32 Iowa 540 | Iowa | 1871
I. In addition to tbe facts found by tbe referee, tbe evidence shows that tbe patents were never delivered to Hamilton, but remained in tbe possession of the United States until they were delivered to tbe plaintiff, in 1865, upon the surrender, by bim, of tbe certificates of entry, and have remained in' bis possession ever since.
As to tbe correctness of tbe first part of tbe decree, quieting the title in plaintiff to the forty acre tract, patented in tbe name of E. H. Thomas, and conveyed by him to tbe plaintiff, which conveyance was duly recorded prior to Rickabaugh’s purchase from Hamilton, there can be no question, nor is any question made thereon, as tbe defendants do not appeal therefrom.
II. The appellee bases bis right and title upon tbe following facts: 1. By the copies of original entries filed in the office of the recorder of deeds, it appeared that W. L. Hamilton, his grantor, was the original purchaser, from
The rights of the parties must be determined in the main by the laws of the United States. "While the State has an undoubted right to legislate as she may please in regard to the remedies to be prosecuted in her courts, and to regulate the disposition of property of her citizens, by descent, devise or alienation, yet in respect to the public domain of the United States, of which the land in dispute was a part, congress is invested, by the Federal constitution, with the power of disposing of and making all needful rules and regulations respecting it. Wilcox v. Jackson, 13 Pet. 498; Irvine v. Marshall, 20 How. 553. So that, in respect to the disposition of the public lands, we must be governed by the regulations established by congress touching the same, until the title has finally passed from the government, and until conveyed by its grantee.
We find that, under these regulations, “ when an individual applies to purchase a tract of land, he is required to file an application in writing therefor; on such application the register (of the land office) indorses his certificate, showing that the land is vacant and subject to entry, which certificate the applicant carries to the receiver, and is evidence on which the receiver permits payment to be made, and issues his receipt therefor. The duplicate of this is handed to the purchaser, as evidence of payment, and which should be surrendered when a patent, forwarded from the general land office, is delivered to him. The other receipt is handed to the register, who must immediately indicate the sale oh his township plat, and enter the same on his tract book, and is transmitted to the general land office, with the monthly abstract of sales and certificate of purchases.” See circular of instructions by general land office issued in 1831. The entry of lands
By act of congress of March. 22, 1852, the certificates of locations of military land warrants were made assignable, subject-to regulations and forms prescribed by thebommissioner of the general land office, and when assigned the patent issued to the assignee.
In this case the land was entered with military land warrants,-by Hamilton, who was a mere- agent for that purpose. He made the entries, however, in his own name, subsequently he ■ assigned the certificates to Thomas. Before doing so he held the mere naked title (such as the certificates could-givey-in trust for- his ¡principals. After assigning the certificates he had no title -whatever in the land. The assignee became entitled to patents for the land in his own name, and that they were not -so-issued, ¡was the result: of mistake or -omission. ¡
When Thomas became the owner of the land by assignment of the certificates, there was no act of congress or even of-this State which required him to record the evidence of his title,- nor has there been at any time since any law to that effect. - - ...... -' -
Thomas therefore could, at anytime after thus obtaining all the title vested by the certificates,- even before the issuance of patents, have conveyed-the land by' deed,;as he did, •to David.: Cavender v. Smith, 5 Iowa, 189; Arnold v. Grimes, 2 id. 1; see, also, 2 Washb. on Real Property, 544, 545, and-cases cited in notes 1 and 2.
The deed from Thomas to the plaintiff vested in the latter the title, to the same extent that it eould have been held under the certificates of entry by an original enterer. Up to the time of the conveyance by Thomas to David-no
The deed from Thomas to the plaintiff was duly recorded prior to Riekabaugh’s purchase from Hamilton. The plaintiff complied with the recording laws at once when those laws became applicable and affected his rights. No record of any transfer of the ownership of the land, prior to the execution and delivery of the deed to plaintiff, was necessary to protect his rights. No law required him to record the certificates of entry and Hamilton’s assignments thereof. The recording of his deed from Thomas was constructive notice to Rickabaugh that the plaintiff claimed the land under the deed. In addition to this, the evidence shows very satisfactorily that the land was commonly reputed in the neighborhood to be that of plaintiff; that Rickabaugh knew this; that he knew that the taxes were regularly paid by plaintiff, and, on one occasion, procured his attorney to apply to plaintiff by letter to purchase the land, prior to his purchase from Hamilton. Taking all these facts into consideration we unite in holding that the defendant had, at least, sufficient notice to put him upon inquiry in respect to plaintiff’s title, and that he cannot be considered a bona fide purchaser without notice. Under these circumstances the defendant was bound to inquire into the source of plaintiff’s title, especially as his grantor, Hamilton, could show neither patent nor certificate of entry to any of the land he purported to convey.
The certificates were delivered to the plaintiff at the time of the conveyance to him by Thomas, and, upon the surrender of the certificates by plaintiff, the patents were delimered to and have ever since been held by him, and we are of opinion that the issuance of the patents by mistake or accident, in the name of Hamilton, did not, and will not, in equity, change the rights of the parties. Upon
Reversed.