Dаvid Radtke, Ellanor Radtke and Jean Radtke brought this products liability action against the Cessna Aircraft Company for bodily injuries sustained when the aircraft, in which they were passengers, crashed during takeoff. 1 Their case against Cessna was based on the claim that the pilot’s seat in the aircraft unexpectedly came unlatched during takeoff, causing the pilot to lose control of the aircraft. Cessna’s defense was pilot error. After instruction from the District Court 2 on alternative theories of negligence and strict products liability, the jury returned a verdict for Cessna and against the Radtkes on all issues. The Radtkes now appeal from judgment for Cessna, claiming that the district court erred in admitting certain evidence and in instructing the jury. We affirm.
I.
The primary issue before us is whether the district court erred in permitting counsel for Cessna to cross examine рilot Thomas Leonzi about his conviction on a multicount, felony drug charge within six years of trial. Because Leonzi’s testimony, by videotape deposition, provided the only direct evidence that the pilot’s seat came unlatched and caused him to lose control of thе aircraft, he was the crucial witness in appellants’ case. Specifically, appellants allege that the district court failеd to exercise its discretion by balancing the probative value of Leonzi’s conviction with its prejudicial effect, as required by the Fed.Rulеs of Evid. 609(aXl) and 403. Alternatively, they argue that the trial court abused its discretion, under either of those rules, by allowing cross examination on the cоnviction.
Although Cessna argues that the Rule 609(a)(1) balancing test protects only criminal defendants and not civil litigants, we have recently declined to resolve that issue, holding that where Rule 403 is also invoked, as it was here, a weighing of probative value versus unfair prejudice is likewise required in civil cases before a witness can be cross examined about criminal convictions.
Czajka v. Hickman, et al.,
Furthermore, we cannot agree with appellants’ alternative contention that the district сourt clearly abused its discretion under Rules 403 and 609 by permitting cross examination of Leonzi on this drug conviction. Notably, the trial judge did exclude evidence of Leonzi’s other criminal convictions in ruling on appellants’ motion
in limine.
Moreover, since Leonzi testified by way of deposition, thе court had the benefit of a full description of these convictions, relative to his testimony, as well as the argument of counsel, beforе ruling on the issues. As we have previously noted in a challenge to the admission of other evidence under Rule 403, “[t]he judge has wide discretion in ruling on the admissibility of evidence and his decision thereon will not be disturbed unless there is a clear and prejudicial abuse of discretion.”
E. I. DuPont De Nemours & Co. v. Berkley & Co., Inc.,
II.
Appellants also allege that the district court erred in permitting Cessna’s counsel to read to the jury, near the end of Cessna’s case-in-chief, a рortion of the judgment of conviction on Leonzi’s drug charge, including the style of the case, the name of the crime, the time and placе of conviction, the date of sentencing, and the type of punishment. Although Leonzi admitted his conviction on the drug charge during cross examination, his testimony on the nature and extent of his sentence could be characterized as ambiguous and incomplete. Thus, as the trial judge nоted, the judgment had probative value for impeachment purposes. Moreover, the district court properly limited the use of the judgment to a recitation of the bare details of the crime, thereby reducing the danger of unfair prejudice to appellants.
See Carlsen v. Javurek,
While admission of the foregoing evidence near the end of Cessna’s case-in-chief might not be acceptablе in most cases, it was not error under the circumstances presented here. Leonzi testified at this trial by videotape deposition. Cessnа was not in a position to offer this impeachment evidence except during its own case. Finally, the record shows that the district court carefully considered each detail sought to be elicited from the judgment before ruling on its admissibility.
Thus, we find that appellants were not unfairly prеjudiced by the admission of this evidence and that the trial judge did not abuse his discretion.
III.
Appellants also contend that the trial court erred by permitting opposing counsel to use an ancillary lawsuit, then pending against pilot Leonzi, his employer, and various persons affiliated with thе airfield in Delaware, to impeach Leonzi’s testimony. We disagree. The Delaware action was clearly relevant to show the intеrest and bias of this witness.
Kanatser v. Chrysler Corp.,
IV.
Finally, aрpellants argue that the district court committed prejudicial error (1) by permitting Cessna’s counsel to make reference to the faсt that appellants had been previously represented by other attorneys; (2) by admitting videotape evidence to show the dimensions of a similar aircraft cabin while occupied by several passengers; and (3) by instructing the jury on strict products liability in language similar to the formulatiоn in Restatement (Second) of Torts § 402A (1965). After carefully reviewing the record and considering these remaining assignments of error, we find them to be without merit.
Accordingly, the judgment of the district court is affirmed.
Notes
. District Court jurisdiction was based upon diversity, 28 U.S.C. § 1332.
. The Honorable Clyde S. Cahill, United States District Judge for the Eastern District of Missouri.
. Thus, this case is factually distinguishable from Czajka where we found that “the district court did not balance the probative value of the evidence against the potential for prejudice. *1001 Rather, the court merely determined the convictions were felonies and allowed the cross-examination.” at p. 319.