David Goyco v. Progressive Insurance Company
A-12-23 (088497)
SUPREME COURT OF NEW JERSEY
May 14, 2024
SYLLABUS
This syllabus is not part of the Court‘s opinion. It has been prepared by the Office of the Clerk for the convenience of the reader. It has been neither reviewed nor approved by the Court and may not summarize all portions of the opinion.
David Goyco v. Progressive Insurance Company (A-12-23) (088497)
Argued January 29, 2024 -- Decided May 14, 2024
SOLOMON, J., writing for a unanimous Court.
In this appeal, the Court considers whether the operator of a low-speed electric scooter (LSES) is a “pedestrian” entitled to personal injury protection (PIP) benefits under the New Jersey Automobile Reparation Reform Act,
In November 2021, an automobile struck and injured plaintiff David Goyco while he was operating an LSES that has two wheels connected by a floorboard, as well as handlebars, a headlight, brake light, speedometer, and electric motor. Goyco made a claim for PIP benefits under his personal automobile policy with defendant Progressive Insurance Company. Progressive denied Goyco‘s claim. It concluded that coverage was not required under Goyco‘s policy, which tracks
Goyco filed a verified complaint, asserting that LSES riders should be deemed “pedestrians” entitled to PIP benefits under the No-Fault Act in light of the 2019 enactment of
HELD: An LSES rider does not fall within the definition of “pedestrian” for purposes of the No-Fault Act. Goyco is not entitled to PIP benefits.
1. With the goals of providing prompt payment of medical expenses arising from an automobile accident, regardless of fault, and containing the rising cost of automobile insurance premiums, the No-Fault Act requires in part that every New Jersey automobile liability insurance policy provide PIP benefits (1) when the covered individual is “occupying, entering into, alighting from or using an automobile“; or (2) when the covered individual is a pedestrian.
2. “Vehicle” is not defined in the No-Fault Act. Plaintiff suggests that the Court should therefore apply the definition from
3. Further, at the time of the accident, Goyco‘s LSES was “propelled by other than muscular power” because it used an electric motor with a rechargeable battery and was not designed to be propelled by muscular power. And plaintiff‘s LSES was “designed primarily for use on highways” based on its features and the broad ordinary definition of that term. In sum, plaintiff was occupying a vehicle propelled by other than muscular power and designed primarily for use on highways, and he was therefore not a “pedestrian” for purposes of the No-Fault Act. (pp. 16-19)
4. The Court rejects Goyco‘s reliance on
AFFIRMED as modified.
CHIEF JUSTICE RABNER and JUSTICES PATTERSON, PIERRE-LOUIS, WAINER APTER, FASCIALE, and NORIEGA join in JUSTICE SOLOMON‘s opinion.
SUPREME COURT OF NEW JERSEY
A-12 September Term 2023
088497
David Goyco,
Plaintiff-Appellant,
v.
Progressive Insurance Company,
Defendant-Respondent.
On certification to the Superior Court, Appellate Division.
Argued January 29, 2024
Decided
Christian C. LoPiano argued the cause for appellant (LoPiano Law Firm, attorneys; Christian C. LoPiano, of counsel and on the briefs).
Patricia A. Holden argued the cause for respondent (Cipriani & Werner, attorneys;
David J. Karbasian argued the cause for amicus curiae New Jersey Association for Justice (Law Offices of David J. Karbasian, attorneys; David J. Karbasian and Jason S. Walker, on the brief).
Nicole R. Cassata argued the cause for amicus curiae New Jersey Defense Association (Chasan Lamparello Mallon & Cappuzzo, attorneys; Nicole R. Cassata, on the brief).
Mark M. Tallmadge submitted a brief on behalf of amicus curiae New Jersey Property-Liability Insurance Guaranty Association (Bressler, Amery & Ross, attorneys; Mark M. Tallmadge and Siena Carnevale, on the brief).
JUSTICE SOLOMON delivered the opinion of the Court.
In this case, we are called upon to decide whether the operator of a low-speed electric scooter (LSES) is entitled to personal injury protection (PIP) benefits under the New Jersey Automobile Reparation Reform Act,
The No-Fault Act requires insurance companies to provide PIP benefits to insured individuals in two circumstances: (1) when the covered individual is “occupying, entering into, alighting from or using an automobile“; or (2) when the covered individual is a pedestrian.
The parties do not dispute that plaintiff David Goyco‘s insurance policy with defendant Progressive Insurance Company (Progressive) must comply with those mandatory statutory provisions. What the parties contest is whether plaintiff was a “pedestrian” within the meaning of the No-Fault Act and, by extension, the policy. Plaintiff argues that LSES riders should be deemed “pedestrians” entitled to PIP benefits under the No-Fault Act in light of the 2019 enactment of
For the reasons that follow, we hold that an LSES rider does not fall within the definition of “pedestrian” for purposes of the No-Fault Act because the LSES is “a vehicle propelled by other than muscular power and designed primarily for use on highways, rails and tracks.”
I.
On November 22, 2021, an automobile struck and injured Goyco while he was operating a “Segway Ninebot KickScooter Max” in Elizabeth, New Jersey. The “Segway Ninebot KickScooter Max” is an LSES that has two wheels connected by a floorboard, as well as handlebars, a headlight, brake light, and speedometer. Pursuant to its owner‘s manual, the LSES is designed to be operated using its rechargeable battery, which powers its electric motor.
Goyco sustained injuries from the accident and incurred medical expenses. At the time of the accident, Goyco was the named insured under a personal automobile policy with Progressive. Goyco reported the accident and made a claim for PIP benefits under the policy, which provided -- in terms that track
Progressive denied Goyco‘s claim for PIP benefits. Progressive concluded that the LSES Goyco operated at the time of the accident did not meet the definition of an “automobile,” and Goyco could not be considered a “pedestrian” because he was “driving” the LSES at the time of the accident.
Goyco filed a verified complaint and an order to show cause, asking the trial court to direct Progressive to pay all reasonable medical expenses incurred to treat his injuries. At oral argument, Goyco asserted that an LSES is akin to a bicycle pursuant to
The trial court determined that an LSES is not an automobile under the statute or the policy. In addition, the court concluded that Goyco could not rely on
Goyco appealed, and the Appellate Division affirmed the trial court‘s judgment. First, the Appellate Division found that Goyco was not a “pedestrian” within the plain language of the No-Fault Act because an LSES is a “vehicle propelled by other than muscular power” that meets the definition of a “[l]ow-speed electric scooter” in
We granted Goyco‘s petition for certification, 255 N.J. 429 (2023), as well as the motions of the New Jersey Association for Justice (NJAJ), the New Jersey Defense Association (NJDA), and the New Jersey Property-Liability Insurance Guaranty Association (NJPLIGA) to appear as amici curiae.
II.
A.
Goyco urges this Court to apply
Amicus curiae NJAJ agrees with Goyco that
B.
Progressive claims that
Amici NJDA and NJPLIGA agree with and largely reiterate Progressive‘s arguments, asserting that the trial court and the Appellate Division‘s application of
Amicus curiae NJPLIGA notes that the exception in
III.
Enacted in 1972, see L. 1972, c. 70, the No-Fault Act had two primary goals: (1) “to provide prompt payment of medical expenses arising from an automobile accident, regardless of fault,” and (2) “to contain the rising cost of automobile insurance premiums,” Cooper Hosp. Univ. Med. Ctr. v. Selective Ins. Co. of Am., 249 N.J. 174, 179 (2021).
To further these goals, the No-Fault Act requires in part that “every owner or registered owner of an automobile registered or principally garaged in” New Jersey “maintain automobile liability insurance coverage.”
every standard automobile liability insurance policy . . . shall contain [PIP] benefits for the payment of benefits without regard to negligence, liability or fault of any kind, to the named insured and members of his family residing in
his household who sustain bodily injury as a result of an accident while occupying, entering into, alighting from or using an automobile, or as a pedestrian, caused by an automobile or by an object propelled by or from an automobile, and to other persons sustaining bodily injury while occupying, entering into, alighting from or using the automobile of the named insured, with permission of the named insured. [N.J.S.A. 39:6A-4.]
“Under No-Fault, automobile insurers are required to provide PIP coverage to their insureds, without consideration of fault, and are prohibited from asserting subrogation claims seeking reimbursement of medical expenses against the at-fault insured‘s PIP provider.” Palisades Ins. Co. v. Horizon Blue Cross Blue Shield of N.J., 469 N.J. Super. 30, 38 (App. Div. 2021).
In this appeal, we review the contours of
A.
Thus, “[f]or the purposes of [the No-Fault Act],” a “pedestrian” is defined as “any person who is not occupying, entering into, or alighting from a vehicle propelled by other than muscular power and designed primarily for use on highways, rails and tracks.”
1.
“Vehicle” is not defined in the No-Fault Act. Plaintiff suggests that we should therefore look to the definition of “vehicle” in
First, just as
Indeed, certain terms are defined differently in the No-Fault Act than they are in Chapter 1. “Pedestrian” itself is an example: in contrast to its multi-part definition in the No-Fault Act, the term is defined simply as “a person afoot” in
Such statutory differences and distinct definitions are not surprising in light of the structure of Title 39 and the disparate types of laws it contains. Subtitle 1, labeled “Motor Vehicles Generally; Traffic Laws,” establishes the rules of the road and provides for their enforcement, whereas Subtitle 2, “Additional Motor Vehicle Regulations,” establishes rules for processes such as financing, owning, maintaining, and insuring motor vehicles. We do not suggest that all chapters within the two subtitles follow the same definitions; rather, we highlight the diverse subjects of regulation covered within Title 39 to illustrate why -- in addition to the limiting language of the definitional sections themselves -- a definition from one chapter cannot simply be imported into another chapter of Title 39.
The sole exception within the No-Fault Act proves that rule. In
Another reason not to look to a statute beyond the No-Fault Act to define “vehicle” for purposes of the Act is that the Legislature has instructed us to interpret a statute by giving each word its “generally accepted meaning” unless a “different meaning is expressly indicated“:
In the construction of the laws and statutes of this state, both civil and criminal, words and phrases shall be read and construed with their context, and shall, unless inconsistent with the manifest intent of the legislature or unless another or different meaning is expressly indicated, be given their generally accepted meaning, according to the approved usage of the language. Technical words and phrases, and words and phrases having a special or accepted meaning in the law, shall be construed in accordance with such technical or special and accepted meaning.
[N.J.S.A. 1:1-1 (emphasis added).]
Those instructions correspond with traditional principles of statutory construction. See DiProspero, 183 N.J. at 492.
Here, we find -- in light of the limiting language of the definitional statutes and the express reference to
“Vehicle” has been variously defined as “[a]n instrument of transportation or conveyance,” Black‘s Law Dictionary 1868 (11th ed. 2019); “a thing used for transporting people or goods, esp. on land, such as a car, truck, or cart,” New Oxford American Dictionary 1864 (2d ed. 2005); “any means in or by which someone travels or something is carried or conveyed; a means of conveyance or transport” or “a conveyance moving on wheels, runners, tracks, or the like, as a cart, sled, automobile, tractor, etc.,” Random House Dictionary of the English Language (Unabridged) 1583 (1965); and “a means of carrying or transporting something,”2 Websters New International Dictionary 2538 (3d ed. 1981).
An LSES clearly falls within those ordinary definitions of the term, and we conclude that it is therefore a “vehicle” for purposes of the No-Fault Act.
2.
Next, we consider whether plaintiff‘s LSES is “propelled by other than muscular power.”
The Appellate Division has recognized, and we agree, that “[t]he purpose and character of [a] vehicle are determinative of whether one is to be covered for PIP benefits as a pedestrian.” Nunag v. Pa. Nat. Mut. Cas. Ins. Co., 224 N.J. Super. 753, 757 (App. Div. 1988). In Nunag, the Appellate Division considered an issue like the one presented here: whether an insurance company was required to pay PIP benefits to an insured who suffered injuries when her moped was struck by an automobile. Id. at 754-55. The
Based on the evidence presented here, we find that, at the time of the accident, Goyco‘s LSES was “propelled by other than muscular power” because it used an electric motor with a rechargeable battery. Critically, Goyco‘s LSES was not designed to be propelled by muscular power. Our inquiry, however, does not end with that conclusion.
3.
We next turn to the final requirement in the definition and consider whether an LSES is “designed primarily for use on highways, rails and tracks.”
In Lane v. Prudential Property & Casualty Insurance Co., the Appellate Division considered whether a child riding a motor bike was entitled to PIP benefits. 196 N.J. Super. 504, 505-06 (App. Div. 1984). The motor bike had no speedometer; its handbrake had been disconnected; and it “bore no license plate, headlights, taillight or turn signals.” Id. at 506. Nevertheless, the court found that the child was not a pedestrian because “the vehicle was capable of traveling 30 to 40 miles per hour and could not be propelled other than by a motor.” Id. at 510. The fact that the motor bike “did not have a license plate, headlights, taillight or turn signals and that its handbrake had been disconnected [did] not mitigate against the trial judge‘s finding that it was ‘designed primarily for use on highways.‘” Ibid.
Applying the ordinary definition of “highway” as we did for “vehicle,” see
“Highway” has been variously defined as “[b]roadly, any main route on land, on water, or in the air,” or “[a] free and public roadway or street that every person may use,” Black‘s Law Dictionary at 876; “a main road, esp. one connecting major towns or cities,” or “(chiefly in official use) a public road,” Oxford New American at 798; “a main road, esp. one between towns or cities,” or “any public passage, either a road or waterway,” or “any main or ordinary route, track or course,” Random House at 671; “a road or way on land or water that is open to public use as a matter of right whether or not a thoroughfare: a public road or way (as a footpath, road, or waterway),” Webster‘s at 1069.
Goyco‘s LSES can travel 15.5 miles per hour and has a headlight, brake light, and speedometer -- several features that the motor bike in Lane did not have. The LSES‘s owner‘s manual provides that LSES operators must “[c]omply with local laws and regulations when riding th[e] product.” An LSES is “designed primarily for use on highways” within the broad
Once again, the No-Fault Act mandates PIP coverage for a “pedestrian,” that is, “any person who is not occupying, entering into, or alighting from a vehicle propelled by other than muscular power and designed primarily for use on highways, rails and tracks.”
B.
Plaintiff argues that a statute enacted in 2019 reveals legislative intent that LSES riders be considered “pedestrians” under the much earlier No-Fault Act.
[e]xcept as otherwise provided by this section, all statutes, including the provisions of chapter 4 of Title 39 of the Revised Statutes, rules, and regulations applicable to bicycles, as defined in [
N.J.S.A. 39:4-10.1 ], shall apply to low-speed electric bicycles and low-speed electric scooters, except those provisions which by their very nature may have no application to low-speed electric bicycles or low-speed electric scooters.[
Id. at (g) .]
Relying on subsection (g), plaintiff argues that, because the regulations applicable to a bicycle also apply to an LSES, and because we have held that a bicyclist is a pedestrian for purposes of the No-Fault Act, see Darel v. Pa. Mfrs. Asso. Ins. Co., 114 N.J. 416, 419 (1989) (“Plaintiff, as operator of a bicycle, was within the definition of a ‘pedestrian’ in
First, it is unclear whether the 2019 statute -- governing the operation of vehicles in keeping with Chapter 4 and Subtitle 1 of Title 39 -- was intended to have any effect on statutes in Subtitle 2, pertaining to ownership concerns such as insurance. Even putting aside the topical disparity between
The conclusion that bicyclists are pedestrians under the No-Fault Act is rooted in
Plaintiff‘s policy arguments are similarly unavailing in light of the clear statutory
In short, we agree with the Appellate Division‘s conclusion that Goyco is not entitled to PIP benefits because he is not a pedestrian pursuant to
Goyco‘s LSES is a “vehicle” that uses a rechargeable electric motor and is therefore “propelled by other than muscular power” and is “designed for use on highways, rails and tracks.” The plain text and legislative history of
IV.
The judgment of the Appellate Division is affirmed as modified.
CHIEF JUSTICE RABNER and JUSTICES PATTERSON, PIERRE-LOUIS, WAINER APTER, FASCIALE, and NORIEGA join in JUSTICE SOLOMON‘s opinion.
Notes
“Automobile” means a private passenger automobile of a private passenger or station wagon type that is owned or hired and is neither used as a public or livery conveyance for passengers nor rented to others with a driver; and a motor vehicle with a pickup body, a delivery sedan, a van, or a panel truck or a camper type vehicle used for recreational purposes owned by an individual or by husband and wife who are residents of the same household, not customarily used in the occupation, profession or business of the insured other than farming or ranching. An automobile owned by a farm family copartnership or corporation, which is principally garaged on a farm or ranch and otherwise meets the definitions contained in this section, shall be considered a private passenger automobile owned by two or more relatives resident in the same household.
[N.J.S.A. 39:6A-2(a).]