps to the Defendant. She could have told you where exactly he was when she went outside to see where he was....
Why didn’t she come in and tell you that that’s where he was as opposed to Ms. Easley who didn’t even see anything [and] stayed in the house? Doesn’t make sense.”
Davis argues that the State’s reference to his failure to call Lakeesha was improper and the trial judge erred in overruling his objection to it.
In 1975, this Court approved the general statement of the missing witness rule in the context of criminal trials. Christensen v. State,
“ ‘The failure to call a material witness raises a presumption or inference that the testimony of such person would be unfavorable to the party failing to call him, but there is no such presumption or inference where the witness is not available, or where the testimony is unimportant or cumulative, or where he is equally available to both sides.’ ”
Id. (quoting 1 Underhill, Criminal Evidence § 45 (rev. 6th ed. P. Herrick, 1973)). This Court revisited the issue in Robinson v. State,
“There is nothing mysterious about the use of inferences in the fact-finding process. Jurors routinely apply their common sense, powers of logic, and accumulated experiences in life to arrive at conclusions from demonstrated sets of facts. Even had there been no instruction concerning the*49 availability of this inference, we think it likely that among the first questions posed in the deliberation of this case would have been, ‘Why didn’t the defendant produce [the missing witness]?’ Only if, as a matter of law, the unfavorable inference could not have been drawn by the jurors would the trial judge have been authorized to prohibit the prosecutor from posing that same question in argument.”
In addressing this issue below, the Court of Special Appeals, relying upon Bruce v. State, 318 Md. 706, 729-31,
We find the trial judge did not err in permitting the State to make a missing witness argument in the instant case. Although the State could have called Lakeesha as a witness, this fact is not dispositive. As the District of Columbia Circuit Court of Appeals noted, the “ ‘availability’ of a witness to the Government must be judged ‘practically as well as physically.’ ... And whether a person is to be regarded as equally available to both sides may depend not only on physical availability but on his ‘relationship’ to the parties.” U.S. v. Young,
The very close relationship that existed between the Defendant and the potential witness was significant in satisfying the requirement that the witness not be equally available to both sides. As this Court noted when setting out the missing witness rule in both Christensen and Robinson: “ ‘The presumption or inference that the testimony of a missing witness would be unfavorable is applied most frequently when there is a relationship between the party and the witness, such as a family relationship, an employer-employee relationship, and, sometimes, a professional relationship.’ ” Robinson,
Whether labeled as husband-wife or domestic partners, the existent relationship between Davis and Lakeesha was sufficiently close that as a practical matter Lakeesha was not equally available to the State. See Hale v. United States,
Our holding here is in accord with our decision in Bruce v. State,
On appeal, Bruce challenged the State’s closing argument as improper. Bruce contended that the missing witness argument was inappropriate since the testimony of his girlfriend would have been cumulative. We affirmed the trial court, finding that the proposed subject matter of the girlfriend’s testimony, “coupled with the testimony about her close relationship to [the defendant],” was sufficient to engender a missing witness argument.
In light of Bruce, Christensen, and Robinson, the judge did not err in permitting the State to make a missing witness argument to the jury in the instant case. There was a sufficient factual basis to support the inference that Davis failed to call Lakeesha because her testimony would have been harmful. Davis made her testimony material when he testified that he was only in the area because Lakeesha sent him to the store with food stamps to get food for their children. Lakeesha could have buttressed Davis’s defense of mistaken identity. Additionally, the relationship between Davis and Lakeesha was sufficient to indicate that she was not equally available to the State. There was a sufficient factual predicate to permit the State to argue the missing witness inference to the jury. Robinson,
In contrast to the argument context is the trial judge’s instruction to the jury. In the latter case, the inference is communicated to the jury as part of the judge’s binding jury instructions, creating the danger that the jury may give the inference undue weight. At the very least, a trial judge’s jury instruction on the missing witness inference may have the effect of overemphasizing just one of the many proper inferences that a jury may draw. As a result, where the jury instruction is the vehicle by which the missing witness inference is brought to the jury’s attention, the trial court should be especially cautious and closely abide by the requirements set out in Christensen. A trial judge has discretion to deny a missing witness instruction, leaving the matter to closing arguments, even when the facts would support the inference. Robinson,
Notes
. We must also note that these required areas of inquiry were qualified under the common law. Under common law rules of voir dire, jurors need not answer any questions likely to humiliate or embarrass them. The determination of which questions needed to be answered, however, rested within the trial judge’s discretion. See J. Alexander Tanford, An Introduction to Trial Law, 51 Mo.L.Rev. 627, 638-39 (1986). Today, even where the scope of the proposed voir dire questioning is otherwise permissible but potentially embarrassing or humiliating, the trial judge should exercise discretion in structuring the questions in a manner which would avoid unnecessarily embarrassing the venire panel. Such questions should be worded in a way that potentially embarrassing responses should be given at the bench, rather than before open court.
. We note that it is not clear from the record whether Lakeesha was Davis's wife or domestic partner. While Davis’s witness, Mary Easley, and his attorney referred to Lakeesha as Davis's wife, Davis himself referred to Lakeesha only as his girlfriend. It is undisputed that Lakeesha was indeed the mother of the Defendant’s children and that he provided support for those children.
Concurrence Opinion
concurring.
I concur in the result. The Court cannot mandate the asking of voir dire questions designed to aid in the exercise of peremptory challenges because it is impossible logically to frame a limitation on the questions that a judge would then be required to ask. A peremptory challenge may be used for any reason that does not involve impermissible discrimination; thus, the field of inquiry becomes virtually unlimited.
The real problem presented by this case is the method to be used in propounding voir dire questions designed to develop information that could lead to a challenge for cause. Experienced trial counsel and judges realize that a sequence of questions is sometimes the most effective method of focusing the prospective juror’s attention on the legitimate subject matter at hand, and comfortably moving that juror toward a significant end question. More and more, our jurors serve for one trial or one day, and as a result the voir dire procedure is new to many of them. Answers to complicated and compound questions do not come easily, and a confused or nervous juror, in an environment that some may find threatening, may elect to say nothing if he or she is unsure of the meaning of the question or of the response that would be accurate. Simple, sequential questions, however, ease an otherwise difficult process, and are sometimes best calculated to produce truthful and useful information.
On the other hand, there are many questions that could qualify as potential predicate questions which, when coupled ■with others, could lead to the development of information relevant to a challenge for cause, and this Court cannot mandate the asking of all such questions. Again, there is no basis upon which to say that preliminary question “A” must be asked, but preliminary question “B” may be refused. The answer, then, lies in the ability of the trial judge to determine
It has been my experience that trial judges are quite capable of conducting effective voir dire within acceptable time limitations, and without hamstringing themselves and counsel by allowing only compound questions. Voir dire and jury selection should not be viewed as a nuisance by trial judges. It is an important part of any trial, and the trial judge should have no hesitancy in using the occasion to assist all parties in the search for relevant information.
Likewise, trial judges should not hesitate to restructure unartful questions propounded by counsel when it appears that the information sought would be relevant and the problem with the question is easily rectified. In the instant case, for example, the trial judge might well have asked the panel, in a single question, whether they or any members of their family had ever worked for a law enforcement agency, and as a result of that fact might find it difficult or impossible to render a fair and impartial verdict in the case about to be tried. The benefit of a compound question in that instance is to focus the prospective juror’s attention on a specific circumstance that experience has shown is sometimes a disqualifying factor for a juror, without taking the time to hear from each juror about his or her uncle, aunt, or sister who was a police officer. Given the questions that were asked in this case, I agree that the failure to ask that question was not error. The point I make is that trial judges, with their superior experience in hearing responses of all kinds from prospective jurors, should not hesitate to propound reasonable questions, or even to assist with the framing of a proper question, even when it would not be error to refuse to do so.
Additionally, I do not join the Court’s opinion because of the dictum which at least implicitly suggests that peremptory challenges are somehow less than desirable. I view peremptory challenges, properly used, as a valuable part of our jury system. Recent decisions designed to prevent impermissible
Dissenting Opinion
dissenting.
For the reasons set forth below, I respectfully dissent.
During the voir dire process, after the trial court had completed its questioning of the venire, the petitioner requested it further to inquire of the panel, whether any member or a close friend or relative, is or has been, a member of the law enforcement community. This question was necessary, he asserted, because, inter alia
I agree completely with the petitioner, “where ‘the sole issue ..is the credibility of [one] police officer as [o]pposed to [the defendant] a voir dire question concerning law enforcement employment or association may well lead to the disqualification for cause of one or more of the prospective jurors.’ ”
The majority correctly identifies the predominating purpose of the voir dire process: the discovery of whether cause for disqualification, which may involve uncovering bias and/or partiality, exists as to any venireperson. Majority opinion at 4-5. This purpose is, of course, served when “examination of a prospective juror ... is conducted strictly within the right to discover the state of mind of a juror in respect to the matter in hand or any collateral matter reasonably liable to unduly influence him.” Bedford v. State,
Unlike the majority, I do not construe Maryland law as requiring that the voir dire inquiry directly establish cause for disqualification. Stated differently, a question on the voir dire may be proper even though an affirmative answer is not automatically disqualifying. That is true whenever the question identifies an area of inquiry, exploration of which reasonably may result in ultimate disqualification. Nor do I read Maryland law to mean that the decision whether disqualifying cause exists is a matter to be determined by the venireperson him or herself, rather than the trial court.
In Bedford, we reviewed the nature of the voir dire examination.
If there is any likelihood that some prejudices in the jurors’ mind which will even subconsciously affect his decision of the case, the party who may be adversely affected should be permitted questions designed to uncover that prejudice. This is particularly true with reference to the defendant in a criminal case. Otherwise, the right of trial by an impartial jury guaranteed to him ... might well be impaired ...
Thus, it is clear that the defendant may benefit from the benevolent purpose of the voir dire only if the voir dire process permits the development of information relevant to cause for disqualification — only if the defendant is permitted to propound questions to the venire designed to unearth “any circumstances which may reasonably be regarded as rendering a person unfit for jury service.” Corens,
To be sure, the nature and extent of the voir dire process lies within the sound discretion of the trial judge. Langley v. State,
[I]f the religious affiliation of a juror might reasonably prevent him from arriving at a fair and impartial verdict in a particular case because of the nature of the case the parties are entitled to ferret it out, or preferably have the court discover for them, the existence of bias or prejudice resulting from such affiliation. In other words, a party is entitled to a jury free from all disqualifying bias or prejudice without exception, and not merely a jury free of bias or prejudice of a general or abstract nature.”
It is necessary that we focus more critically on the trial court’s exercise of discretion. As we have seen, and the majority does not dispute, it is the trial court that is entrusted with making the decision whether cause for disqualification exists. It is that decision to which the court’s exercise of discretion is directed and which an appellate court must review. The majority recognizes that in attempting to empanel a fair and impartial jury, the critical inquiry is directed
While professional, vocational, or social status is not dispositive of a venireperson’s qualification to serve, it does tend to prove bias; that a venireperson has been, or is, a member of the group to which the principal witness for the State belongs is relevant to the determination of that person’s partiality or bias. Thus, the prospective juror’s mindset should not be inquired into in a vacuum; instead, because it is the correlation between the juror’s status and his or her state of mind that is dispositive, as the majority also recognizes, see majority opinion at 46, when the venireperson’s status is relevant to his or her bias, the question whether the venireperson can be fair and impartial should be linked with that venireperson’s status. Therefore, while “[t]he fact that a prospective juror is employed as, related to, or associated with a law enforcement officer[, for example,] does not establish that the prospective juror has any undue bias or prejudice that will prevent that person from fairly and impartially determining the matter before them,”-majority opinion at 45, whether, in a particular case, that venireperson should be discharged as biased necessarily will depend upon the circumstances, including, in addition to the venireperson’s bottom line conclusion in that regard, as reflected in the answers he or she gives, the character and duration of the position, the venireperson’s demeanor, and any and all other relevant circumstances. In short, the trial court, being the proper authority for doing so, will determine from all of the circumstances whether “a demonstrably strong correlation [exists] between the status in question and a mental state that gives rise to cause for disqualification.” Majority Opinion at 45.
It was to allow that correlation to be explored that the petitioner proposed further voir dire. It is because the trial
Obviously prospective jurors may be struck for cause whenever they confess, for whatever reason, an inability to be fair and impartial. Indeed, disqualification ordinarily is automatic when that occurs. But surely that is not the only basis on which venirepersons could be stricken. In a proper case, where there is information from which the contrary could be found, a trial court could, on motion, strike for cause a venireperson who professes to be able to decide the case fairly and impartially. Thus, whatever the prospective juror’s response to the ultimate voir dire question, a prospective juror may, and should be, subject to challenge for cause. See
Thus, the strike for cause process encompasses the situation where the motion to strike is made on the basis of information developed during the voir dire process, not simply where the prospective juror admits an inability to be fair and impartial. In point of fact, I maintain that the voir dire process is meaningful only when it is expansive enough to allow a party — be it the State or the defense — to elicit factual information which could form the predicate for a challenge for cause. Unless the voir dire process is interpreted as requiring the trial judge to ask questions that will produce such factual information as may be relevant to the venireperson’s bias, the voir dire process will be rendered all but entirely useless. When the inquiries that constitute proper voir dire are restrictively interpreted, so that the voir dire process does not produce any information other than that which is automatically disqualifying, the defendant may be deprived of the right to a fair and impartial jury; he or she is completely at the mercy of the good faith, objectivity, and astuteness of the individual venirepersons. I believe that it is an abuse of discretion for the court to so restrict the voir dire process.
Under the rationale underlying the majority’s view of voir dire, taken to its logical conclusion, all that would be necessary to empanel a legally sufficient jury is that the trial court ask the prospective jurors whether they could be fair and impartial. Only those jurors who confessed that they could not
The jury selection process in capital cases is instructive. In Bowie, we considered the adequacy of a voir dire examination into juror attitudes concerning the death penalty. The entire voir dire examination on that issue consisted of the following:
Ladies and gentlemen, the State of Maryland has filed a request before the court that if found guilty, Mr. Damon Bowie will be put to death. Is there any member of the prospective jury panel who has any feeling whatsoever about such a request, and I don’t care which way you feel about it, that it would interfere with your ability to fairly and truly judge this matter based only on the evidence before the court?
Said another way, is there anybody in this room who has such feelings about the death penalty one way or the other way that it would affect you emotionally or to the extent that it would override your ability to judge this matter based only on the evidence brought out in the courtroom and the instructions of the court to you and the application of that evidence to the law? If you have a positive response, please stand in place.
This Court reversed. After reviewing the decisions in Witt, supra; Grandison v. State,
What occurred in the instant case is in no way similar to what occurred in Witt or in our cases applying Witt. In those cases, the basis for the juror’s conclusion and, therefore, for the court’s ruling was apparent in the record. All we have in this case is a trial judge’s propounding of a question designed to elicit from prospective jurors their bottom line conclusion as to their ability to serve on a capital sentencing jury. Once the prospective juror answered that question, i.e., indicated that, because of an inclination for or against the death penalty, they could not impartially apply the law in accordance with the court’s instruction, they were excluded without further inquiry, not even that requested by appellant, because it would have allowed the parties to “argue them out of their responses that they cannot fairly and accurately try this case.”
It is significant that the question asked was extremely broad; not only did it address both sides of the death penalty issue, but the answer to it did not provide any clue as to what caused, or causes, the prospective juror’s predisposition. Moreover, the answer to the question did not reveal whether the attitude thus expressed would, or should, result in automatic disqualification. In other words, the mere answer to the question does not provide the trial judge with any meaningful information concerning juror bias on which to act, nor does it conclusively establish juror disqualification; here, the question gives no clue and, hence, does not make apparent the nature of the juror’s apprehension or bias or indicate that automatic disqualification would be appropriate. Were we to endorse the procedure followed in this case, we would be ratifying a trial court’s shifting to the prospective jurors, themselves, the responsibility to make the ultimate decision as to their ability to serve on a capital sentencing jury, thus, allowing the court to avoid the exercise of discretion.
In Bowie, the jurors’ attitude for or against the death penalty was not automatically disqualifying, See Witt,
The voir dire actually conducted in this case is also informative. The trial court asked six questions on voir dire. Of the six, an affirmative answer to only one, namely,
“4) ... whether any of the jurors is “likely to give more or less weight to the testimony of a police officer merely because that person is a police officer,”
Davis v. State,
1) ... whether any of the prospective jurors had any knowledge or information about this particular case[;]
*67 2) ... whether any of the jurors knew a) the [defendant], b) defense counsel, c) the assistant state’s attorney, d) Officer Andrew Bratcher, the chief police investigator and only State’s witness; or e) Mary Easlay, a witness for the . defense[;]
3) ... whether any of the jurors “has been or ... has a close relative who has either been the victim of or has been charged with or convicted of a drug related crime[;]”
5) ... whether any of the jurors “knows of anything that would keep him or her from giving a fair and impartial verdict in this case[;]”
6) ... whether any of the jurors “knows of any reason why he or she should not sit on a jury in this ease[,]”
Davis v. State,
Questions 5) and 6) are somewhat different. Initially, it is to be hoped that a Court would not, without further inquiry, excuse a prospective juror who answers these questions in the
Although not identical, in the case sub judice, a prospective juror’s belief as to whether, given his or her law enforcement background or connection, he or she cannot fairly and impartially decide the case is not conclusive as to that juror’s qualification to serve. While it may be that the defendant will challenge, and the court will order, the discharge of all those prospective jurors who say that they cannot be impartial, the defendant is also entitled to explore whether those with a law enforcement connection or background, who, by their silence, purport to be able to be fair and impartial, ought, nevertheless, be disqualified by reason of bias. So, it is to allow the defendant to challenge for cause prospective jurors who do not admit partiality or bias that prompts a defendant to request that questions pertaining to the jurors’ status be asked.
I do not advocate unlimited voir dire of the kind against which the majority makes such a compelling case. My position simply is that a prospective juror’s status or attitude must be the subject of the voir dire examination when a critical witness in the case occupies that status or has that attitude. In that event, the purpose of the voir dire examination is to identify the prospective jurors with that status or attitude. This may be accomplished by expanding the scope of the voir dire somewhat; rather than the six questions the trial judge asked in this case, it may be necessary to ask an additional
I would reverse and remand for new trial.
ELDRIDGE, J. joins in the views expressed herein.
. The petitioner also argued that expanded voir dire would assist him in the exercise of his peremptories, a purpose he urges this Court now to recognize as legitimate. Maryland law, of course, as the majority points out, is to the contrary. See Whittemore v. State,
. The question at issue in this case is quite different from those sought to be asked in Handy and Whittemore, both of which I believe were correctly decided. In Handy, the defense wanted to know “whether a juror was married,” id.,
"[N]either in law nor in common sense can it be supposed that competency to judge of the effect of such provocation is found exclusively in married men, and if we indulge in speculation as to the reason behind this question, imagination can suggest none moré substantial than we have hazarded.”
Id.
In Whittemore, the question concerned the prospective juror's age and former business. In affirming the trial court's refusal to ask that question, the Court said:
The appellant here suggests, by way of illustrating the need of freedom to ask questions as to a juryman’s former occupation, that, in this instance, conceivably, he too may have been a former penitentiary guard, and because of that fact unfitted to render an impartial verdict on a charge of murder of a guard by a prisoner. But the answer to that suggestion is that if such ground for doubting a juryman’s fitness should be known, or feared, a question directed to that ground specifically would not only be proper, but in this case would probably have been asked; and if facts showed reason to doubt the juror’s fitness to sit in judgment, a challenge for cause might have been allowed.
. It may be that a motion to strike for cause may be appropriate even when the only available information is that the venireperson is, or is related to, a police officer. See Tate v. People,
. We said in Bowie v. State,
. By stressing that it would not have been error had the court asked the subject question, like Judge McAuliffe, the majority seems to be sending a message to trial judges that they should not curtail voir dire too strictly, thus muting the impact of its ruling. Implicitly therefore, the majority recognizes that the inquiry is not totally irrelevant to the exercise of the right to challenge for cause. In any event, this same message has been delivered to trial judges in the past. In fact, in both Handy and Whittemore, the Court noted the trial court's discretion to have asked the excluded question. See Handy,