Case Information
*1 Before SMITH, GARZA, and PRADO, Circuit Judges.
PER CURIAM: [*]
Plaintiff-Appellant Janice Bonner Davis brought federal and state law claims of employment discrimination against Defendant- Appellee Department of Health and Hospitals (“DHH”) in Louisiana state court. Specifically, Davis alleged that she was denied a promotion [1] in 2001 based on her membership in a labor union, in violation of the Louisiana Constitution, and was denied the same *2 promotion in 2002 because of her race and gender, in violation of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e to 2000e-17. The DHH removed the case to federal court. Davis then voluntarily amended her petition, deleting her federal claims, and moved to remand the case to state court. The district court denied the motion to remand, and the case proceeded to trial. After judgement was entered in accordance with a jury verdict in favor of the DHH, Davis appealed the district court’s refusal to remand.
The primary dispute between the parties pertains to the
district court’s exercise of jurisdiction over Davis’s state law
claim. 28 U.S.C. § 1441(a) permits removal of actions of which
the United States district courts have original jurisdiction. §
1441(a); Melder v. Allstate Corp. 2005). “We review a district court’s determination of the
propriety of removal de novo.” State of Texas v. Walker , 142
F.3d 813, 816 (5th Cir. 1998). The propriety of removal is
determined by looking to the plaintiff’s complaint as it existed
in state court at the time of removal. Cavallini v. State Farm
Mut. Auto Ins. Co. ,
At the time of removal, Davis’s complaint included a federal
discrimination claim under 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a)(1) and a state
law discrimination claim, which alleged a violation of L A . C ONST .
art. X § 10(a)(3). We have held that a federal claim, “though
*3
[later] abandoned, permits a district court to exercise
supplemental jurisdiction over remaining state claims.” McGowin
v. ManPower Int’l, Inc. ,
Davis’s state law claims are supplemental to her federal
claim, and the district court had jurisdiction to hear the case.
The state and federal claims derive from a common nucleus of
operative fact, as a substantial number of factual issues are
common to both claims. See Fla. E. Coast Ry. Co. v. United
States ,
“[A] district court has discretion to remand a properly
removed case to state court when all federal-law claims have been
eliminated and only [supplemental] state-law claims remain.”
Jones v. Roadway Express, Inc. 1991). Davis argues that the district court erred in refusing to
remand the case to state court after she dismissed her federal
claim. We review the district court’s denial of Davis’s motion
to remand for abuse of discretion. Parker & Parsley Petroleum
Co. v. Dresser Indus. ,
Notes
[*] Pursuant to 5 TH C IRCUIT R ULE 47.5, the court has determined that this opinion should not be published and is not precedent except under the limited circumstances set forth in 5 TH C IRCUIT R ULE 47.5.4.
[1] The relevant promotion was for the position of Assistant Director of Nursing.
