3 Conn. App. 317 | Conn. App. Ct. | 1985
The plaintiff, employed by the defendant board of education as an elementary school principal, was charged with misconduct and inefficiency and was reassigned to a position as an elementary school teacher after a series of hearings. She sued the defendant, and now appeals
The complaint was in four counts and sought declaratory,
On December 4,1979, the plaintiff appealed this decision to the board. Hearings were held on this appeal from April 9, 1980, through March 11, 1981. A decision rendered by the board on April 30, 1981, upheld the prior decision to reassign the plaintiff. She was removed from her position as principal at that time and sustained a loss of wages because the teaching position salary is substantially less than the principal’s salary.
We must read the complaint most favorably to the plaintiff. Reitzer v. Board of Trustees of State Colleges, 2 Conn. App. 196, 201, 477 A.2d 129 (1984). The first count of the complaint essentially states a breach of contract claim. It alleges that the administrative manual, which contains terms and conditions of the plaintiff’s employment, was part of the employment contract between the plaintiff and the defendant, but that the procedure described in that manual governing charges of substandard conduct was not followed. The second count alleges that the defendant’s state and federal constitutional rights were violated by the defendant’s failure to accord her the process due under the administrative manual. In the fourth count,
The defendant moved to dismiss the complaint on the basis of lack of subject matter jurisdiction. The trial court agreed and granted the motion. The plaintiff appeals, arguing that the court looked beyond the question of subject matter jurisdiction and improperly dismissed the case on its merits. We agree.
The trial court, concluding that no contract was alleged in the first count, granted the motion to dismiss because no breach of contract claim could succeed; without an allegation of a contract, the first count was essentially an administrative appeal over which the court did not have jurisdiction; because the plaintiff had no constitutionally protected right to her job as a principal, her second count could not succeed; and, under the fourth count, the plaintiff was not protected by the Hartford Teacher Tenure Act because she was reassigned, not dismissed. The court reached the merits of the plaintiffs claims in granting this motion and erred in doing so.
The plaintiffs complaint, for purposes of subject matter jurisdiction, is sufficient. It alleges breach of contract, raises constitutional claims of due process, and claims that statutory procedures were not followed. Whether there is a contract and what its terms are, whether the plaintiffs right to her principalship is constitutionally protected, and whether there are applicable statutory procedures, are issues outside the scope of a motion to dismiss based on lack of subject matter
The plaintiff is required to allege facts amounting to a colorable claim of injury; see Reitzer v. Board of Trustees of State Colleges, supra; which the court is competent to entertain. Henry F. Raab Connecticut, Inc. v. J. W. Fisher Co., 183 Conn. 108, 112, 438 A.2d 834 (1981). The Superior Court has broad subject matter jurisdiction over legal and equitable rights. General Statutes § 52-1. The plaintiff’s claims were within the scope of the court’s subject matter jurisdiction and were properly pleaded. Whether they could withstand a motion to strike for failure to state a claim upon which relief could be granted is another issue, on which we do not express an opinion. See England v. Coventry, 183 Conn. 362, 365, 439 A.2d 372 (1981); Reitzer v. Board of Trustees of State Colleges, supra, 199; Diaz v. Board of Directors, supra, 48. The issue before the court was not whether the plaintiff’s claims would be successful, but whether the court could properly hear those claims. Reitzer v. Board of Trustees of State Colleges, supra, 201. We conclude that it could, under the facts alleged in the plaintiff’s complaint.
There is error, the judgment is set aside and the case is remanded for further proceedings.
In this opinion the other judges concurred.
This appeal, originally filed in the Supreme Court, was transferred to this court. General Statutes § 51-199 (c).
Although the trial court found that the plaintiff was not seeking a declaratory judgment, we read the plaintiff’s requests for “findings” defining her rights as claims for a declaratory judgment and consequential relief. See Milford Education Assn. v. Board of Education, 167 Conn. 513, 520, 356 A.2d 109 (1975); see also Practice Book § 389.
The plaintiff is not pursuing the third count on appeal.
The cases cited by the defendant similarly go to the merits of the case and are inapposite. Reitzer v. Board of Trustees of State Colleges, 2 Conn. App. 196, 201, 477 A.2d 129 (1984).