3 Haw. 274 | Haw. | 1871
OPINION OP THE COURT, BY
We find the facts to be according to the documentary and oral evidence above stated, in which there is no conflict. The plaintiff took the deed of the land from his father with full knowledge of the prior lease then in force. This appears from the testimony of Green and from the evidence that he resided on the land, and jointly with Green and his father, occupied the premises for pasturage during the continuance of the lease, and for several years previous. Such knowledge is alone sufficient in equity to put a person on the inquiry as to the term of the occupancy. Cunningham vs. Potter, 99 Mass., 252. The plaintiff’s written acknowledgment of his father’s authority concerning the lease, made on the same day with the deed, is alone conclusive on the point of knowledge. Our statute of registry provides that leases for more
The rights of the assignees of a reversion to bring an action on the covenants or to claim a forfeiture on the breach of the covenants of a prior lease, and the rights of the lessor to re-enter after assigning the reversion, may not be clear under our statute. The common law did not allow a chose in action, as a right of entry, to be assigned. Hence when the Crown, in the time of Henry VIII, granted away the monasteries, the grantees found that they could sue in the name of the grantors for breach of covenants in the lease, but that neither they nor the grantors who had parted with the estate could re-enter and defeat the leases for breach of conditions. It was only by Statute 32, Henry VIH, c. 24, that grantees of reversions obtained the previous rights of
But the plaintiff claims that if the first lease was good as against himself, the second is not, and that the substitution of the second lease works a surrender of the first, and further, that his consent, indorsed on the second lease, being without consideration, had no other effect, than to make the lessee his tenant at will or sufferance. This view is unsound for several reasons. A prior lease may be regarded as surrendered in law upon the mutual execution of a second, but this is only by reason of the intention of the parties themselves. It is absurd ,to suppose they intended to substitute a void for a valid lease. Schafflin vs. Carpenter, 15 Wend., 400; Flagg vs. Dow, 99 Mass., 98; Van Renssellaer vs. Penniman, 6 Wend., 569; Springstein vs. Schermerhorn, 12 John., 357. “Where parties enter into a contract which would have the effect of rescinding a previous one, but which can not operate according to their intentions, the new contract shall not operate to affect, the previously existing rights.” Noble vs. Ward, 2 Eng. Exch., (1867) 137. Moreover, the evidence shows a legal agreement between the plaintiff and lessee, on full consideration, that the latter should hold under the terms of the substituted lease. If we admit that no other consideration, such as the plaintiff’s acknowledgment of his father’s power to lease, can be shown for the deed than that which is expressed in the deed, or if shown that it could not affect the subsequent lease, it is a fair inference, and one that we can not avoid, that the plaintiff’s assent to the second lease was given on consideration of the advantages he would receive from its terms, which would give him rights of residence and pasturage not secured by the first lease, and of the receipt, jointly with his father, of
Assuming that the grantor of the reversion could, by our law, take such steps as would defeat this lease for breach of condition to pay rent, so that the plaintiff would be entitled to treat the lessee and those holding under him as trespassers, let us inquire, (1,) whether there was a breach of condition, and (2,) whether legal steps were thereupon taken to work a forfeiture. Rent due and payable in advance September 24th, 1869, and again March 24th, 1870, was not then paid, but no demand therefor was made until the lessor’s letter of August 20th, 1870, delivered to' Green by Berrill previous to September 24th, then following, by his letter of September 19th, 1870, and by his agent Asegut’s letter of September 24th. presented to Green by Lett, October 1st. The second letter of the plaintiff refers to the previous bill sent by Berrill, hence no demand was made for the advance rent of September 24th until October 1st, when demand was made by an agent of whose appointment the lessee had received no notice from the lessor personally. The demands of August 20th and September 19th were certainly not made as the law requires, which insists that the demand be made at some time before sunset on the day the rent is payable. Chapman vs. Harney, 100 Mass., 353.
Besides, these demands were satisfied by the lessor’s' unconditional acceptance, October 3, of the rent accrued to September 24, which must be held to be a waiver of forfeiture previously claimed. Stuyvesant vs. Davis, 9 Paige, 427. There would be difficulty in holding the demand of October 1st, by letter of Asegut of September 24th, as legal, in point of time, precision, or due notice of Asegut’s
It is therefore ordered, adjudged, and considered by the Court, that the defendant to take judgment for costs and go without day.