40 Ala. 587 | Ala. | 1867
If a person who is interested in an estate, With a knowledge of his rights, misleads another into dealing therewith, he will in equity be postponed to the party So mislead, and will be required to make his representations good, even to the extent of any claim or title he may have in the estate. — Adams’ Equity, 373, And this, though the representations are by parol, and without any considera- . tion moving to the person who makes them. They do not operate as a conveyance of the interest of the party making them, but by way of estoppel, to preclude him from setting up any claim or title in himself at the time, against the party he misleads; and this estoppel is not available in a court of law, but may be enforced in a court of equity. Doe, ex dem. McPherson v. Walters, 16 Ala. 714; Smith v. Mundy, 18 Ala. 182; Stone v. Britton, 22 Ala. 543; Walker's Heirs v. Murphy, 34 Ala. 591. A court of equity will also enjoin a party from setting up an unconscientious defense at law, or from interposing impediments to the just rights' of the other party. — 2 Story’s Equity, § 903.
The appellant does not insist that his bill is one for discovery in aid of the suit at law ; but he seeks to enjoin the appellee from setting up any defense at law against the right of appellant to recover the land in controversy. The bill alleges that Hopkinson had a legal title, or “ insists
A bill which alleges the ground of action in the alternative, is insufficient, if one of the alternatives shows that the complainant is not entitled to the remedy sought, as the bill must be construed most strongly against the pleader; and we proceed, therefore, in the discussion of this cause, taking as true the averment in the bill that Hopkinson had the legal title at the time of the sale to Ellison. — Andrews v. McCoy, 8 Ala. 920,
If, before David bought of Ellison, Shepard induced David to buy as alleged in the bill, then the title which was in Ellison was transferred to David by the conveyance to him executed by Ellison, as against any mere adverse possession of Shepard; and the appellant was entitled, on the facts alleged in the bill, to sue in his own name, and recover the land, as against any title or possession which Shepard may then have held, if the title was acquired subsequent to the purchase of Ellison, and not from Ellison himself; but, as to any he may have acquired prior thereto, we express no opinion, as the question is not raised on the record.
The bill, it is true, alleges that Shepard claimed title ; but that is not equivalent to an averment that he had title, when applied to land. Upon the allegations of the bill, the appellant has a clear and adequate remedy at law; although it alleges that all the title-deeds of Hopkinson to said land .are in the hands of appellee, or under his control, and that, for this reason, appellant is unable to produce them, or show a claim of title in an action at law. Now, as this bill is not one for discovery, of what avail is this allegation to give jurisdiction ? Non constat, but that he may be able to make proof of the contents of the deeds on the trial, upon notice to produce them.
The allegations of the bill-being taken as true, the appel
Let the decree be affirmed.
BYRD, J. — The appellant has made an application for a re-hearing, and furnished an argument in support thereof. The court is satisfied that the bill does not allege any fraud which gives a court of equity jurisdiction of the cause. It is not alleged that Shepard made the representations to appellant in bad faith, or with intent to defraud. The legal effect of the allegations presents the case of a party making representations, or a contract, binding on him, which he declines afterwards to make good or perform. In order for the court to take jurisdiction in such a case as this, some title or defense which would defeat the action at law must be distinctly and positively averred. — Jones v. Cowles, 26 Ala. 612; 18 Ala. 332; 26 Ala. 405.
The court carefully considered the allegations of the bill, in making up the opinion, and, in effect, passed upon the question of fraud, which is the gravamen of the argument