183 P. 702 | Cal. Ct. App. | 1919
Lead Opinion
[1] This is an appeal from an order appointing a receiverpendente lite, in a suit in equity, more resembling the old suit to remove a cloud on title than the code suit merely to quiet title. The appellant contends the order should not have been made, as such appointments are not usually made in suits to quiet title. In this case there were equitable considerations before the court in addition to those of the ordinary suit to quiet title. Equity has inherent power in aid of its jurisdiction to grant injunctions and to appoint receivers, and the exercise of the power rests very largely in the discretion of the chancellor. *433
Every presumption is in favor of the regularity of the order. Mere denial of the facts in the plaintiff's verified complaint and affidavits simply presents an issue of fact, which the court below determined adversely to the appellant.[2] If there is any conflict in the affidavits, those in favor of the prevailing party must be taken as establishing the facts stated therein, and also all facts which may reasonably be inferred or presumed from the direct and positive statements. (Doak v. Bruson,
[3] After the order appointing the receiver was made, judgment was rendered for the plaintiff, from which judgment the defendant below, the appellant here, appealed. The judgment has been affirmed. (Davies v. Ramsdell, ante, p. 424, [
The order appealed from is affirmed.
Haven, J., and Brittain, J., concurred. *434
A petition for a rehearing of this cause was denied by the district court of appeal on April 23, 1919, and a petition to have the cause heard in the supreme court, after judgment in the district court of appeal, was denied by the supreme court on May 22, 1919, and the following opinion then rendered thereon:
Addendum
The application for a hearing in this court after decision by the district court of appeal of the first appellate district, division two, is denied on the ground last stated in the opinion of the district court of appeal, which is substantially that the judgment in favor of the plaintiff, on whose application the receiver was appointed, having been affirmed and having become final, it does not appear how the appellant could possibly have been prejudiced by the making of the order. We express no opinion upon the first question discussed in the opinion, viz.; the propriety of the appointment of a receiver in such a case as this.
All the Justices concurred.