William J. DAVIDSON, Appellant, v. UNITED STATES, Appellee.
No. 81-102.
District of Columbia Court of Appeals.
Argued April 12, 1983. Decided Oct. 17, 1983.
467 A.2d 1282
G. Williаm Currier, Asst. U.S. Atty., Washington, D.C., with whom Stanley S. Harris, U.S. Atty., Michael W. Farrell and John R. Fisher, Asst. U.S. Attys., Washington, D.C., were on brief, for appellee.
Before KERN and NEBEKER, Associate Judges, and GALLAGHER, Associate Judge, Retired.
KERN, Associate Judge:
Appellant was convicted upon his plea of guilty to the misdemeanor crime of destruction of propеrty,
I
Appellant claims that the D.C. Work Release statute,
We disagree based on the legislative history which indicates that this is a remedial, not a penal, statute. Work release ameliorates the harshness of a jail term, аnd minimizes the stigma of complete imprisonment. In contrast, a penal statute has punishment as its primary purpose. Holley v. Coggin Pontiac, Inc., 43 N.C.App. 229, 237, 259 S.E.2d 1, 6 (1979). SUTHERLAND, Statutory Construction, § 60.04 (4th ed. 1974). Clearly, punishment is not the primary purpose of work release, as it aims at rehabilitation of prisoners.1
Since the statute is remedial in nature, we are not persuaded by the contention of appellant that this court must narrowly construe its provisions. We note that the language in
Finally, under
We conclude that the work release statute is remedial in nature. As such, its provisions may be interpreted broadly and the trial court‘s order of restitution was proper. See Hutchison Bros. Excavation Co. v. District of Columbia, 278 A.2d 318, 321 (D.C.1971); SUTHERLAND, Statutory Construction, § 60.01 (4th ed. 1974).
II
Appellant further maintains that had Congress intended to give the trial court such broad power to order restitution, the statute would have been more broadly worded when enacted. See, e.g.,
When the Report discusses restitution as a sentencing option, there is no differentiation made between its use in probation and work release. Thus, restitution appears to have been recognized by the Council as a sentencing alternative available under the general rubric of sentencing at the time of the enactment of the 1982 Act. Therefore, the authority to utilize restitution had existed when a judge selected either one of the alternative mechanisms under the overall sentencing scheme, i.e., probation or work releаse.
The recognition that restitution is “... widely used in Superior Court ...” as a sentencing technique (Committee on the Judiciary Report, supra at 5), negates the contention by appellant that the trial judge‘s use of restitution as part of a work release plan for appellant was аn aberration of the sentencing process in the instant case.
III
Finally, appellant notes that of the four state statutes which served as models for
Contrary to appellant‘s argument, we are not persuaded that the existence of such provisions in two of the four statutes utilized in designing the statute for the District of Columbia indicates that the omission by Congress in the District‘s statute reflected a congressional decision to deny to sentencing judges the use of restitution when granting work release.
As previously noted, the legislative history of the new Act enacted by the City Council reflects an intent to codify what the Council deemed was in fact existing authority and to provide guidelines for using the tool of restitution. Moreover, when a “... statute is a composite of the statutes of two states the court will usually refuse to follow the construction of either state and will construe the statute according to its plain meaning.” SUTHERLAND, Statutory Construction, § 52.02 (4th ed. 1974). A comparison of the four statutes with the
In sum, the legislative history of the work release statute shоws an intent to rehabilitate prisoners by allowing them to continue at their place of employment, while serving a sentence of imprisonment; thereby, serving their debt to the community while also maintaining their dignity by continuing to work and to earn their salary as before. Given the remedial nature of the statute, we conclude it must be read broadly so that the authority of the sentencing judge to fix “the terms and conditions” of the work release may include restitution — particularly when the statute contains a provision permitting the convicted defendant‘s salary to be used, inter alia, tо pay any debt which has been reduced to judgment. In addition, the legislative history of the new Act reflects the fact that the Council was merely codifying existing authority in sentencing courts to permit the use of restitution as a part of the overall sentencing scheme whether or not it was work release. Accordingly, the trial judge here possessed the authority to order restitution when granting work release from a prison sentence for 270 days.
Affirmed.
NEBEKER, Associate Judge, dissenting:
I respectfully dissent. While I do not dispute the worth of permitting a trial judge to condition work release on the payment of restitution, I am unаble to locate statutory authority for so doing in this case. The majority‘s statement that nothing in the work release statutory scheme bars restitution simply begs the question.
Fine discussions of the penal or rehabilitativе purposes of the work release statute aside, there was no authority for the trial court‘s imposition of restitution as a condition of appellant‘s work release. Should the new Sentencing Improvements Act be repealed or later limited, this decision seems to say thаt restitution (in the name of rehabilitation and not in the interest of justice for the victim) is permitted in any event and for any offense. While as a matter of favored policy I might agree that restitution in this and other cases is a fine idea, I submit that the rule of law should not be sacrificed in the name оf presently perceived virtue. I would vacate the sentence and remand for resentencing.