David Steed & Associates, Inc. v. Young

ASSOCIATES, DAVID AND STEED Then, Q. following week, you didn’t INC., Corporation, An David you feel make it could to work? Steed, Delray Holm C. Claren P. Right. A. Holm, Petitioners, Q. So, Franks, you to Dr. went I think said, you Tuesday. Would that YOUNG, February have been 12? Honorable District Grant L. Judge, District Seventh Judicial February 12, yes. A. Idaho, County State of in and for the Bonneville, Respondent, Q. During that first —from February February 1st—the first up until 21st, morning you are Bank, Respon- The Idaho First National about, just talking you did your hurt Party dent-Real in Interest. away your job during back from No. 17252. period of time? On, Supreme A. no. Idaho. Sept. Q. you When Dr. saw Franks on Febru- ary you did tell him that it you

felt to you your like had a knife in

back? knife,

A. I said it like there felt was a

sharp pain a knife stabbing like me in

the back.

Q. alleged And this was before acci- February

dent of 20?

A. previous Yes. This was week

that, the 20th.

Q. your Isn’t it true that back was both-

ering you you when returned to work

on February 18?

A. It was like the week of the 4th. I

just just had a low—it a little

backache. There was no knife there more, low, know, just you a little every

ache in my back time I bent

over.

Q. This was on 18th?

A. Yes.

I. presented The determination of the issue appeal on should made in the of be context history purposes the and the to of by jury. wisely pro- Our forefathers in Article vided Section 7 of the Idaho Larsen, Pocatello, for Stephen peti- G. by jury Constitution: “The to trial tioners. They provid- shall remain ...” inviolate so ed they recognized because the that Hart, Sullivan, Langroise, Holland system guardi- single important is the most Boise, respondent party for inter- —real people’s right protected the to be (argued). est. John C. Ward oppressive overreaching govern- from and respondent appearance by Grant L. No ment. Young. Few Americans realize to that HUNTLEY, Justice. civil cases has been almost lost in England. English judges, the ac- with Steed, al., petition by et David quiescence bar, compliant totally have require judge, mandamus district by jury eliminated the to trial civil denying vacate his order Steed except cases cases libel or slander. causes action asserted English themselves seem to have for- compulsory grant their counterclaim. We gotten jurist, the words of their eminent the writ. Blackstone, who wrote that trial is: First National Bank instituted glory English ... law ... [i]t against mortgage foreclosure action Steed privilege most transcendent allegedly to recover amounts due on his for, any subject enjoy, or wish separate ac- defaulted loans. Steed filed be property, he cannot affected his his against alleging tion Bank various liberty, person by his but unani- grounded in law causes of action both and neighbors mous consent of of his twelve equity, including causes of action for equals. and contract, fraud, constructive breach conspiracy, negligence, fraud and intention- Blackstone Commentaries 79. distress, al infliction emotional construc- legislators judges Some American and for injunctive trust and a claim relief tive similarly following have lost touch with the competition. unfair Steed made a language in Indepen- our Declaration of request proper timely for a dence: apart eq- from on the causes [George has combined with others to III] by the causes to be tried court. uitable jurisdiction foreign subject us our The court ordered the two cases Constitution, unacknowledged our consolidated, complaint Steed’s laws; giving their his assent to acts of properly denominated coun- pretended legislation: depriving ... For 13(a) pursuant to I.R.C.P. because terclaim us, cases, many of trial benefits from it arose the same transaction as by jury ... complaint. Bank’s essayist, philosopher De The French The Bank filed a motion to strike Steed’s appreciat- Toqueville, who understood and ground for a trial on the demand democracy keener in- ed in America with action in primarily this is a foreclosure the Nine- sight than other observer upon equity, the counterclaim was based system Century, stated teenth in the necessarily determined fore- in America: action, and Steed’s counterclaim closure society in real direction of places ... relief. The district also asked and not in governed ... the hands granted motion and struck the punishes government ... He who ... demand for trial. persuasive. Collins, criminal ... the real master of Folkner v. 249 Iowa society. sovereigns All the have who N.W.2d govern authority, chosen to their own leading case with Federal society, and to obeying direct instead of 13(a) Theatres, Rule is Beacon Inc. v. direction, destroyed or enfeebled Westover, 359 U.S. 79 S.Ct. the jury. institution the of L.Ed.2d That case is identical Theatres, to the at bar in Those who believe in strict case that Beacon construction sought our recognize judi- by require of Inc. also Constitution that the mandamus to ciary’s “support oath court striking to and defend the district to vacate an order its requires Constitution” upon legal that we resist the for a demand issues temptation judicial power to enhance found its counterclaim. through encroachment into provinces Supreme the the Therein Court stated: delegated constitutionally jury. to the holding The in Beacon Theatres was that legal equitable both where issues are

II. presented single in a “only under imperative Our forefathers’ wise man- circumstances, constitutional the most cir- today 38(a): is date reflected I.R.G.P. cumstances which in of view the flexible Jury procedures of the right Right Federal Rules we can- preserved.— trial of — anticipate, not now the byjury by of trial as declared legal trial of be lost given through the issues by Constitution as stat- equitable ute determination of pre- of the state of Idaho claims. shall be Theatres, Inc., except served parties to the U.S. at 510- inviolate [Beacon department. the small (Emphasis holding, claims 79 S.Ct. at That' of 957.] added). course, applies judge whether legal chooses characterize the provisions Constitutional con should be presented as “incidental” is- give practical strued so as to them effect sues or not. Conse- [Footnote omitted.] according to the intention of the framers. quently, in a case such as this where 18, 115 Fletcher Gifford, See there cannot even be a contention of such Grice Clearwater Timber circumstances,” “imperative Beacon The- En requires any legal atres issues for Bd., gelking v. Investment timely is and prop- (1969)(motion denied, 458 P.2d 213 93 Ida erly demanded jury. be submitted to a (1969)). ho 471 P.2d 594 Queen, Wood, Dairy Inc. v. 13(a) U.S. Rule compul- states Idaho’s law for 82 S.Ct. 8 L.Ed.2d 44 sory counterclaims: Theatres, quoting Beacon Inc. See also Compulsory plead- counterclaims. —A Strasser, Corp. Evans Financial ing shall as state a counterclaim N.M. Sanguinetti claim serving which at time of Strecker, 94 Nev. pleading pleader against any op- (1978); Hightower Bigoney, 156 So.2d posing party, if it arises out of the trans- (Fla.1963). 17 A.L.R.3d 1308 action or occurrence subject that is the opposing matter of the party’s claim stressing While require does not adjudication its issues, legal explained Bea- presence parties of third of whom Theatres, con Inc.: acquire jurisdiction.... cannot injunctive relief in basis the feder- added). (Emphasis al has always irreparable courts been 13(a) This rule is identical to Federal Rule inadequacy legal harm and remedies. is mandatory Al- directive. At as much required justify least is though we are bound the federal in using trial court its discretion under rule, inasmuch as Idaho rule based eq- the Federal Rules to claims allow nature, upon federal rule of the origins same legal uitable to be tried ahead of interpretation ones, federal court’s of the rule is since this has same effect equitable injunction legal an procedures view flexible immaterial, judging claims. And it anticipate, Rules we Federal cannot now employed, properly if that discretion is legal can the Rules and the before Federal lost through prior issues be determina- Judgment Declaratory passed, Act were tion claims. Leimer v. See equity, exercising jurisdiction courts of Woods, Cir., 196 F.2d 833-836. As law, were, in separate from courts shown, being we have is far from cases, enjoin subsequent some allowed to (Footnotes omitted, empha- such a case. actions the same between sis involving controversy. same 510-511, Id. at 79 S.Ct. 956-957. action, the subsequent was because We abide in authority and the though providing opportunity try analysis clear The Court Beacon jury, might protect the case to a not atres, Thus, Inc. it is irrelevant whether right equity plaintiff to fair and a legal issues are eq “incidental” to the controversy. orderly adjudication of claims, since See, right jury uitable to a trial e.g., New York Ins. Co. v. Life Cir., specifically guaranteed is Seymour, 6 F.2d 73 A.L.R. under both added). 38(a).1 (Emphasis art. 1 Constitution 7 and I.R.C.P. Further, case, in the instant the Bank has 506-507, at at 954-955. Id. 359 U.S. 79 S.Ct. only claimed that beginning the case If there should be cases where the avail- equity legal must lie in equity, since the joinder ability declaratory judgment of or equitable, issues are “incidental” to the legal equitable of causes in one suit legal equitable both issues are “inex respects protect not in all would tricably intertwined.” The made Bank has ir- plaintiff seeking equitable relief from showing “imperative of circumstances” reparable affording harm a while deprive eq in its case which it of would cause, legal trial court legal relief if the uitable tried necessarily will have to use its discretion jury. We thus find no reason to deciding legal whether the or deny precious Petitioner Steed his most should cause be tried first. Since right one, by jury. to trial constitutional right to trial is a constitutional however, requirement while no similar per analysis, In the final the most court, by protects trials that discre- 13(a) argument suasive is that Rule would must, very narrowly tion is limited and compelled party “if a be unconstitutional it possible, pre- to wherever be exercised jury by plead either to waive his jury trial. As this Court said serve by ing the counterclaim or the claim waive 109-110, Neely, U.S. Scott pleading it....” 156 So.2d Hightower, “In the 35 L.Ed. 358: S.Ct. 508, 17 at A.L.R.3d Barron quoting [jury] right Federal courts this cannot be Holtzoff, Proce Federal Practice and with, of dispensed except by the assent dure, by to a trial 405. Since the it; it be entitled to nor can “inviolate” the Constitution jury is under claim, by any a impaired blending with Idaho, equity party the State of a to an of law, cognizable a demand properly of action has a for relief in aid of the pursuant legal causes of action raised action, during This pendency.” or counterclaim, there compulsory unless his long-standing equity dictates principle of showing circum “imperative a clear imperative under only the most circumstances, stances” which would cause circumstances counterclaim, claim, cross-claim, 42(b) statutory third- provides any or 1. Idaho Rule also claim, separating party any separate there is a risk or of method trials when or issue cross-claims, party: claims, prejudice to a counter- number claims, issues, claims, always third-party court, or Separate furtherance of trials. —The preserving inviolate the prejudice, or when convenience or avoid Constitutions, expedition declared statutes rules separate trials will be conducive to economy, may (Emphasis separate trial the court. order a mortgagor trial to a affording guarantee a “irreparable harm while claimant legal cause.” Beacon trial in the asserting compulsory legal claim Theatres, Inc., supra.2 brought a fore- mortgagee who then In v. Home closure action. Stevens Sav- III. Assn., Loan ings and that a writ of man- The Bank also claims mortga- ruled that improper bring vehicle to date was an trial on the entitled to gors were mandamus is case before the since in their suit to recover issues of fact raised in- judicial discretion is inappropriate when mortgagee, against the statutory penalty used when the volved and should mortgagee though the had sued even seeking the writ has a “clear party Mortgagors had mortgage. foreclose the performed. right” petitioned to have the act first, mortgag- brought their action and the Prather, 280, 506 P.2d Felton a foreclosure action. ee had followed with (1973). In those instances in which a cases were present As in the the two by jury, no dis- party is entitled to held that consolidated for trial. deny in the court to a “clear cretion lies suit was a the foreclosure legal right” required both the Idaho mortgagors. the suit of counterclaim to and the Idaho Rules of Civil Constitution ruling guaranteeing Procedure. mort- my opinion the directly applicable gagors permanent is made The alternative writ accept I a rule that this case. am unable judge requires as it the district insofar trial on striking order the demand for would defeat vacate his trial, remanded for and case is the mort- mortgagor’s legal claims because proceedings further consistent herewith. gagee courthouse first. reached the Petitioners, attorney fees Costs procedure adopted by The code of civil awarded. legislature in 1881 con- the Idaho territorial following provisions: tained the BISTLINE, J., concurs. The answer of the defendant Sec. 237. JOHNSON, Justice, specially shall contain: concurring: I concur in the result reached

opinion Huntley. special matter con- Justice This 2. A statement of new purpose concurrence is for the of demon- claim. stituting a defense or counter strating reading that a correct Idaho cases harmonizes them with the claim mentioned The counter Sec. 238. granting legal trial on the claims existing must be one in the last section I clarify Steed. also wish to how I against plain- and of a defendant favor

believe this proceed procedural- ease should tiff, judgment whom a several between ly after remand. action, arising and in the might be had of action: following causes out of IDAHO CASES SUPPORT JURY TRIAL FOR out of COMPULSORY LEGAL COUN- action 1. A cause of TERCLAIM TO FORECLOSURE AC- complaint forth transaction set TION plaintiff’s as the foundation subject claim, connected with 1, Art. 7 of the Idaho constitution was § action; interpreted early history in the of this state 277, Case, P. 170 108 v. 2. This court in its that a Dover Lumber earliest cases ruled 654, Niichels, party (1918); P. in an action is Idaho 284 entitled v. 48 Johnson 488, trial on counterclaims or cross-claims. (1930); Fogelstrom Murphy, Idaho 70 Moore, 77 P. 18 Robertson Whipple, and Anderson 222 P.2d 1080 Smith, P. Sandstrom To the Clark, Penninger Lateral Co. v. cases are inconsistent the latter four extent Idaho Those cases they are overruled. herewith contrary and the rule asserted in were overruled against plaintiff in a lien foreclosure suit. If the set Sec. 239. defendant omit to up men- a counter claim in the cases Later decided cases on in the the last tioned first subdivision of distinguish compulsory issue failed section, assignee neither he nor his permissive counterclaims from counter- afterwards maintain action Case, claims. Dover Lumber Co. plaintiff therefor. (1918) purported

C.C.P.1881, 238, and 239. §§ overrule Robertson and Sandstrom. clearly permis- counterclaim in Dover was part These provisions became of the laws under the statutes then in force. The sive of this at the state time of statehood and “damages by rea- counterclaim asked part code continued to be of our until alleged [mortgagee’s] son of breach of an they they when repealed were because modifying original agreement con- were in conflict with the Rules of P. tract.” 31 Idaho at 109. R.S., R.C., Civil Procedure. & C.L. 4185; provided The statutes that a counterclaim C.S., §§ §§ “arising existing 6696; 5-612, 5-613, upon contract and I.C. §§ 5-614; Sess.Laws, com- 1. commencement action” eh. R.C., R.S., pulsory. C.L. 4184 and Compulsory gov- are now^ counterclaims §§ 13(a). Similarly, in erned the three other cases by I.R.C.P. proposition that are cited for Steed Stevens, This shortly Court stated after is not entitled to a simply that art. 7 of our constitution action, permissive claims in his contained to jury secures trial “as it existed in- and not counterclaims at the adoption date of the of the constitu- Niichels, 48 volved. Johnson tion.” Hollingsworth, Christensen v. (1930),(counterclaim for breach lease); Murphy, 70 Idaho Fogelstrom v. applied continued to be the rule this (1950), (cross-complaint Rudd, present. Court down to the Rudd v. receiver); wrongful appointment for 105 666 639 It is Whipple, 71 Idaho 227 Anderson v. clear to me that at the time our constitu- for (cross-complaint refusal adopted, mortgagor asserting tion a was a grown crops endorse checks for on the compulsory counterclaim based on a claim subject the equitable land that jury at law was entitled to a trial on action). in the issues of fact raised counterclaim. ruling The clear Stevens is evidence The trial court ruled that Steed’s claims this. There- were counterclaims. fore, jury is entitled to a trial on Steed shortly following decided Stevens Cases in his counter- issues raised Steed principle. echoed this basic Robertson claims. Moore, v. P. (1904) mortgagor that a this Court stated PRECEDE JURY TRIAL SHOULD damages a who asserted counterclaim for IN JUDGMENT in a have been suit for foreclosure would ACTION FORECLOSURE on the entitled to a trial counterclaim may trial con- if had On court timely demand for remand clearly proceed on the issues but a cerned about how been made. was dicta in relation to law. counter are tried correct statement of the that to be tried the court. compulsory coun the issues to be claim in Robertson was a this Supreme wrestled with existed at Iowa Court has terclaim under statutes that that trial Likewise, has concluded question that time. Sandstrom Smith, entry judgment 416 court should defer after (1906) proceedings until determi- passing stated in that foreclosure Hedinger on a nation the counterclaim. had a to have Herweh, 34 N.W.2d damages brought 239 Iowa for “cross-action” it has (1948); Collins, Starting with our earliest cases 249 Iowa Folkner (1) recognized this will not pro- A similar that 91 N.W.2d been a trial court will commit anticipate cedure should be followed here. (2) error or exceed BAKES, Justice, dissenting: anticipated issue to correct a writ will not Miller, errors. In re (1) following I dissent for the reasons: Stewart, Rust particular pre- the issuance of this writ is Paxton, Olden court, contrary mature because the trial v. District Skeen statement, majority’s finally has not (1916); Gropp P. 1072 petitioners determined whether the will re- Huyette, ceive a trial on the issues raised counterclaim; Accordingly, is no basis for the is-

their if the trial there even petitioners in this court had denied suance of the writ of mandamus counterclaim, on the issues raised in their petition should be dismissed for case. The such action would not be erroneous under that reason alone. long prece- established and consistent Court, dating incep-

dent of this from the II Constitution; (3) tion of even if the trial court had entered an erroneous judge assuming Even the district order, adequate petitioners have an holding had entered a final order remedy by way appeal; at law therefore petitioners not entitled to a extraordinary writ of mandamus on the issues raised their counter reasons, should not have issued. For these claim, grounds there still be no would I dissent. in this case. In enter issuance of the writ ing judge order the would such an

I following long line of Idaho have been The issuance of a writ of mandate to the precedent, duty which it was his to follow. premature. this case is Con- prior decisions of this Court Numerous trary to the in majority opin- statement a foreclosure action clearly held that ion, Judge Young yet has not denied the that, “[Ejquity is an action and petitioners trial on raised the issues subject having jurisdiction of obtained Admittedly, their counterclaim. in his for the dispute, will retain it matter of a 30,1987, July order acknowledged dated he between settlement of all controversies thereto_” rule, longstanding established in innu- Boesig parties with Court, merable decisions of this that once Freer, er v. equity jurisdiction obtains dispute v. Dou Carpenter Accord proceed equity court will to a settlement Inc., Idaho ble R Cattle aspects of all dispute between the (1985); Whipple, P.2d 222 Anderson parties. Nevertheless, petitioners’ due to Fogelstrom 227 P.2d urging, Judge Young, in the final sentence 488, 222 P.2d 1080 Murphy, 70 Idaho order, of his stated: Case, 31 Ida Dover Lumber Co.

“IT IS 108, 110(1918)(“The FURTHER ORDERED that the 284, 170 fact ho judgment court will reserve to determine legal defense to an up sets that defendant any legal whether after issues remain change not action does equitable cause of the court trial of the action foreclosure proceedings or entitle the character require that will trial.” trial....”); Rees v. him to demand a Gorham, proceeded The district court never further Young is bound to follow Judge Since

with the case because this Court issued its Court, hardly be it can Thus, of this yet writ. decisions alternative we do not know jurisdic his argued he either exceeded granted whether the trial court would have simply erroneously when he ruled petitioners trial on the issues raised tion or precedent. our their counterclaim. followed regard summa- law in this is well is not a matter of The The issuance of writ ¡ Gropp Huyette, rized in ompel a lesser right. only is used It (1922): 688-689, i.e., legal duty, perform a clear tribunal to elementary appellate court “It is that an duty which does not involve a ministerial manner, summary by a may in this of discretion. Dalton v. Idaho the exercise extraordinary remedy of resort to the Comm’n, 107 Idaho Dairy Products prohibition, interfere with inferior courts Welch, (1984); Fitzpatrick exercising judicial regularly who are Felton them,.... reposed power power Prather, determine contro- courts to hear and Here, existing prece- under implies properly them versies before Court, judge did of this the district dents questions to decide all also peti- legal duty grant clear not have a same, either or growing out counterclaim in tioners a trial on their appellate courts are cre- wrong, and contrary, foreclosure action. To the purpose reviewing such ated decisions, pro- the entire under our heard the trial court has actions after as an ceeding to be tried the court Ap- controversy. and determined the suit, It can not as a action. anticipate pellate courts cannot Young had a argued Judge hardly be committed, or that a trial error will be duty contrary rule to the ministerial jurisdiction, and court will exceed its by this Court. precedents laid down thereupon jurisdiction take before a mat- determined court has heard and to hear ter which it has Ill determine, appears it and where and In Trustees Butte Kolp v. Board of may sought prohibited that the act to be 111, 102 County Dist. No. Joint School supreme in the speedily be reviewed 320, 326, 629 P.2d by appeal from the order stated that “substantive tribunal, appeal will not or if an inferior appropriate areas generally are not lie, law] upon [of then a writ of error certiora- proceeding in a of consideration mandamus ri, not issue.” prohibition will the writ added.) are to be considered other (Emphasis if adequate legal remedy is unavailable.” both the order In the instant added.) statement is (Emphasis This latter actions taken would be other issue limits the writ on I.C. 7-303 which based judg- a final appealable once there was plain, speedy there is not a to “cases where Judge following precedent ment. ordinary remedy in the adequate jurisdiction, his Young did not exceed appeal is course of law.” discretion, any error. or commit his abuse adequate plain, speedy erred, adequate regarded as But even if he had right to Timber Pro form of a remedy remedy law. at law the Clearwater Accordingly, the appeal was available. Ass’n v. Dist. tective improvidently issued. writ was Young, 71 Smith v. 369 P.2d 571 (1950). 31, Where an Idaho IV lie. mandamus will not appealable, is

order 555, Aker, 777 8 P.2d Aker v. 51 challenge not majority opinion does (1932). permitted “Mandamus will of this unwavering of decisions line appeal or a function of an supplant the Idaho Constitu- since rendered Prather, 95 of review.” Felton v. writ re- this Court adopted, in which tion was 1353, 280, 282, 1, 1355 506 P.2d 7 of section that “Article peatedly held available, constitution, guaranteeing Court is appeal to this Where the Idaho not refer to by jury, Mi does mandate is not available. St. writ 609, Re- Steele, Morton v. Morton equitable 30 Idaho actions.” Monastery v. chaels 1014, 729, 735, Co., 241 P. 41 Idaho alty 167

255 appellants were not entitled to 1015 rule is too well settled action and “[T]he authorities, require jury upon that a counterclaims of a the citation of mortgage equitable pro- an nature.” foreclosure is ceeding, party in which neither is entitled proceed in context Specifically, of a Gorham, trial.” v. 30 Idaho Rees ing equity mortgage, in to foreclose a this 212, 88, (1917).1 207, 164 P. 89 Case, 31 Court in Dover Lumber v . Co. cases, 276, (1918), P. stated: equally long

In an line of this 170 108 equity Court has held that once has ob- question presented next is whether “The dispute, equity tained will denying by jury in the court erred proceed, jury, without a to settle all contro- damages for of Case’s counterclaim [for respect to versies between the with Cyc., It is said in 24 breach of contract]. 1898, dispute. early in initial As as 126, pp. 127: ‘The fact defendant 87, Hollingsworth, Christensen v. 6 Idaho up equitable defense to an sets 93, 211, (1898), P. this Court stated change does not the char- cause of action guaranty that ‘the to trial proceedings “[t]he him to acter of the or entitle by jury shall remain inviolate’ has no refer- demand a trial. ...In the absence equitable Shortly ence to cases.” there- pleads a a statute a who defendant after in in Burke Land & Livestock equitable in action is counterclaim an 42, 56, Wells, Fargo 7 Idaho Co. not entitled to a the issues (1900), P. this Court stated: thereon, notwithstanding the equity, having juris- independent “A court of obtained cross-demand constitutes an any purpose, may upon separate diction of a cause for cause of action purposes, proceed might brought retain it for all action have been and a ” determination of all of the matters trial demanded.’ 31 Idaho at (emphasis issue.” 170 P. at 110 Then, quoting language after the above Christensen, The rule announced from the Burke the Court Johnson Burke, and Dover Lumber cases has Co. Niichels, 654, 659, 48 Idaho 284 P. consistently by been followed (1930), following: added the since the first decision on that issue in conclude, therefore, Niichels, appellants’

“We 1898.2 Johnson v. 48 Idaho contention in this Fogelstrom Murphy, is without mer- 284 P. 840 it, and that primarily equity this was an cases, quoted by jury equity.

1. In addition to the above the rule Their function is to suits following Brady has been followed cases: preserve the as it existed at the date of the Yost, 273, 283, 6 Idaho constitution.”). adoption of the ("In party actions in this state neither right.”); is entitled to a as a matter of recog- 2. The in the Dover Lumber Co. case Johnson, Shields v. (1904); 10 Idaho nized and overruled the dicta in Robertson v. Niichels, Johnson v. 659- Moore, 77 P. 218 (1930) ("It is the settled rule Smith, 86 P. 416 Sandstrom (1906), pleads of this court that a defendant who majority opinion which the uses as its counterclaim in an tled, action is not enti justification overruling nearly a dozen Idaho right, as a matter of trial of the cases. The Court in Dover Lumber Co. stated: arising thereon. ... will not now be [I]t Kruse, “In Johnson Service Co. v. 121 Minn. said that the to trial 1914C, 850, N.W. Ann.Cas. law, guaranteed equity cases as well as but followed, quoted law as above and there defendant in an case is not entitled appended to that case an exhaustive note right.”); a matter of Tomita v. weight showing supported by great it to be Johnson, (1930); Fogel authority. By expression, which was Murphy, strom dictum, Moore, obiter 115, in Robertson v. 10 Ida. 1080, ("The guarantee constitutional 218, again P. right by jury in 'the to trial Sandstrom v. that shall remain Smith, 446, 416, 12 Ida. cases.”); equitable this no court seems inviolate’ has reference to doctrine, to have contrary announced a Whipple, and Anderson v. cases, 351, they these (1951) ("These so far as provisions conflict with the P.2d Const, rule [Idaho 7, quoted, 1, 5, hereby above are overruled." and art. were not § § 1] art. 284, at 170 P. at 110. right not of trial intended to do extend the 112, by right 227 mon to trial as it existed Whipple, Anderson v. law Freer, adoption Boesiger P.2d 351 v. 85 Ida- at the of the the Constitu time of (1963); Carpenter ho tion. in its earliest As this Court stated Co., Inc., 108 Double R Cattle subject, case Holl on the Christensen v. ingsworth, 6 Idaho (1898), recognition princi- of The most recent the equity jurisdic- once “It

ple that has obtained the settled doctrine in a number of dispute, proceed, provisions tion of a will with- having states constitutional jury, out a to settle all the controversies [including similar to those above cited parties respect between the with to the Constitution, Art. the of § dispute, this in year initial came earlier right by jury”] “the that of those Overholser, Nash provisions light must be in of read the P.2d 1180 In Nash this Court ac- existing adop- at the the law the time of knowledged the in equitable rule that an tion the constitution.” (in proceeding) it action Nash was a divorce Again Ltd. Irrigating in Portneuf litigant is not to a a a entitled trial on 1046, 1049 116, 125, 100 Budge, 16 Idaho legal counterclaim. The Court in Nash (1909), stated: the Court required held that the wife not to was join guaranty right “The the constitutional her tort claim husband guaranty clearly to trial because, action if their divorce the existed time of right that at the the claim, required join the the wife was tort constitution; adoption right the right the she would have to “waive to a right.” was the common-law Now, jury trial on the tort claim.” three Rudd, Recently, Rudd v. later, 180°, majority the has turned months we stated: P.2d 639 holding joining legal counterclaim action cause of does not guarantees “The Idaho Constitution the right the “waive on the right jury trial in at cases Const, [legal] Today claim.” the Court also art. common law. See for our recent deci- overruled rationale 7.§ Overholser, supra.

sion Nash preserve is to provision's “This 'function pen, right one as it existed at With stroke of contained trial] [to adoption page last of the Constitu- a remote footnote on the date ninety- Whipple, this tion.’ opinion, majority overrules Anderson (1951). Historically, year-old line of Idaho cases which held that right to trial existed equity has once obtained law, jury, common in cases tri- dispute, equity proceed, will without a cases at not Thus, by equity. able settle all of the controversies between in a existed, preserving it this with to the initial dis- given provision merely preserves explanations are constitutional pute. Two in cases to a trial at majority’s action. provision common law. ‘Th[is was] “[cjonstitutional provi- The first is that not extend the intended to do[es] give so as sions should be construed equity.’ by jury to suits of trial according to in- practical affect them Ida- Whipple, supra.” 105 Anderson cases.)” (Citing of the framers. tention 115-116, ho 666 P.2d at 642-643 However, af- Ante P.2d 719. (bracketed emphasis in original, material setting out “intention of the fram- ter rule, analysis majority makes ers” jury trial in law was. The common the intention of framers of what held, time Article However, at the this Court has on innumera- existence occasions, adopted, did not the Idaho “intention of the Constitution ble counterclaim permit jury trial on Article adopting framers” the fore- equitable action for codify com- filed in an Idaho Constitution was

257 Accordingly, anything a had “intentions of the is dif- mortgage.3 closure of framers” “in- ex- majority analysis made ferent than the common-lawrule which an framers,” recognize at the time the Idaho tention of the it would isted Constitution egregiously adopted, provided it which “a de- how errs when it overrules was (each making pleads in an of our such fendant who a counterclaim all cases adop- entitled, action is not as a matter analysis) clear back to the time of right, jury trial of the issues tion of the Constitution itself. Niichels, 48 Idaho thereon.” Johnson v. justification in the ma- The second made 840, 654, 659, 842 Christen- jority opinion is Federal Rule of Civil Pro- 87, Hollingsworth, Idaho P. 211 sen v. 6 53 13(a) cedure of the United the decision (1898). Theaters, Supreme States Court in Beacon Westover, 948, 500, Thus, Inc. v. 359 79 S.Ct. analysis U.S. our decision in Rudd (1959). majority opinion Rudd, 3 L.Ed.2d 988 The supra, applies equal force to with authority and the states: “We abide in the action. As the instant has been established analysis above, The- clear in Beacon a foreclosure the Court action is an action aters, Inc.,” “Thus, recognizing just equity. right jury without rejected right year pleading we rationale does not exist ... [and] [s]ince existed, [petitioners any the Beacon case in Nash v. Theaters not denied were] Overholser, 7, rights 114 Idaho 757 constitutional under Article § Rudd, of the Idaho Constitution.” Rudd v. 105 Idaho at 666 at P.2d 643. Accord Supreme The United Court has States 69, 76, Spencer, 625 Skelton never held that the trial in the (1981), denied, cert. seventh States amendment United 102 S.Ct. L.Ed.2d 208 U.S. binding upon Constitution is the states (1981), quoting approval with Fein v. through the fourteenth amendment. Rudd Schwartz, (Mo.Ct.App. 404 S.W.2d Rudd, P.2d at 642. at 1966) (“The instant suit is one Beacon Theaters case is Therefore not exist at com which did binding upon this This Court has Court. and never mon law has as a matter just recently held reluctant that we are not state.”). in this interpret differently our Constitution Niichels, from the United States Constitution. State In Johnson (1930), Thompson, exactly case like the Idaho almost ninety case, present appellants asserting We done so for over were years using on this complaint issue of the cross counterclaims they trial on fore- they counterclaims defenses claimed proceedings. opinion majority closure The entitled to a trial. This Court explain ninety stated, failed to why years quoting has from v. Holl Christensen overruled, precedent par- ingsworth, supra, should be that it is settled doctrine ticularly in a case such as this where in Idaho that totally premature. majority light is must provision issue be “read in the opinion existing adoption has failed that the to demonstrate law time of the Ass’n, recognized Savings previously Home 3. Stevens v. & Loan 5 Ida- that sanctions "such (1898), distinguishable. enough, ho if serious and fines ... substantial There, plaintiffs the trial level of court denied rise to the criminal sanction.” State Bennion, complaint against mortgage their com- trial on pany penalty provided $100 for the for in R.S. In the Stevens case was when decided, (now 45-915) penalty $100 for the and sub- § mortgage company’s codified at I.C. was “serious enough criminal failure to record a satisfac- stantial rise to the level of [to] mortgage. narrowly tion of the tailored lan- ... In such a Article sanction. guage, granted apply.” the Stevens Id. never been would There has only statutory question $100 on the suit to that at the was recover the time the Constitution penalty. Jury adopted criminal trial was ordered was allowed in all nature, penalty penal proceedings. because the raised Steed counterclaim however, here, hardly Harding Savings category. v. Home Ac- Investment & fits that cordingly, inapplicable. and this Court Stevens majority opinion result in this case. The the constitution.” 48 Idaho at that, ignores prior of numerous dis- efforts at 842. The Court also noted “It is tinguished justices of this Court who have rule a defend- settled of this stated that the framers intended that “a pleads eq- ant who a counterclaim in an pleads defendant who counterclaim an entitled, a matter of uitable action is not as entitled, action is not aas matter right, arising to a trial of the issues right, trial of the issues cases.)” Id. (Citing thereon. at Niichels, thereon.” Johnson v. 48 Idaho at Johnson quoted at 842. The from 659, 284 P. at 842. case of Burke Land Live- & very early Wells, Co., Fargo stock Co. & 7 Idaho Finally, majority opinion laments that 42, 56, and then conclud- “judges legislators and in the United States ed as follows: general, particular, and in Idaho in increasing evidenced an tendency to arro- “ ‘A equity, having court of jur- obtained gate power unto by constricting themselves any purpose, may

isdiction of a cause for usurping jury system.” and Ante retain purposes, proceed it for all majority opinion 766 P.2d 718. The a determination of all of the matters then admonishes who believe “[t]hose issue.’ strict construction of our Constitution [to] recognize judiciary’s that the ‘sup- oath to conclude, therefore, appellants’ “We port and requires defend the Constitution’ mer- in this is without contention temptation we resist to enhance it, primarily and that this was judicial power through encroachment into not entitled to appellants action and provinces constitutionally delegated upon counterclaims of Ante jury.” 766 P.2d nature.” preachments, Those high sounding they as be, may recognized will be Thus, empty rheto- majority correctly while the states compared ric when to the decisions and the rule to be that Article the consti- Court, opinions of just this rendered in provision, tutional months, last few which have overruled give “should construed as to so [it] deprived litigants verdicts and of their con- practical according effect to the intention See, e.g., stitutional trial. framers,” majority of the then makes Harvey v. F-B Truck Line 115 Idaho analysis intention framers (1988); 767 P.2d 254 Ross Cole- majority of the Idaho Constitution. The Co., Inc., man does not mention the fact that this (1988) J., dissenting). (Huntley, Such occasions, on numerous has made contradictions, together overruling with the analysis and concluded that the fram- long precedent of line of Idaho without equity, ers intended that once court of “[a] explanation, seriously unsettling have a ef- obtained of a cause for [has] law, fect on the and leave bench and any purpose, may retain it for [the court] bar with little direction in these matters. purposes, proceed all to a determina- obscure footnotes of reason- Neither devoid tion of all of the matters in issue.” Burke ing analysis, high sounding phras- nor Wells, Fargo Land & Livestock Co. v. es, appealing concealing to the ear but Co., supra at 56. Accord Anderson v. inconsistencies, either the Court’s advance Whipple, (1951); 227 P.2d 351 development justice cause of or the rational Fogelstrom Murphy, of the law. Waller, Finlayson Johnson sum, petition for writ of manda- Niichels, mus should never have been entertained Oberholtzer, Gillette (1) because: petitioner’s claim prema- explaining Without how the ture since the trial court has not made a analysis, final court erred in its earlier intent decision regarding whether it will al- low petitioners majority arbitrarily nearly overrules trial on their legal counterclaims; years precedent order to reach even assuming the decision, his had made a final judge nearly a supported by decision would be cases, and therefore it

dozen exceeded his hardly be said that he has discretion, or com-

jurisdiction, abused his error; (3) any

mitted event, adequate remedy

appeal, is an which, cases, and I.C.

at law under all our 7-303, precludes the issuance of the writ § mandate; years of consistent correctly held

precedent of this Court court has “obtained

that once subject matter of a dis- the settlement of

pute, will retain it for [it] parties....”

all controversies between the Freer, 551, 563, 381

Boesiger v. (1963) (emphasis the,common law rule at the time

That was trial,

the Idaho constitutional adopted,

Article was drafted and intention of the framers was

and the clear codify Article the exist- would

ing common law rule.

Accordingly, petition of man- for writ

damus should be dismissed.

SHEPARD, C.J., concurs. BERGMAN,

Mary individually Ruth

Mary Bergman Rep Ruth as Personal

resentative of the Estate of Steven New Berg Bergman

ton Frank Steven

man, Plaintiffs-Appellants, HENRY, Lynn

Terri the Estate of Terri Nancy

Lynn Henry, Wayne Tucker and P.S., Tucker, wife, Hagadone Evans, Lackie, Coeur Craven & husband Corporation Holiday Hospitality d’Alene, plaintiffs-appellants. for Jarold d/b/a Inn, Donna Trone Luskin and Jane argued. Cartwright III, Through Does I Defendants-Re Boise, Lynch, defendant- Imhoff and spondents. Hospitality Corp. respondent Hagadone No. 17011. Furey D. ar- Holiday Inn. Patrick d/b/a gued. of Idaho. Supreme Court

Sept.

HUNTLEY, Justice. appeal presents the issue of wheth- lies a licensed er a cause of action

Case Details

Case Name: David Steed & Associates, Inc. v. Young

Court Name: Idaho Supreme Court

Date Published: Sep 6, 1988

Citation: 766 P.2d 717

Docket Number: 17252

Court Abbreviation: Idaho