26 Cal. 23 | Cal. | 1864
This is an action of ejectment brought to recover a certain fifty-vara lot of land in the City of San Francisco. The action was commenced by filing a complaint in the usual form, in July, 1863. The defendant by her answer controverted the material allegations of the complaint, and as an affirmative defense, pleaded the Statute of Limitations, and also an estoppel in pais, arising from the conduct and declarations of the Honorable David C. Broderick, from whom the plaintiff claimed to derive his title to the demanded premises, of which it is alleged the plaintiff had notice by thé defendant’s actual possession of the lot at the time he purchased the property. By the answer it is alleged that on the 27th of August, 1853, one Henry Braddick was in possession of the
To maintain the issue on his part the plaintiff produced and gave in evidence a grant of the lot in question, made in 1849, by the authority of the Pueblo of San Francisco, to David 0. Broderick and Frederick D. Kohler; a conveyance from Kohler in 1852 of his interest in the lot to Broderick; a conveyance in October, 1858, from Broderick to John A. ItcGrlynn; a conveyance in November, 1858, from McGlynn to Hugh P. Gallagher; and a conveyance in October, 1862, from Gallagher to the plaintiff. Mr. Broderick died on the 16th of September, 1859.
The defendant claimed title derived from Henry Braddick by deed bearing date on the 27th of August, 1853, and produced and gave the same in evidence; and also produced witnesses who testified of and concerning the declarations and representations alleged to have been made by Mr. Broderick in his lifetime, which are set forth in the defendant’s answer.
Tli’e defendant was also sworn as a witness on her own behalf; and her counsel then proposed and offered to prove by her the facts set up in the answer pleaded, as an estoppel in pais; and also that she received a deed from the person in possession of the premises, viz: Henry Braddick, on the 27th
The plaintiff objected that the defendant was incompetent as a witness to testify as to any matter of fact which occurred between her and Mr. Broderick in his lifetime. The Court sustained the objection, and the defendant’s counsel duly excepted.
The jury rendered a general verdict in favor of the plaintiff; and also a special verdict in response to special issues submitted to them. The result of the special verdict may be stated as follows:
First—On the 27th of August, 1853, the defendant purchased of Henry Braddick the lot in controversy, for the sum of seven hundred dollars, which she paid to him, and at the same time he executed to her a deed of conveyance for the same, bearing date on that day, when she entered into the possession of the lot, and from that time until the trial of this action, has been in the exclusive possession of it.
Second—Before the defendant received the deed from Brad-dick, and before she had paid him the consideration of seven hundred dollars for the premises, she informed Broderick that she wished to purchase the premises, when Broderick disclaimed having any claim or title thereto. He was then aware that she intended to purchase the lot of Braddick.
Third—The defendant, relying upon this disclaimer of Broderick, purchased the lot and paid seven hundred dollars for it, when she would not have done so if Broderick had not made such disclaimer.
Fourth—When Mr. Broderick stated that he had no claim or title to the lot, he was not apprised of the true state of his own title, and in making such statement or representation to the defendant he did not intend to deceive or defraud her.
Fifth—Mr. Broderick, in making this statement or repre
Sixth—The defendant was not, at the time she purchased of Braddick, wholly destitute of all knowledge of the true state of the title to the lot, nor of all means of acquiring such knowledge.
Each party moved for judgment. The. Court entered judgment for the plaintiff in accordance with the general verdict. The defendant applied to the Court for a new trial, which application was denied. The appeal is from this order, and also from the judgment.
Several points are made on the part of the appellant on which she relies for a reversal of the judgment.
I. It is claimed on the part of the appellant that she was competent as a witness to testify on her own behalf as to declarations and statements made to her by Broderick, notwithstanding he had departed this life previous to the trial.
By section three hundred and ninety-two of the Practice Act, in force at the time of the trial, parties as well as strangers in interest to the controversy were competent as witnesses, except as otherwise provided in that Act.
The three hundred and ninety-third section of the Act provides that no person shall be allowed to testify, under the provisions of the next previous section where the adverse party or the party for whose immediate benefit the action or proceeding is prosecuted or .defended is the representative of a deceased person, when the facts to be proved transpired before the death of such deceased person.
The point here presented may not be particularly material in this case, inasmuch as the jury by their special verdict found the facts in every essentially important particular to be as the defendant sought to establish them by her own testimony. But, notwithstanding, the question is one of much practical importance in the administration of justice, and we deem it proper to dispose of it now that it is before us.
The import and effect of the word “ representative ” is the question to be determined in the disposition of the exception
In 1851 the rule of the common law on this subject was changed so far as to render competent as witnesses persons interested in the event of the action, other than parties or persons for whose immediate benefit the action might be prosecuted or defended. (Practice Act of 1851, Sections 392 and 393.) By that Act a party could examine the adverse party, who thereby became competent as a witness on his own behalf, if he elected so to do ; but if he testified to new matter not responsive to the inquiries put to him by the party who called him, or not necessary to explain or qualify his answer thereto,' or to discharge, when his answer would charge himself, then his adversary might offer himself as a witness, on his own behalf, as to such new matter. (Id., Sections 418-421.) In 1854 (Laws of 1854, p. 84,) it was provided that “parties may be witnesses on their own behalf when the action is brought for the settlement of, or in relation to, the business and accounts of a copartnership then existing, or which had previously existed between them, to prove vouchers or items of an amount under one hundred dollars.” In 1861 (Laws of 1861, p. 522,) the Act was so amended as to permit a party to an action to
In 1863 (Laws of 1863, p. 70) the Legislature again amended the Act, making parties competent witnesses, except that “no person shall be allowed to testify, * * * when the adverse party, or the party for whose immediate benefit the action is prosecuted or defended, is the representative of a deceased person, when the facts to be proved transpired before the death of such deceased person.”
It is manifest, from the legislation on the subject, that the policy of opening the door to the admission of parties as witnesses, to testify generally in their own cases, has been contemplated with no light degree of apprehension; and to guard against the mischiefs and to secure the benefits arising from the change of the law, the Legislature, in respect to it, provided, as amply as practicable, to place the parties on an equality. ,
By the Act of 1861, the party who proposed to become a witness was required to give his adversary notice of the particular matters concerning which he intended to give evidence, that the adverse party might be prepared to meet it by his own testimony or that of other witnesses; and even with this protection against surprise a party was not permitted to become a witness in his own behalf unless the adverse party was living, nor where he might be an assignee, administrator, executor or legal representative of a deceased person. The change effected by the amendment of 1863 seems to have beerq intended to dispense with the necessity of the notice required under the law as it stood previously, and yet to retain in substance the portion of it which disabled one party from testifying concerning matters of which the other, as the
In Grand Gulf Railroad and Banking Company v. Bryan, 8 S. & M. 275, Mr. Chief Justice Sharkie said: “In legal parlance, the executor or adip-inistrator is most commonly called the legal representative.”':--; Aniuix the same case he denied that the terms “legah Vepresentaiive^^yere limited to this use alone, saying: “ih regal'd to things, teal, the heir is also the legal representative,gapA só i^hp devisee, who takes by purchase;” and that %§n "Asiignee'óf;giuntee is a legal representative of the assignoí^r grafitos in/egard to the thing assigned or granted;” and he allb^aA^iat “general expressions in law must be construed to have a general application, unless there be a clear indication that they were intended to be used in a restricted sense. Representative is one who exercises power derived from another. A purchaser derives his power over the estate from his vendor.” (Phelps v. Smith, 15 Ill. 574.)
We are of opinion that the word “representative” in the amendment of 1863, was intended by the Legislature to designate the executor or administrator of a deceased person, and also the person or party who had succeeded to the right of the deceased, whether by purchase or descent, or operation of law. Any other construction would leave the purchaser of an estate from a grantor, who subsequently died, in a worse condition than the grantor’s executor would be had no conveyance of the estate been made. There is no reason why the plaintiff in this case should be exposed to the interested
II. The defendant claims that the special verdict is inconsistent with the general verdict, and that by the special verdict she was and is entitled to judgment; and the doctrines of the law of estoppel in pais are relied on as requiring a judgment for the defendant. On the part of the plaintiff it is maintained that neither the facts pleaded by the defendant nor the findings of the jury, as contained in them special verdict, authorize a judgment different from that given and entered in the case.
Estoppels in pais seem, in them common law origin, to have arisen only in the case of those solemn and peculiar acts to which the law gave the power of creating a right, or passing an estate, and to which the law attached as much efficacy and importance as to matters appearing either by deed or of record. Mere acts, statements, or admissions of a party, when not made or performed under seal, of record, or in the course of some of those acts to which peculiar authority was attached by the law, were not considered as estoppels, and had no other weight than that of evidence, more or less strong, but which might be explained or rebutted.
By the rules of the common law an estoppel by deed or by matter of record must be specially pleaded, unless the circumstances be such as to prevent it from being placed on the record by a plea. (7 C. B. 310; Howard v. Mitchell, 14 Mass. 242; Bartholomew v. Candee, 14 Pick. 167.) On the other hand, estoppels by matters in pais, of a nature of which Courts of law would take cognizance, could be relied on in evidence as conclusive without being pleaded by way of estoppel, (Sanderson v. Collman, 4 M. and Gr. 209; Darlington v. Pritchard, Id. 783.)
But equitable estoppels in pais, generally, if not univer
The answer does not show by averments that Broderick was, at the time of the conversation between him and the defendant, apprised of the true state of his own title, nor that he made the statements and representations imputed to him, and found by the jury, with the intention to deceive or defraud the defendant, or with such carelessness and culpable negligence as to amount to a constructive fraud; ñor that the defendant was without knowledge of the true state of the title to the premises, or without the means of readily acquiring such knowledge, when she purchased of Braddick.
Some of these facts at least we deem material and essential to the creation of an equitable estoppel in this case; but as evidence was produced on the trial in the same manner as if these facts had been properly pleaded, and the jury have rendered a special verdict which negatives such facts, we shall consider the case upon the special verdict without regarding the objection made on behalf of plaintiff to the answer.
According to the modern decisions of the Courts, both in England and in the States of the American Union, it is established that wherever an act is done or statement made by a party which cannot be contravened or contradicted without
In Pickard v. Sears, 6 Ad. & Ell. 447, Lord Denman, Chief Justice, said: “Where one by his words or conduct wilfully causes another to believe in the existence of a certain state of things, and induces him to act on that belief, so as to alter his own previous position, the former is concluded from averring against the latter a different state of things as existing at the same time.” In order to create an equitable estoppel there must be an admission intended to influence the conduct of the man with whom the party is dealing, and actually leading him into a line of conduct which would be prejudicial to his interest, unless the party estopped be cut off from the power of retraction. For the prevention of fraud, the law holds the admission to be conclusive. (Cowen, J., in Dezell v. Odell, 3 Hill, 219.) It was held in the same case by Mr. Justice Bronson, that to constitute an estoppel in pais against a party, there must be, first, an admission which is clearly inconsistent with the evidence which the party proposes to give, or the title or claim wMch he proposes to set up ; second, that the other party has acted upon such admission and will be injured by allowing the truth of the admission to be disproved. (3 Hill, 221, 222; Welland Canal Company v. Hathaway, 8 Wend. 483.)
It will be observed that in the decision of Lord Denman, to which we have referred, the word “ wilfully ” is of potent import, and is made to characterize the act of the wrongdoer in effecting the injury done; and in all the cases in which the doctrine of equitable estoppel is applied, it will be found that it rests for its foundation upon the equitable principle that is ever invoked for the prevention of the mischievous consequences of fraud. (Copeland v. Copeland, 28 Maine, 539, 540; Commonwealth v. Moltz, 10 Barr, 531; Adams’ Equity, 151.)
In Biddle Boggs v. Merced Mining Company, 14 Cal. 367, 368, Mr. Chief Justice Field held that to the application of
The doctrine of estoppel in pais should not be too readily extended when the effect of it is to divest men of their estates in lands. It should be remembered that we have a statute which makes a writing essential to the assignment or creation of an estate in real property, and that one of the objects of such statute was to render estates secure. In Parker v. Barker, 2 Met. 423, the Supreme Court of Massachusetts held that a parol stipulation made by one party and acted on by the other will not constitute an estoppel with reference to land unless it be attended by actual fraud or concealment. (5 Metcalf, 461 and 478.)
In Jackson v. Sherman, 6 John. 21, it was held that parol declarations are inadmissible to prove or disprove a title; and in Jackson v. Vosburgh, 7 John. 186, that like evidence of a disclaimer of title is inadmissible. This rule cannot be too closely adhered to, and a departure from it can only be justi
The case of Storrs v. Barker, 6 John. Ch. R. 166, on which ,the defendant places reliance, does not, in our judgment, at all .militate against the doctrine maintained by the decisions which we have cited, but may be cited in their support. In that .case it was held that one knowing certain facts, which had .the effect to create a title in himself to property, though not .aware of such effect, if active in inducing one who, to nil appearances had a title to it, to sell and another to purchase ■it, should not be permitted afterward to allege his ignorance of the law, in attempting to recover the property of the purchaser. In .the.case here referred to both parties claimed from ,the same source—the one through a devise made by a feme ■covert, which was void, and the other as her heir at law. The heir at law recognized for years the devise as valid, and as ¡passing the estate to.the devisee; and while the devisee and the purchaser were negotiating in respect to the matter, which lasted through several weeks, he repeatedly advised the one to .sell and the other to buy, declaring that he considered the title under the will good (pp. 167, 172); and for three years thereafter permitted the purchaser to make improvements, and exercise acts of ownership upon the land without interposing ¡any claim as the heir at law, founded on the invalidity of the -devise. Chancellor Kent, after referring to these circumstances, said: “If the case rested upon these facts alone, it
The statement which the jury have found that Broderick made, to the effect that he had no claim to the lot, was a mistake of fact which the jury, upon all the evidence before them, say was not made with any intent to deceive or defraud the defendant, nor with gross carelessness or culpable negligence, and we think it would be carrying the doctrine of estoppel in pais to an extent that would encourage the grossest frauds and perjuries, and would result in many instances in divesting the owner of his title and transferring it to another upon evidence of declarations unwittingly and innocently made, were we to hold that the facts found by the jury create an estoppel against the plaintiff’s assertion of his title to the demanded premises.
We may say in respect to parol evidence of the declarations and admissions of persons made long anterior to the trial, upon which an estoppel in pais may be sought to be founded, that it cannot be too carefully scrutinized by Courts and juries.
III. The defendant requested the Court to give certain instructions to the jury, which were refused, and now assigns this action of the Court as erroneous.
The first requested instruction was : “ That where two innocent parties must suffer, that party who had been the cause of another’s loss must lose.”
In Lickbarrow v. Mason, 2 T. R. 70, Mr. Justice Ashhrst said : “ Wherever one of two innocent persons must suffer by the act of a third, he who enabled such third person to occasion the loss must bear it.” But great caution should be exercised in applying this principle, and the Court should be satisfied that the case is one calling for its application, before the question is submitted to the jury, as to which of the parties is entirely in delicto. The instruction requested is ambiguous, if not entirely unintelligible. It does not inculcate the doctrine enunciated by Mr. Justice Ashurst. In legal contemplation the person who causes a loss to another is not innocent, and it would have been improper for the Court to have charged the jury that, both parties being innocent, one of them could be found guilty of a wrong to the other.
If the fact of constructive notice to the defendant of the existence of this grant had any bearing on the case, the ruling of the Court refusing this charge is justified by the case of Touchard v. Keyes, 21 Cal. 202, and the statutes referred to therein.
The third requested instruction—“ That, as the law stood and was construed by the Supreme Court of California in August, 1853, and prior thereto, D. C. Broderick had no title to Lot 1,090"—was irrelevant to any question before the jury, and the Court was right in refusing the request.
The fourth requested instruction—“ That a man claiming to own land was bound to know the state of his own title”— was properly refused, because such is not in all cases the law. The case of Storrs v. Barker, cited in support of the doctrine of the instruction, goes no further than to hold that the presumption is that every one is acquainted with his own rights, provided he has had reasonable opportunity to know them.
The exceptions taken to the general charge of the Court have already been disposed of in the consideration of the several questions examined, and it is unnecessary to notice them in detail.
TV". The last point made on the part of the defendant is that the plaintiff’s cause of action was barred by the Statute of Limitations.
The transcript of the record contains this statement: “Proceedings for confirmation of pueblo title considered in evidence, by which it appeared that the City of San Francisco had, under the Act of Congress on that subject, petitioned the United States Board of Land Commissioners, in the year 1853, by petition in due form, for a confirmation of the pueblo land, claiming the same under grant and the laws and proceedings of the Mexican Government, and which land embraced the land in controversy in this action, and .that said claim is now, on due proceedings, prosecuted on appeal, pending and yet
By the sixth section of the Statute of Limitations (Wood’s Digest, 46,) an action may be maintained by a party claiming real estate or the possession thereof under title derived from the Spanish or Mexican Governments, or the authorities thereof, if such action be commenced within five years from the time of the final confirmation of such, title by the Government of the United States or its legally constituted authorities.
In Johnson v. Van Dyck, 20 Cal. 228, the Court held that the “ final confirmation” to which the Act of Congress of 1851 refers is the final adjudication of.the tribunals- of the United States upon the validity of the title of the claimant under the Mexican grant; that until the survey which follows such adjudication is made and approved, the title is not definitively confirmed to any particular premises; that the confirmation to which the Act of this State refers is the definitive confirmation ; and that the Statute of Limitations begins' to run only from the time the patent may be issued. (Richardson v. Williamson, 24 Cal. 289.)
Thus the statute and the authorities cited and referred to settle this point.
We have noticed every question presented on the part of the appellant, and the conclusion to which we have arrived is that there is no cause for disturbing the judgment rendered.
Judgment affirmed.