*1
DAVIS
Randy
LINE, INC.
DOMINION FREIGHT
OLD
Hodge, Arnold, Randy Chief Appellant, “DUB” J a decision i i c c challenging W.H. us us t t e.e. claim for his Commission denying of Workers’ Compensation benefits. and additional total-disability medical temporary expenses 26, 2000, of the Court dated January In a published opinion See decision. remanded the Commission’s reversed Appeals Inc., Line, Dominion Davis Old Freight we R. 2-4 granted to Ark. Ct. (2000), Pursuant Sup. the Court of We affirm court’s decision. of the review appellate decision the Commission’s and remand and we reverse Appeals, the denial of relief. basis for a substantial because it fails to display
Background that on Davis sustained a parties agree April for Old while compensable right-ankle injury working appellee, Line, Dominion Inc. Dr. On Freight September Jay Lipke a Davis’s dislocation performed surgical repair partial pero- neal tendons. Dr. Davis with a Subsequently, Lipke diagnosed clot, blood medi- required anticoagulant hospitalization 1, 1996, cation. Dr. notes indicated that As Lipke’s well-healed, Davis’s wound was ankle demonstrated good motion, and there was no range evidence of subluxation of the tendon. Dr. also remarked that he Lipke anticipated would be released return to work when the blood-clot condition *3 stabilized. 13, 1996, on
Unfortunately, Davis approximately the when he on aggravated surgical repair stepped awkwardly ankle to avoid on his niece. At the time of stepping two-year-old incident, the Davis heard loud He returned to Dr. pop. Lipke, However, who treated the new as a Dr. noted injury sprain. Lipke 2, 1996, 1996, on December and December that the incident the disrupted because Davis’s prior surgical repair healing process was incomplete.
As a result of the November additional injury, sought workers’ benefits. In Old Dominion compensation response, asserted that the November constituted incident an indepen- cause, dent an award of additional intervening benefits. barring the Following Administrative Law hearing, with Old Judge agreed Dominion and concluded that Davis had failed to entitlement prove to additional benefits. Davis the decision to the appealed ALJ’s Commission, Workers’ affirmed and Compensation adopted the findings. ALJ’s the Commission’s decision the Following affirming ALJ’s
denial, Davis the of to Arkansas Court appealed Appeals. case, court reversed and remanded the appellate the reasoning Commission had no substantial basis to deny compensability because it had the to standard determine applied wrong legal whether the November 1996 incident an constituted intervening the court concluded that Significantly, appellate intent, although an via Act 796 of legislature expressed law or of administrative any “all decisions overrule prior opinions Commission, courts of the Workers’ Compensation judge, act,” that of this in conflict with to or contrary any provision state all decisions not a blanket of that declaration was prior (1) repeal causes, and (2) intervening subject in force causes remains law regarding independent act for new cases. Commission, the Court of its decision reversing support decisions in cited with Georgia-Pacific its approval prior Appeals Carter, Ark. (1998) (holding App.
Corp. new act relevant analysis has not changed independent- Co., 11 R Eads and v. & Constr. intervening-cause cases), Guidry J. act under (decision Ark. S.W.2d 483 (1984) prior that claimant’s activity triggering subsequent complication finding an be under the circumstances” to be must “unreasonable indepen dent cause). and
From
court’s decision
remanding
reversing
appellate
Commission,
In their
for
comes
instant
petition
appeal.
decision,
and the
from
review
the Court
Appeals’
appellees
curiae,
Association,
that Act
(1)
Self
as amicus
Arkansas
Insurers
argue
all
intent
declared the
repeal
unambiguously
legislature’s
decisions,
act,
the new
and case law in conflict with
opinions,
was mis-
court’s reliance on Carter
(2)
Guidry
appellate
Code Ann.
(3)
9—102(5)(F)(iii)
section
(Repl.
placed,
11—
*4
of the instant case
controls
1996), specifically
proper disposition
additional
Davis
and dictates denial of
benefits.
response,
argues
all
inconsistent
that
intended to
merely
legislature
repeal
the.
law.
I. Substantialevidence
the suffi
first
on
point
appeal challenges
Appellant’s
decision
of the evidence
the Commission’s
deny
ciency
supporting
that his
1996
him
benefits on the basis
November
additional
ing
we
when
accident was an
Notably,
a case
to review
decided
Court
by
Appeals,
grant petition
v.
it as
filed
in this court. See Williams
we review
if it was
originally
State,
State,
487,
v.
Ark.
755
most
court will
the evidence in the
favorable to the
view
light
affirm
decision and
when that decision
Commission’s
is supported
Inc.,
Ctrs.,
v.
Ester National Home
335
substantial evidence.
Ark.
by
356, 361,
Golden v.
(1998)
Davis also admitted he sustained a nonwork-related injury to the same anide a few before November days 1996. then treatment sought from Dr. to his Lipke. According Dr. remarked report, that Davis “was Lipke well until *5 doing the other when his two-year-old niece snuck behind him day and twisted ankle. There right was a loud evident. He’s had pop significant since that time.” that swelling Given Davis acknowl-
756 related, must was nonwork we that injury the subsequent
edged the correct standard the Commission legal decide whether applied an inter- that constituted determine whether injury independent Therefore, merits of second we address the appellant’s vening the first. in order resolve appeal point II. SectionH-9-I02(5)(F)(iii) the the instant concerns The heart of interpreta appeal Ann. of set forth Ark. Code tion of the standard review legal now codified as section 1996), section 9—102(5)(F)(iii)(Repl. 11— states 1999). U-9-102(5)(F)(iii) Section 11-9-102(4)(F)(iii) (Supp. that: for a (5)(F),
Under benefits shall not be payable this subdivision inter- results from a nonwork-related condition which cause vening a causes or injury following pro- compensable A indepen- nonwork-related need or a for treatment. longs disability not onthe dent causedoes recklessness negligence part require a claimant. of the construction of a statute when added.)
(Emphasis Significantly, issue, at we is will General Assembly, enacting presume it, of its the full of the constitutional knowledge possessed scope full of on the same subject, powers, knowledge legislation McLeod, full decisions under law. of knowledge judicial Co., Fe Comm’r Revenuesv. Santa Trail 205 Ark. Transp. We must effect to the S.W.2d also (1943). give legislature’s intent, usual of common sense and words their use giving making State, ordinary meaning. Kyle the November
Although agree injury parties event, caused as to whether nonwork-related by they disagree incident was cause. In an support decision, the inde- refer to the Commission’s appellees history 1984, the doctrine. In Court of Appeals pendent-intervening-cause that if causal between there is a connection adopted principle there is and the injury subsequent disability, primary compensable is no cause unless disability independent intervening subsequent is under claimant that “unreasonable by triggered activity *6 Co., v. circumstances.” & R. Eads Constr. 11 Ark. Guidry App. J. 219, 483, 223, 669 S.W.2d 485 (1984) (citations omitted). the enacted Act 796 of with legislature Subsequently, annulling Commission court decisions purpose pre-1993 act. also note that interpreting applying pre-1993 Appellees to Act 796 of workers’ laws did not prior compensation Therefore, address term cause.” “independent intervening Act 796 was an of all according appellees, unambiguous rejection law, Since including Davis’s occurred prior Guidry. injuries after the Act effective date of that the assert Commis- appellees sion the correct standard. legal applied
In Davis response, argues section interpretation makes 11-9-102(5)(F)(iii) because all any nonwork analysis illusory related incidents that or need for treatment would prolong disability be deemed causes as a automatically intervening mat Further, ter oflaw. contends section 11-9-102(5) is (F)(iii) and, codification actually case law specifically, test. We In Guidry court held agree. Guidry, that: appellate
—... not can there only be an cause independentintervening without or recklessnesson the but negligence claimant’s unreasonable part, con- duct on a claimant’s create an part may independent intervening cause would not otherwise exist.
(Emphasis added.)
11 Ark.
at
Guidry,
... a nonwork-related cause independent intervening does not require negligence recklessnesson the of the part claimant. at issue statutory tracks the language but language Guidry leaves the standard of unreasonableness intact.
Moreover, we must assume that the
legislature
aware
it
when
enacted
Guidry
section
(F)
and of
11-9-102(5)
(iii),
Geor
Carter,
gia-Pacific Corp.
S.W.2d That statutory provision clearly changed to the court adhered the following announced in Guidry. Guidry, principles: is have arisen out of and shown to primary injury
When flows every natural employment, consequence the course it is unless out employment, from the likewise arises of the injury own an causeattributable claimant’s independentintervening resultof misconduct. (Emphasis or negligence added.) is there is a connection between the whether causal question [T]he and if such a and the there is injury subsequent disability primary cause unless connection, intervening there is no independent claimant by part is disability triggered activity subsequent which is unreasonableunder circumstances. added.) (Emphasis an clearly above principles provide independent or connection is shown when the claimant’s own cause misconduct, unreasonable results in a subse- or activity negligence, other on the -9-102(5) (F)(iii), second Section injury. quent hand, the claimant’s or recklessnessis unneces- provides negligence a nonwork-related show sary
Section 11-9-102 Act 796 1993 after (5)(F)(iii), by adopted decision, further that workers’ states Guidry compensation benefits shall not a conditionwhich results nonwork-related be payable for from cause compensable injury following independent intervening or a need for treatment. disability causes or prolongs Here, to his ankle was Davis’s second claimant’s Randy injury nonwork-related, his sister’s since it occurred at house. clearly when, caused his to avoid own conduct second injury Randy’s contact, niece and came down he over two-year-old stepped he at on the ankle had work. injured right previously awkwardly evidence to show Davis’s second There is no substantial injury nonwork-related Because the due to his own activity. excludes benefits ion 9—102(5)(F)(iii) clearly language plain § 11— circumstances, I must dissent. these respectfully
Smith, this dissent. J., joins *8 C. FUDGE STATE of Arkansas
James 99-1102 CR S.W.3d 315 Court of Arkansas
Supreme delivered Opinion June