295 S.W. 944 | Tex. App. | 1927
This cause is presented as an agreed case under the statute. Appellee, a fraternal benefit society, issued a certificate of insurance to appellant Mrs. Mary David in the sum of $1,500. The policy provides that Mrs. David, the holder thereof, is admitted as a member of appellee, and provides that each member —
"agrees to pay all assessments levied by the board of directors of said association as needed, the sum of $1.10 upon the death of any member in this class. * * * Should any member in this class while in good standing lose his or her life by accidental means, the holder hereof agrees to pay $2.20 upon call for same. * * * Should any member in this class while in good standing lose an eye, hand, or foot by accidental means only, the member hereof agrees to pay the sum of 55 cents. Should any member in this class become totally and permanently disabled from accidental means only, prior to attaining the age of sixty-five years, the member agrees to pay $1.10."
Paragraph 7 of the certificate provides:
"Should any member in this class become permanently and totally disabled from accidental means only, said association agrees to pay the member holder of this certificate the sum of $1 received from each member in good standing, not to exceed the sum of $1,500, * * * provided that said total and permanent disability of the member must be due to *945 bodily injury or disease occurring after the date hereof."
It is agreed that Mrs. David was totally and permanently disabled, and that same was wholly caused from disease, and that the disease was not caused from any accident or accidental means. The one question to be determined is whether the policy provides for insurance against permanent disability caused by a disease which is not attributed in any way to an accident or to accidental means.
The cardinal rule for the construction of all contracts is that they should be given a reasonable construction and construed according to the intent of the parties. Thomson v. Collins (Tex.Civ.App.)
In this case the parties have agreed that appellant's disease is not the result of any accident and is not caused by any accidental means This being true, she is not entitled to recover.
The judgment of the trial court is affirmed.