Thе appellants brought this action individually and as representatives of a similarly situated class of persons, all of whom arе employed by the City of Atlanta. They appealed the lower court’s grant of appellees’ motion for summary judgment based upon the appellants’ lack of standing to maintain the suit.
The record shows that on January 20, 1975, an ordinance was enacted which directed the city’s
In June, 1975, the city determined that pursuant to the ordinance a majority of employees of appellant’s governmental unit had become members of and had authorized dues check-off to the appellee, American Federation of State, County and Municipal Employees, commonly referred to as AFSCME. The following month, thе city began deducting AFSCME dues from the wages of those employees for whom it had signed cards authorizing such deductions. Later in July, 1975, the аppellants, describing themselves as employees within this defined unit, brought a class action suit in the Superior Court of Fulton County, against numerous officials of the City of Atlanta and the AFSCME union. They alleged that they had not desired to become members of AFSCME and had nоt authorized deductions from their pay for AFSCME dues. The appellants also alleged that check-off for AFSCME dues from the wagеs of any employee was improper in that it had not been authorized by a majority of the employees in the unit, and that thеrefore the acts and conduct of the appellees violated appellants’ lawful rights under the Constitution and the lаws of the State of Georgia.
The record indicates that at the time the city instituted dues check-off for AFSCME the city had in its possession check-off authorization cards from all employees from whose wages dues were deducted, including the appellants, but that some of the employees who had authorized check-off of AFSCME dues, including appellants, withdrew such authorizations prior to and during July, 1975. For administrative convenience the city waited until the end of July, 1975, to put into effect all withdrawals recеived prior to and during that month, thus resulting in July, 1975 dues being deducted from the
While the union believed the city’s application of the ordinance in July, 1975 was both reasonable and proper, they had no desire to retain money which employees believed had been taken frоm them improperly, and therefore, the appellees, in a pleading filed in the superior court, offered to refund thе $5 in dues deducted for any member in the month of July, 1975, upon a showing that said employee submitted a withdrawal authorization card somеtime prior to July 31,1975. Although the appellants never accepted this offer, the offer remained open throughout the litigation and continues to remain open now.
After twice denying appellants’ motion for a summary judgment, the superior court granted the appellees’ motion for summary judgment on grounds that the appellants’ only alleged injury was the deduction of dues fоr July, 1975, and since the appellants had been offered a refund of said dues they had no standing to challenge the city’s deduction of AFSCME dues from the wages of other employees who had previously authorized such deductions and had never withdrawn their authоrizations. Held:
Without reaching the merits of appellants’ contentions, an examination of the complaint and the record below disclose no injury other than the deduction of AFSCME dues from appellants’ wages in July, 1975. The union appellees have continually offered to refund those dues to the appellants; however, it is clear that these appellants seek mоre than the return of their $5 in dues for July, 1975. They seek a determination from the court that the City of Atlanta erroneously granted dues chеck-off and seek an order terminating the check-off to AFSCME.
This court has held that in order to maintain an action challenging а statute, or an administrative action, such as the grant of check-off to AFSCME, the plaintiff must show that "interest or rights of such complаining party are affected by the statute or the action of the agency. [Cits.]”
West v. Housing Authority of Atlanta,
Similarly, since the appellants are no longer within the class of those persons whose rights are adversely аffected by the check-off and stand to suffer no harm by the continuation and presence of the check-off upon thе books, they have no standing to challenge the continuation of the check-off subsequent to July, 1975, when they withdrew their authorizations.
Frances Wood Wilson Foundation v. Bell,
Judgment affirmed.