Defendant appeals his conviction of two counts of violation of the Georgia Controlled Substances Act (possession with intent to distribute Phentermine (Count 1) and cocaine (Count 2)). In the companion case defendant appeals from the denial of his motion for supersedeas bond pending appeal. Held:
1. Defendant contends that the State failed to prove venue as to Count 2. Gantt, a former deputy sheriff testified that while working undercover he purchased the cocaine from defendant at his house. The crux of defendant’s argument is whether the State proved that defendant’s house was located in Paulding County.
When asked whether defendant’s house was in Paulding County, the former deputy sheriff responded, “Yes, sir. I believe it’s Paulding County area.” Defendant argues that testimony that the crime occurred in the Paulding County
area
is not evidence of venue
in
Paul-ding County. However, the former deputy sheriff had previously responded affirmatively to a query as to his having “had an occasion to go by the defendant’s house here in Paulding County.” Slight evidence is sufficient to establish venue where there is no conflicting evidence. See
Ludden v. State,
2. Count 1 of the indictment charged that defendant did “deliver, distribute and possess with intent to distribute,” a controlled substance. Count 2 of the indictment charged that defendant did “deliver, distribute, sell and possess with intent to distribute” a controlled substance. Defendant complains that the trial court charged only as to “possession with intent to distribute” and did not charge the jury as to the other means by which the crimes charged could be accomplished. Thus, defendant argues the charges were not tailored to fit the charges in the indictment.
The trial court’s duty in delivering charges to the jury is to tailor those charges not only to the indictment but also adjust them to the evidence at trial. See
Crosby v. State,
3. Defendant’s fourth enumeration of error complains of allegedly improper remarks made by the district attorney at trial before the jury. However, no objection was made at trial and we are unable to consider these contentions raised for the first time on appeal.
Harvard v. State,
4. In a
Brady v. Maryland,
5. Defendant contends that the trial court erred in restricting his cross-examination of former deputy sheriff Gantt as to the ownership of an automobile driven by Gantt. Outside the presence of the jury it was disclosed that Gantt was “presently with the FBI and DEA in a pending investigation” and would prefer not to disclose the ownership or intended use of the automobile. Defendant contends that due to evidence of the deputy sheriff’s financial difficulties the ownership of
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the automobile was relevant to the witness’ credibility. We do not agree. Law enforcement officers are commonly paid a salary and furnished with automobiles. Their dependence on such does not open the door to irrelevant inquiries. “An exercise of discretion by the trial court in excluding irrelevant evidence cannot be error and will not be error in the absence of an abuse of discretion.
Harris v. State,
6. In his seventh enumeration of error defendant raises the sufficiency of the evidence. The State’s evidence shows that defendant gave former deputy sheriff Gantt a capsule of Phentermine and that on a separate occasion the deputy sheriff purchased cocaine from defendant.
Defendant argues that the deputy sheriff has been impeached in a number of ways and that as a matter of law the testimony of the deputy sheriff cannot be believed or considered. However, the question of whether a witness has been impeached and other matters as to credibility are for the jury. We find that any rational trier of fact could reasonably have found from the evidence adduced at trial proof of defendant’s guilt beyond a reasonable doubt of the offenses charged.
Jackson v. Virginia,
7. The trial court did not err in refusing to give defendant’s requested “Charge No. 26 in regard to the law of the crime of bad check.” Defendant incorrectly argues that the bad check statute (OCGA § 16-9-20) is relevant to the matter of impeachment of former deputy sheriff Gantt. However, the uncontroverted evidence shows that former deputy sheriff Gantt was never arrested, charged or indicted for the offense of criminal issuance of a bad check. This enumeration of error is without merit.
8. Defendant contends the trial court erred in failing to give his requested charges based on OCGA § 45-12-37 dealing with financial rewards for persons furnishing information leading to the arrest and conviction of persons for selling illegal drugs. A similar charge was given by the trial court which provided the jury with substantially the same information as to the financial rewards available to the witnesses. Defendant argues that the jurors should have been informed of the financial rewards available to the witnesses in order to determine the credibility of the witnesses. The charge given by the trial court was more than adequate for this purpose. This enumeration of error is without merit.
Cohran v. State,
9. The trial court did not err in charging as to circumstantial evidence.
Barnes v. State,
10. In the companion case defendant enumerates as error the denial of his motion for supersedeas bond pending appeal and the underlying factual findings. There was compliance with the applicable procedure set forth in
Birge v. State,
Judgments affirmed.