93 Mass. 514 | Mass. | 1866
The substance of the averments of the declaration in this action is, that the defendants, being druggists and chemists, sold and delivered to certain persons an article which the defendants supposed to be black oxide of manganese, but which was in fact sulphide of antimony; that this mistake arose from the negligence and want of skill of the defendants; that the person to whom the article was sold by the defendants, acting on the belief that it was the oxide of manganese, resold it to the plaintiff; that he, influenced by the same belief, mixed it with chlorate of potassia; and that thereby a dangerous and explosive substance was created, which exploded and caused great injury and damage to the person of the plaintiff and to his property. From these averments it appears that the plaintiff did' not enter into any contract, directly or indirectly, with the defendants. The plaintiff obtained the article by a sub-sale from those to whom the defendants had previously sold it. There was therefore no privity between the plaintiff and the defendants. It is not alleged that the defendants were guilty of any false or fraudulent representations concerning the article sold by them. There is no averment that the article was of itself dangerous, but on the contrary the implication from the allegations is that it was harmless and innocuous, and only becomes explosive and dangerous by being compounded with chlorate of potassia; nor is it averred that the defendants had any knowledge that the article was bought of them to be resold to the plaintiff, or that they had any notice or information of the purpose for which it was to be used, or that it was intended to compound it with any other substance.
This statement of the facts averred in the declaration, and of the omission to insert therein other and additional allegations,
We think it equally clear that the plaintiff shows no cause of action ex delicto against the defendants. The insuperable difficulty is, that the averments in the declaration do not disclose any duty or obligation which rested on the defendants towards the plaintiff in the sale of the article to the persons from whom the plaintiff purchased it. As has been already stated, it was an innocuous substance, which became dangerous only when
There being no duty imposed on the defendants towards the ' plaintiff arising out of any contract, this action is to be maintained, if at all, by showing a breach of some duty or obligation imposed on them by law. They have been guilty of no actionable carelessness or negligence unless it can be shown that they were bound to use some care or caution on which the plaintiff had a right to rely. Failing to show this, or to aver a state of facts from which the law would imply it, the gist of this action, which is founded on alleged neglect and want of due care, is wholly wanting. We know of no rule or principle of law by which a vendor of an article can be held liable for mistakes in the nature or quality of the article arising from his carelessness and negligence, which causes loss or injury to other persons than his immediate vendee, where there has been no fraudulent or false representations in the sale, and the article sold was in itself harmless ; especially where the sale is made without any notice to the vendor that the article is bought for a third person, or that it is intended to be used in combination with other substances which may make it dangerous or injurious to persons or property. In such a case a vendor assumes no responsibility and incurs no liability beyond that which results from his contract with his vendee. With remote vendees of the article, who purchase it by sub-sales from those to whom it was originally sold, he enters into no contract, either express or implied, and takes on himself no obligation or duty whatever. Nor has he done any wrongful or illegal act towards third persons, for the consequences of which he is liable. The general principle applicable to this class of cases is, that a vendor takes on himself no duty or obligation other than that which results from his contract For a breach of this, he is liable only to those with whom he contracted. All others are strangers. The law fastens on him no general or public duty arising out of his contract, for a breach of which he can be held liable to those not in privity with him.
The views which we have taken of the rights of the parties to this action are supported by the decisions in Winterbottom v Wright, 10 M. & W. 109, and Longmeid v. Holliday, 6 Exch 761. See also Broom on Parties, 246, et seq.
Demurrer sustained; judgment for the defendants.