Defendant was tried before a jury and convicted of two counts of violating Georgia’s Controlled Substances Act by possessing Lorazepam and possessing marijuana. Defendant was also convicted of driving under the influence of alcohol and driving without prоof of insurance. This appeal followed the denial of defendant’s motion for new trial. Held:
1. Defendant contends the trial сourt erred in denying his motion in limine and motion to suppress, arguing that the evidence support *321 ing bis convictions was obtained as a rеsult of an unlawful traffic stop.
Officer Richard Penson of the Rome City Police Department testified that he stopped defendant’s car because he noticed that defendant was not wearing the shoulder strap safety belt that was visibly provided in the car defendant was operating. OCGA § 40-8-76.1 (b) provides that “[e]ach occupant of the front seat of a passenger vehicle shall, while such passenger vehicle is being operated on a public road, street, or highway of this state, be restrained by a seat safety belt approved under Federal Motor Vehicle Safety Standard 208.” Because this safety standard does not necessаrily require shoulder strap safety belts, defendant argues that Officer Penson’s observation regarding defendant’s failure to use his car’s shоulder strap safety belt does not support probable cause that defendant was violating OCGA § 40-8-76.1 (b). We do not agree.
Although Federal Motor Vehicle Safety Standard 208 may not require shoulder strap safety belts, it is undisputed that shoulder strap safety belts are an оption under this federal regulation and that defendant’s car was so equipped. Thus, Officer Penson’s observation that defendant wаs not wearing his car’s shoulder strap safety belt supports probable cause for stopping defendant for violating OCGA § 40-8-76.1 (b). Defendant, nonetheless, argues that Officer Penson used this minor infraction as an unlawful pretext under OCGA § 40-8-76.1 (f) for stopping and harassing defendant. This Codе subsection provides that “probable cause for violation of [OCGA § 40-8-76.1 (b)] shall be based solely upon a law enforcement оfficer’s clear and unobstructed view of a person not restrained as required by this Code section. Noncompliance with thе restraint requirements of this Code section shall not constitute probable cause for violation of any other Code section.” OCGA § 40-8-76.1 (f).
“When a police officer makes a traffic stop based on his having a clear view of the occupants of thе front seat of a vehicle not wearing their seat belts, he is in the same situation as a police officer making a stop pursuant to
Terry v. Ohio,
In the case sub judice, Officer Penson testified that, after asking defendant for his driver’s license and proof of insurance, he detеcted an odor of alcohol about defendant’s “person and inside of the car.” Officer Penson also testified that, instead of producing a driver’s license, defendant gave him an identification card indicating that defendant was an employee of a local law enforcement agency. Officer Penson testified that, after instructing defendant that he “still needed to see his drivеr’s license and insurance,” defendant produced a valid driver’s license but failed to produce proof of insurance. Offiсer Penson testified that he arrested defendant after defendant admitted consuming alcohol “earlier” that evening. This testimony аuthorizes the trial court’s finding that Officer Penson’s traffic stop was not arbitrary or harassing, in violation of OCGA § 40-8-76.1 (f). “ An officer conducting a routine trafile stop may request and examine a driver’s license and vehicle registration and run a computer check on the documents. See
United States v. Guzman,
864 F2d 1512, 1519 (10th Cir. 1988). Accord
Florida v. Royer,
2. Defendant contends the trial court erred in admitting scientific reports and testimony indicating that a substance found in defendant’s possession was marijuana. Defendant argues that this evidence should have been excluded at trial beсause the State waited until the first day of trial to have the suspected marijuana tested and, thus, avoided defendant’s discovery rеquest for any written scientific reports.
OCGA § 17-16-2 (a) requires a defendant to provide “written notice to the prosecuting attorney thаt such defendant elects to have [Georgia’s Criminal Discovery provisions, OCGA § 17-16-1 et seq.,] apply to the defendant’s case.” Defеndant did not provide such notice in the case sub judice. He, therefore, cannot complain that the State
*323
waited until the first day of trial to have the suspected marijuana tested.
Wright v. State,
Judgment affirmed.