577 A.2d 338 | Me. | 1990
Norman Davis appeals the judgment of the Superior Court (Lincoln County, Bradford, J.) affirming the decision of the Secretary of State, Division of Motor Vehicles (the “Secretary”), suspending Davis’s driver’s license pursuant to 29 M.R.S.A. § 2241(1)(D) (Pamph.1988).
Our review of the record discloses the following. On August 31, 1988, Norman Davis consulted Thomas Reeder, a specialist in internal medicine, complaining of chest pains and numbness and tingling in his feet. Reeder noticed that Davis smelled of alcohol. Davis advised Reeder that he had been previously arrested for driving under the influence of alcohol but had substantially modified his alcohol consumption since that time. In the course of ordering and administering various laboratory tests, Reeder ordered a blood-alcohol test which revealed that Davis had a blood-alcohol content of .17 percent. On September 14, 1988, when Davis returned to Reed-er’s office for a scheduled appointment, Reeder again noticed alcohol on Davis’s breath. He told Davis the results of the blood-alcohol test taken during the previous visit and reported that the other laboratory tests indicated that Davis had hypertension, peripheral neuropathy, liver function abnormalities, hypoglycemia and hypo-eholesterolemia, all secondary to alcoholism, and recommended he immediately receive treatment for these conditions. He advised Davis of his intention to report his medical findings to the Secretary.
At a hearing to review Davis’s license suspension, Davis and Reeder testified and Davis submitted the Driver Medical Evaluations filled out by two doctors, Karen Ottenstein and Robert Stein. On the Driver Medical Evaluation form, Ottenstein checked off a box indicating that Davis’s license should be unrestricted but made no further comments. Stein made no recommendations regarding the suspension or restriction of Davis’s license but made the following comments: “I saw Mr. Davis only once for evaluation of his peripheral neuropathy. His neuropathy would not interfere with his ability to operate a motor vehicle.” Davis also submitted the medical report of Stein stating that Davis suffered from, inter alia, distal symmetric polyneu-ropathy, hypertension, congestive heart failure, alcohol use, glucose intolerance, and diabetes mellitus. It was also stated in the report that Stein had strongly urged Davis to seek medical care and that “[Davis] needs desperate control of his blood pressure. He is at high risk for further heart disease and stroke. His blood pressure is out of control. He is clearly having nocturnal symptoms of congestive heart failure.” Although Stein found Davis physically capable of driving a motor vehicle, he stated that he “[did] not feel capable to assess Mr. Davis’[s] alcohol consumption and its impact on his motor vehicle license.”
The hearing examiner found that: (1) Davis’s health problems and impairments
Davis first contends that his license was suspended solely because of the hearing examiner’s conclusion that Davis was presently an alcoholic. We disagree. Under the Maine Administrative Procedure Act, 5 M.R.S.A. § 11007(4)(C)(5) (1989), an administrative agency’s findings of fact may be overturned only upon a showing by the party challenging them that they are “unsupported by substantial evidence on the whole record.” Gulick v. Board of Environmental Protection, 452 A.2d 1202, 1207 (Me.1982). This standard of review is identical to the “clear error” standard used to review a trial court’s factual findings. Id. at 1207-08. Inconsistent evidence in the record and the possibility that different conclusions could be drawn therefrom does not prevent the agency’s findings from being sustained if there is substantial evidence to support them. Seven Islands Land Co. v. Maine Land Use Reg. Comm’n, 450 A.2d 475, 479 (Me.1982). The reviewing court will not substitute its judgment for the agency’s where there may be a reasonable difference of opinion. Id.
The record before us clearly contradicts Davis’s characterization of the proceedings and the examiner’s decision. The hearing examiner determined that Davis suffered from numerous adverse medical conditions, only one of which was alcoholism, that interfered with his ability to safely operate a motor vehicle.
Davis next challenges the Secretary’s suspension of his license on the ground that it violates the equal protection clauses of the United States and Maine Constitutions. Starting from the erroneous premise that his license was suspended because of his status as an alcoholic and not because of an adverse medical condition preventing his safe operation of a motor vehicle, Davis argues that a classification based on alcoholism has no rational basis and furthers no legitimate governmental aim and thus violates his right to equal protection. See Dandridge v. Williams, 397 U.S. 471, 485, 90 S.Ct. 1153, 1161, 25 L.Ed.2d 491 (1970); Lambert v. Wentworth, 423 A.2d 527, 531 (Me.1980). The Profiles do not draw a distinction between alcoholics and nonalcoholics for the purpose of evaluating a license suspension, nor did the hearing examiner draw such a distinction in the instant case. Accordingly, Davis fails to surmount the threshold requirement of establishing his membership in a class, suspect or otherwise, that has been denied equal protection under the laws.
The entry is:
Judgment affirmed.
All concurring.
. 29 M.R.S.A. § 2241(1)(D) (Pamph.1988) provides:
1. The Secretary of State ... may suspend or revoke ... any license issued to any person*339 to operate a motor vehicle or right to operate a motor vehicle ... after hearing for any cause which he deems sufficient. He is also authorized to suspend or revoke ... any license ... issued to any person without preliminary hearing upon showing by his records or other sufficient evidence that the driver:
D. Is incompetent to drive a motor vehicle.
. 29 M.R.S.A. § 547 (Supp.1989) provides for the establishment of a Medical Advisory Board and for the promulgation of regulations to establish guidelines defining what constitutes an adverse medical condition. Pursuant to section 547, the Secretary has promulgated “Functional Ability Profiles” as guidelines for assessing the competence of a person to operate a motor vehicle.
. 29 M.R.S.A. § 547(3) (Supp.1989) provides in pertinent part:
Any physician ... who becomes aware of a physical, mental or emotional impairment which appears to present an imminent threat to driving safety and reports this information to the office of the Secretary of State ... in good faith shall have immunity for any damages claimed as a result of so doing.
. The hearing examiner found that Davis suffered from hypertension, obesity, smoking, diabetes, peripheral neuropathy, congestive heart failure, liver function abnormalities, hypoglycemia, hypocholesterolemia and alcoholism.
. The instant case is distinguishable from Jackson v. State, 544 A.2d 291 (Me.1988), cert. denied, — U.S. -, 109 S.Ct. 3185, 105 L.Ed.2d 694 (1989), in which the plaintiffs status as an insulin dependent diabetic automatically disqualified him from obtaining employment as a school bus driver. Nevertheless, in Jackson, we found the State had a rational basis for the classification and held there was no equal protection violation. Jackson, 544 A.2d at 295. Here, as in Jackson, Davis has not claimed a violation of the Code of Fair Practices and Af