[¶ 1] Paul C. Davis was struck and seriously injured by defendant Edwin Rodriguez. Rodriguez was driving while intoxicated soon after he and Davis exited a chartered bus at the conclusion of a business promotion trip. Davis appeals from a grant of summary judgment entered in the Superior Court (Penobscot County, Anderson, J.) in favor of the business that organized the trip, its employee, thе chartered bus company, and its employee. We affirm.
I. BACKGROUND
[¶ 2] The parties do not dispute the majority of the following facts, which we view in the light most favorable to Davis as the nonmoving party and which are established in the summary judgment record. See Beal v. Allstate Ins. Co.,
[¶ 3] The trip took place on August 19, 2006, and began and ended as planned at the Orrington parking lot of Crescent Lumber, Davis’s employer. In advance of the bus trip, Dionne bought four or five cases of beer and a gallon of rum for participants to consume during the trip. Dionne was aware that Rodriguez drank rum on the way to Bar Harbor. Rodriguez was loud and obnoxious throughout the day and consumed alcohol on the fishing boat and at the Bar Harbor restaurant where the group dined after the fishing excursion.
[¶ 4] Neither Webb nor Cyr supplied any alcohol to the bus passengers during the trip. Cyr’s invoice stated: “Consumption of alcoholic beverages and unlawful narcotics by passengers is prohibited on buses.” The partiеs dispute whether Webb knew or should have known that bus passengers were consuming alcohol on the bus. Webb did not accompany the partici
[¶ 5] On the return trip there was a scuffle involving Rodriguez, and the parties dispute whether racial epithets were shouted at Rodriguez. When the bus reached the Crescent Lumber parking lot, Rodriguez exited the bus and went to his truck. The parties dispute how much time elapsed between Rodriguez’s exit from the bus and his attempt to drive out of the parking lot, but it is undisputed that some of the trip participants approached Rodriguez’s truck in a threatening manner during this period. Soon after Rodriguez started to drive his truck, he struck and seriously injured Davis. Rodriguez later pleaded guilty to reckless endangerment, aggravated assault, and OUI.
[¶ 6] Davis’s claims under the Maine Liquor Liability Act (MLLA), 28-A M.R.S. §§ 2501-2520 (2006)
II. DISCUSSION
[¶ 7] The MLLA is “the exclusive remedy against servers who may be made defendants under section 2505, for claims by those suffering damages based on the servers’ service of liquor.” 28-A M.R.S. § 2511; see 28-A M.R.S. § 2505. The statute is broаd, including as a “server” any “person who sells, gives or otherwise provides liquor to an individual,” pursuant to 28-A M.R.S. § 2503(5), and making both “licensee” and “nonlicensee” servers subject to liability for negligent or reckless service of liquor, pursuant to 28-A M.R.S. §§ 2503(3), (4), 2505-2507. The MLLA provides a relatively brief statute of limitations of two years, 28-A M.R.S. § 2514, and a very brief notice period of 180 days, 28-A M.R.S. § 2513. Because Davis failed to provide timely notice of his claim pursuant to section 2513, he has no claim under the MLLA against Dionne or Brockway. In order to obtain rеlief from the exclusivity provision in section 2511, Davis must show some relationship between himself and these defendants — separate from the relationship created by their furnishing of alcohol — that would support a claim of negligence. See Thibodeau v. Slaney,
[¶ 8] As the court noted, Webb and Cyr were not servers or furnishers of alcohol, so the exclusivity provision does not apply to Davis’s claims against them. Nonetheless, in order to survive summary judgment on his claims for common law negligence against each of these defendants, Davis “must establish a prima facie case for each element of his negligence cause of action: a duty owed, a breach of that duty, and an injury that is prоximately caused by a breach of that duty.” Belyea v. Shiretown Motor Inn, LP,
A. Cyr’s and Webb’s duty
[¶ 9] Davis agrees that the duty of Cyr and Webb is determined by Cyr’s status as a common carrier. Davis argues that Cyr had a duty as a common carrier to either remove Rodriguez from the bus
[¶ 10] “Duty involves the question of whether the defendant is under any obligation for the benefit of the particular plaintiff.” Jackson v. Tedd-Lait Post No. 75, Am. Legion,
[¶ 11] Davis argues that the discharge of passengers in the parking lot was rendered unsafe because Rodriguеz had been drinking and it was reasonably foreseeable that he would drive his vehicle after he exited the bus. Davis asks us to impose a duty on Cyr and Webb to ensure Davis’s safety by рreventing Rodriguez from driving his truck after the bus trip ended. However, we have declined to extend the duty of a common carrier “to include an in loco parentis type of responsibility to intervene in an arguably intoxicated passenger’s life, perhaps against the passenger’s wishes, to ensure that the passenger does not harm himself or herself aftеr the common carrier has given the safe exit that the law requires.” Id. ¶ 14,
[¶ 12] Davis also argues that Cyr and Webb had a duty arising from Cyr’s statement on its invoice thаt “[consumption of alcoholic beverages and unlawful narcotics by passengers is prohibited on buses.” Cyr’s invoice statement does not alter the duty of Cyr or Webb; the standard of care applicable to these defendants is that of a common carrier.
B. Brockway’s and Dionne’s duty
[¶ 13] Davis argues that Brock-way and Dionne breached a duty to-comply with the Cyr invoice statement when Dionne bought alcohol before the excursion. Any duty not to purchase alcohol arising from the Cyr invoice statement would be inextricably linked to the service of alcohol and would therefore trigger the MLLA’s exclusivity provision pursuant to 28-A M.R.S. § 2511. See Jackson,
[¶ 14] Davis also argues that Brockway and Dionne had a special relationship with Davis and a fiduciary duty to him because Dionne organized and led the excursion. “[T]he general rule is that an actor has no duty to protect others from harm caused by third parties.” Fortin v. Roman Catholic Bishop of Portland,
The entry is:
Judgment affirmed.
Notes
. Title 28-A M.R.S. §§ 2501-2520 (2006) has since been amended, but not in any way that affects this appeal. P.L.2009, ch. 247, § 1 (effective Sept. 12, 2009) (codified at 28-A M.R.S. §§ 2501-2520 (2010)).