In the Matter of Stephen W. SCHUYLER, Respondent.
No. 48S00-1504-DI-175
Supreme Court of Indiana.
May 26, 2016.
On October 7, 2015, pursuant to
The Court finds that more than six months have passed since Respondent was suspеnded due to noncooperation with the disciplinary process. Accordingly, the Court concludes that Respondent‘s suspension should be converted to an indefinite suspension from the practice of law pursuant to
IT IS THEREFORE ORDERED that Respondent‘s current suspension from the practice of law for failure to cooperate with the disciplinary process is converted to an indefinite suspension, effective immediately. Respondent is ordered to fulfill the continuing duties of a suspended attorney under
All Justices concur.
David P. ALLEN, Appellant (Petitioner below), v. Kimberly W. ALLEN, Appellee (Respondent below).
No. 13S01-1601-DR-00053.
Supreme Court of Indiana.
June 1, 2016.
Matthew J. McGovern, Anderson, IN, Attorney for Appellee.
On Petition to Transfer from the Indiana Court of Appeals, No. 13A01-1411-DR-00476
DAVID, Justice.
This case presents the question of whether a trial court may order that di-
Facts and Procedural History
David Allen (Father) and Kimberly Allen (Mother) divorced in 2002. The parties agreed to share custody of their two children, with Father paying child support to Mother. The parties’ settlement agreement and dissolution decree did not provide for payment of college expenses. In 2010, the parties agreed to an order whereby basic child support for their daughter, Hunter, was terminated, Father became responsible for Hunter‘s undergraduate educational expenses, and Mоther became responsible for providing Hunter‘s health insurance.
In 2013, shortly before Hunter‘s 21st birthday, when Hunter was a senior at Indiana University, Father petitioned the court for modification of the agreed order. Father advised the court that Hunter was considering post-graduate education in dental school and Father requested, among other things, an order regarding Hunter‘s graduate educational expenses. Specifically, he sought to have Hunter‘s dental school expenses apportioned between him and Mother.
The trial court held two evidentiary hearings and entered an order in October 2014. With regard to Hunter‘s educаtional needs, the trial court found that Hunter graduated from IU with a degree in biolo-
As for the parents’ financial situations, the trial court found that Mother had assets of approximately $843,000 and a weekly income of approximately $1,700. It found that Father had a net worth of over $2 million and acсess to significant real property, personal property, bank accounts and business interests. It also found that while Father earned approximately $101,000 in 2013, he was capable of generating approximately $4,600 per week. Accordingly, the trial court ordered that the 2010 agreement between the parties was to remain in effect. Thus, Father is responsible for the cost of dental school for Hunter (less any contribution from Hunter through grants, scholarship, loans, etc.) and Mother is responsible for Hunter‘s health insurance.
Father appealed, arguing, among other things, that the trial court erred in not determining each parent‘s presumptive share of educational expenses according to the Child Support Guidelines. Mother cross-appealed, arguing that the trial court did not have statutory authority to enter an educational award for graduate school expenses. The Court of Appeals reversed, аgreeing with Father that the trial court erred by essentially making Father liable for all dental school expenses that Hunter does not otherwise cover. Allen v. Allen, No. 13A01-1411-DR-00476, Slip. Op. *7-8, 2015 WL 4511503 (Ind. Ct. App. July 24, 2015). It rejected Mother‘s cross-appeal argument that the trial court lacks authority to order parents to pay for their child‘s graduate school expenses. Id., 2015 WL 4511503, at *6. The Court of Appeals remanded the matter to the trial court for an order that apportions dental school expenses between Father, Mother and Hunter. Id., 2015 WL 4511503, at *8.
The Court of Appeals denied Mother‘s petition for rehearing. Mother then sought transfer, which we granted, thereby vacating the opinion below. See
Standard of Review
This matter turns on defining the term “postsecondary” in the relevant child support statute. Questions of statutory interpretation are questions of law and are reviewed de novo. Pinnacle Properties Dev. Grp., LLC v. City of Jeffersonville, 893 N.E.2d 726, 727 (Ind. 2008).
Discussion
Mother argues, as a matter of first impression, that a triаl court has no statutory authority to order either parent to pay any portion of a child‘s graduate school expenses. The relevant statute provides:
The child support order or an educational support order may also include, where appropriate:
(1) amounts for the child‘s education in elementary and secondary schools and at postsecondary educational institutions, taking into account:
(A) the child‘s aptitude and ability;
(B) the child‘s reasonable ability to contribute to educational expenses through:
(i) work;
(ii) obtaining loans; and
(iii) obtaining other sources of financial aid reasonably available to the child and each рarent; and
(C) the ability of each parent to meet these expenses
The primary goal when interpreting a statute is to effectuate the legislative intent; “an unambiguous statute needs no interpretation, and courts must give effect to the plain and ordinary meaning of the language.” State v. I.T., 4 N.E.3d 1139, 1143 (Ind. 2014) (internal quotations omitted). However, “when a statute is susceptible to more than one interpretation, it is deemed ambiguous and is thus open to judicial construction.” In re Howell, 27 N.E.3d 723, 726 (Ind. 2015). Additionally, courts will not read into a statute that which is not the expressed intent of the legislature. N.D.F. v. State, 775 N.E.2d 1085, 1088 (Ind. 2002).
“Postsecondary” is a term that is not defined in the statute, and as evidenced by the parties’ arguments, it can be interpreted in two different ways: as including grаduate and professional school expenses or as not including graduate and professional school expenses. Thus, the statute is subject to judicial interpretation.
“The legislative definition of certain words in one statute, while not conclusive, is entitled to consideration in construing those same words in another statute.” State Bd. of Accounts v. Indiana Univ. Found., 647 N.E.2d 342, 347-348 (Ind. Ct. App. 1995), trans. denied. While the term postsecondary is not defined in the family law and juvenile law titles of the Code, it is defined in the higher education title. In that title, “approved postsecondary educational institution” refers to a “postsecondary educational institution that operates in Indiana and ... provides an organized two (2) year or longer program of collegiate grade directly creditable toward a baccalaureate degree[.]”
This definition clearly excludes graduate and professional school as it defines postsecondary education as “an organized two (2) year оr longer program of collegiate grade directly creditable toward a baccalaureate degree[.]“.
This definition does not purport to apply generally outside of Title 21. However, several statutes outside of Title 21 explicitly incorporate this definition. For example:
Ind. Code § 35-50-6-3.3(a)(3)(C) , (D) (criminal statute providing credit time for offenders who obtain an associate‘s or bachelor‘s degree at an “approved postsecondary educational institution” as defined byInd. Code § 21-7-13-6(a) );Ind. Code § 6-8.1-7-1(d) (statute allowing Department of State Revenue to provide certain information about those delinquent in paying educational loans to an “approved postsecondary educational institution” as defined byInd. Code § 21-7-13-6(a) );Ind. Code § 12-7-2-16 (human services statute providing that “approved postsecondary educational institution” has the meaning set forth inInd. Code § 21-7-13-6(a) ); andInd. Code § 16-18-2-22 (health statute providing that “approved postsecondary educational institution” has the meaning set forth inInd. Code § 21-7-13-6(a) ).
While the statutory provision at issue (
The Court of Appeals declined to read a prohibition against inclusion of graduate school expenses into the statute. It stated that the Legislature was free to enact such a limit but did not do so. However, on the other hand, the Legislature could have included the terms graduate or professional school in the statutory language, used clearer phrasing or defined postsecondary, but it did not do so. Also, in 2007, the Legislature amended
Furthermore, when looking at the child support statutes as a whole, it is not clear that the Legislature intended the term “postsecondary” to embrace any and all education after high school. Instead, recent amendments to the child support statutes reveal the Legislаture‘s intent to limit parental financial obligations after children reach the age of majority. For instance, effective July 1, 2012, the Legislature amended
Similarly,
We note that Indiana is one of the few states that even has a statute providing for the educational expenses of children once they have reached the age of majority. Most states have no statutes or case law requiring that divorced parents provide for college expenses absent an agreement to do so.2 Of the states that do allow for payment of college expenses, the majority of those states limit payment of such expenses to a certain age, thus precluding a requirement that a parent pay for graduate or professional schоol expenses or even
We also note that married parents have no legal obligation to pay for thеir children‘s educational expenses beyond high school, let alone graduate school expenses. Thus, while this Court certainly understands and values the amount of discretion we give our trial judges, particularly in family law matters, we do not believe that it is the court‘s province to order a divorced parent to pay for a child‘s graduate or professional school under the statutory language as written, without clear instruction and guidance from the Legislature that it intends to confer this significant authority and discretion on the courts. Of course, even though we interpret the statute to exclude graduate and professionаl school expenses, this does not leave children seeking to have their divorcing or divorced parents assist them with their graduate and professional school expenses without a remedy. Parents are still free to agree to pay all, or a portion of, their children‘s graduate or professional school expenses in their settlement agreements. The courts can enforce such agreements.
Conclusion
We hold that the term “postsecondary,” as used in
RUSH, C.J., RUCKER, and MASSA, JJ., concur.
Andy Mohr WEST d/b/a Andy Mohr Toyota, Butler Motors, Inc. d/b/a Butler Toyota, and TW Toy, Inc. d/b/a Tom Wood Toyota, Appellants (Petitioners below), v. OFFICE OF THE INDIANA SECRETARY OF STATE, Auto Dealer Services Division, and Carol Mihalik, in her Representative Capacity as Securities Commissioner of the Auto Dealer Services Division, and Toyota Motor Sales, U.S.A., Inc., Appellees (Resрondents below).
No. 49S02-1511-PL-668.
Supreme Court of Indiana.
June 2, 2016.