134 N.W. 751 | N.D. | 1912
Lead Opinion
This action arises over the estate of Anton Emil Peterson, deceased. The appellants, Ladehol et al., claim to he blood relatives of Peterson through his mother, deceased having been an illegitimate son. Appellants all reside in Norway, and rely wholly on documentary proof of the antecedents of the deceased and of their relation to him.
The settled statement of the case for the purposes of this appeal contains certified copies or originals of all proceedings had in the county and district courts in the litigation involved in the issue here presented. We are confronted with a motion to strike made by each party, leveled at a portion of the matter embraced in the statement as settled; that of respondents Miesen going to the question contended, for by them that the trial in the district court, while a trial de novo. should have been limited to a review of the transcripted and certified record of proceedings had in the trial in the county court; the sustaining of which motion would eliminate the cross-examination of the respondents and their various witnesses from the consideration of this court on this appeal; appellants contend that the appeal on trial de novo from the county to the district court permits a retrial of the action, the resubmission of testimony, with the district court acting as a trial, instead of an appellate, tribunal.
Respondents Miesen further predicate as error the action of the district court in permitting the filing after time of the undertaking on appeal from county court, and attack the jurisdiction of this court to consider the merits of the case; urging that this court should now do what they contend the district court on appeal should have done, summarily affirm the judgment for want of the proper appeal bond on the intermediate appeal.
We will therefore first consider whether the district court 'acquired jurisdiction. The statute, § 7966, provides: “To effect an appeal the appellant must cause a notice of the appeal to be served on each of the other parties, and file such notice with the proofs of service, and an undertaking for appeal in the county court within thirty days from and after the date of the order or decree.” Section 7968 provides: “An executor, administrator, or guardian may appeal without filing an undertaking from a decree or order made in any proceeding in a case in which he has given an official bond; and when he appeals in that manner the bond .stands in place of such undertaking. A special
Sec. 7969 provides: “When the appellant seasonably and in good faith serves a notice of appeal on some of the parties, but through mistake or excusable neglect' fails to obtain service on all, or in like manner omits to do any other act necessary to perfect the appeal or effect a stay, the county court upon proof of the facts by affidavit may, in its discretion, extend the time for perfecting the service or other act, and permit an amendment accordingly upon such terms as justice requires.” Other sections of the statute regulate stay proceedings and the amount and obligations of the undertaking on appeal, and attempt to define some procedure applicable to an appeal from any of the various and peculiar matters necessary of determination in probate proceedings. In this case the district court in remanding to the county court acted upon affidavit filed, making proof of seasonable and good faith action, and prima facie excusing the neglect or mistake in filing the fatally deficient undertaking on appeal, provided the statute, § 7969, can be held to apply in such a case and permit such practice. It is noticeable that these statutes on probate appeals in no instance make the service and filing of a valid bond a condition precedent to the attaching of jurisdiction on appeal. We here find no provision similar to § 8502 governing appeals from justice court, that “to render an appeal effectual for any 'cause an undertaking must be executed on the part of the appellant,” with certain conditions required by a statute manifestly mandatory. It is also noticeable that appeals in other matters than from the county court are more easy of classification, making it a more simple matter to define the conditions to be necessarily required in such appeal bonds than in the bonds that may be necessary in the various appeals' granted under art. 9 of our Probate Code. The issues in probate court are many and varying. Probate procedure deals with matters of estates in which justice more imperatively demands that technicality shall not stand in the way of the descent and distribution of the estates of deceased persons, nor interfere in many other kindred matters, all within the jurisdiction of the county court. The statutes on probate appeals are many and are to be construed broadly, that they may cover the full scope of such matters embraced. Sections 7964 to 7989 constitute an endeavor on the part of the legis
As the motion to strike involves the determination of whether the district court on trial de novo was limited to the transcripted record from the county court, prescribed in § 7979, construed with §§ 7984-5-6-9, decision of this question is next in order. These provisions are very similar to §§ 5975-6 of the Compiled Laws. The appeal taken is from all issues of law and fact with a retrial in the district court remanded. It is true specifications of error were served with the notice of appeal and undertaking on appeal, evidently under a misapprehension by appellants of their rights, but the notice of appeal invokes
Respondents urge that under § 111 of the Constitution the district court had no jurisdiction to try this action de novo, except upon the record, and that to do so would be assuming original jurisdiction in violation of the constitutional mandate. Section 111 provides that county courts shall have “exclusive original jurisdiction” of this class of actions. Section 103 of the Constitution grants district courts general original jurisdiction except where otherwise provided in the Constitution, and “such appellate jurisdiction as may be conferred by law.” Section 7985 provides of what such appellate jurisdiction shall consist, and that the district court may try the action de novo on appeal. It is by virtue of the right of appeal and the statute granting it, that such trial anew is had, and this is not the exercise by the district court of original jurisdiction. See Prante v. Lompe, 77 Neb. 377, 109 N. W. 496; Ribble v. Furmin, 69 Neb. 38, 94 N. W. 967, 968. Christianson v. Farmers’ Warehouse Asso. 5 N. D. 438, at pages 446, 447, 32 L.R.A. 730, 67 N. W. 300; Cavanaugh v. Wright, 2 Nev. 166. In the absence of constitutional prohibition, the legislature has the right to regulate appeals and prescribe the mode of exercise of review by the appellate court. 2 Cyc. 507. This contention is without merit. The decision of these practice questions also determines adversely to the contention of the respondents Miesen their motion to strike from the statement all matters excepting those appearing on the certified record from the county court filed in district court on the intermediate appeal.
The next question is whether proof has been made of a common-law marriage under the laws of Michigan, at which place it is alleged deceased and respondent Dorothea Miesen, formerly Dorothea Harnau,
This marriage was kept secret from her mother and likewise from "his stepfather. The former objected to the young Norwegian, and the latter asserted the marriage of a Norwegian and a Dutch girl was not the proper kind of an alliance. So she kept on working as a domestic, Emil visiting her every week or every other week, ostensibly as her beau. She says they “cohabited together as husband and wife at every •opportunity,” and explains her understanding of cohabit as indulging in sexual intercourse. To her sister-in-law and a few relatives and acquaintances she asserts he introduced her as his wife, and at one place Jived with her as such for a short time with the family at whose place
Petitioner Davidson testifies to knowing deceased for twenty years. That he was told by him of his child back in Michigan; that he did not want his whereabouts known; that deceased got mail from Michigan by having it addressed to petitioner, to keep his actual whereabouts a secret, and that he got mail in that manner for four or five years.
The testimony discloses that the birth of Herman occasioned considerable surprise, at least among some of the witnesses who have testified, and that the people inclined to discuss such things, “all.said she wasn’t married.” Dorothea admits that she felt “ashamed” and' “did not go out in society much,” and that “circumstances were such that I could not go out.” The boy Herman remained unnamed until her marriage in 1870 to her present husband, when the source of her former trouble became known as Herman Miesen, and evidently lived' in blissful ignorance of early circumstances and the identity of his own father, according to his mother’s testimony, until about the time of or after his father’s death. This singularly about coincides in point of time with the date of a letter by respondents’ present counsel to a witness in the case, resident at Dalton, Michigan, stating that “Anton E. Peterson (Amel E. Peterson) recently died in this state, leaving considerable property, but he leaves no heirs that we know of. We find some letters written by you about twenty-five years ago to Peterson, which indicate that you knew him and his family,” and inquiring for relatives. And very soon thereafter these respondents, Dorothea Miesen and Herman Miesen, are claimants for the $6,200, ready to be distributed to the heirs at law of the deceased.
The circumstance of the early marriage of Dorothea Harnau in her maiden name as a' single woman to Miesen, the year following Emil’s unceremonious departure, is explained by the testimony of Dorothea Miesen, that she had read in some newspaper that one Anton E. Peterson, whom she assumed was her common-law husband Emil Peterson, had died in Duluth, leaving her a widow. She is uncertain as to the date or year she saw this newspaper account, but knows it was before she married Miesen. In any event without divorce she remarried. The marriage record in evidence proves she married representing herself as a single woman, and under her maiden name of Dorothea Harnau, at Muskegon, Michigan, on October 29, 1879, by a ceremonial marriage. Her explanation as to why she used her maiden name is significant. Her testimony places her own interpretation on her asserted marriage, and her own uncertainty as to how she regarded her status at the time she married Miesen condemns her other testimony as to the existence of
When she married Miesen she was twenty-one years of age. She .since has lived with him continuously over thirty years and has borne him five children. She now asserts in her endeavor to obtain this inheritance, her prior marriage to a man with whom admittedly she has never resided as a wife, and a man whose every act, though indefensible from every standpoint, has been contrary to the probability •of any such marriage ever in fact having taken place. There are no equities in her claim. To establish it she must confess herself a bigamist as well as bastardize her own five children, and overturn a consistent course of living of thirty years’ duration, for her paltry share, by inheritance, from a man whose decease demands that we refrain from characterizing his conduct in the matter.
Proof has been offered of the construction by the courts of Michigan ■of their statutes and the right of marriage as bearing upon the validity of this alleged common-law marriage in that state. A common-law marriage is there valid. But giving the widest possible scope to the proof with the benefit of every doubt to respondent Dorothea Miesen, .and including all her own testimony, much of which is objectionable on the ground of incompetency, her claim of marriage cannot be sustained. It is true she recites what she terms as an oath probably sufficient in itself to constitute a contract of marriage in prcesenti, and
What we have said assumes the truth of the testimony of Mrs. Miesen as well as its admissibility. As all witnesses tending to establish the alleged marriage testified by deposition, no advantage was given the trial court in determining the credence to be given the testimony over what can be gained from the transcript. We have weighed all evidence offered on behalf of respondents Miesen with great care, but are unable to concur in the findings of the lower court. Respondents have the burden of proving the marriage, and have not met that burden. After making allowances for the fact that they are testifying to matters occurring half a lifetime before, and that after such lapse of time uncertainty of recollection as well as difficulty in obtaining proof is but to be expected, yet we cannot conclude otherwise than that the proof shows no marriage, rather than the existence of one. The presumption naturally arising from certain established cardinal facts negatives absolutely the existence of a marriage. Both parties have irrevocably so construed their relation by their own actions, and in this indeed do actions speak louder than words. Time does not efface the fact nor obliterate the reason nor alter natural presumptions to be drawn from the secrecy in which the relations of these parties were shrouded. His flight from the country and subsequent life under a cloud strongly indicates an intent to avoid the consequences of meretricious relations with this girl, and evinces his continued determination to remain a fugitive from justice, as he early chose to do, rather than to marry her. His breaking from arrest and subsequent flight would be admissible in the prosecution against him for bastardy, to avoid the results of which he fled. It would be strange reasoning indeed to say that, such being the case, it did not refute the idea of a previous marriage as well
On the merits respondents Dorothea Miesen and Herman Miesen are without interest in these proceedings. Dorothea Harnau was never married to Anton Emil Peterson, deceased, and Herman Miesen, though he be their illegitimate son, cannot inherit from Peterson, his father; there being no pleadings nor proof upon which can be made a
Because in passing upon the merits of this case it was unnecessary to determine the competency of the testimony of the alleged wife, wherein she testified to the alleged marriage, her testimony having for the purpose of this suit been considered without excluding any part thereof, we do not mean to determine that such testimony is admissible under our statute, § 7253. It is unnecessary to determine the question of its admissibility, and therefore we do not pass upon that question raised.
We now turn to the evidence touching the relationship of the appellants to Anton Emil Peterson, the deceased, all of which was offered under objection on the part of respondents Miesen. The elimination of these two respondents from this action does not obviate the necessity that full proof of relationship and right in law to inherit exist as the basis for an order of final distribution. Besides, the state is interested, as, in the event of a failure of heirs, the estate of the deceased, under the statute, must escheat to the state.
Proof is offered along two lines: Eirst, evidence tending to establish heirship under the rules applying to admissibility of matters of family history, including entries in a family Bible; and second, documentary proof offered consisting of copies of various church records from Norway, certified as such by the keepers thereof whose official capacities are variously authenticated; which non judicial records are offered to establish the pedigree and family tree of the deceased; as supplemental proof of heirship to that contained in the family Bible tending to identify respondents as the heirs now entitled to receive their distributive shares of this estate. On the declarations as to family history we have testimony of one Nord, taken on deposition. From this it is established that one Hans Peterson Mortkjarnet was the stepfather of the deceased and resident for years near Muskegon, Michigan. He died in 1888. He was there when deceased fled that country. He died possessed of a Bible containing entries as to births, deaths, marriages, and family data. He had stated to the witness that this Bible once belonged to Anton Emil Peterson,- deceased, having been given him by his stepfather Hans, remaining, however, in the possession of
This takes us to the second inquiry as to whether the church records can be received over objections as to want of foundation laid and incompetency. They are intended to supplement the Bible entries as proof of identity of the appellants as the heirs of deceased Peterson. These church records consist of seven different purported transcripts of that number of church records of births, deaths, marriages, and matters of family history tending to connect the various appellants in blood relationship to the deceased Peterson. Each transcript is under oath certified by a person describing himself as the parson of such particular church and the keeper of such church records, and that the transcript made by him is a true and correct copy of the original records of such church parish, kept by him or his predecessors under duty imposed by law; and affixed to each certificate, and authenticating both the certificate and the official signature of such parson in each instance, is the certificate of the district judge under the seal of the court of the district in which such church is situated, certifying to the official character of such judge and of such parson, and that such parson is the authorized and legally required keeper of the church records of the church in question.
Further, that such church records are those established by the laws of Norway, and are receivable in evidence as proof in any court in Norway, and that the originals cannot be removed from the district. Accompanying such certified copies in Norwegian are translations thereof in English, duly certified by “the official translator to certified translations,” together with a statement of his official character and to the correctness of the translation and the genuineness of the signature of the attesting judges. There is also attached to each of the seven certified copies the certificate under seal of the chief of the ecclesiastical ministry of Norway, stating the law and certifying to the signatures of the pastors. Accompanying these certified records is the certificate of the consul general of. the United States, resident in Christiania, Norway, certifying under his official seal the genuineness of the signatures of the attesting district judges and other officials, and that the several certificates were executed by lawful authority and.
Our statutes do not prescribe the foundation necessary to admit such proof. Hence resort to the common law. Such may consist of proof of facts by deposition sufficient to'constitute a foundation for the evidences offered, or by the more convenient mode where permissible of the use of certificates to authenticate documents, which authentication operates as a testimonial guaranty sufficient for their admission. In any event before these copies of «foreign non judicial official records are admissible, it must appear that the originals are there official records of such foreign country. To establish this fact, proof of the foreign law making them official records and imposing the duty of their keeping must be made in the same manner as the proof of any other fact in issue. See extensive note to State v. Behrman, 25 L.B..A. 449. In the absence of statute regulating the class of proof required to establish the foreign law, the written law can be proven only by the foreign written statutes or properly exemplified copies thereof. But as to the unwritten law of the foreign country, proof is made by the testimony of those familiar therewith competent to testify, and after sufficient foundation is laid to satisfy the court that the witness testifying is qualified to testify on the subject. Our statute, § 1291, makes the same distinction in kind of proof required. Admitting the qualification of Hobe, consul for Norway, to testify as an expert, the fact does not appear that the laws of Norway under which the purported documents are required to be kept are in writing, or whether they exist as unwritten law, either common or civil. Of the fact we cannot take judicial notice. Hence the proof necessary to admit these documents is wanting so far as oral testimony offered as a foundation is concerned.
But are the documents themselves sufficient to establish their admissibility? We will take judicial notice of the official signature, seal of office, and genuineness of the certificate of the United States consul accompanying these records. Granting full force to such certificate, it but establishes the signatures of the district judges as genuine and that full faith and credit may be given to their statements. They in turn certify the parsons as the keepers of these records, and
We might remark that the rules stated as to the foundation necessary to admit certified copies of these foreign nonjudicial, but official records, has no application to any similar proof offered when coming from any state or territory a part of the United States, being fully covered by our own statutes, §§ 7291 to 7301, inclusive; all of which statutory regulations must be construed as subordinate to and to be harmonized with art. 4, § 1, of the - Constitution of the United States, pro
From the declarations of matters of family history proven by Bible •entries, there is insufficient evidence upon which a decree of final distribution herein can be granted. But it appears that proof may on retrial be made of the right of some of appellants to share in this estate. Accordingly we order that the judgment of the district court be reversed and vacated and the petition of respondents Atiesen be dismissed for want of merit, and we remand this action to the district court of Benson county for further proceedings as to the claims of the appellants, directing that the action be there retained for trial on the right of these appellants to inherit this estate, and in the event of a determination adverse to them judgment will be entered that the estate of Peterson, deceased, escheat to the state of North Dakota. The district court is directed to grant appellants such reasonable time, and in any event not less than four months if desired, within which to submit proof of heirship. And the appellants will take all further proceedings herein only on notice thereof to the state’s attorney of Benson county and the attorney general of the state of North Dakota, either of whom may appear and participate in behalf of the state. The final judgment of the district court will direct the judgment to be entered in county court.
Appellants will recover costs and disbursements taxable in the coun
Rehearing
On Petition for Rehearing.
In a petition for rehearing counsel have questioned in many particulars the opinion filed. We adhere to our decision. Counsel vigorously attack the constitutionality of the trial de novo provisions of § 7985, authorizing a retrial in district court on the matters involved in the distribution of the proceeds of the estate, concerning which the existence of a common-law marriage constituted the main issue. While the matter is but incidental to the exercise of probate jurisdiction, yet as § 7985 confers on appeal on the district court the duty of trying de novo probate matters mentioned in such section, its constitutionality is challenged, and if such statutory right of appeal is invalid the judgment of the county court would be conclusive and should be affirmed, as jurisdiction to try de novo would not be conferred by the appeal upon the district court, because of the unconstitutionality of the appeal statute. If the statute is unconstitutional the district court trial as had was a nullity. The constitutional provisions are recited in the main opinion. Do the provisions of § 111 of the Constitution, granting to the county court “exclusive original jurisdiction in probate and testamentary matters (enumerated), and such other probate jurisdiction as may be conferred by law,” prohibit retrial in district court on new evidence, — a trial de novo in all particulars ? We answer emphatically that it does not. A trial de novo is but the exercise of the appellate jurisdiction conferred by law and authorized under § 103 of the constitution, defined in practice by § 7985; The legislature -has thereby seen fit to declare the manner of exercise of the appellate jurisdiction with which the district court on appeal is clothed to be that of trying the cause anew, instead of limiting the appeal to a review of á record already made. Such appellate court .at the conclusion of such trial enters its judgment under § 7986, directing the form and substance of the judgment to be entered in the county court, the court of ex-
Counsel cite as against the constitutionality of the statute mentioned a decision of this court on the Newman law, Christianson v. Farmers Warehouse Asso. 5 N. D. 438, 32 L.R.A. 730, 67 N. W. 300. This case cannot be construed as authority for counsel’s position. It fully supports our holding. We quote therefrom the following; found bn pages 446, 447, of the opinion: “We find no definition of appellate jurisdiction so limited that it will not permit the appellate court to review the facts as well as the law if the legislature so required. As we have’seen the supreme court of the territory of Dakota at the time of and prior to the adoption of our constitution was expressly required to review facts in certain cases under § 5237 of Compiled Laws. We have no authority for saying that the constitutional convention intended to curtail that jurisdiction. Nor have we any warrant for saying that such convention used the words 'appellate jurisdiction’ in § 86 of the Constitution in any other or different sense from that given to the same words in § 103, defining the jurisdiction of the district courts. And when in the latter section it is declared that the district courts shall have 'such appellate jurisdiction as may be conferred by law,’ it is not meant that the legislature may define appellate jurisdiction and make it mean one thing in one case and a different thing in another case. It is only meant that it shall have appellate jurisdiction in such cases as the law’may declare. It is undisputed that the appellate jurisdiction in such courts may be exercised by a strict trial de novo upon new pleadings and entirely new evidence, but it is entirely competent— and it is almost universally done — for the legislature to declare that in certain cases involving only small amounts the appellate jurisdiction of those courts shall be exercised only in the correction of errors, and such provisions do not affect the question of appellate jurisdiction, but of appellate procedure. In Story on the Constitution § 1761, that learned authority in discussing the appellate jurisdiction of the Federal Supreme Court, says: 'In the first place it may not be without use to ascertain what is here meant by appellate jurisdiction and what is the mode in which it may be exercised. The essential criterion of appellate jurisdiction is that it revises and corrects the proceedings in a cause already instituted, and does not create that cause. In reference to
The celebrated and pioneer case on the Federal Constitution is that of Marbury v. Madison, 1 Cranch, 131, 2 L. ed. 160. It was there ¡sought to compel the issuance of an office commission by mandamus commenced as an original proceeding in the Supreme Court, based •upon the authority of a statute assuming to so grant to the Supreme 'Court original jurisdiction. The Federal Constitution, while not in -express terms denying the Supreme Court original jurisdiction in such matters, did expressly declare the original and appellate jurisdiction •of that tribunal; and by inference denying it original jurisdiction excepting when granted by the Federal Constitution in express terms. This implied negative against original jurisdiction was given force •and held controlling and as rendering the statute granting such excess of original jurisdiction unconstitutional. The following language of Chief Justice Marshall is instructive: “When an instrument organizing fundamentally a judicial system divides it into one supreme, and ■so many inferior courts as the legislature may ordain and establish; then enumerates its powers and proceeds so far to distribute them as to define the jurisdiction of the supreme court by declaring the cases in which it shall take original jurisdiction, and that in others it shall take appellate jurisdiction, the plain import of the words seems to be, that in one class of cases its jurisdiction is original, and not appellate; in the other it is appellate, and not original. ... To enable this
From the foregoing portions which we have italicized it is plain that fhe legislative right to prescribe the manner of exercise of the appellate jurisdiction is there recognized; and the distinction drawn not on the manner of its exercise, the appellate procedure used, but rather in denial of the right of an appellate court to be used as a court wherein causes of action may be originally litigated. This case is consonant with the opinion of our court in Christianson v. Farmers’ Warehouse Asso.; and also Cavanaugh v. Wright, 2 Nev. 166, a case on all fours with the one at bar. We quote therefrom: “ ‘appellate jurisdiction’ in Its most limited and technical sense means jurisdiction to retry and determine something that has already been tried in some other tribunal. If we were to give the phrase its most technical and limited meaning, we might rather hold that the framers of the Constitution intended thereby to require that all appeals from justices should be tried de novo, than that none should be so tried. But we are not disposed to give it so narrow and technical a construction. We think as used in the Constitution the phrase ‘appellate jurisdiction’ was intended to be used in a broad and •comprehensive sense. It was intended to confer jurisdiction upon the district courts to hear cases on appeal either in the strictest sense, which would require a trial de novo, or to review them as law cases are reviewed at common law. We think the language quoted from the eighth section clearly confers on the legislature the power to regulate the manner of appeals to the district court. It might require in one class of
Bearing in mind the construction of the supreme court of Idaho on their constitutional provisions, to be that the probate court there possesses sole, exclusive original jurisdiction, as granted ours under § 111 of our Constitution, the case from that' court of Be Sharp, 18 L.R.A. (N.S.) 886, is in point. We quote from page 897: “The matter of appeals from probate courts is within the legislative will, and the lawmaking power may regulate it, extend it, or limit it, as it sees fit.”
The case of St. Louis County v. Sparks, 11 Mo. 202, is apparently an authority supporting respondent’s contention, but in reality is a decision denying a trial do novo in the absence of a statute prescribing: the right thereto in appeals from county court, as is explained in Lacy v. Williams, 27 Mo. 281, where it is said “a trial de novo in the circuit court would not strictly be the exercise of appellate jurisdiction (St. Louis County v. Sparks). It is clearly competent for the general assembly to confer such a jurisdiction, but, until it is expressly done, we-do not consider that the bestowal of mere appellate power would authorize the courts to try causes do novo.” Many similar holdings may be-found. See 3 Century Dig. cols. 1369-1379. And many cases favor a trial do novo when granted by statute, but are decisions where the-statute is not challenged on the ground of alleged unconstitutionality.. As illustrative cases, see Hedderich v. Hedderich, 18 N. D. 488, 123 N. W. 276; Levy v. Moody, — Tex. Civ. App. —, 87 S. W. 205; Fitts v. Probate Ct. 26 R. I. 256, 58 Atl. 801; Decker v. Cahill, 10 Okla. 251, 61 Pac. 1101; Norway Plains Sav. Bank v. Young, 68 N. H. 13,
But respondent may argue that this interpretation of our constitutional provisions permits the legislature, by a process styled by it as an appeal, to abrogate the constitutional provision that probate courts shall have exclusive original jurisdiction in probate matters, and in effect confers original jurisdiction upon the district court; and, further, that if this conclusion is sound, the same consequences will result with' reference to trial matters generally, either probate as to the probate court, or as to law and equity in the district court, whereby the supreme court may in a similar manner, by legislative caprice, be made in practical effect a trial court concerning appeals from either district or probate courts. And we may be asked why, under our holding in this case, such may not inevitably follow, and if so, what constitutional barrier remains to define the jurisdiction of the several courts or keep separate their jurisdictions from confusion or intermingling at the will ■of the legislature. This is effectually answered by the determination of the meaning of the terms “original jurisdiction” and “appellate jurisdiction,” as in force at the time of the adoption of the Constitution; when considered with the phraseology of §§ 86, 103, 111, defining the jurisdiction of the supreme, district, and county courts respectively. With this it must be remembered that as to the probate court, § 111 of the Constitution is a grant of power; while as to the supreme and district courts the constitutional provisions are not wholly a definition of jurisdiction, but rather a limitation of powers already possessed. The district courts were courts of general jurisdiction in law and equity, the general common-law trial court; while the supreme court succeeds to the powers of the court of King’s bench through which appellate jurisdiction was exercised by the use of writs of error as to errors of law and writs of certiorari as to jurisdictional matters arising on the records
But as to the district court its jurisdiction was equally well understood and defined at statehood at a time when it was exercising, under the right of appeal to it from inferior courts, the power to try de novo matters of fact as well as law; when the term “appeal” so used meant more than the common-law process under writ of error; and when an appeal taken on both law and fact must have meant what it now means, the trial de novo in that court, wherein evidence was offered and the trial had without reference to the manner or the record of the trial in the court below. See Constitutional Debates, 293-317, & 570-571, concerning these constitutional provisions. With such a practice then prevailing, can we conclude that these constitutional provisions were drafted and adopted with reference thereto and with reference instead to the ancient notions prevailing in the early history of this country, under which an appeal, if existing, meant but a review of a record, instead of a trial do novo? In the words of Justice Bartholomew in 5 N. D. 446: “We have no warrant for saying that the constitutional convention intended to curtail that jurisdiction,” as then existing in such courts. And we have no better light in which to determine the intent of the Constitution and its framers than such contemporaneous history; remembering also that, as is said in Martin v. Hunter, 1 Wheat. 304, 4 L. ed. 97, the Constitution unavoidably deals in general language.” And again, in M’Culloch v. Maryland, 4 Wheat. 407, 4 L. ed. 601: “A Constitution to contain an accurate detail of all the subdivisions of which its great powers will admit, and of all the means by which they may be carried into execution, would partake of the prolixity of a legal code, and could scarcely be embraced by the human mind.” See also Ex parte Henderson, 6 Ela. 279.
And in reality the terms “appellate jurisdiction” and “original juris
We conclude, then, the statute assailed as unconstitutional is a valid exercise of legislative power, in that the right of a trial de novo in district court on an appeal in probate matters from the county court is but a regulation of the manner of exercise of the appellate jurisdiction conferred upon the district court by an appeal on law and fact.
In the original opinion the costs were taxed against respondent. In so doing we erred, and the order should be modified to the end that the right to tax costs be denied to both parties, appellants and respondents. It is, as respondents urge, that neither party prevailed on the appeal and appellants in fact may never establish their right to share in the estate, or may never appear further in this action; in which event, in failing to recover on the merits, they would be no more entitled to recover judgment for costs of respondents than respondents are entitled under present conditions to recover costs of them. To such extent the
The petition for rehearing is denied.