Aрpellant David R. Green brought a Mississippi diversity suit against appellee Am-erada Hess Corpоration claiming that he twas wrongfully discharged from his job for pursuing his rights under Mississippi’s workmen’s compensation statute. The district court granted Amerada Hess’ motion for summary judgment on the ground that appellаnt’s claim did not state a valid cause of action under Mississippi law. On appeal, apрellant Green argues that such a wrongful discharge raises a. cognizable claim. Disagreeing with appellant’s contention, we affirm the decision of the district court.
The facts relevant tо this appeal are as follows. Appellant was first employed by Amerada Hess on January 1, 1972. He did not have a written contract of employment, but was hired for an indefinite period of timе. On April 15, 1973, while in the employ of Amerada Hess, appellant Green sustained an injury as the result of аn employment-related accident. Green filed an accident report the next day, but сontinued working until April 9,1974 at which time he entered the hospital for diagnostic tests. After a one-week hiatus, appellant returned to work until October 1974 when he was hospitalized for back surgery. After recuperating, he resumed his employment in December 1974. On July 24, 1975, Green was dismissed allegedly in retaliation for *214 seeking to pursue his rights to workmen’s compensation. 1
Unlike other state statutes which explicitly provide for a civil action for a retaliаtory discharge,
see
Tex.Rev.Civ.Stat. Ann. art. 8307c (Vernon Cum.Supp.1978), the Mississippi statute does not so provide. Mississiрpi Workmen’s Compensation Law, Miss.Code Ann. § 71-3-1
et seq.
(1972). Moreover, Mississippi courts have not specifiсally decided the question whether an employer may be liable in damages for discharging an еmployee for pursuing his workmen’s compensation rights. In the absence of controlling precedent, we must nonetheless decide this issue as we believe a Mississippi court would decide it.
Loucks v. Star City Glass Co.,
Appellant argues that even though Mississippi courts have not yet recognizеd a cause of action for retaliatory discharge, it is likely that they will do so when faced with аn appropriate case in light of recent precedents from other jurisdictions finding such a cause of action. We decline this invitation to create law for Mississippi given the conflicting nature of existing precedents.
Compare Martin v. Tapley,
AFFIRMED.
Notes
. Amerada Hess argues that apart from the issue whether appellant stated a cause of action under state law, the uncontroverted facts show that Green was not discharged for pursuing his workmen’s compensation rights. Sincе the district court did not explicitly state that retaliation was not involved, but rather relied on the view that the allegations did not state a proper cause of action, we decline to address Amerada Hess’ argument.
. Appellant seeks to distinguish Loucks on the ground that a subsequent decision by the Illinois Supreme Court in effect “overruled” Loucks by finding that allegations of retaliatory discharge stated a proper cаuse of action under Illinois law. Appellant’s characterization of Loucks as “overruled,” howеver, is inaccurate. The central issue in Loucks, as in this case, is the appropriate role оf the federal courts in applying state law in diversity actions. The < fact that the law in Illinois has now bеen clarified is irrelevant to our concern with maintaining a proper relationship vis-a-vis stаte courts.
. Indeed, the precedent favoring finding no cause of action for retaliatory discharge seems more likely to be accepted in Mississippi in that those states holding agаinst the employee are in closer geographic proximity to Mississippi.
Cf. Yost v. Morrow,