David Piercy appeals the District Court’s 1 dismissаl of his petition for a writ of habeas corpus. We affirm.
*1077 I.
The facts of this case are not disputed. In March 1971, a Nebraska court sentenced Piercy to five years imprisonmеnt for burglary. Approximately eighteen months later, Piercy escaped and remained at large for over three months. In January 1973, he was returned to custody, and two months later wаs sentenced to a consecutive term of one year for the escape. In December 1974, having served over three years and eight months on these sentences, Piеrcy was released on parole.
Less than four months later, in April 1975, Piercy was arrested for possession of burglary tools, loitering, and prowling. He was denied bail through the intervention of the Nebraska Board of Parole (Board) and thus immediately began accumulating time toward his sentences. In August 1975, a Nebraska court sentenced Piercy to three to five years imprisonment for attempted burglary and to twenty months to five years imprisonment for possession of burglary tools. The court made these sentences concurrent to eаch other but consecutive to his previous sentences. Shortly thereafter, the Board revoked Piercy’s parole on his 1971 and 1973 convictions.
Piercy served the time remaining оn his 1971 and 1973 convictions and when discharged from those sentences in April 1977, had served approximately five years, eight months, and one week. He then began serving the sentence frоm his 1975 conviction, and in May 1978 was granted parole. Within four weeks, Iowa authorities arrested Piercy on burglary charges. In August 1978, the Iowa court sentenced Piercy to ten years imprisonment on his guilty plea. He remained in Iowa’s physical custody until April 1979, when he was returned to Nebraska under the Interstate Corrections Compact, Neb.Rev.Stat. §§ 29-3401 et seq. He continued serving time on the Iowa conviction until Iowa discharged him in November 1982. He had served approximately four years and three months on his Iowa sentence.
In the interim, in April 1981, Nebraska sentenced Piercy to a consecutive six-month sentence for violating parole on his 1975 conviction. In November 1982, he began serving the time remaining on the 1975 conviction. Piercy сompleted this sentence iri May 1986, and then began serving his six-month sentence for violating the 1978 parole. He was released on parole in July 1986, having served approximately four years and nine months on these two convictions. 2
Piercy’s attempts to secure post-conviction relief involve both state and federal court proceedings, in which hе has claimed relief on four grounds, three of which he asserts in the petition before us: (1) denial of bail in violation of the Eighth Amendment; (2) failure to receive a prompt parоle revocation hearing in violation of his Fifth and Fourteenth Amendment rights to due process and his Eighth Amendment right to make bail; and (3) Nebraska’s failure to acknowledge the concurrent running of Pi-ercy’s Iowa and Nebraska sentences, in violation of the Full Faith and Credit Clause and the Due Process Clauses of the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments.
After reviewing the record of Piеrcy’s state and federal post-conviction proceedings, we are satisfied that he has exhausted state remedies for the first two grounds asserted in this appeal in conformity with 28 U.S.C. § 2254(b). As to the third, we agree with Piercy that recourse to the Nebraska courts would be futile in light of the Nebraska Supreme Court’s ruling in
Falkner v. Nebraska Board of Parole,
In April 1984, Piercy filed the current petition for habeas corpus, which the District Court referred to a magistrate, who issued a report and recommendation based on the parties’ briefs. The magistrate discussed in detail all three asserted grounds for relief, finding against Piercy on each, and recommended dismissing the claims with prejudice. Piercy, thrоugh counsel, timely filed a response stating his objections to the magistrate’s report. The District Court adopted the magistrate’s conclusions and accepted his recommendation that the petition for writ of habeas corpus be dismissed with prejudice. Piercy v. Black, No. CV84-L-54, at 3 (D.Neb. Jan. 11, 1985) (Memorandum Order), reprinted in D.R. at 111.
II.
We turn first to the merits of Piercy’s claim that he has been incarcеrated longer than the time necessary to serve all the sentences imposed on him. Piercy argues that the time he spent in a Nebraska prison serving the Iowa sentencе should be credited toward the time he had to serve on pending Nebraska sentences. In other words, he wants the Nebraska Board of Parole to treat his Iowa sentencе as running concurrently with his Nebraska sentence for the period after he was transferred to Nebraska under the Interstate Corrections Compact, Neb.Rev.Stat. § 29-3401. We conсlude, however, that his claim does not implicate any federal rights and therefore cannot properly be the subject of federal habeas corpus relief.
Cf. Veneri v. Missouri,
Fedеral habeas corpus relief is available only when the petitioner “is in custody in violation of the Constitution or laws or treaties of the United States.” 28 U.S.C. § 2254(a);
see generally Preiser v. Rodriguez,
We find these contentions meritless. Piercy’s full faith and credit argument is baseless because one state cannоt control the manner in which another state administers its criminal justice system. We agree with the Iowa Supreme Court that “[pjenal laws have no extraterritorial effect.”
Herman v. Brewer,
Nor are we persuaded by Piercy’s due process argument that he has a liberty interest in the concurrent running of his Iowa and Nebraska cоnvictions. He has failed to show that either Iowa or Nebraska has created such a liberty interest, and it seems plain that they have not.
See Williams v. State,
The other two issues raised in Piercy’s habeas petition can be disposed of very briefly. Piеrcy’s claim to habeas relief because of an alleged denial of bail in April 1975 is without merit because he received credit on a subsequent sentence for time therеby served. Similarly, Piercy’s claim that he was denied his constitutional right to a prompt due process hearing in 1975 is without significance because of the credit Piercy received for time served. In any event, the record indicates Piercy received ample due process in his parole revocation in 1975: Following his arrest on April 10, 1975, Piercy on April 15 reсeived notice of a probable cause hearing, and the probable cause hearing was held the next day. Thereafter, the petitioner pleaded guilty to the сharges against him and finally the Nebraska Board of Parole revoked Piercy’s parole on August 29, 1975. We hold that the District Court was correct in dismissing these claims.
III.
For the reasons discussеd above, we affirm the judgment of the District Court dismissing Piercy’s petition for a writ of habeas corpus.
Notes
. The Honorable Warren K. Urbom, United States District Judge for the District of Nebraska.
. Although Piercy has been released, the issues presented in his petition are not thereby moot, since he remains in the "custody" of the state under the terms of his parole.
See Jones
v.
Cunningham,