Davis v. Stapf

(1) Has been judicially determined to be the father in an action brought the statutes relating paternity proceedings;

(2) acknowledged Has himself, in writing, father; to be the openly Has and notoriously recognized child to be child; his

(4) Has subsequently married the mother has acknowl- edged himself, orally uniting, or in to be the father. added).

(Emphases I don’t mean to conflate parenthood. these notions of My only point is the visceral one: if this divorce had case included request by Brittany for support child from Michelle as well the dispute visitation, as over the court might well have faced possibility that Michelle as qualified Jaxon’s “father” with regard support but stood as a third regard with Or, visitation. perhaps, finding “fatherhood” for support purposes might have informed the court’s circum- exceptional stances analysis. Either way, greater potential for this sort dichotomy the context of a same-sex divorce con- firms my instinct the historic treatment of same-sex parenthood longer is no up to the task.

Nancy DAVIS, et al. STAPF,

Linda et al. 2533, Sept. Term,

No. 2013. Special

Court of Appeals Maryland.

Aug. (Matthew Timothy Maloney Bryant, Joseph, M. Green- F. PA, brief), Greenbelt, MD, Laake, appellant. on the wald & (Clifford Capelle Robinsons, Lauren S. A. brief), on the Towson, MD, for appellee. KRAUSER, C.J.,

Panel: NAZARIAN, GRAEFF and JJ. GRAEFF, J.

It is a criminal offense for an adult to knowingly or willfully allow an unrelated person under the age of 21 to consume alcohol for nonreligious purposes at a residence the adult owns (2014 10-117(b) § leases. Md.Code Supp.) of the Criminal (“CL”). Law Article The question raised in this case is whether a who violates this statute has a care that can result liability civil when an intoxicated minor subsequently injured. 28, 2009,

On November 17-year-old Steven Dankos was drinking at a party. He was killed when the truck in which he riding, driven another intoxicated partygoer, crashed. Davis, Nancy individually, as Mother and Next Friend of Dankos, decedent, Steven and as Personal Representative of Dankos, the Estate of Steven appellants (collectively “Ms. Davis”), against filed suit Stapf, Linda appellee, the Circuit Court for County. Howard Ms. Stapf filed a motion to dismiss the complaint, arguing she owed no of care law, Steven under Maryland therefore, the complaint failed to state a claim upon which relief could be granted. After a hearing, granted court Ms. Stapfs motion to dismiss. appeal,

On presents Ms. Davis three questions for our review, which we have rephrased, consolidated and as follows: Did Ms. a statutory have duty to pursuant Steven 10-117(b),

to CL prohibits adult property own- ers from allowing minors to consume alcoholic bever- ages on their premises?

2. Did Ms. Stapf have a duty of care to Steven based on a

special relationship that was created when she hosted an underage drinking on her property and knowingly permitted Steven to consume alcohol? Steven, harm to prevent assume Stapf Did Ms. consuming minors were and other she knew he

where over the control exercised her property, alcohol on house, controlled at her present were who people alcohol? the flow of below, judgment shall affirm we set forth

For the reasons the circuit court. BACKGROUND AND PROCEDURAL FACTUAL the circuit propriety involves the this appeal Because dismiss, look to the we a motion granting ruling court’s in Ms. Davis’ alleged The facts in complaint. alleged facts follows. are as complaint amended first High Hill School a senior River Steven was on the football team. Clarksville, played he Maryland, where old, Kevin, who had son, years then 19 Stapf had Ms. among known residence was Stapfs Hill. Ms. River attended house,” Stapfs to Ms. due “party Hill as a River students drinking.” With underage condone “permit willingness tacit, was used her residence express approval, Stapfs Ms. con- alcohol was parties for where every weekend” “virtually by underage persons. sumed Stapfs at Ms. 28, 2009, was held November

On Stapf purchased party, to the Ms. days prior Two residence. illegally Kevin also of alcohol. worth approximately $115 maintained, and kept, The alcohol was alcohol. purchased Stapfs garage. in Ms. cooled had been next Stapf, Ms. who p.m., 10:00 approximately

At time, there were At that door, to her residence. returned driveway and on the in her parked 20 vehicles approximately people were young house. Several adjacent to her street house, large was a to her and there the street walking down garage. congregating property on her people crowd she did not know and that party, to the size of the Due asked Stapf Ms. party, who were at the people number also made leave. people to make some of Kevin including stay, could individuals call as to which judgment Erdman, David who had been drinking several hours and “obviously intoxicated.” Mr. Erdman was 22 years old at the time. Stapf requested

Ms. that one of Kevin’s friends move her truck to block driveway to discourage additional people from in the parking driveway. As a result of Ms. Stapfs intervention, a of people number left party, and a smaller group Kevin’s friends and acquaintances stayed in the garage, with Stapfs Ms. permission. Stapf,

Ms. who appeared at least four times at the garage party, observed numerous underage individuals drinking alco- hol. Despite her actual knowledge that underage persons were consuming house, alcohol at her and her ability to control, prohibit, and limit the consumption of alcohol at her residence, Ms. Stapf did not tell anyone to stop drinking alcohol, nor did any she take steps to prevent intoxication. party

While the in continued the garage, Ms. Stapf played kitchen, solitaire in the in close proximity to the garage. At approximately a.m., 1:80 Stapf Ms. asked that the music be turned down. At some in point the early hours, morning Kelsey Erdman, Mr. sister, Erdman’s younger came into the kitchen and told Ms. Stapf that she was concerned about Mr. Erdman driving his truck home. She stated that Mr. Erdman her, was embarrassing and she asked Stapf Ms. if she should drive him home. Ms. Stapf had seen Mr. Erdman consume alcohol throughout the evening, and she knew that Kelsey was concerned about his level of Nevertheless, intoxication. Ms. Stapf did not recommend that Kelsey drive Mr. Erdman home or do anything else response to Kelsey’s request for assis- tance. She did not call Mr. Erdman’s parents regarding his condition and inability to drive. Nor did she check Mr. condition, Erdman’s attempt to take his keys, or ask Mr. Erdman to stay at her residence until he was sober. Steven,

Ms. Erdman, knew that Mr. and Mr. Erd- 18-year-old brother, man’s Erdman, Thomas consumed alco- hol at her residence and were intoxicated as a result. She observed that Steven and Thomas right, tired, were “not like that, by should known Stapf knew or have

drunk.” Ms. Erdman was so morning hours of November Mr. early stand without assistance. Never- intoxicated that he could not theless, to inform them that their any parent she did not call alcohol, intoxicated, consuming were illegally children were home. also did not intervene safely could not drive She and leaving her permit any refuse to intoxicated drivers and car, were intoxicated knowing they despite residence legally operate a vehicle. safely and unable on Mr. Erdman approximately At 2:48 a.m. November with Mr. Erdman drove left the Thomas Steven. in the truck. Thomas sat front parents’ pickup his GMC seat, rode the bed of truck. and Steven passenger residence, after Mr. Erdman Shortly leaving Stapfs ejected was Folly Quarter crashed the truck on Road. Steven alcohol the truck killed. Mr. Erdman’s blood con- from and grams per at the of the accident was .21 centration time blood; legal of more than 2.5 times the limit. milliliters to blood concentration between .21 .30 Steven’s alcohol was per 100 of blood. grams milliliters 28, 2010, Stapf charged with allowing On October was § underage persons drink alcohol in violation of CL 10- to 117(b). on the ultimately placed charge The State stet docket. with, inter January charged Mr. Erdman

On was alia, committing a homicide with motor vehicle while under of He and guilty plea, the influence alcohol. entered a incarceration, years sentenced him to five all but 18 court suspended. months 27, 2012, Complaint. November Ms. Davis filed the On

On In May Complaint. she filed the First Amended I, liability, alleged Stapf, social host she that Ms. as the Count to that alcohol party, “duty host of the owed a ensure was allowing consumed with and refrain from intoxicated care to continuing such as Erdman from consume persons [Mr.] alcohol,” she all who travel on the “also owed to allowing to roadways refrain from intoxicated individuals drive a vehicle while intoxicated.” Ms. Davis alleged that Ms. breached this when she permitted Mr. Erdman to consuming continue alcohol while he was intoxicated and failed stop Mr. Erdman from driving, despite knowing that he was unable to drive due to his level intoxication. As a direct proximate Stapfs cause Ms. breach of duty, Mr. truck, Erdman crashed resulting Steven’s death. II,

In “Negligence—Duty Count to Person in Class Statute Protect,” Designed Ms. Davis alleged that Ms. Stapf Steven, owed a who was a member of the class of meant people protected by to be criminal statute CL 10- 117(b), “prohibits an adult from knowingly and willfully allowing an individual 21 years age to possess or consume an beverage alcoholic at a residence or within the curtilage of a residence that the adult owns and in which the adult resides.”1 alleged Ms. Davis that Ms. Stapf breached that duty when she permitted party to occur at her resi- dence knowing underage persons, Steven, including were illegally consuming alcohol. She asserted that Ms. Stapf knew or should have known Steven was intoxicated and unable himself, to care for and Ms. Stapfs actions were “a direct and proximate cause degree [Steven’s because death] [his] intoxication him prevented making intelligent and informed decision getting about into a vehicle with a drunk driver” and into climbing the back of a pickup truck without using seatbelt. III, Act, Count Negligence—Duty to Ms. Davis alleged Stapf,

that Ms. standing parentis in loco to Steven and other minors property, on her duty assumed a of care protect to them actions, from harm from resulting illegal her including Steven, preventing who was unable to make informed and complaint, In the Ms. Davis asserted that Steven a was member of the protected by class intended to be two other criminal statutes in addition (2014 10-117(b) Supp.) § to Md.Code of the Criminal Law Article (“CL”): § appeal, § CL 3-602.1 and CL 3-204. On Ms. Davis asserts only 10-117(b). protectee § Steven was an intended CLof There- fore, only arguments we pleadings will address raised in the 10-117(b). relating § to CL by decisions, in bed of truck driven riding intelligent Stapf that Ms. breached alleged Ms. Davis a drunk driver. getting him from prevent to: by failing duty her to Steven driver, keys confiscate by a drunk into the vehicle driven house, contact Steven’s at her drinking any individuals situation, make sure Steven inform them of to parents an informed and until he could make her house remained at her decision, leaving Erdman from prevent Mr. intelligent concerned about her that she was Kelsey after told property intoxication, a sober driver to and locate him due to driving home. take Steven wrongful claims for death and V asserted

Counts IV Stapfs negligence. on Ms. survival based on four complaint grounds. to moved dismiss Stapf Ms. (1) recognize does not “Maryland asserted: Specifically, she (2) Ms. shop liability”; Stapfs or dram liability social host did not criminal statute nonprescriptive violation of a alleged (3) did not stand in loco liability; Stapf Ms. establish tort Steven; a legal Ms. “did not assume Stapf to parentis to occur.” duty by permitting party that the court should argued Davis’ she opposition, Ms. First, motion to dismiss for several reasons. deny Stapfs to her under- Stapf she that Ms. owed argued “special relationship” on a property on her based age guests author- guests her and these as sole that “existed between party goers based that monitored the actions ity figure Second, she asserted parentis.” on the doctrine of in loco Steven, minor, of care to Stapf that Ms. owed 10—117(b), § adults from prohibits which pursuant CL minors to consume alcohol their unrelated permitting in the class of asserted that Steven was homes. Ms. Davis 10—117(b) i.e., un- designed protect, individuals CL drinkers, suffered Steven was the and the harm derage designed the statute was against of harm type protect.

Third, that Ms. assumed argued Ms. Davis garage to occur her permitted when she Steven underage persons illegally consuming where were alcohol. the asserted that Ms. assumed She party permitted minors she monitored the the when drinking. underage dismiss,

At on motion to the reiter- hearing parties in arguments presented filings. ated the the written Counsel Davis, however, for Ms. did on the expound argument that creating duty. there was a “special relationship” Counsel supported stated that the facts a basis for the existence of such a ... relationship, which characterized as loco “[w]e’ve parentis which is one relationship, recognized Maryland Brown, (Tenn. law.” Counsel cited Biscan v. 160 S.W.3d 462 2005), that the “crux and arguing special the nature of the relationship exercising asserting is one of control” and “Stapf owed a ... based on her actions of monitoring party, exercising judgment and control over who could be there, taking steps to have someone move a vehicle to obstruct facts, asserted, driveway.” Those counsel “establish[] special relationship.”

At the conclusion hearing, the court oral made findings. respect With to the liability, issue of social host court prior reviewed cases on this issue and stated that “there inis this state no liability injured social host to a who as a direct or indirect having result the host served alcohol Charles, to a quoted tortfeasor.” The Court Wright Sue & Inc., 466, 478, denied, Md.App. cert. (2000), as follows: such “Whether cause

action is necessary or desirable our democratic scheme of things ... is a people decision for the themselves to make speaking through properly legislature repre accountable Accordingly, sentatives.” the circuit court concluded “it’s clear a legal proposition simply recognize as that we don’t liability,” social host the court dismiss that aspect “would as to of it.” II, statute,

With respect Count the violation of a court argument “caught my stated that attention.” It however, that, in rejected argument, stating

ultimately Palace, Inc., 104, 906 Md.App. v. New York Veytsman (2006), that statutes imposing this Court held A.2d 1028 people alcohol to intoxicated and penalties serving criminal for liability. create civil The court further found minors do not people not a of the class of that CL that Steven was member however, that designed protect, recognizing, § 10-117 was to if looking of a sort of at the dots finding “may this be more you aspect opposed creating will a cause as proximate mean, I situation in the passive conditions.... it’s a rather was a not the unfortunately passenger sense of the decedent driver.” III, court stated tracked

With to Count which the respect in loco the court stated that “the parentis argument, only willing of in loco arises when one is parentis status ... obligations, assume all the receive all the benefits associat- standing parent,” ed with one as a natural and the court did “in setting not find that a social of a few hours.” The court it if explained might be a different situation Steven “was going guest to be weekend and there was communication ... parents parents with one set of and the set and [other] might other there be a assuming responsibilities stronger argument.” It concluded: just pled

But I don’t find as it’s here that it creates a situation of in loco or ... children who parentis up show a normal after or game football season football or after maybe after with the understand- prom type prom ing they’re going spend night something, it I may just be a different situation. don’t see it here as into in I on that falling parentis, loco so would dismiss basis also. V,

Finally, wrongful the court dismissed Counts IV and action, logic death and the survival “under the same as the 18, 2013, social based on its argument.” September host On findings, dismissing the court issued an order counts Complaint seeking damages against Ms. Davis’ First Amended Ms. Stapf.2

STANDARD REVIEW OF explained This Court has of a trial the standard review court’s order dismiss granting motion to for failure state claim upon which relief could granted: be if,

“A trial motion may grant court to dismiss when truth assuming the of all facts and well-pled allegations drawn, the complaint any inferences that may be viewing those facts most light favorable to non- moving allegations ‘the party, do state a cause action ” may which relief be granted.’ Latty Joseph’s v. St. Heart, Inc., Soc’y 254, 198 Md.App. Sacred 262-63 [17 (2011) Northeast, Md., A.3d 155] RRC BAA LLC v. Inc., (2010)). 638, 413 643 Md. A.2d The facts set [994 430] forth in complaint “pleaded must be with sufficient specificity; conclusory bald assertions and statements by RRC, pleader will suffice.” 413 Md. at 644 A.2d [994 430].

“ ” the grant ‘We review of a motion to dismiss novo.’ de (2013) Unger v. 214 Berger, Md.App. 432 [76 510] A.3d (quoting Reichs Ford Road Venture v. Joint State Roads Comm’n, (2005)). Md. 388 509 A.2d Accord [880 307] Dhanda, Kumar v. Md.App. 198 342 A.3d [17 744] (2011) (‘We review the decision to grant court’s the motion correctness.”), legal aff'd, dismiss for 426 Md. 185 [43 (2012). A.3d We will affirm the judg 1029] circuit court’s “ any ground record, ment ‘on adequately shown even one which the court upon circuit has not relied or one ” Constr., parties have not Monarc raised.’ Inc. v. (2009) Aris Corp., Md.App. [981 A.2d 822] Complaint, 2. The court ordered that Count VI the First Amended Insurance, alleged against uninsured claim motorist Erie 18, 2013, open remain and active. On December Ms. dismissed Davis 10, 2014, January against the claim Erie Insurance. On Ms. Davis filed Appeal her Notice of to this Court. Comm’rs, 578, 591 Md.App. v. Bd. Sch. (quoting Pope (1995)). A.2d 713] [665 DSFederal, Inc., 224 Md. v. LLC Telecom Process

Advance (2015). 164, 173-74, 119 App.

DISCUSSION in granting court erred that the circuit Davis contends Ms. Stapf ground on the Ms. motion to dismiss Stapfs Ms. Stapf that Ms. She asserts duty of care to Steven. owed no (1) statutory duty pursuant on: a of care based duty had a (2) the adult 10-117(b); relationship between special “a §CL her property”; minor on her host and the social care.” of a conduct, assumption constituted an “which recognize does not Maryland contends that that the liability. host She asserts of action for social cause consistently have held that mere courts Maryland appellate licensee guest liquor to a than host owes lesser social guest regardless age patron, owes to a business “in of the recent decision accordingly, light patron, LLC, Group, [433 Warr JMGM under a (2013),] to hold liable incongruous [her] it would be liability.” theory of social host claim, plaintiff must show negligence

To on a prevail “(1) was under a that the defendant following elements: (2) that the defendant injury, plaintiff (3) injury suffered actual duty, plaintiff that that the breached loss, injury proximately that or resulted the loss Warr, 433 Md. at duty.” from the defendant’s breach Inc., 353 181, Target, v. On (quoting 70 A.3d 347 Valentine (1999)). in 544, 549, 727 The motion to dismiss Md. A.2d 947 element, of care. duty on the first this case focused duty is a plaintiff of whether a defendant owes Analysis claim; legal duty, without a negligence in a step critical first that causes no conduct that breaches there can be Md. County, v. 370 Montgomery harm. Muthukumarana (2002) (“ 447, 457-58, ‘[N]egligence is a breach 805 A.2d 372 one, can be no duty, there owed to and absent

407 ”) negligence.’ (quoting County, Ashburn v. Anne Arundel 306 617, 627, (1986)). “Duty” Md. 510 A.2d 1078 has been defined “ ‘an obligation, as to which the law will give recognition and effect, to conform to a particular standard of conduct toward ” Warr, another.’ 433 atMd. 70 A.3d 347 Patton Football, 627, 636-37, Rugby USA (2004)). The a legal generally existence of is a question of law for the court to at Veytsman, Md.App. decide. 906 A.2d 1028.

Because the motion to dismiss was on based the lack of a duty, and Ms. Davis’ brief on duty, focuses the element of we will with begin below, this claim. explained, element As however, that element not in dispositive this case.

I. Shop/Social Liability Dram Host In assessing whether the ruling, circuit court erred as a law, matter of that Ms. Davis not did assert a valid cause of against action we Stapf, begin by do noting we on write a clean slate. The Maryland appellate courts re- peatedly that, law, have held under the common liability civil does not attach to vendors of alcoholic beverages or social See, hosts the torts of patrons inebriated or guests. e.g., Warr, 347; atMd. Wright, 131 Md.App. at 470-71, 749 A.2d 241. Wright, Md.App. Judge Charles Moylan, Jr.,

E. Court, writing for this discussed the evolution case, of the common law in regard. this In that 17-year-old Anthony Burch, Wright, along with 18-year-old pur- Jason chased alcohol from a liquor They store. then drove friend, Foard, Bobby home another they where consumed the alcohol they purchased. had Id. Mr. Wright subsequently away drove was killed a crash. Wright’s Id. Mr. parents against filed suit owners/operators defendant liquor alcohol, store that had sold him the as well as against parents of Mr. Foard. Id. The circuit court granted motions to dismiss in favor of all defendants. Id.

408 history shop of dram this recounted

On Court appeal, 249, 254-55, Hatfield, with State liability, beginning (1951).3 ad- Appeals of Hatfield, In the Court 78 754 for injuries liable tavern could be dressed whether served Love, illegally whom the tavern Frank a minor to alcohol, holding that the tavern Joyce.4 caused James that, other liable, although the Court noted could be held creating rights damage had civil statutes jurisdictions enacted who, alcohol, by selling injuries against for those action injury, person who caused the the intoxication of “caused” Maryland. had Id. at no such enacted statute been A.2d 754. The Court stated: statute, right no the common law knows

Apart from such, for intoxicating liquors, as against action seller or wilful person negligent whose ‘causing’intoxication of sober, beings, caused Human drunk or injury. has wrong (apart own torts. The law are their responsible statute) between a recognizes proximate no relation cause by a who has liquor buyer sale of and a tort committed liquor. drunk the it wrong

... law is not an actionable “Under common to an able-bodied give intoxicating liquors either to sell or man.” Appeals explained shop liability,”

3. The the term "dram as Court of has follows: liability” liability shop of a "[c]ivil The term "dram refers personal injury beverages for caused commercial seller of alcoholic (9th by ed. Dictionary an intoxicated customer.” Black's Law 2009). shop” archaic for a bar or tavern. Black's “Dram is an term antiquated unit of fluid 567. The term "dram” is Dictionary Law ounce, measurement, liquid equivalent eighth by used to one apothecaries; phrase shop” its "dram was a result of the use in hard the dram. fact that taverns often sold alcohol LLC, (2013). Group, n. Warrv. JMGM provided § 2B 114 at the time that it Md.Code Art years age to sell to a under 21 misdemeanor alcohol beverage. person visibly under an alcoholic This the influence of Vol.) (2011 provision currently Repl. Art. 2B is codified in Md. Code 12-108(a)(l). 254-55, Id. at 78 Court A.2d 754. The held that the tavern responsible was not for the of patron actions the intoxicated “ because common law rule holds man ‘[t]he who drank the liquor liable and considers the act it selling as too remote to be a proximate injury cause of an caused by negligent act ” 255, purchaser the drink.’ Id. at Leach, 66, v. (quoting 774, Seibel 233 Wis. 288 N.W. 775 (1939)).

In Wright, Judge Moylan noted had there been several law, attempts change to this but the Court of Appeals had so, declined to do stating that the determination whether to liability civil impose on vendors of beverages alcoholic for the of drunk patrons “clearly torts impacts on the development of the law to the relating dispensing consumption alco- beverages, subject holic long regulated pervasively by the 473, legislature.” Id. at 749 241 A.2d Felder Butler, 174, 183-84, (1981)). 292 Md. 438 494 If such a made, change should be it by should be done the General Assembly. Wright, 473, 131 at Md.App. 749 A.2d 241. Ac- Warr, 252, cord 433 Md. at 70 A.3d 347. After reviewing this history regarding dram shop liability, we held that Mr. Wright’s parents could not maintain an action against 476, liquor Wright, store. 131 at Md.App. 749 A.2d 241. The Court next turned to the action against Mr. Foard’s for parents negligently permitting deceased to consume alcohol at their residence. Id. at 749 A.2d 241. We Walker, stated that prior this Court’s decision in Hebb v. denied, Md.App. 536 A.2d cert. 541 A.2d (1988), controlling. Hebb, the Court addressed the of a liability 17-year-old social host his parents. 17-year-old boy, The while his out-of-town, parents were had a with party, nearly per- sons, uninvited, and one of the guests, intoxicated 16-year-old Walker, car, Holly flipped killing her the passenger, David 657-58, Md.App. Hebb. 73 at 536 A.2d 113. Characterizing “yet Maryland the case as another into attempt import form of Shop liability,” Dram the Court stated that it would be injuries caused host liable for a minor

“illogical hold an who was intoxicated individual a third person not be licensee would liquor when interloper party” at the 658-59, 113. The Court stated: Id. civilly liable. higher patron must owe a business “Surely a licensee liquor Yet, guest. liquor to a does a social host duty of care than seen, motor torts licensee, have liable as we Id. at 536 A.2d 113. patrons.” intoxicated his that the violation rejected argument Hebb The Court in 400A, made unlawful for a Md.Code, §27 it Art. beverage, an alcoholic years age possess a statutory civil It noted that breach of liability. created if three only following the negligence evidence of is considered “ (1) the plaintiff the was ‘a member of are met: requirements (2) to the designed protect’ the was persons class of statute “ designed the the was type must statute ‘injury suffered be “ ‘legally sufficient plaintiff presents prevent’ to statutory that the violation was evidence demonstrate ” 660, A.2d Id. at 536 injury cause of the sustained.’ proximate Trails, Inc., Md.App. 69 Pahanish v. Western (1986)). 362, 342, appel- The Court held that 517 A.2d lants failed this test for two reasons:

1) 27, 400, seq., designed et Md. Ann.Code art. The against consumption minors of alcohol. alcohol at the Holly was that Walker consumed evidence The she at Johnson’s home of the decedent. alcohol drank 2) Even if Johnson served by party; was taken her into the Walker, that factor was not the or alcohol to Ms. provided of the death of Hebb. [David] direct cause that, by stating The Court at 536 A.2d 113. concluded Id. action, it must liability if were to be a valid cause of social host legislature. by be enacted Wright,

In at this Court Md.App. “Maryland in does that the Hebb was clear: message stated The liability.” cause action social host recognize such a cause of action is neces- concluded: “Whether Court is, things, scheme of sary in our democratic desirable make, for the people speaking through decision themselves properly legislative their accountable Id. at representatives.” 478, 749 A.2d 241. Warr, recently,

More in of Appeals Court revisited the issue whether a tavern owner could be held liable for the of an In patron. actions intoxicated a four to three opinion, majority of the Court declined to recognize cause of against action a commercial vendor who sells alcohol to anoth- er person. analysis 347. The however, majority opinion, on the duty focused element of a cause of action for negligence, as to the opposed element of proximate cause. Warr, “tavern”) a patron (the of Dogfish Head Alehouse

consumed at least 17 drinks away and then drove and struck vehicle, Mr. resulting injuries Warr’s to Mr. Warr and one of his daughters and the death of his daughter. second Id. at 173-74, 70 A.3d tavern, 347. Mr. and Mrs. Warr sued the that it alleging “had breached its to ‘not furnish alcohol persons,’ intoxicated injuries.” caused their Id. at 174, 70 A.3d 347. The Court declined to dram impose shop liability on the “in any tavern the absence of owed tavern to the Warrs.” Id. at 70 A.3d 347. “

The by Court began noting general the rule that ‘there is duty no a person’s to control third conduct so as to prevent personal another, harm to a special unless relationship exists either between the actor person and the third or between the ” actor and the person injured.’ 183, Id. 70 at 347 A.3d (quoting 568, 583, Remsburg Montgomery, 376 Md. 831 (2003)). “[hjuman A.2d 18 It adhered to principle the that sober, beings, drunk or responsible torts,” are for their own 190, id. at 70 Hatfield, A.3d 347 (quoting 197 Md. at 78 754), A.2d and it held a that tavern owner not have a does of duty care to general public members of the for harm caused by patron, 183-195, a absent a “special relationship.” Id. at 70 A.3d 347. the Because Warrs did not “allege special a rela- tionship between tavern, themselves and the owners” of the

412 Warrs, to as members not a the owe

the tavern “did 195, 199, 347. at 70 A.3d public.” Id. general the argument Warrs’ then discussed the Appeals The Court the sale that, prohibiting there is a criminal statute “because owners persons,” “the tavern visibly intoxicated of alcohol at Id patron.”5 to serve an intoxicated a to refuse owed the Court rejecting argument, 347. that 70 A.3d liability that, extrapolated it had “not civil historically, stated alcohol,” noting sale of regulating the from criminal statutes 183-84, had that, Felder, the Court at criminal the of this rejected argument the that existence liability civil because statute was sufficient establish liability.” Id. impose not laws to civil legislature “had enacted that, to 197-98, explained impose Court at 70 A.3d 347. The statute, a criminal must liability on the of a civil basis “ ‘(a) designed or violation of a statute ordinance show plaintiff, persons which includes protect specific class (b) injury com- proximately caused the violation ” Brooks, at of.’ Id. A.3d 347 plained 616). criminal The Court stated designed not on the Warrs was statute relied It explained: if specific persons. class prohibiting sale of alcohol and regulating statutes The were enacted “for visibly its to those intoxicated provision health, people safety welfare and protection, Vol.), (1957, Repl. Article Maryland this State.” Code l-101(a)(3). 2B, establishes that jurisprudence Our Section not sufficient to create class of individuals is general this because, required “we the statute always tort have acts that mandatory to set forth allegedly ordinance violated persons class of clearly protection particular for the are Thus, ... merely public not for the as a whole.” the sale of alcohol prohibiting of criminal statutes existence Vol.) 12-108(a)(l) (2011 Repl. Maryland 2B states that Code Art. "(i) may sell alcohol: To a licensed vendor of alcohol any underage person’s own or for the use of years age for the use who, sale, (ii) any person time or person; at the of other To beverage.” visibly any delivery, influence of alcoholic is under the to support intoxicated individuals not sufficient liability case, in the instant identify because the statute does not a particular protectees. class 198-99, at 347 (quoting

Id. A.3d v. Chesapeake Wietzke Ass’n, 388, (2011)). 355, 421 Md. 26 A.3d 931 Conference Accordingly, the held that Court the tavern “did not owe a Warrs, duty to the as the general public.” members of Id. at 199, 70 A.3d 347. The further that Court stated it with agreed words Supreme Court of Delaware that “the deter- impose mination whether to liability on tavern owners injuries caused intoxicated involves patrons significant public policy considerations and is best left to the General Assembly.” 199, at Matassa, Id. A.3d 347 Shea v. (Del.2007)).6

II. Ms. Davis’ Contentions Ms. Davis acknowledges precedent, the above and she does argue that Ms. had a to Steven under a theory contends, however, common law social host liability.7 She Ms. Stapf that had a statutory duty pursuant Steven to CL 10-117(b), separate which “arises apart the com- dissent, Judge Sally Judges Adkins authored in which Harrell and joined. respect McDonald With to the issue whether tavern owed a Warrs, duty of "special care to stated dissent relation- ship” play only doctrine "comes into when the actor's conduct is Warr, passive,” 433 Md. at 70 A.3d and because the Warrs tavern, vendor, alleged actively that the a commercial created risk of serving visibly harm in patron, intoxicated the Warrs stated claim 220-237, had tavern reasonable care. Id. willingness prece- 347. The dissent further indicated a to overrule the (1951), Hatfield, dent from State v. 197 Md. 78 A.2d 754 and Felder Butler, (1981) that, law, as a matter providing proximate injury occurring alcohol is not the cause of as a Warr, result the intoxication of the served. 433 Md. at 237- 253, 70 A.3d 347. contest, therefore, 7. Ms. Davis does not the circuit court's dismissal of I, alleged negligence theory Count which of common law liability. social host 414 that She also asserts liability. host governing law” social

mon illegal consumption the and facilitate hosts that furnish “social special relationship a duty a based on by minors owe of alcohol Ms. as- she contends that Finally, minors.” these to to occurring harm from prevent of care to sumed a permitting s affirmative acts of Steven, “Stapf that Ms. stating to minors by permitting house and to occur her party the a triggered amounts of alcohol massive consume arguments. these We turn to address care.” reasonable A. Statutory Duty against that rule social argues general Davis because, even in the here liability applicable is host a may impose duty a duty, of a common law statute absence to “the often referred as principle, on a defendant. This care that, Rule,” there is provides or “where Statute Ordinance protect a class of statutory designed scheme applicable “defendant’s plaintiff,” which includes the persons ordinance,” and ordinarily prescribed by ‘is statute’ ordinance is itself evidence of of the statute or “violation Paul, 111, 100, 438 Md. P’ship Blackburn Ltd. negligence.” Inc., III, Realty (quoting Brooks v. Lewin 90 A.3d (2003)). 70, 78, liability For civil to be 835 A.2d 616 statute, a must show the on the basis of imposed following:

(a) designed ordinance the violation a statute or the plain- which includes specific persons class protect (b) tiff, proximately injury caused that violation is deter- of. “Proximate cause established complained persons within the class mining plaintiff whether of kind harm suffered is sought protected, be * * * prevent. statute to the drafters intended the relationship of this cause and effect It is existence evidence prima violation of statute makes the facie negligence.” Brooks,

Id. at 378 Md. at 616). Warr, Accord Md. at 70 A.3d 347.

Protection of a Particular Class of Persons Blackburn, the Court made limited; clear “the Statute or Ordinance Rule” is it applies only designed particu- when the statute is persons merely lar class of and “not at In public the large.” case, three-year-old that Christopher suffered a severe brain injury nearly after he in an apartment complex pool. drowned Christopher’s Id. at 90 A.3d 464. mother filed suit others, against apartment the owner of the and complex, who they that argued because, were entitled to summary judgment alia, therefore, inter a Christopher trespasser, was and they 105-06, only owed a limited to him. Id. at duty 90 A.3d 464. whether, Court The addressed in addition to the limited duty law, imposed by the common a petitioners duty had pursuant regulations set forth in the Code of Maryland Regulations (“COMAR”) regarding 118-22, pool barriers. Id. at

The Court first regulations looked to see who the were to protect. enacted It that concluded were they enacted to the health safety of at pools, individuals arid in particular, regulations the identified a particular class be i.e., protected, age children under the of five. Id. at 90 A.3d 464. Christopher years Because was three at old the accident, of time the a protected he was member of the class. Id. at A.3d pursuant 464. Accordingly, to the Statute Rule, or Ordinance Christopher because a of was member of persons class regulations, identified allegedly and he injuries sustained that the statute was intended to prevent, of alleged reasonable trier fact could find that the violation of requirements COMAR showed a of breach that petitioners Christopher. owed Id. The Court held that the “the common-law rule that a landowner owes limited Rule.” or Ordinance trumped was the Statute

trespassers Id. 90 A.3d 464. at indicated, Warr, 198-99, as that a statute will create a tort similarly

Court noted criminal class protection particular if it is for the of only enacted case, § that 2B 12- In that the Court held Art. persons. 108(a)(1), visibly alcohol to intoxicated preventing sale of not the statute satisfy requirement did this because persons, State,” a “the protection people for the this enacted general class individuals. mind, argu- we Ms. Davis’ background

With that assess applies ment the Statute or Ordinance Rule here. CL provides 10-117 as follows: (a) Furnishing alcohol.—Except provided as in subsec- (c) section, person may of this furnish alcoholic tion beverage to an individual if: knows person furnishing beverage alcoholic years; of 21 age the individual

(2) the alcoholic is furnished for the beverage purpose consumption by the individual under the age years.

(b) possession consumption or alcohol.— Allowing (c) section, in adult Except provided as subsection of this an knowingly willfully allow an individual under may age years actually possess of 21 or consume residence, at a or beverage curtilage alcoholic within that the adult or and in residence owns leases adult resides.

(c) Exceptions.—(1) The set forth in subsec- prohibition (a) apply person tion of this section does not if the furnish- beverage the alcoholic and the individual to whom the ing beverage alcoholic is furnished: (i) are family, members the same immediate alcoholic is furnished and consumed in a beverage private residence; curtilage residence or within the of the or (ii) participants religious ceremony. are in a (2) (b) prohibition The set forth in subsection of this section does not if apply allowing the adult the possession or consumption of the alcoholic beverage and the individual under the age years who possesses or consumes the alcoholic beverage:

(i) are members of the same immediate family, and the alcoholic beverage possessed and consumed in a private residence, or residence, within the curtilage of the adult; or

(ii) are participants a religious ceremony.

An adult § who violates CL 10-117 “is guilty of a misdemean- (1)

or and on subject conviction is to: a fine not exceeding $2,500 offense; for a first $5,000 a fine not exceeding for 10—121(b).8 second or subsequent § offense.” CL 10—117(b) argues § Davis that CL meets the first requirement of the Statute or Ordinance Rule it because was “ ‘designed protect a specific class persons which includes ” Blackburn, the plaintiff.’ 438 Md. at 90 A.3d 464 (quot Warr, ing 347). 433 Md. at In support she states: The legislative histories leave no doubt about the purpose of this enactment: minors from being served alcohol at homes other than their own. Its enactment was motivat- ed by prevalence of house parties where parents adult permitted minors to come into their homes and drink alco- hol, often resulting serious injury or death. legislature (a) enacted subsection of what is now CL 10-117, prohibiting person furnishing persons alcohol legal drinking under the age. 1988 Md. Laws ch. 3120. The purpose of loophole this statute was to close a in the law where licensed beverages sellers of alcoholic guilty were of a selling misdemeanor person to a person purchase but a liquor could for the under-21 and not be held accountable. See Senate Judicial Proceedings Report, (Md. Leg. Committee Floor 1988 410th Sess. 1988). 1996, (b) currently In what is § subsection of CL 10-117 was enacted, prohibiting knowingly allowing an adult from under years age 21 possess of or consume beverage an alcoholic in the 441, residence in which the adult resides. 1996 Md. Laws ch.

418 was within the 17-year-old Steven Davis asserts that

Ms. i.e., years age 21 of at under individuals protectees, class of of a unrelated adult. the home 10—117(b) § that “CL contends disagrees. She persons, class of but specific protect not enacted

was people welfare of the general the promote instead to liability may imposed civil not be accordingly, Maryland argues She of a violation of this statute.” on the basis to minors or the of alcohol regulating provision “statutes the as a protect public meant to intoxicated individuals are associated with alcohol con- dangers from the various whole Warr, 433 individuals.” She cites irresponsible sumption by that, 347, 198-99, for the proposition “[w]here 70 A.3d general public, of the is enacted for the benefit a statute that violation of the statute can- dictates Maryland precedent liability.” civil used to establish be enacting purpose intent assessing legislative 10—117(b), first to the of the statute. language § we look CL Alizadeh, 213, v. 435 Md. Mummert See (2013) (“To Assembly, of the we ascertain the intent General normal, meaning language of the of the begin plain with the statute.”). Here, statute plain language suggests 10-117(b) persons § to protect that the of CL purpose to be too immature to age who are deemed under v. consequences drinking. Congini See appreciate Co., 504 Pa. 470 A.2d Portersville Valve “incompetent under 21 to be persons has deemed (legislature alcohol”). to handle the affects however, unambigu is not clear and language, Because the 10-117(b), enacting CL we regarding purpose ous Recovery Lien history. See Allstate & legislative look to (2014), 575, 585, 101 A.3d 520 Stansbury, Md.App. Corp. (2015). A review of granted, cert. designed that the statute was legislative history this reveals i.e., age persons specific persons, class of an to drink at home knowingly permitted of 21 who are nonreligious purposes. unrelated adult file The bill for HB 267 that the of reflects 1996 enactment 10-117(b) §CL was related to tragic 15-year-old death Fouts, who, after Tiffany drinking becoming and semicon- scious, raped ultimately and died.9 Gail H. Ewing, Presi- Council, dent Montgomery County submitted letter of HB support stating that tragic story involving “[t]he Fouts, drunk, die, Tiffany raped who was and outside left shows the consequences ignore adults who underage drink- ing By in their making responsible homes. adults legally for alcohol, minors allowing possess or consume this bill serves as a deterrent to underage drinking.” from H. Letter Gail President, Ewing, Council, Montgomery County to Hon. Jo- Vallario, Jr., (Feb. seph Chairman, F. Judiciary House Comm. (on 1996) (Md. file Bill HB Legislative Services File 1996)). The bill also file refers to Baltimore Sun newspaper article titled “Teen’s death provides impetus for drinking bill.” Ruhl, bill, Sherrie death provides impetus Teen’s drinking 7, 1996, Jan. (http://perma.cc/U4MD-CH43). 3B Sun, Balt. Moreover, a from Academy letter the American of Pediatries supporting the bill noted that underage drinking endangered Stern, MD, teens. Letter Chair, from Melvin Legislative Committee of Maryland Chap, Academy the American Vallario, Jr., Chairman, Pediatrics to Hon. Joseph F. House Appeals 9. The surrounding Court of summarized the facts her death subsequent involving response civil operations case of the 911 that, 11, 1995, center. It stated Tiffany on November Fouts and house, boys friend went to Eric present, F.'s where three other were mother, along with Eric’s Montgomery Tresa F. Muthukumarana 447, 457-58, County, (2002). This Court ex- plained: arrived, Shortly Tiffany after and beverages Melanie "alcoholic were made and available consumed all of” the minors at the hour, Tiffany home. Within began one to vomit and "became semi- time, guests engaged conscious.” At that "certain in nonconsensual head, Tiffany,” "heavy acts dropped objects” sexual with on her condition, upon Tiffany’s "urinated her.” In an effort to conceal Eric dragged F. and Donte through W. her outside of the home shirt, socks, skirt, They Tiffany, wearing only basement. "left a tee shoes, directly in an area woods located behind town- home.” Id. 1996) (on (Jan. 30, Legislative file Services Judiciary Comm. 1996)). (Md. A concern with general Bill File HB 267 more reflected in a letter young protecting people Coalition, which Prevention Drinking Maryland Underage feel that this bill will strongly “Coalition members stated: reducing the number adult great purpose by serve resulting often drinking parties and underage sanctioned young Letter deadly consequences people.” to our Holmes, Maryland Dir. of Underage Bonnie M. Exec. the Vallario, Jr., to Hon. F. Drinking Joseph Prevention Coalition 1996) (on (Feb. Chairman, Judiciary House Comm. file (Md. 1996)). Bill HB 267 Legislative Services File history, this conclude that legislative Based on we the 10—117(b) young § for was to protect people CL impetus immature age the who are deemed to be too to under dangers from the consequences drinking, the appreciate this legislators by to The to do relating drinking. sought knowingly people’s other discouraging allowing adults from such, § to drink in their As CL 10- children alcohol homes. i.e., designed specific persons, 117 was class of protect of 21 who are persons age knowingly permitted the nonreligious drink at the home of an unrelated adult for purposes. § 10-117 is more than the significantly

CL limited statutes Warr, regulated involved and the sale of Hatfield by enacted for alcohol commercial vendors were “people purpose protecting State.” Code Vol.) (2011 Warr, 2B, l-101(a); § Art. Repl. § designed

70 A.3d 347. 10-117 was Because CL class of and Steven was a member this specific persons, class, protected prong the first Statute Ordinance Rule is satisfied. District a similar Appeal applied

The Court of Florida (Fla.Dist.Ct. analysis Haffner, Newsome v. So.2d case, injured by estate minor of a App.1998). gunshot brought against self-inflicted wound a civil suit social The circuit court dismissed the com- residential host. it plaint, ruling that failed to state a cause of action. The reversed, appellate court holding that a claim for negligence properly made upon based a violation of “open house party” statute. This statute made it a crime an adult having control of a residence to

“allow an open house party place to take at said residence if any beverage alcoholic or drug possessed or consumed at said by any residence minor where the adult knows that an alcoholic or beverage drug is in possession of or being consumed a minor at said residence and where the adult fails to take steps reasonable to prevent possession or consumption of the alcoholic beverage drug.” (1997)). Id. at 185 (quoting Fla. Stat. 856.15 The court stated that this statute was “clearly designed protect minors from the harm that could result from the consumption of alcohol or drugs by those who are too imma- appreciate ture to potential consequences.” Id. It held that, by statute, enacting the legislature “the has therefore imposed a duty of care on hosts and created a civil cause social of action for a statutory violation.” Id. at 186.

Other courts similarly have held that a statute prohibiting furnishing alcoholic beverages to a 21 person under years of age was meant to protect specific persons class of “against a particular hazard, i.e., the dangerous effects of intoxication of See, those” Gensel, under 21. e.g., Longstreth v. 423 Mich. 675, (1985). 377 N.W.2d 812-13 Accord Hansen v. Friend, (1992) (statute 118 Wash.2d 824 P.2d prohibiting furnishing liquor to any years of age, protects a minor’s health and safety interest from the minor’s own inability to drink responsibly, imposes duty of care on minors). social hosts not to serve liquor

Having found that the first of prong the Statute or Ordi- satisfied, nance Rule was turn we to the second of prong rule, i.e., that harm suffered Steven is the kind that the General Assembly intended the prevent. statute to Cause

Proximate The of the Statute or Ordinance Rule prong second was the violation of the statute showing that requires As has injury. Appeals cause the Court proximate explained: by determining whether the

“Proximate cause is established protect- to be persons sought is within the class plaintiff ed, is of a the drafters and the harm suffered kind which * * * It is the existence of prevent intended statute relationship and that makes the violation of this cause effect prima negligence.” a statute facie evidence Brooks, Blackburn, 616). below, explained As we conclude Md. at the harm here is the kind that the drafters suffered to prevent. intended indicated, history that the legislative purpose

As shows minors, of the statute was to who are too immature to alcohol, danger risky handle the from behavior affects Here, intoxication with intoxication. ex- associated Steven’s that, tragically, him to was fatal. The harm to posed danger Steven, which is to have resulted from Steven’s im- alleged intoxication, kind that paired judgment due to was the intended As Davis states her prevent. drafters brief, placed position Steven’s intoxication him in a unrea- peril: sonable prevented intelligent in- making

Steven Indeed, leaving night. decision formed about intoxicated, not have had Steven been he would ridden truck that was he in a with a driver so intoxicated could certainly would climbed into the barely stand. He not have truck, of a fallen and allowed intoxi- pickup asleep, back away high driver to the truck at a rate of cated later drive truck, while he rear of the a speed lay unprotected of great peril. position

Given our conclusion that a Steven was member of a particular persons sought class of to protected, be the harm suffered the kind that drafters of the statute intended to and that prevent, alleged Ms. Davis that Ms. Stapf knew that Steven and unrelated drinking other minors were at her reasons, for non-religious home we concluded that Ms. Davis alleged properly § that Ms. had a under CL 10- 117(b) to exercise reasonable care to stop underage drink clear, and minors. ing however, those We make that a 10-117(b) duty pursuant to only CL will be found when an adult knowingly willfully and allows an unrelated individual age under the of 21 drink to alcohol at his her residence. The Statute or Ordinance Rule apply does not a impose on an adult persons when under 21 drink alcohol residence without the adult’s knowledge.

Ordinarily, this analysis, based on we would find that Ms. Davis has set forth a prima negligence facie case of sufficient against it prevail motion dismiss was for the trier (1) of fact if determine: Ms. Stapf violated the duty by statute; so, if imposed whether violation was a proximate injuries. cause of Steven’s Pittway Corp. See v. Collins, 253, (2009) (“It is well that, established ‘unless facts admit of but one inference ... of proximate determination ... cause is for the ”) Reicher, jury.’ Caroline v. (1973)); Hines, Macleary 817 F.2d 1084-85

(3d Cir.1987) (whether social host’s conduct was cause of injury, alleged where minor that his condition impaired caused him to create an unreasonable risk of harm to himself accepting person ride with a so obviously intoxicated that a ride, reasonable not would have accepted was a question clear, This Court jury). however, has made principle violation of a statute is evidence of evidence, is a negligence rule of of a the creation substan Co., tive cause of Joseph Mgmt. action. v. Bozzuto (2007). Md.App. 325, 918 A.2d 1230 Because the Court of has held Appeals that there no cause of action for social host 424 Davis has stated cause we conclude that Ms.

liability, cannot action. of law, held, a matter of that “the has as Appeals

The Court of it providing is and the act of liquor who drank the liable” man of Hat proximate injury.” cause an is “too remote to be Warr, Accord 433 at 197 Md. at 78 A.2d 754. field, (common J., 202-03, (Adkins, law dissenting) 70 347 A.3d “ theory on the shop liability predicated ‘was precluding dram serving alcohol was the drinking rather than the of that ” “ intoxication,’ of legal of and ‘the chain proximate cause of negligent serving an alcoholic bever causation between by voluntary was the customer’s age injury and severed ”) alcohol.’ A. drinking act in al., et Frank Sloan Balancing Drinkers, Drivers, And Private Bartenders: Accountability Hebb, (2000)); 73 Public Choices (providing at alcohol minor Md.App. Pursuant to passenger).10 driver not direct cause death Davis, law, not a matter of has shown precedent, this as support negligence her proximate the element of cause claim. that, could that argue precedent, holding

One this when “ordinary with bodied it is the dealing [person], able thereof, rather than the that consumption furnishing of alcohol is distin- proximate any subsequent damage” is the cause dealing age with under the of 21. guishable persons when per- Assembly that the has determined these Given General alcohol,” to be handle the affects of “incompetent sons that Congini, argued persons it could be Hatfield, by patron of the intoxicated the tort committed here, Steven, opposed as tavern. That Erdman was the driver Mr. analysis. significant Supreme Delaware to the As the Court of has explained: is, (that reasoning consumption Using alcohol similar proximate resulting injuries), any not the sale thereof is cause injured majority patron jurisdictions has who is determined voluntary does a cause as a result of his intoxication not have against operator at law. action the tavern common (Del.1981). Wright Moffitt, Miller Accord v. Inc., (Utah Gastronomy, Ct.App.2005). 110 P.3d under 21 qualify “ordinary persons. do not as able bodied” case, This Court is not able to make distinction in this however, given that the served the alcohol Hatfield made, was a minor. To extent such a distinction should be it must of Appeals be made the Court or the General Assembly. 10-117(b) §

Accordingly, although this Court holds that CL imposed a on Ms. duty Stapf, sufficiently and the complaint alleged a of duty, given violation this of Appeals Court precedent regarding proximate cause, the issue of we cannot say that Ms. Davis of stated a cause action based on CL 117(b). II, circuit court properly The Count dismissed alleging negligence based on the violation of a statutory duty.

B. Special Relationship Ms. next argues Davis that Ms. a Stapf duty had care to Steven based on a “special relationship” she estab lished when party she hosted a at her permitted residence and minors and underage individuals consume alcohol. She asserts that required this Stapf “to exercise reason able protect care to Steven and the other minors in her harm,” residence from including “contacting or the [Ms. Davis] other parents of the children at the night.” house that Ms. Stapf contends that Ms. Davis failed to preserve her claim that there “special was a relationship” because Ms. Davis’ argument in circuit court was on based the doctrine of in parentis. loco sure,

To be the focus of complaint was Ms. Stapf “owed duty’ a special because “stood in an in parentis she loco Steven.” relationship with At the on hearing the motion to dismiss, however, counsel for expounded Ms. Davis on the argument, stating that there was a “special relationship,” which ... as in parentis “[w]e’ve characterized loco relation- ship, recognized is one Maryland law.” Counsel Biscan, cited 160 S.W.3d at which addresses whether an adult allowing a minor to drink alcohol a duty has to the minor the facts in argued a and he special relationship, on

based issue special relationship.” The this case “establish[] sufficiently relationship preserved special based on a our review. “ rule that a ‘is under no general

The by ... acts third special protect another ” statutes, relationship.’ a special or person, the absence (2012) State, (quoting v. 38 A.3d 418 Pace Servs., 382 Md. Mary’s County Dep’t Soc. Horridge St. (2004)). 170, 183, ‘special creation of “[T]he relationship’ can be “established duty’ by ‘special virtue of (1) relationship between either the inherent nature by (2) undertaking one or parties; upon inducing thus often reliance party, assist other Patton v. States acting party.” the conduct of the United Football, 627, 639, Rugby America 18). 589-90, Remsburg, 376 Md. at respect to the first the inherent nature prong, With that can rise to relationship, “special relationship” give a (1) special for a a liability party actions of third includes: the the “which relationship person, actor and third between a the to control third duty upon person’s actor imposes (2) conduct”; actor special relationship a between the and duty a on the actor to person injured, creates State, 447, 473, v. the third Pendleton 398 Md. protect party. Hopkins, Lamb (1985)). 242, 492 A.2d 1297

Here, that Ms. had a Stapf special Ms. Davis does assert Rather, Ms. relationship Stapf with Steven. she asserts that duty a to on her special relationship had care Steven based him. adult host with asserts that social that “[a]n She serve[s], illegal consumption permits, or facilitates relationship a to property special alcohol on adult’s creates onto adult property, proper- the minors who come minors care.” ty duty owner these a owes a support argument special In of her that Ms. had a her to relationship imposed with Steven that on Steven, Davis cases in jurisdictions cites other that have adult had a duty held that an social host of care to minors who to drink on on permitted illegally property were their based a special relationship between the social host and minor. Biscan, in 466-67, For example, 16-year-old S.W.3d at injured Jennifer Bisean was a acci- single-car automobile adult, dent a leaving party Worley, after hosted Paul home. Worley’s finding Worley Id. that had a special to protect minors at the Court of Supreme Tennes- that, immaturity see stated their and inexperience, “because of duty may exist minors it might towards where not exist towards Id. at adults.”

The court evaluated several factors—public policy, foresee- ability, ability and means and to control the third party—in determining Worley relationship whether had a sufficient Biscan, guests, including his minor such he owed her a duty. public that, Id. With court respect policy, the found generally prohibited because minors are alco- consuming hol, and public policy considerations favor imposing act protection for the of minors a duty where such be might adults, absent dealing when with that factor weighed favor of finding special relationship. Id. at respect 480-81. With that, to foreseeability, the court concluded because it was drive, that guests foreseeable drink would it also was that guests foreseeable would ride with drivers who been had thus, drinking; weighed factor in favor of finding special relationship. respect Id. at 481. With means and ability party, that, to control the third the court concluded Worley, an adult host was “in of party who charge” held minors, “certainly ability has some to control the conduct of his guests,” which have may preventing included access to their contacting parents cars or of intoxicated guests. Id. Concluding 481-82. that these supported finding factors a that, of a special relationship, Worley the court held because “knowingly permitted and facilitated alco- consumption minors, act, hol a illegal Worley duty had to exercise care to his prevent guests reasonable from third harming persons or from harm befalling themselves.” Id. at 482. (“As (R.I.2005) Marciano, Martin

Accord illegally alcohol to have made alleged host who is a party ‘the plaintiff owed defendant underage guests, available harm protect care to [him] reasonable exercising duty or other [guests] hands of fellow attack at the and criminal Speiser ”) al., M. persons.’ et The third Stuart (1985)) (footnote 9:20, at 1125 Torts Law of American omitted). here, that an adult who presented argument

The 21 to drink person an unrelated allows knowingly with relationship a special home assumes in his or her alcohol care, one. intriguing is an duty a that imposes because, similar not, however, the issue resolve needWe the Court of duty, if there was even argument, previous law, drinking is the held, matter of as a has Appeals furnishing not the injury, any subsequent cause of proximate Accordingly, the (or of the alcohol. consumption) allowing III, asserting that Ms. dismissed Count properly circuit court relationship, on a special of care based duty assumed a Stapf parentis argu an in loco characterized as Ms. Davis ment.

C. Assumption Duty Of that Ms. owed argument final Ms. Davis’ she “assumed of care because Steven minors knowingly permitted she minors in her care when Steven, individuals, prop to enter her including underage garage.” in her amounts of alcohol large and consume erty Biscan for the again Davis cites of her Ms. support argument, permitting that, affirmative actions by her proposition minors to consume permitting to occur her house alcohol,” of reasonable care “massive amounts exer Moreover, Stapf “specifically because “triggered.” and who was of alcohol consumption cised control over “these minors she owed property,” to be on her permitted duty of care.” that,

Ms. does not Stapf dispute general proposition another, when a acts for the benefit of he must act contends, however, carefully. Stapfs acquies- She Ms. to underage drinking cence was not an act which she care, “assumed a and to hold otherwise would abrogate Maryland the common law rule that not recognize does social liability.” host

Although generally there is no to act for the person, generally benefit of another “when one does indeed act another, for the benefit of he must act in a [or she] reasonable Muthukumarana, manner.” 370 Md. at 805 A.2d A 372. however, reasonably, to act is conditioned an affir upon Id. mative act being taken. 805 A.2d 372. For example, where a places tavern owner patron unconscious horses, in a sleigh and starts the he has undertaken a duty to injured party by third actually placing the patron Warr, transport it starting home. 433 Md. at Here, Ms. affirmatively did act to protect Steven Rather, from death. she acquiesced to underage persons drinking alcohol at her home. That acquiescence does not equate to assumption duty. reason, For this as well as cause, the lack of proximate discussed, as previously Davis no states cause of action against Ms. Stapf on this ground.

III.

Conclusion precludes Precedent a conclusion that Ms. Davis stated a cause of against action Ms. Stapf negligence. The circuit court properly granted Ms. Stapfs motion to dismiss complaint.

JUDGMENT AFFIRMED. BE PAID BY COSTS TO APPELLEES.

NAZARIAN, J., concurring. solely express and write join opinion,

I the Court’s leaves the opinion where this view about slightly different view, and in a break my law forward. going state of the n.10, n.10, at 908 at 424 120 A.3d op. see majority’s, with the to the significant was the driver is that Mr. Erdman the fact the is the fact that breaks case because that analysis of this here, holding and the source chain. Our proximate-causal identified, this situation distinguishes have duty we in that could way host case a shop dram or social typical different facts. slightly in case with matter another majority liability host cases In dram and social shop discusses, duty and the analytical path between correctly decision, intervening interrupted by injury at issue is v. decision to drive. Warr always the drinker’s almost LLC, (2013), 70 A.3d 347 to cite Group, JMGM Appeals “de- example, the Court only the most recent Head liability Dogfish [Ale- on impose shop to dram cline[d] Warrs,” the owed to the any in the absence house] customer hit and killed of the driver the Alehouse’s survivors 177, 70 347. The Court held— way home. Id. at A.3d on his reiterated, who alcohol really—that provides tavern owner “[a] not control over the patron an intoxicated does exercise driving walking, example,” in or patron, conduct of the foreseeability, does exist any “regardless by harm caused a third respect with general public, between special relationship the existence of a party, absent injured person or the sued and sued and the 183-84, principles at 70 A.3d 347. These party.” the third Id. new, our courts have them consistent- nothing applied are see, Hatfield, 197 ly shop, e.g., in the dram State both Charles, (1951); 249, 254-55, Wright v. Sue & (2000), 466, 478, 241 and social Inc., Md.App. 131 Walker, See, 658- Md.App. Hebb v. e.g., host contexts. (1988). A.2d 113 however, case, or social host shop dram typical Unlike contrary, To the we duty. not fail for lack of this case does held, I now have and wholeheartedly agree, that Steven Dankos1 was member of the class the Assembly General (2002, Vol.), Repl. § intended Md. Code 10-117 of the (“CL”) Criminal Law Article to protect, and that the Statute imposed Ordinance Rule care on Ms. Stapf. op. 415-21, at 120 A.3d at 903-07. Stapf had a duty not to him knowingly home, serve alcohol in her and she indisputably breached that duty. duty vitiated, view, Nor was that in my minor, Steven’s decision to drink. Steven was a and a minor to whom Ms. owed a Stapf duty, grounded statute, not to serve him in place. the first So again, to the extent that the shop analysis historic dram analysis severs the at the drink, 423-24, drinker’s decision to see at op. 907- 08, the source and nature of the duty we have recognized here flowed from Ms. precisely Steven because he drank alcohol her house with knowledge. her And in light of the specific scope CL 10-117 and the protects, narrow class it the General has Assembly already distinguished this case from 424-25, regard. See op. 120 A.3d at 908- Hatfield 09.

It enough, just is not though, duty. find a This case fails because Ms. Stapfs breach of her Steven was not the proximate Instead, cause of his death. the proximate cause of his death was the intervening by decision Mr. Erdman—an adult, to whom Ms. did not duty—to owe the same drive drunk with Steven in the bed of his truck. But in another case—if, for example, minor drank to point of alcohol poisoning, or perhaps injured in a drunken fall in the server’s house—the causal connection between the service of injuries alcohol and the minor’s might justify different result. That obviously case must await day, another but I understand our opinion this ease to open possibil- leave ity within analytical this narrow space. majority’s pattern I will referring follow the to Steven his first name.

Case Details

Case Name: Davis v. Stapf

Court Name: Court of Special Appeals of Maryland

Date Published: Aug 26, 2015

Citation: 120 A.3d 890

Docket Number: 2533/13

Court Abbreviation: Md. Ct. Spec. App.