*1
was cor-
the “reasonable
instructions
certainty” language
rect was neither
to nor decided
this court. See id.
by
presented
A
not
case is not
any point
necessary
passed
on to decide the case or not
raised as
issue
specifically
addressed
the court. Mach v.
County Douglas, 259
CONCLUSION
The Court of
erred in
Appeals
affirming
of the
judgment
district court with
to the issue of
respect
because
damages,
district court’s instruction that Pribil’s evidence must establish
the amount of
with
damages
“reasonable
was not war-
certainty”
ranted
the evidence in this case and
to Pribil.
prejudicial
Pribil did not seek further review of the other determinations of
and,
the Court of
so those
Appeals,
issues are not before us
remand, stand as decided. See US
Ecology Boyd Cty. Bd. of
Reversed remanded with directions. Guy Davis, v. Dean appellant, executive Settle, director, Community Mental Health Center, program and Kim Etherton, supervisor, appellees.
Crisis Center, Filed 2003. No. S-01-1214. July *2 Keefe, Defender, Dennis R. Public County Dorothy Walker, A. and Student, John C. Senior Certified Law Jorgensen, for appellant. E.
Gary Lacey, Lancaster and Michael County Attorney, E. Thew for appellee.
Hendry, C.J., Wright, Connolly, Stephan, McCormack, Miller-Lerman, JJ. J.
McCormack,
NATURE OF CASE This from appeal arises an order of the district court for Lancaster County interpreting the Nebraska Mental Health Act, 83-312, Commitment 83-318, Neb. Rev. 83-337, Stat. §§ 83-351, and 83-1001 (Reissue to 83-1080 1999 & Cum. Supp. 2000). Davis, Appellant, filed Guy for a petition writ of habeas corpus that he alleging was detained unlawfully by appellees, Settle, Dean executive director of the Lancaster County Center, Community Etherton, Mental Health and Kim program supervisor Crisis Center. filed a Appellees motion to and the quash, district court sustained their motion.
ASSIGNMENTS OF ERROR that assigns, rephrased, the district court (1) erred in 83-1027, determining that which that requires § a civil commit- ment be fixed within 7 “after the been taken into protective custody,” was in this case inapplicable and in that 83-1028 determining (2) § controlling; denying habeas Davis; (3) relief to corpus upholding grant continuance to the state the Lancaster Board. OF REVIEW
STANDARD involve a factual does not When a jurisdictional question law, which requires is a matter its determination dispute, from the deci independent to reach a conclusion court al., M. et In re Interest made the lower courts. sions of Clifford K., Sarah (2000); In re Interest
BACKGROUND his two of sexually assaulting Davis was convicted He was and sentenced to 10 to 20 imprisonment. years’ stepsons the Omaha Correctional Center scheduled to be released from Ph.D., 14, Mark E. Weilage, 2001. On August Center, Correctional acting a clinical at the Omaha psychologist 83-1024, sent a letter to the Douglas County pursuant that Davis be referred to the office Attorney’s recommending Mental Health Board possible postincarcer- ation commitment. 13, 2001, the office
On September Douglas County Attorney’s acted notification upon by filing petition.
claimed that Davis was ill and that “mental-health- mentally board-ordered treatment” was the least restrictive means for the issue. The also that immediate cus- addressing alleged petition of Davis was to the occurrence of harm tody the required prevent described in 83-1009. 13, 2001,
On the Health Mental September Board issued a custodial order. The order the placed of Dr. at the Weilage Omaha Correctional Center for “up to a of 7 from the date of this order unless period days you receive further instructions from this Board.” On the same day, the case was transferred to the district court for Lancaster County and the Lancaster Mental Health Board. Sometime County between 13 and Davis was September to transported Lancaster and at County the Crisis Center the placed operated by County Community Center under the direction of On which appellees. would be the September order, eighth after the day the September Lancaster County office Attorney’s issued to Davis a summons for a hearing held on September before the Lancaster Mental (Lancaster Board) Health Board to determine whether Davis was ill. The return on the indicated that service summons mentally was made 24. on September 25, 2001, Davis, counsel,
On September represented by before the Lancaster Board and the moved dismiss appeared on the that he denied a within grounds hearing petition days as statute and that the to state cause required by failed a of action. The moved to continue the county attorney hearing based an earlier communication between upon representatives the office and attorney’s the defender’s office that county “the case... would not tried be The Lancaster Board over- today.” ruled Davis’ motion to dismiss and the granted county attorney continuance, 7-day the final 2. rescheduling hearing October 27, 2001, On Davis filed a writ of habeas corpus. He that his continued detention at the Crisis alleged Center was he illegal because had not received a within 7 after hearing days taken into as being 83-1027. He further required by § alleged that the Lancaster Board the lacked grant continuance county filed a attorney. response, appellees motion to After a on October quash. hearing district court entered order sustaining motion to and vacat- appellees’ quash order, Davis’ writ of habeas From that corpus. Davis has per- fected this appeal.
ANALYSIS Section 83-1027 provides:
Upon filing sections petition provided by 83-1025 and 83-1026 belief stating county attorney’s that the immediate is not required 83-1026, for the reasons sections 83-1025 provided by clerk the district court shall cause a summons fixing time for a place hearing and issued prepared to the sheriff for service... The . summons shall fix a time for the within seven after been subject taken into protective custody. *4 error,
In his of first Davis assignment that 83-1027 argues that a held requires 7 within of time that the days is taken into subject He claims that protective custody. his hear- held more than after he days 7 was taken into protective
236 thus, have dis- the Lancaster Board should and that
custody However, of the merits we decline to address missed his petition. shows, as of because the record presented this error assignment after at the writ of habeas that argued hearing, September Davis 2001, 20, in Board no the Lancaster had authority keep custody. protective 13, 2001, custodial order giving Douglas September Board of Davis provided is in in Weilage’s] to be held Omaha
“patient [Dr. [the] to a 7 Correctional Center for care and treatment of period up the date of this unless receive further from order you instructions from this Board.” in the record shows fur- Nothing ther instructions from Mental Health Board would other action that extend the time 7 any period beyond Because days. Davis’ sentence ended on 19 prison September and the custodial order all expired cus- September legal 21. The Lancaster Board did tody not have expired September to retain of Davis after 20. above, spite there no relief to be granted We, Davis because he is no in longer there appellees’ custody. fore, conclude that this case is moot. A case becomes moot when the issues cease to exist lit initially presented litigation or the a igants cognizable lack interest in legally the outcome of litiga tion. & Sons City Hastings, 265 Neb. Stoetzel rule, N.W.2d 636 aAs general moot case is dismissal. An summary Id. court choose to review may an otherwise moot case under the public interest if it exception involves matter or affecting interest when public other rights or liabilities bemay affected its determination. This a consideration of the exception requires or public nature private question presented, of an desirability authoritative officials, for future adjudication guidance of public and the like lihood of future recurrence of the same or a similar problem. Chambers v. Lautenbaugh, McCook, (2002); Wilcox v. City, 634 N.W.2d Because we find the expiration of the custodial order to Davis’ unique case unlikely we repeated, refuse interest apply exception.
237
CONCLUSION reasons, that this we conclude is appeal
For above-stated moot.
Appeal dismissed. Connolly, L, dissenting. us, On the record I am
I dissent. respectfully presented Therefore, if I would remand the cause unsure this case is moot. factual for further findings. case when the issues in initially presented
A becomes moot cease to lack a litigants legally exist or litigation cognizable Lore, interest the outcome of Green v. litigation. it, as I The understand majority opinion, that this
holds case is moot because named in respondents Davis’ no have Davis in their it longer custody, making for the court to relief. grant any impossible meaningful the time filed At that Davis his were petition, hold- appellees tell him. The now us that have parties released appellees Davis from this fact renders the custody, they agree case moot, Davis that the interest although argues exception unclear, the mootness doctrine should record apply. us, however, do not tell if released parties appellees Davis into the or
back transferred him into community custody state another official or agency.
I that the be agree case would moot if has been Davis released back into the But the of the community. implication majority’s is that would the case be moot if opinion even appellees only transferred Davis into the of another state official or I do not The state agency. agree. should not able to avoid review of habeas appellate proceedings by shifting from the named petitioner another respondent state Johnson, official or See v. McGee 161 Or. agency. App.
P.2d moot, it this Because is unclear if case is I would remand the cause the district court with directions to determine whether has been or released been transferred only to the of another official or See state 13A agency. Charles al., Wright Alan et Federal Practice and Procedure 3533.10 facts, (1984) (“[i]f at 440 court is unsure of the it is common to remand consideration of mootness courts”). lower J., in this dissent. joins Andersen, appellant,
David H. appellee. A.M.W., Inc., *6 Filed 2003. No. S-02-756. July Sellers, Sellers, L.L.R, John A. & Gilroy for appellant. David E. and David J. Copple Feeney, & Copple, Rockey P.C., for McGough, appellee.
Hendry, C.J., Wright, Connolly, Stephan, McCormack, Miller-Lerman, JJ.
Wright, J.
NATURE OF CASE David H. Andersen this breach brought of contract action A.M.W., against (AMW), Inc. alleging AMW had failed to pay commissions due Andersen. A bifurcated trial was held on the issue of whether the action was barred applicable statute of limitations. The trial court found that a cause of action accrued when Andersen did not receive his first commission