258 P. 440 | Cal. Ct. App. | 1927
[EDITORS' NOTE: THIS PAGE CONTAINS HEADNOTES. HEADNOTES ARE NOT AN OFFICIAL PRODUCT OF THE COURT, THEREFORE THEY ARE NOT DISPLAYED.] *613 This is an appeal from a judgment entered in favor of respondent and against appellant on account of a compromise agreement. The allegations of the complaint may be summarized as follows:
In May, 1920, A.W. Scott and Frank Burt were promoting the Golden Gate Cinema Studios Corporation and engaged plaintiff as fiscal agent for the sale of its stock, agreeing to pay him twelve and one-half per cent brokerage or commission "of the amount of all stock issued or subscribed for"; that plaintiff commenced preparations for the sale of the stock, etc., but that before the conditions of the corporation commissioner's permit had been complied with Scott and Burt "and said Golden Gate Cinema Studios Corporation decided to organize another corporation to take the place of said Golden Gate Cinema Studios Corporation," and organized Pacific Studios Corporation, defendant herein; that prior thereto the employment of plaintiff "ceased and *614 was terminated by mutual consent of the parties, without prejudice, however, to the claim of plaintiff for commissions." etc.; that there had been obtained subscriptions for $85,000 of the stock of Golden Gate Cinema Studios, a corporation; that plaintiff was therefore entitled to $10,625 brokerage; plaintiff then alleges that defendant was organized for the purpose of carrying on the business originally planned by Golden Gate Cinema Studios Corporation, "which business said Pacific Studios Corporation has taken over and is now conducting," and that this defendant "has also taken over and appropriated, without consideration, all of the assets of Golden Gate Cinema Studios Corporation of the value of more than ten thousand dollars; that by reason thereof Golden Gate Cinema Studios Corporation is insolvent, etc; that thereafter plaintiff performed certain services for Pacific Studios Corporation of the reasonable value of $2,500, and that on November 12, 1920, defendant Pacific Studios Corporation agreed to pay plaintiff and plaintiff agreed to accept the sum of $5,000 in full satisfaction of both said claims in installments, of which but $1,000 has been paid, and plaintiff therefore prays judgment for the balance of $4,000."
The answer admits the first contract (Golden Gate Cinema Studios Corporation with Davis), but denies, among other things, that Pacific Studios Corporation was organized to take the place of Golden Gate Cinema Studios Corporation, or to carry on its business, or that it took over any assets of Golden Gate Cinema Studios Corporation, denies that any valid subscriptions were obtained by Golden Gate Cinema Studios Corporation, and denies that it agreed to pay plaintiff anything; admits that there was paid to plaintiff on November 12, 1920, the sum of $500 and on February 7, 1921, the sum of $500, but that each of them was made by said Scott and Burt without warrant or authority from this defendant.
Thereafter permission was obtained by plaintiff to file a "Second Amended and Supplemental Complaint" in the main similar to the former amended and supplemental complaint, but adding a final installment of $500.
The court found in accordance with the allegations of the complaint and entered judgment for respondent in the sum *615 of $4,000. From this judgment appellant Pacific Studios Corporation has appealed.
Appellant urges (a) that the Scott-Burt and Davis agreement was beyond the power of the corporation to make; (b) that it was made without sanction or ratification of the board of directors of the corporation; (c) that this defendant is in no sense a continuance of Golden Gate Cinema Studios Corporation, and that defendant received no property whatever from Golden Gate Cinema Studios Corporation; (d) that the court erred in admitting in evidence the Scott-Burt and Davis agreement, and the order on Scott; (e) that the evidence is insufficient to support certain of the findings.
Under the assignment of error that the agreement was beyond the power of the corporation to make it is questionable whether the defense of ultra vires is properly before the court, as there is no allegation in defendant's answer of such defense. [1] If the defendant seeks to avoid its contract upon the ground ofultra vires, the burden is upon it to allege and prove such defense (Brown v. Board of Education,
[3] The defense of ultra vires, urged by appellant, is no longer looked upon by the courts with favor, particularly when relied upon as a shield to escape liability. It is the policy of the law and the endeavor of the courts to hold corporations as well as natural persons to their contracts. Such defense introduced against a contract which has been executed in whole or in part by the corporation is looked upon with disfavor. As to contracts of corporations that are malum in se or malumprohibitum, they will not be enforced; but as to contracts not thus objectionable, justice and public policy require that the doctrine of ultra vires should be limited in its scope and application (McQuaide v. Enterprise Brewing Co.,
"Where, as was clearly the case here, an officer of a corporation is held out by such corporation to be possessed of power to perform all acts involved in its ordinary and usual business, the law will not permit third parties to suffer from such acts of such officers by the plea of the corporation that the ostensible authority of such officer was not in fact conferred upon him" (Stevens v. Selma Fruit Co.,
[4] Appellant urges that at best respondent's claim was against Scott, Burt, and the Golden Gate Cinema Studios Corporation; that while there are allegations in the complaint alleging that Pacific Studios Corporation absorbed the assets of the former corporation, the testimony fails to show that the first corporation ever possessed anything; therefore, that while Scott and Burt may have been willing to pin the Golden Gate Cinema Studios Corporation indebtedness on Pacific Studios Corporation, something more must be shown before the corporation itself can be held liable for an attempt to foist upon it a debt wholly unconnected with its affairs. The evidence, however, establishes the fact that the debt is not, as appellant contends, a debt wholly unconnected with its affairs. It is not a case of one corporation paying the debt of another. In the first place, some of the services for which judgment was rendered were performed for appellant itself. The court so found, and there is sufficient evidence to support such finding. Mr. Davis testified that the new corporation reaped the benefit of the work that had been done through his activities and efforts as well as that of others, including Mr. Gerson, Mr. Gallagher, Mr. Burt, and Mr. Scott; that at a meeting at the company's office in the Hewes building — the office of the old and new corporation — Mr. Burt, general manager, stated to him (Davis) that he was authorized to offer him $5,000 in full settlement of all his claim for brokerage ($10,625 due from the old company) and services rendered defendant corporation ($2,500), totaling $13,125; that the $5,000 was to be in settlement of all respondent's rights under the contract and for additional services rendered for and in behalf of the new company; that Mr. Burt represented *618 to him that he had been authorized to offer him $5,000, no more, no less. Appellant then stated to Burt that inasmuch as his (Davis') claim was for a brokerage of twelve and one-half per cent on $85,000 and in view of the services he had rendered the new corporation, he felt that he was entitled to founders' shares in the new corporation and to a larger cash sum than $5,000; that Burt did not deny that he was entitled to founders' shares, but stated to him that on that matter he had no voice; that he (Davis) had numerous telephones, long distance and otherwise, from Mr. Scott and Mr. Burt requested him to take up with Mr. Stephens of Stephens Company the carrying on of the financing, they urging him to recommend the project to Mr. Stephens as a good offering; that he recommended that they procure the services of John Jasper of Hollywood to build the studios; that that was subsequently done, and that Mr. Jasper called upon him for inside information and that he recommended him to Mr. Scott and Mr. Burt. That some service was performed for the new corporation was admitted in a letter of Mr. Burt, manager of the new corporation, written to respondent. The letter is dated November 12, 1920, and written on the letter-head of appellant corporation and addressed to respondent, and is as follows:
"Confirming verbal conversation of even date regarding your claim against the Pacific Studios Corporation for services rendered, it is understood between us that these services will amount in the aggregate to $5,000.00 and that you will accept as payment the sum of $500.00 monthly until same is liquidated, it being understood, however, that if at any time the Company desires to pay in excess of this sum it is at their option. I am inclosing herewith order for the first payment of $500.00 and will see that similar order is delivered into your hands every thirty days from this date.
"Kindly acknowledge receipt of this letter and verification of its acceptance.
"Very truly yours, "PACIFIC STUDIOS CORPORATION, "By FRANK BURT, General Manager."
The letter of even date from Frank Burt to A.W. Scott, president of Pacific Studios Corporation, is as follows: *619
"Will you kindly pay to Mr. Harry F. Davis on presentation of this order the sum of $500.00 in keeping with agreement entered into with Mr. Davis of even date?
"Very truly yours, "PACIFIC STUDIOS CORPORATION, "By FRANK BURT, General Manager."
Furthermore, this is not a case of one corporation paying the debt of another. The evidence amply sustains the finding of the court that the appellant Pacific Studios Corporation was formed for the purpose and with the intent to carry on the business originally planned and intended to be carried on by the Golden Gate Cinema Studios Corporation and was in fact a continuation of the old corporation.
Mr. Davis, who was himself a subscriber to the first corporation, testified that the new company was formed to take over the assets of the old company; that it took over all the assets of the old company, took over the same option for a site at San Mateo, and the indorsements and subscriptions that were on hand, and the contracts with production companies for making pictures, occupied the same offices in San Francisco and that its officers and directors were substantially identical with the old company. The Golden Gate Cinema Studios Corporation had planned to build at San Mateo on the same site. The directors of the new corporation are, with one exception, the same as the old corporation. They have the same president and the same general manager. They had been proceeding under a wrong plan, and it needed revamping. They needed more capital to carry out the undertaking as it was then being planned. This testimony is corroborated by the testimony of Mr. Scott, which shows that the new corporation took a lease on the San Mateo site upon which he had previously taken an option for the earlier company, and which same site so leased was referred to in the prospectus of the Golden Gate Cinema Studios Corporation and the permit granted to it by the corporation commissioner and in the later prospectus of the Pacific Studios Corporation. It also shows that the indorsement of the Golden Gate Cinema Studios Corporation, made and ratified by the board of supervisors of San Francisco, was appropriated and used by Pacific Studios Corporation for the purposes of promotion, and that they *620 likewise took advantage of the indorsement of the committee appointed by the mayor of San Francisco, which appeared as an "advisory board" on the prospectus of the Golden Gate Cinema Studios Corporation and the indorsement of the Civic League. Furthermore, in a letter written by Mr. Scott, president of the new company, to Mr. Merk, editor of "The Advance," for publicity purposes, August 12, 1920, only a few days after the incorporation of the new company, Mr. Scott wrote: "I know you will be interested to learn that our plans for the building of a motion picture studio enterprise in your city are rapidly approaching consummation. As you know we started out some months ago with a plan contemplating the investment of some $300,000 for this project. Discussion of the plan in San Francisco and consultation with experts in this line with financial interests brought us to the conviction that the situation justifies the building of the enterprise on a more comprehensive scale and the investment of a considerably greater sum of money, and we havearranged our plans to that end and changed the name of thecompany to the Pacific Studios Corporation, and our ultimate investment in your community will probably approximate $1,000,000. . . . Several contracts have already been arranged which assures us of the success of the enterprise."
Mr. Gallagher, who was a director in both corporations, considered the new corporation liable to him for his own claim for moneys advanced to the old corporation and that the new corporation is the result of the work they did with reference to the old corporation.
Mr. Gerson, who claimed to be the originator of the idea of the studios and who performed services in the formation of the first corporation and was one of its directors, claimed founders' shares in the new corporation for the work done for the old corporation.
Mr. Kirkbride, who assisted in securing the San Mateo and Burlingame subscriptions, testified that about two-thirds of the persons who pledged subscriptions to the first corporation subscribed to the second.
Continuance of the old corporation in the new is also evidenced by a stipulation showing the personnel of the new corporation to be substantially identical with that of the old. It is also evidenced by the fact that the new corporation *621 assumed and paid obligations of the old corporation, to wit: The printing bill, a claim for publicity work by Mr. Crowley, Mr. Scott's account for advancements made to the old corporation, and that founders' shares were given to Gerson, Gallagher and Scott for services rendered to the old corporation. To be sure, some of the witnesses for appellant deny the identity of the new corporation with the old, but such testimony only creates a conflict of evidence, and there being substantial evidence in the record to sustain the findings of the trial court, under the well-established rule they will not be disturbed on appeal.
[5] The evidence also sustains the conclusion that the contract was sanctioned and ratified by Pacific Studios Corporation. Mr. Burt, who wrote the letter of November 12, 1920, was the general manager of appellant corporation, held out as such to the public by the corporation through its circulars and prospectus. The corporation had an executive committee with extensive powers appointed pursuant to its by-laws, which committee at the time respondent's claim was adjusted consisted of Mr. Burt, Mr. Scott, Mr. Gallois, and Mr. Pearson, and both Mr. Scott and Mr. Burt obviously authorized and approved the settlement with Mr. Davis, and there is no direct evidence that Mr. Gallois and Mr. Pearson disapproved it. In addition, Mr. Bell, a director and attorney for the corporation, approved the settlement. He stated to Mr. Lum, representing respondent, that he would recommend to appellant a settlement of $5,000 net cash. Mr. Stephens knew of respondent's claim and that negotiations for settlement were going on and offered to take up with Mr. Scott the matter of settlement. He advised respondent to accept $5,000 on the partial payment plan and himself approved it. Mr. Caswell, treasurer of the corporation, signed the checks by which two $500 payments on the contract were made by the corporation. Also, Mr. Burt testified that Mr. Caswell, Mr. Bell, and Mr. Scott were in favor of the settlement. Mr. Gallagher, also a director of the new corporation, favored the settlement and also testified that "there was a continuous discussion of the Davis claim running through the boards of the old and new corporation," showing knowledge of the corporation. Mr. Burt in a letter of October 1, 1920, to Mr. Davis stated that the settlement of this claim was placed in the hands of Mr. Bell *622 "by instruction of the board of directors." Mr. Davis testified that he had conversations with all the different members of the board, including Mr. Burt, Mr. Scott, Mr. Stephens, Mr. DeCamp, Mr. Gallagher, and others before November 12th, the date of the accord. Mr. Burt testified: "Q. Did you tell Mr. Stephens that you had settled this claim with Mr. Davis after you had written this letter of November 12th? A. I presume I told the board about my action, for I regularly made a written report of my activities. Q. Do you know whether you reported that to the board? A. I said I presumed I reported it." There is no evidence that the directors ever repudiated the agreement until the answer was filed in this action.
[6] Existence of authority may be shown by proof, of course of business, the knowledge of the board of directors of the corporation, and by presumptions of such knowledge (Mahoney Min.Co. v. Anglo-California Bank,
[8] But even if the acts of the directors do not constitute a ratification of the contract, they are estopped from so claiming, and such estoppel need not, as claimed by appellant, be pleaded. In Blood v. La Serena L. W. Co.,
Eels v. Gray Bros. etc. Co.,
"It is a general rule that notice to an officer or agent of a corporation is notice to the corporation if in matters in which such agent or officer would have authority to act for the corporation or whose duty it would be to communicate it to the board of directors or to an officer who had some power or authority in the matter. Such agents or officers are conspicuously the president of the corporation, the general manager, if it have one, the secretary and a bank cashier" (Clarke on California Corporations, 586). "But if full knowledge was necessary, it must be presumed that the corporation had full notice of all the facts which were known to the president. The president of a corporation is a proper person to whom notice, which is to affect a corporation, is to be given. The corporation has no eyes, ears or understanding save through its agents. The president is considered the head of the corporation, and it is his duty to report to the trustees information affecting the interests of the corporation. And the presumption is that he does so. Usually this is a conclusive presumption" (Thompson on Corporations, sec. 5228). This rule cited with approval inBalfour v. Fresno Canal etc. Co.,
Appellant cites Guernsey v. Johnson Organ Piano Co.,
Nor is Bonner Oil Co. v. Pennsylvania Oil Co.,
International Magazine Co. v. National Radio Co.,
From what has been said it follows that there is no merit in appellant's assignments "that the Scott-Burt and Davis agreement was beyond the power of the corporation to make — that it was made without sanction or ratification of the corporation — that this defendant is in no sense a continuance of Golden Gate Studios, and that defendant received no property whatever from Golden Gate Studios."
[9] As to the assignment "that the court erred in admitting in evidence the Scott-Burt and Davis agreement and the order on Scott" for the reason, as urged by appellant, that such evidence is incompetent, immaterial, and irrelevant and not binding on the corporation because not authorized and because it bears no seal, it is sufficient to say that it is not a deed as was the case inBarney v. Pforr,
[10] As to the assignment "that the evidence is insuffisufficient to support certain of the findings," there is likewise no merit. The findings which it is claimed are unsupported are finding VI, that defendant has taken over and appropriated without consideration the assets of the Golden Gate Studios and that such assets are worth $10,000; finding *626 VII, that plaintiff believed there was due him $10,625, and that he performed certain services for defendant and plaintiff believed the reasonable value of such services to be $2,500; finding X, that the reasonable value of the service rendered by plaintiff to both corporations is $5,000; finding XI, to the effect that defendant duly and regularly agreed to pay plaintiff $5,000; findings XII and XIII, relating to the agreement to pay plaintiff $5,000, and finding XIV, finding many of the denials in the answer untrue. As to finding VI, the evidence shows that defendant assumed and agreed to pay the claim of plaintiff; therefore it is not important what was the value of the assets of the former corporation; however, there is evidence of such assets and their value, which, if necessary, is sufficient to sustain the finding. As to finding VII the court was justified in finding from the demands made by plaintiff upon Mr. Burt, the general manager, for such amounts that plaintiff believed that his services were reasonably worth what he demanded. Finding X, that plaintiff's services were reasonably worth $5,000, finds sufficient support in defendant's own agreement to pay him such sum therefor, even if there were no evidence of their value in the record. As to findings XI, XII, and XIII, relative to the agreement of defendant to pay plaintiff $5,000, such findings are supported, as is shown by the evidence herein set out, and there is likewise no error in finding XIV, wherein the denials of defendant are found to be untrue.
The judgment is affirmed.
Tyler, P.J., and Knight, J., concurred.
A petition by appellant to have the cause heard in the supreme court, after judgment in the district court of appeal, was denied by the supreme court September 22, 1927. *627