110 Cal. 231 | Cal. | 1895
This is an appeal by Sarah Davis from a decree of distribution to Florence Blythe Hinckley of the property and estate of Thomas H. Blythe, deceased.
The said Blythe died intestate in April, 1883. Letters of administration upon his estate were issued in that year to Philip A. Roach, who was afterward succeeded by others as administrators. More than one year after the issuance of letters the respondent herein, Florence Blythe Hinckley, then Florence Blythe, commenced proceedings, under section 1664 of the Code of Civil Procedure, to have the claims of all persons to said estate, and its distribution, ascertained and declared in the manner provided by that section. She filed her petition in October, 1885, claiming to be the daughter and sole heir of said deceased, and entitled to the distribution of his whole estate. The court duly made an order requiring all persons, named or unnamed, to appear on February 1,1886, and exhibit their claims of heirship, ownership, or interest in said estate, which was duly published; and on said day nearly two hundred persons appeared claiming such heirship. Within the time prescribed by law said Florence filed her complaint, setting forth the facts constituting her heirship to the deceased and her claim to said estate; and the numerous persons who had appeared filed pleadings, or “ answers," as they are called in the section, setting up the facts constituting their claims to heirship and distribution. They are mostly associated in certain groups, and their claims were mostly inconsistent with and hostile to each other, each group contending that the deceased was descended from parents different from those alleged by either oí the other claimants. After various proceedings not
The contention of appellant is, that the said proceedings and decree under section 1664 (styled "Blythe v. Ayres”) are not conclusive as against her. But that
In the case at bar, the question arises upon the objections by appellant to the introduction by the respondent of the prior proceedings in the administration of the estate of Thomas H. Blythe, including the proceedings under said section 1664 and the judgment and decree rendered therein. These proceedings were properly set forth by respondent in her petition for distribution; and they were all specifically denied by the appellant in her answer to said petition. If there is any one of the averments of the petition—from the death of Blythe to the moment when the answer was filed—that is not denied by the answer, we have failed to discover it. The English language seems to have been tortured in the answer through apparent fear that the denials might not be considered comprehensive and complete. She denies that any proceeding was taken under section 1664, or that any person appeared and filed an answer therein, or that any judgment was rendered, or any-
It is quite apparent, therefore, that the said evidence objected to was properly introduced in proof of averments denied by the appellant and necessary to respondent’s application for distribution.
Moreover, the evidence objected to was admissible, generally, as proof of respondent’s status as sole heir of the deceased. Whether it would be conclusive as against appellant, or whether it would have been evidence at all against her on the question of the status of respondent, if appellant were “ interested in the estate,” is, as before stated, not a necessary question here. Upon the issue of her interest in the estate the court below allowed her to introduce all the evidence she had to offer; and it found that she is in no manner akin to said Blythe, deceased, and has no interest in or claim to any of his estate. It is Contended that the finding is against the
There are no other points in the case necessary to be hoticed.
The judgment and decree of distribution appealed from are afBrmed.
Henshaw, J., Van Fleet, J., and Garoutte, J., concurred.
Beatty, C. J., and Harrison, J., deeming themselves disqualified, took no part in the decision of this cause.