Plaintiff, a Delaware corporation, with its principal place of business in Cincinnati, Ohio, and a branch office in Houston, Texas, for the general administration of business in the Gulf area, did on July 1, 1941, pursuant to previous invitation for bids, enter into a contract with the United States, acting through the Emergency Relief Branch of the Procurement Division of the Treasury Department, for the sale to the United States of 60,000 gross tons of scrap iron of various grades and tonnages at the total contract price of $957,000. Thereafter, on August 15, 1941, an amendment to said contract was entered into by the terms of which plaintiff agreed to sell to the United States an additional 20.000 gross tons of scrap iron of various grades and tonnages as therein provided, at an additional price of $327,000. The total contract price became, therefore, $1,-284.000, and the total tonnage involved 80.000 tons. Neither the contract nor its supplement authorized the United States to cancel same.
With reference to deliveries of scrap iron the contract provided as follows: “F. A. S. the following Gulf Ports at the option of the Seller and in conformity with vessel space: Tampa, Fla., Pensacola, Fla., Mobile, Ala., Gulfport, Miss., Corpus Christi, Texas, New Orleans, La., Lake Charles, La., Port Arthur, Texas, Texas City, Texas, and Houston, Texas.” The expression “F. A. S.” is defined as “free alongside” meaning free alongside ship.
The monthly requirements for delivery under the contract, as well as the actual *350 shipments of scrap iron under the contract, with dates of invoices, names of ships and quantities loaded by the plaintiff are set out in Findings 3 and 4.
As stated therein, the record discloses no complaint made to the plaintiff at any time by or on behalf of the defendant that deliveries were not maintained according to schedule. On October 3, 1941, the defendant addressed the plaintiff a letter cancelling the contract in the 'following language:
“The British Purchasing Commission has advised this office that they are withdrawing from the present Scrap Market and request that we cancel the undelivered balances of all scrap contracts.
“You will, therefore, make no further deliveries of Scrap, under the above numbered contract and Supplement No. 1 thereto, other than those already scheduled.”
Three deliveries were shown to have been made after the date of cancellation for the reason that they had been scheduled prior thereto. Total deliveries under the contract became therefore 53,430 tons, leaving undelivered 26,570 tons.
The facts involved in this case are adequately set out in our special findings of fact and need not be again repeated for the purpose of considering the issue involved herein, which is, did the defendant’s cancellation of the contract constitute a breach thereof for which the defendant is responsible to the plaintiff in damages.
In our opinion, such cancellation cannot be legally justified either by the terms of the contract or by the reasons given in the letter of cancellation set out above.
The defendant contends that the plaintiff was obliged to make advance requests of the British for ships to load its available scrap and that its failure to make such requests accounted for the reduced number of ships furnished; further, that even if ships had been furnished, plaintiff could not have performed .the contract due to the shortage of scrap during the period involved and the plaintiff’s heavy domestic commitments, but neither contention is supported by the evidence and they are contrary to the findings of fact.
In other words, the plaintiff was at all times ready, willing and able to perform its obligations under the contract, but was prevented from doing so by the act of cancellation on the part of the defendant.
“It is a principle of fundamental justice that if a promisor is himself the cause of the failure of performance, either of an obligation due him or of a condition upon which his own liability depends, he cannot take advantage of the failure. * * * One who agrees to pay for goods on delivery, cannot set up the lade of delivery when caused by his own act. The principle that prevention by one party excuses performance by the other, both of a condition and of a promise, may be laid down broadly for all cases. Williston on Contracts, Vol. Ill, Sec. 677.”
Hinckley v. Pittsburgh Bessemer Steel Company,
The case of United States v. Speed,
There is no question that the cancellation was a total breach of contract of the defendant as to the undelivered quantity of scrap. It is settled law that an unqualified and positive refusal to complete performance of a contract, though the performance is not yet due, may be treated as a complete breach and entitle the injured party to bring his action at once and be compensated therefor. Roehm v. Horst,
It further appears that the defendant is now estopped from asserting that the plaintiff is guilty of a breach of contract. During the life of the contract plaintiff never received any complaint from the defendant or its agents regarding the performance and even on October 3, 1941, the date the contract was cancelled, no comment was made as to the character of plaintiff’s performance up to that date, nor was such performance suggested as the reason for cancellation.
Defendant first asserted that plaintiff had breached the contract after this case had been docketed and it was not until after the trial began that defendant attempted for the first time to rely on this so-called breach as a basis for its cancellation. The authorities for this proposition are well summarized in Chevrolet Motor Co. v. Gladding, 4 Cir.,
*352 “While the contract might have been terminated for various reasons before its performance was completed, the appellant eliminated these questions when it elected to cancel for the reason assigned, which the jury finds groundless.”
As stated by Mr. Justice Brandéis in the case of Lynch v. United States,
Under these circumstances, the measure of plaintiff’s damages is the amount of profit it would have earned had the contract not been cancelled. Anvil Mining Company v. Humble,
The plaintiff made a net profit averaging $0.92126 per ton on the 53,430 tons that it delivered under the contract. Of the remaining 26,570 tons to be delivered, all but 3,343 tons were either in the hands of the plaintiff of under purchase orders and available for performance of the contract at the time of cancellation. The cost to the plaintiff of this tonnage was the same as that which it had delivered. The plaintiff would have averaged the same net profit on this tonnage after deducting the direct expenses for shipment if delivery had been made. There is nothing speculative or uncertain about these prospective profits and the contract price for the undelivered scrap was the same as for the delivered scrap. The direct expense incident thereto would not have been different from that used in computing profits on the delivered quantities. Plaintiff’s prospective profits were obviously within the contemplation of the parties and are a mere matter of multiplication. The Office of Price Administration approved the price paid by the Government under this contract at $1.50 more per ton than plaintiff was permitted to pay its suppliers under Maximum Price Schedule 4. The defendant therefore knew and expected that plaintiff would receive a profit of $1.50 per ton under this contract, less any direct charges borne by the plaintiff in delivering the scrap to the ships.
It plainly appears with reference to the 3,343 tons not yet purchased at the time of cancellation that plaintiff would have been able to procure and deliver them in the ordinary course of business. Therefore, the same prospective profit would have been realized on this tonnage had the contract not been cancelled. The cost of the scrap 'for plaintiff could not have been more than that already purchased because OPA Maximum Price Schedule No. 4 was in effect at that time, which schedule would not permit the plaintiff to buy scrap at higher prices than previously bought and delivered under this contract. Plaintiff never paid more than this regulation permitted and it is reasonable to assume that it would not have done so for this amount which it could easily and speedily have secured.
Plaintiff fulfilled its legal obligation to diminish its damages by cancelling without loss or liability purchase orders for 9,595 tons of scrap immediately upon defendant’s cancellation. The remaining 13,632 tons which were on hand or on purchase order were diverted to the domestic market and a profit of $1,136.88 was realized thereon, for which credit was given.
Had plaintiff been permitted to complete its performance under this contract it would have realized a profit of $24,477.88, less the actual profit of $1,136.-88, or $23,341.00, and for this plaintiff is entitled to judgment.
It is so ordered.
JONES, Chief Judge, and MADDEN, WHITAKER, and LITTLETON, Judges, concur.
