153 Ark. 626 | Ark. | 1922
(after stating the facts). It is first contended by counsel for Davis & Worrell, the defendants, that the plaintiff, General Motors Acceptance Corporation, is not entitled to maintain this suit because it has not complied with our statute regulating foreign corporations doing business in this State. Crawford & Moses ’ Digest, secs. 1825-32 inclusive.
It appears from the record that the plaintiff has not complied with our statute prescribing the terms upon which foreign corporations may do business in this State. It is the contention of the plaintiff that the transaction in question does not bring it within the prohibition of the statute. The statute does not specify what particular acts shall constitute doing business in this State by a foreign corporation. The general holding, however, is that the doing of business is the exercise in this State of some of the ordinary functions for which the corporation was organized. In other words, it is the actual doing or engaging in business in this State by such corporation.
In White River Lumber Co. v. Southwestern Improvement Assn., 55 Ark. 625, it was held that a foreign corporation is not doing business within the meaning of the statute by entering into a contract with a resident thereof, where the contract is made and is to be performed elsewhere.
So too in State Mutual Fire Ins. Assn. v. Brinkley Stave & Heading Co., 61 Ark. 1, it was held that a contract made with a foreign insurance company through its local soliciting agent at a place outside of the State is not doing business within the State within the meaning of the statute. These cases hold that the rule is not altered by the fact that the contracts relate to property in this State.
Again, in Scruggs v. Scottish Mortgage Co., 54 Ark. 566, it was held that a foreign corporation, in lending money on land in this State, is not doing business in the State, within the meaning of sec. 11, art. 12 of the Constitution of 1874, if the agreement for the loan was made in another State, and the notes and securities delivered and the money paid there.
In Bamberger v. Schoolfield, 160 U. S. 149, it was held that a foreign corporation is not doing business in a State by purchasing in another 'State negotiable securities executed within the’ first State.
In the application of the principle stated in the illustrative cases given above, we agree with the chancellor that the transaction in the present case does not come ■within the prohibition of our statute regulating foreign corporations doing business in this State. >•
It is true that it was a part of the business of the plaintiff corporation to discount notes of this character, and that it did discount notes purchased from about forty dealers in ¡motor vehicles in the State of Arkansas. The plaintiff was organized under the laws of the State of New York and had a branch office at Dallas, Texas, where it transacted its business with residents of the State of Arkansas.- It' furnished dealers of motor vehicles in Arkansas with whom it contemplated doing business with ’blank forms of contracts to be used by such dealers in selling their motor vehicles. There was a place on such form for the purchaser of the motor vehicle to make a statement of his financial condition. The dealer was required to send to the plaintiff at Dallas, Texas, a statement of his financial -condition, and an investigation of his financial condition was also made through reports by commercial agencies and otherwise. Then the plaintiff would agree to extend a general line of credit to such dealer. The dealer in making a sale would take the note of the purchaser on one of the blank forms furnished by the plaintiff. This was all done, however, to better enable the plaintiff to pass upon the securities offered it for discount. The plaintiff had no interest whatever in the business of the dealers from whom it bought such commercial paper. It had no established agency in this State. In each instance the paper was sent to its office in Dallas, Texas, and accepted there. The money was paid there, or through a bank in Chicago upon orders of the- home office in New York. Thus it will be seen that the contract was made and the money paid in each instance outside of the State. The applications for sale of commercial paper were received by the plaintiff at its office outside of this State. They were passed upon there and accepted or rejected there. The plaintiff had no agency in this State, and the mere fact that it acted upon applications -coming through residents in this State would not constitute doing business in this State within the meaning of the statute.
As we have said, it does not appear that the plaintiff ever had an agency in this State, and the most that can be said is that it actually accepted discounts from forty different dealers in motor vehicles. The negotiations, however, were conducted by the dealers themselves, who, although residents of this State, were not in any sense the agents of the plaintiff, and the plaintiff was not in any way connected with their business or obligated to purchase at a discount or otherwise the notes which such dealers should take for motor vehicles sold by them.
It is true that the furnishing of blank contracts to be used by the dealers in selling their motor vehicles and in purchasing the notes given for said motor vehicles tended to further the business of such dealers, but this did not make such transactions fall within the terms of the act. This would not be the controlling test. The test is, was the transaction of the business such that the corporation was for the time being, through its agents or otherwise, within the State for the purpose of doing business?
In reaching this conclusion we do not mean to say that a foreign corporation must have an agency established in this State to bring it within the operation of our statute regulating foreign corporations doing business in this State; but we do hold that in a case like this, where the foreign corporation had its place of domicile in another State and discounted commercial paper of parties with money paid out in. such other- State on applications made to it there through dealers in this State, such transactions do not constitute doing business in this State by such foreign corporation.
It is also insisted by counsel for Davis & Worrell that the decree should be reversed because -one of the motor trucks was purchased through the false representations of the Newport Foundry & Machine Company. Frank Worrell, one of the members of the firm, testified that this truck was represented to him to be a new truck, and that when he began to use it he found that it had been used for at least six months, and that some of its parts showed wear, and that it was altogether in such a defective condition that it could not be used. Two of his employees corroborated his testimony.
On the other hand, the manager of the Newport Foundry & Machine Company testified that Worrell was a man of several years’ experience in the use of motor trucks and that he made a thorough examination of the one in question before he purchased it. The truck was never repainted, as testified to by Worrell. At the request of Worrell the truck was changed so as to put a dump body upon .it, and it was probably touched up to cover up the scars made in making the change. The car was driven through the country from Newport to Imboden at the time it was purchased, but it was entirely new. An employee of the company who drove the truck through the country and delivered it, testified that it was new and all right.
The chancellor found the issue of fraudulent representations in favor of the plaintiff, and when we consider that Worrell had had several years’ experience in running motor trucks and made a thorough examination of the one in question, it can not be said that the finding of the chancellor that he was not induced to buy it by the false and fraudulent representations of the seller was against the preponderance of the evidence.
Moreover, the plaintiff purchased the note given for the purchase price of the motor truck for value before maturity, and it does not appear from the record that it had any knowledge of any false representations which induced the sale of the motor truck, if any such were made by the seller.
As we have already seen, the plaintiff was not interested in the sale of the motor trucks and had nothing whatever to do with the sale thereof.
There is .a dispute between the parties to this lawsuit as to what testimony properly appears in the record; but, inasmuch as we have accepted the abstract of the testimony made by appellants, and have reached the conclusion that the decree should be affirmed, we have decided not to go into the dispute between the parties in this respect or to consider which is right.
From the conclusions we have reached, it follows that the decree must be affirmed.
