Davis v. StateDavis v. State
- Reporters:
- ,
- Before:
- Anstead, Glickstein, Gunther (per curiam)
We sua sponte consolidate these three appeals and reverse the trial court‘s order denying appellants’ motion to suppress.
The following excerрt from the order is the focus of this appeal:
The court is troubled by Detective Robataille‘s omissions and errors in this case, but finds that these were not the result of bad faith. Since the purpose of the exclusionary rule is merely to deter the police from further invasions of privacy, a good faith exception is applicable in those cases where officers apply for and receive a facially valid warrant. Such rule from U.S. v. Leon, 468 U.S. 897, 104 S.Ct. 3405, 82 L.Ed.2d 677 (1984) and U.S. v. Williams, 622 F.2d 830 (5th Cir.1980) compels the Court to deny all the motions to suppress. Were Leon‘s good faith exception not to apply to wiretap cases, then under the totality of the circumstances the Court would suppress all taped conversation. [emphasis added]
In United States v. Leon, 468 U.S. 897, 104 S.Ct. 3405, 82 L.Ed.2d 677 (1984), the Supreme Court carved out an exception to the exclusionary rule holding that suppression of evidence obtained pursuant to a search warrant was not justified in cases where evidence is obtained pursuant to a police officer‘s оbjectively reasonable reliance on a magistrate‘s determination of probable cause even where the search warrant is ultimately found to be unsupported by probable cause. The Leon court retained the rule set forth in Franks v. Delaware, 438 U.S. 154, 98 S.Ct. 2674, 57 L.Ed.2d 667 (1978), which held that suppression remained an appropriate remedy if the magistrate or judge in issuing a warrant was misled by information in an affidavit that the affiant knеw was false or would have known was false except for his reckless disregard of the truth.
By stating that absent the good faith exception articulated in the Leon case, he would have suрpressed all taped conversation, the trial court in the case at bar was referring to the fact that the affidavit presented to secure the wiretap authorization, by virtue of its numerous omissions and misrepresentations, was unsupported by probable cause and that the other statutory violations by the police, including inadequate minimization and failure to utilize more extensive investigative techniques, compelled the suppression of the evidence. Thus, the sole issue becomes whether the rationale of Leon dealing with evidence obtained through a search warrant should also apply to cases involving evidence obtained through a court-authorized wiretap where it is found that the affidavit on which the wiretap order was based is shown to be defective, notwithstanding good faith by the police officer who drafted the affidavit.
Although Leon‘s applicability to cases involving wiretap evidence obtained on the basis of an affidavit lacking in probable cause is to be considered here for the first time in Florida, it has already been addressed in several other jurisdictions. In United States v. Spadaccino, 800 F.2d 292 (2d Cir.1986), the district court ruled that there had been a violation of the post-interception notice requirement of Connecticut‘s Wiretap Statute1 but denied suppressiоn on the basis of the good faith exception to the exclusionary rule announced in Leon. On appeal, the court held that Leon‘s good faith exception is inapplicable to excuse a violation of the state statute. In explaining its decision the court observed that in determining the nature of the rights to be protected, the conduct that constitutes a statutory violation, and the remedy warranted by a violation, “it is appropriate to look to the terms of the statute and the intentions of the legislature, rather than to invoke judge-made exceptions to judge-made rules.” (emphasis added) Spadaccino, 800 F.2d at 296 (citing United States v. Giordano, 416 U.S. 505, 527, 94 S.Ct. 1820, 1832, 40 L.Ed.2d 341 (1974)). The court cited State v. Formica2 which held that failure to meet the post-interception notice requirement of the state statute required the suppression of evidence derived from a wiretap order. Noting that the intention manifested by the legislature is entitled to deference from the courts, the Second Circuit concluded that “the district court was not entitlеd to engraft upon the notice requirement of the Connecticut wiretapping statute an exception for actions of law enforcement officers carried out in good faith.” Spadaccino, 800 F.2d at 296. While holding that Leon‘s good faith exception did not excuse the government‘s violation of the state‘s wiretapping statute, the Spadaccino court nevertheless affirmed the district court‘s denial of the motion to suppress on the basis that the rule announced in Formica should not be applied retroactively in the Spadaccino case.3 In United States v. Orozco, 630 F. Supp. 1418 (S.D.Cal. 1986), the district court rejected the Government‘s contention that Leon should extend the good faith exception to
These cases essentially hold that because Leon dealt solely with a judicially-created remedy to the judicially-created exclusionary rule, it should not be applied in a case which focuses on the legislatively-created wiretap statute which contains within itself, the statutorily-mandаted remedy of suppression of evidence for government violations of its strict requirements.
In Florida, the legislature has unequivocally announced its intention to suppress evidenсe obtained in violation of
In order to protect effectively the privacy of wire and oral communications, to protect the integrity of court and administrative proceedings ... it is necessary for the Legislature to define the circumstances and conditions under whiсh the interception of wire and oral communications may be authorized and to prohibit any unauthorized interception of such communications and the use of the contеnts thereof in evidence in courts and administrative proceedings. [emphasis added]
Suppression of evidence obtained from an illegally obtained wiretap is further mandated by
Whenever any wire or oral communication has been intercepted, no part of the contents of such communication and no evidence derived therefrom may bе received in evidence in any trial, hearing, or other proceeding in or before any court, grand jury, department ... if the disclosure of that information would be in violation of this chаpter. [emphasis added]
By setting forth in unequivocal language that the suppression of evidence is the consequence of an illegal wiretap, the Legislature removed from judicial purview, the authority to alter the statutory scheme by creating a good faith exception. It is significant to note that the Legislature has not amended the provisions requiring suppression although four years have now elapsed since the issuance of the Leon decision.
Courts have consistently construed
Based on the foregoing authority, we believe that the trial court erred in denying the motion to suppress based solely on the conclusion that Leon‘s good faith exceptiоn should extend to the probable cause requirements of
Accordingly, we reverse and remand with directions that the motions to suppress be granted in accord with the findings of fact of the trial court and the reasons set out in this opinion.
REVERSED AND REMANDED with directions.
ON PETITION FOR REHEARING
The petition for rehearing is denied. However, we certify the following question as one of great public importance.
SHOULD THE GOOD FAITH EXCEPTION TO THE EXCLUSIONARY RULE AUTHORIZED BY UNITED STATES V. LEON, 468 U.S. 897, 104 S.CT. 3405, 82 L.ED.2d 677 (1984) BE APPLIED TO THE EXCLUSIONARY PROVISIONS OF THE FLORIDA WIRETAP LAW SET OUT IN
CHAPTER 934, FLORIDA STATUTES (1985) ?
ANSTEAD, GLICKSTEIN and GUNTHER, JJ., concur.