Davidson v. SchmidtDavidson v. Schmidt
- Reporters:
- , ,
- Before:
- Brown
*19At the time we adopted the Constitution of 1865 the mechanics’ lien law had been on our statute books for more than thirty years . During all that time the circuit сourts were charged with its enforcement under ‘the provisions of section six, article fivе, of the Constitution of 1820, which provided that they should have “exclusive original jurisdiction in all civil cases which shall not be cognizable before justices of the peace, until otherwise directed by the General Assembly.” The same provision was continued in the samé words in the Cоnstitution of 1865. The circuit court is a superior court of general jurisdiction and nothing will be prеsumed to be without its jurisdiction,- while nothing will be presumed to be within the jurisdiction of the justices of the peace, which is not exercised according to the course of the commоn law, but depends entirely upon the provisions of the statutes which create and regulаte the office. [State ex rel. v. Hopkins, 87 Mo. 519; Pleasant Hill v. Dasher, 120 Mo. 675.]
The court, having as we have seen, exclusive jurisdiction over these cases, and the Constitution having declared that this condition should continue “until otherwise directed by the General Assеmbly,” that body by the act of March 30,1872 (Laws 1871-2, p. 44), directed that justices of the peace should have jurisdiction in all actions brought to enforce mechanics ’ liens in every county of less than 100,000 permanent inhabitants where the amount or balance claimed to be duе does not exceed ninety dollars. It further provided as follows: “Every person entitled tо such lien rfiay hereafter, after having complied with the provisions of the said chapter one hundred and ninety-five, and after having filed his account and statement, as presсribed by section five of said chapter, institute his-actions therefor, as above provided.” The question before us, reduced to its lowest terms, is whether the provisions of the Act of 1872 just referred to have the effect of divesting the circuit court of the jurisdiction it had therе*20tofore exclusively exercised, or whether it simply hacl the- effect which its words requirеd, of an exercise by the Legislature of the constitutional power to direct that this exclusive jurisdiction be shared by another tribunal.
The appellant supports its contentiоn by the ingenious suggestion that the Act of 1872 should have the effect of a repeal of all laws, including constitutional provisions, on the same subject, and their reenactment as of the same instant of time. In this way they say that the justices of the peace already having jurisdiction in the class of’ mechanics ’ lien cases referred to, the constitutional grаnt of jurisdiction of the circuit court could not attach to it. This is a very interesting fiction but it ignores one of the most universal and useful rules of statutory construction, requiring those parts of аn old statute retained as part of an amended scheme, to be considered not as if repealed and again reenacted, but to have been the law all along, and the amendments not to have been the law at any time before their passage.
It is true that this court decided differently in Stamps v. Bridwell, 57 Mo. 22, which was followed in Williams v. Payne, 80 Mo. 409; but these cases were taken up and expressly overruled by us in Tackett v. Yogler, supra, a well considered case in which the сourt says that the rule announced in those cases should be no longer adhered to. This case has been followed in State ex rel. v. Hopkins, supra; Pleasant Hill v. Dasher, supra; Lаckland v. Walker, 151 Mo. 210; St. Louis v. Hollrah, 175 Mo. 79. We are still satisfied with the doctrine we announced in those cases.
It follows that the judgment of the Cape Girardeau Circuit Court must be affirmed.
Blair, G., concurs. PER CURIAM.— The foregoing opinion of Bbown, C., is adopted as the opinion of the court.
All the judges concur.