After Charlie Henry Davis was convicted of aggravated sodomy, he received a life sentence. On appeal, he enumerates four errors.
This case arose while Davis, his brother, another male codefendant, and an unidentified woman and her two young children were driving around. Davis offered the victim, who was standing at an intersection, a ride. Because the victim knew Davis, she joined the group. After dropping the woman and her children off, the three men began whispering. Davis’ brother then drove down a back country road and stopped, ostensibly for the men to relieve themselves. When the men returned, they cut the car off, locked the doors, and Davis began beating the victim’s face. He insisted she submit to intercourse, began tearing her clothes off, and continued to strike her. The victim testified that the men raped and forced her to orally sodomize them, eventually continuing outside the car when it got too hot. After several hours, the victim escaped, running naked through woods and briars until she came to a house where she received assistance.
1. Davis maintains the trial court’s exclusion of evidence of prior sexual activity between him and the victim requires reversal. We disagree.
The Rape Shield Statute bars the admission of evidence relating to the victim’s past sexual behavior unless it directly involves the accused’s participation and supports an inference that the accused could have reasonably believed that the victim consented to the conduct at issue.
Griffin v. State,
During the pre-trial hearing on this matter, Davis testified that the victim volunteered to have sex with the male occupants of the car for $10. He claimed she had waved him down before and had sex with him for money or drugs on a “heap [of] occasions.” The trial court concluded that Davis had no reason to believe the victim had consented to sex, even if she had done so' previously as Davis alleged, inasmuch as she was beaten and had to run naked through the woods for help.
In light of the victim’s testimony, the trail of clothing left near the crime scene, and the evidence of her injuries, we cannot say that Davis’ claim to prior consensual sex with her substantially supports the conclusion that he reasonably believed she consented on the night of the offense. See
Logan v. State,
2. Davis maintains that evidence of the two similar transactions was improperly admitted because their prejudice outweighed their probative value. Davis does not argue that the affirmative showings required under
Williams v. State,
We have found no authority supporting this contention. Furthermore, Davis’ intent and bent of mind and the victim’s consent were hotly contested issues which the similar transaction evidence illuminated.
Smith v. State,
3. Davis maintains that the trial court’s jury instructions on the similar transactions did not properly limit the purposes for which the evidence could be considered. Specifically, he asserts that by charging that the similar transaction evidence could be used to show the perpetrator’s identity, a fact not in issue, the trial court confused the jury.
The record shows that Davis never filed a written request for such instructions and never objected to those given. These facts undermine this enumeration.
Dunbar v. State,
Furthermore, the trial court’s contemporaneous limiting instruction substantially
4. Davis maintains that his sentence must be vacated because in imposing it the trial court considered the similar transactions. Because the law clearly permits sentencing courts to consider any evidence properly admitted during the guilt-innocence phase, we find no error.
McClain v. State,
Judgment affirmed.