10 Wend. 50 | Court for the Trial of Impeachments and Correction of Errors | 1832
The following opinions were delivered :
It appears by the record in this case that the defendants in error sued T. Hill, junior, in the supreme court of this state, in which suit the present plaintiff in error came into that court and entered into a recognizance of bail for Hill in the usual form ; that a recovery was had in that suit against Hill, and an execution against his body returned unsatisfied. The present defendants then proceeded against Davis, the plaintiff in error, upon his recognizance of bail in the same court. He voluntarily appeared in that court, and without making any objection to its jurisdiction, or suggesting that he held any office or sustained any particrilar character which exempted him from a proceeding against him in a state court, pleaded, five several pleas, all of which were found to be false. The supreme court thereupon gave judgment against him for debt and costs, according to the condition of the recognizance, into which he had voluntarily entered in that court. He then sued out a writ of error to this court, without ever having raised the question of jurisdiction in the supreme court, and instead of assigning any errors appearing upon the record or proceedings of the supreme court, he alleged as a ground for reversing the judgment of the supreme court, that at the time of the commencement of the suit against him, he was the consul general of the king of Saxony. This court being of opinion that a judgment of the supreme court could not be reversed upon an error in fact assigned here, and that it had no jurisdiction to reverse a judgment of an inferior court, except for errors apparent upon the face of the record and proceedings of the court below, and that
As the judges of the supreme court of the United Slates had frequently decided in their circuits that proceedings against bail and by bill in equity to restrain the prosecution of a suit in a court of law, were not to be considered original suits within the meaning of the laws of the United States conferring jurisdiction upon the federal courts, it might reasonably be presumed that the same principle would be applied to the jurisdiction of the state courts ; and I am yet to learn that the supreme court of the United States intend to apply a different principle to the state courts to deprive them of jurisdiction, from that which they apply to the federal courts in order to acquire jurisdiction in cases which are not within the letter of the law. According to the decisions of the supreme court of the United States in Simms v. Guthrie, 9 Cranch, 13, and in Logan v. Patrick, 5 id. 288, and of Judge Story in Dunlap v. Stetson, 4 Mason’s R. 360, a bill in equity may be sustained against a parly in a federal court, to restrain a suit commenced by him on the law side of the same court, although he would not have been subject to the jurisdiction of that court, if he had not voluntarily submitted himself to its jurisdiction by the commencement of a suit on the law side thereof; and in Bobyshall v. Openheimer, 4 Wash. C. C. R. 433, the circuit court of the United States for the district of Pennsylvania decided that a person, by giving a bail bond to the marshal, for the appearance of the defendant in a suit in that court, subjected himself to the jurisdiction of that court in a suit upon the bond brought by a citizen of the same state in which the defendant resided, and, within- which the suit was brought. The law of the United States not having given jurisdiction to the' circuit court, in suits between citizens of the same state, it
The supposition that the privilege of a public minister is the privilege of his sovereign, and is one which therefore could not be waived, may be correct when applied to ambassadors and other public diplomatic agents who by the law of nations áre not liable to be sued at all in the courts of the country to which they are accredited; but this principle is not applicable to the case of a consul or mere commercial agent, who is not entitled to any such exemption. Viveash v, Becker, 3 Maule & Sel. 284. Vattel, book 4, § 75. De La Font’s case, 2 Nott & McCord, 217. As to him, it is a mere personal privilege, which he as well as any other defendant may waive. The sovereign has undoubtedly an interest in preserving his public ministers from prosecution in any court of the country to which he is sent; but it can be of no consequence to the sovereign whether his commercial agent is compelled to pay his honest debts by the judgment of the supreme court of this state, or of an inferior federal tribunal.
The question as to the jurisdiction of a state court to review the decision of another court of the same state of inferior jurisdiction, in which the constitution and laws of the United States are in nowise brought in question, is one which belongs to the decision of the state courts alone ; and even if the
The provision in the revised statutes authorizing this court to award an issue to try a question of fact arising upon a writ of error here, was not intended to give to this court jurisdiction of a case, which it did not before possess, and which was already amply provided for by the common law by a writ of error coram vobis in the supreme court, but the object of the statute was to facilitate the decisions upon questions of fact which might arise in causes where this court before had jurisdiction, as upon a release of errors pleaded to an assignment of errors in law in this court. If any error in fact existed in the proceedings and judgment in the supreme court which was properly assignable for error, Davis should have sued out a writ of error coram vobis, returnable in that court, as was done in the case of Dewitt v. Post, 11 Johns. R. 460. And if that court decided wrong upon such writ of error, this court would then have had jurisdiction to correct their proceedings upon a writ of error founded on the latter judgment; but this
Although the judgment of this court has been reversed on a writ of error in the supreme court of the United States, the mandate directs that such further proceedings be had in this cause as according to right and justice, and in conformity to the opinion and judgment of that court and the laws of the United States ought to be had, that writ of error to the contrary notwithstanding. I think, therefore, the defendants in error are entitled to a judgment declaring that by the constitution and laws of the United States a consul general of the king of Saxony was exempted from being sued in the state court, but that this court has no authority or jurisdiction by the laws of this state to reverse a judgment of the supreme court upon any errors in fact assigned in this court, and which do not appear in the record and proceedings of the supreme court, and that the judgment for that reason should be affirmed with double
The supreme court of the United States is admitted to be a court of limited powers; it has no general jurisdiction to review the judgment óf the state courts. By the constitution and laws of the United States its jurisdiction is confined to particular classes of cases. Should that tribunal attempt to reverse the judgment of the state court in a case over which it evidently had no jurisdiction, it might be proper for the judges of this court who have sworn to support the constitution of the United States, to enquire whether they could conscientiously do any affirmative act to carry into effect what they believed to be an unconstitutional exercise of power; or whether they should not leave that tribunal to execute its own judgment as it might, and by the employment of such means, if any, as were legally within its control. That question, however, does not arise here, as we are bound to presume that court has not gone beyond its jurisdiction, if we can reconcile its decision with a legitimate exercise of its constitutional powers in any other way. Here they have taken it for granted that this court had jurisdiction by the local law to reverse a judgment of the supreme court for error in fact assigned in this court, and that it was not necessary for a defendant in the supreme court to make his objection to its jurisdiction there ; but inasmuch as doubts were suggested on those questions on the argument of the writ of error in the supreme court of the United States, they have not considered themselves authorized to reverse the judgment of the supreme court, and have sent the cause here that such judgment might be given as was consistent with their construction of the constitution and laws of the United States, relative to "the exemption of a foreign consul from prosecution in a state "court.
The questions to be determined by us are—what has been decided in this case by the supreme court of the United States, and what is necessary to be done to give effect to the judgment of that court 1 We have the opinion delivered by Mr. Justice Thompson, in the reversal of the judgment of this court, from which it manifestly appears, that that court Considered this court to have decided in affirming the judgment of the supreme court of this state, that the fact that Charles A. Davis was consul-general of the king of Saxony was not sufficient cause for reversing the judgment rendered by the supreme court—because from the record it appeared that was the only question presented for the judgment of this court, and it not appearing from the record that any objection had been taken that the exemption of the plaintiff in error had not been set up in proper time, or that the judgment of this court was founded upon any other consideration than that assumed as above as the ground of decision. Now in relation to the right of state courts to entertain jurisdiction of suits against foreign consuls, there is no difference of opinion between this court and the supreme court of the United States; nor did this court affirm the judgment of the supreme court of this state upon the ground upon which the supreme court assumes the decision was made. The judgment was affirmed because the plaintiff in error by the laws of this state had not the right, after suffering a judgment to pass against him in the supreme court, to raise the question of his exemption for the first time in this court. The questions whether the plaintiff in error had not waived his exemption by neglecting to plead it in the supreme court, and whether error in fact in a case like this can be assigned in this court, it is true, are adverted to in the opinion of Mr. Justice Thompson ; but what he says upon those points is to be regarded merely as his impressions upon questions casually raised by counsel, but not presented by the record for the deliberate opinion and judgment of the
The first question presented by this motion is, what must be the action of this court, in order fully to obey the mandate of the supreme court of the United States 1 The judgment of this court was, that the judgment of the supreme court of this state be affirmed. By the mandate of the supreme court of the United States, it is declared that the judgment of this court be reversed, and wTe are commanded to render judgment in conformity to their judgment. Of course we are required to vacate the former judgment of this court. Suppose we have thus far complied with the directions of the mandate, the attitude of the cause is this : There is a judgment of the supreme court of this state, in favor of the defendants in error against the plaintiff in error. The plaintiff in error has assigned in this court for error in fact, that at the time of the commencement of this suit against him in the supreme court, he was consul general of the king of Saxony, and of course was suable only in the courts of the United States. To this assignment of error, the defendants in error have pleaded that no such error appeared in the record of the cause in the supreme court. Upon the record containing this informal issue, we are required by the mandate of the supreme court of the United States, to render judgment between the parties, with the direction that the judgment so to be rendered, shall be “ conformable to the judgment and opinion of the supreme court of the United States, and with the constitution and laws of the United States, the said writ of error notwithsthanding.” It becomes important then, to ascertain what are the judgment and opinion of that court, to which we are required to conform our judgment. The súpleme court of the United States in their opinion delivered by judge Thompson say, the question legitimately presented by
It has been suggested that we are allowed by the mandate a latitude in respect to the judgment to be rendered, within
The motion made on the part of the defendants in error, that this court dismiss the writ of error by which the judgment of the supreme court of this state was brought under review, cannot be granted without disobedience or evasion of the mandate. Regarded in this point of view, the question now before the court, assumes all that interest which attaches to every question of conflicting jurisdiction, between the courts of the United States and those of the several states. I am aware it is urged we may consistently with the mandate dismiss the writ of error, on the ground that although we admit the plaintiff in error was not liable to be sued in the supreme court, yet we have no jurisdiction of the issue of error joined in this court; and it is contended that if we so dismiss the writ of error, assigning upon the record the reasons for adopting this course, our judgment will be sustained by the supreme court of the United States. But I deem this position altogether fallacious. We have now no power to alter the record of this cause as it came before this court, from the supreme court of the United States; nor have we power to vary the issue before this court, and the reason is obvious: the cause belonged to the supreme court of the United States. It has been remanded to us, with direction to render judgment of a particular force and effect. We cannot avail ourselves of the record to render a judgment different from that which we are required to render, nor to dismiss the writ of error, which would be tantamount to rendering judgment against the party in whose favor we are commanded to pronounce judgment; nor can we make any alterations in the record, the effect of which would be prejudicial to either of the parties who litigated in the supreme court of the United States. The statement of reasons to justify our dismissal of the writ of error would be a variance in the record affecting the rights of the parties. Nor is it safe in this instance or as a precedent to adopt such a course. The judgment is to be rendered, not
* proceed next to examine the reasons urged against the motion to reverse the judgment of the supreme court. In the first place, it is said that this court had no jurisdiction over the record of this cause sent from the supreme court of this state, to review the judgment thereof upon an assignment of error in fact. This argument presents the singular proposition, that this court has assumed (therefore has decided it had jurisdiction) to render judgment of affirmance of a judgment of the supreme court, but is now to decide when the judgment of affirmance is found to be erroneous, that it has not jurisdiction to render a judgment of reversal upon the same issue and under precisely the same circumstances. The supreme court of the United States have correctly decided that this court assumed on the former hearing the very jurisdiction it is now invited to disclaim. The error found in our judgment, let it be remembered, is that we erred, not in assuming to decide, but in deciding wrong. If the court, then, exceeded its jurisdiction in deciding at all, no such error has been complained of to the supreme court of the United States; that court has found none ; it is not now for us to correct it; it is too late, so far as this cause and these parties are concerned. What we are commanded to do is not to decide that the court then erred in assuming jurisdiction, but the jurisdiction being no longer debatable, it is to render a correct judgment in lieu of the former erroneous judgment. The mandate requires us to assume this jurisdiction. To allege we have not the power or right conferred by the constitution and laws of this state to assume the jurisdiction and render judgment, is to maintain that the supreme court of the United States has decided erroneously, for which reason we are not bound to submit; and what is this but the subordinate tribunal refusing to yield to the decisions of the superior—the inferior court reviewing the decisions of the appellate court 1 By the constitution and laws of the United States, it is declared that in certain cases the supreme court of the United States shall have appellate jurisdiction over this court. The right of appellate jurisdic
jurisdiction ; for if the inferior court could lawfully resist on the ground of absence of jurisdiction in the appellate court, then the inferior court, and not the appellate court, would be the tribunal to determine the extent of jurisdiction of the appellate court. Of course the inferior court would exercise the paramount power: which is absurd. Necessarily, also, the appellate court must have the right to decide whether error has been committed, and to direct the manner and extent of remedy. If it had not such right, then the inferior court would obey such mandates as it should think proper to obey, and would resist such as it should think proper to resist. This also would be to elevate the subordinate over the appellate tribunal. The principle I have asserted is not new; it prevails in the constitution of this state. The power of this court to review the errors of the supreme court and court of chancery is accompanied b}r the power to decide not only in what cases this court has jurisdiction, but to define also the limits of their jurisdiction, and to prescribe the manner and extent of the correction of errors; and as properly may either of those courts refuse to render such judgment as we direct, upon the ground of our want of jurisdiction or usurpation of jurisdiction, as this court allege these objections against a judgment of the supreme court of the United States. Nor do I think there is any ground for alarm in the power which I am free to admit is thus conceded to the supreme court of the United States.
Acting under a due sense of their responsibility, that court have never yet abused the power conferred upon them by the constitution. Its judges being amenable to impeachment, and all its judgments subject to the conservative legislation of congress, the supreme court of the United States may be obeyed with much more safety, as regards the liberty and rights of the people, than the courts of the several states be allowed to erect barriers, as may suit their interests or caprice, against the exercise of jurisdiction of the appellate court. The power to decide correctly, and enforce a decision when correctly
Mr. Senator Sudam expressed his opinion that the proper course to be pursued in this case would be to reverse the judgment of affirmance of this court, and that then the cause would stand here as it did previous to the rendition of judgment in this court. He believed if the reasons upon which the judgment of this court was founded, had appeared on the record sent up to the supreme court of the United States, the decision of that court would have been different from what it was. He concurred in the propriety of entering the order proposed by the chancellor, and then the plaintiff in error, if he thought proper, might take up the decision of this court for review.
The rule or order proposed by the chancellor to be entered, is in these words:
“ The plaintiff in error in this cause having removed the transcript of the record of the judgment in this cause, heretofore given in this court, into the supreme court of the United States by a writ of error; and on reading and filing the mandate of the said supreme court of the United States, by which it appears that the said supreme court of the United States have reversed the judgment of this court, and have remanded the cause to this court, with directions to conform its judgment to the opinion of the said supreme court of the United States, and that such further proceedings be had in this cause, as according to right and justice, and in conformity to the opinion and judgment of the said supreme court of the U. States ought to be had, the said writ of error notwithstanding; and
On the question being put, Shall the rule or order proposed by the Chancellor be entered ? the members of the Court voted as follows :
In the affirmative—The Chancellor, Mr. Justice Sutherland, and Senators Armstrong, Beardsley, Bronson, Conklin, Cropsey, Deitz, Edwards, Fisk, Foster, Gansevoort, Halsey, Hasbrouck, Lansing, MacDonald, M’Dowell, Stower, Sudam, Westcott—20.
In the negative—Senators Birdsall, Griffin, Seward—3. Whereupon the order was accordingly entered.